The impact of World Bank and International Monetary Fund programme lending on health care delivery, health conditions and health status in sub-Saharan Africa, 1980 to 1992 by Evans, Christopher J.
B63 7<?/1B >4 E>@;2 0/=9 /=2 7=B3@=/B7>=/;
<>=3B/@F 4C=2 ?@>5@/<<3 ;3=27=5 >= 63/;B6
1/@3 23;7D3@F# 63/;B6 1>=27B7>=A /=2 63/;B6
AB/BCA 7= AC0$A/6/@/= /4@71/. (-,' B> (--)
1NVOWXTUNKV 8% 3Z GSW
/ BNKWOW AY HROXXKJ LTV XNK 2KMVKK TL ?N2
GX XNK
CSOZ KVWOX\ TL AX /SJVK[ W
(--+
4Y QQ RKXGJGXG LTV XNOW OXKR OW GZ GOQGHQK OS
AX /SJVK[ W @KWKGVIN @KUTWOXTV\
GX.
NXXU.&&VKWKGVIN$VKUTWOXTV\ %WX$GSJVK[ W%GI%Y P&
?QKGWK Y WK XNOW OJKSXOLOKV XT IOXK TV QOSP XT XNOW OXKR.
NXXU.&&NJQ%NGSJQK%SKX&('')*&(''(*
BNOW OXKR OW UVTXKIXKJ H\ TVOMOSGQ ITU\ VOMNX
The Impact of World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund Programme Lending on Health Care 
Delivery, Health Conditions and Health Status in Sub 
Saharan Africa: 1980 to 1992 
CHRISTOPHER .1. EVANS 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of St. 
Andrews 
School of Economics and Management 
University of St. Andrews 
April 1995 

I, Christopher J. Evans, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 
100,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried 
out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher 
degree. 
Date: 2./0 	 , 	 Signature: 
I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No. 12 in January 1992 and as a 
candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in January 1992; the higher study 
for which this is a record carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1992 
and 1995. 
Date: .2.10 	 , v 	 Signature: 
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and 
Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of 
St. Andrews and that this candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for 
that degree. 
Date: 	 Signature: 
In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews I understand that I am 
giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the 
regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any 
copyright vested in this work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the 
title and abstract will be published, and that a copy of my work may be made and 
supplied to any bona fide library or research worker. 
Date: 	 1 I 6 	 Signature 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge the support and encouragement that Professsor M. Malek 
has provided as my academic supervisor for the last three years. I would also like to 
thank the librarian at UNICEF headquarters, New York, Miss J. Ando, and the field 
staff of FAO, the UNICEF office in Accra, and especially Dr. Gotinck for providing 
time to give me information and answer my questions regarding the health situation in 
Ghana. Thanks are also due to the Trustees of the Russell Trust who financed, in 
part, my travel to Ghana. 
I would also like to acknowledge the support that Dr. M. Tavakoli provided on 
using PC Give and assistance with basic econometrics. Mr. Julian Crowe of the 
Computing Laboratory also deserves mention for his friendly and expert assistance 
with the use of Cricket Graph and word processing problems. Finally, I would like to 
thank colleagues in the Pharmacoeconomics Research Centre for their friendship and 
advice on this thesis. In particular I would like to acknowledge the support of Paul 
Vacani, Dr. J. Rasquinha and Lisa Bethel. Special mention is given to Michael A. 
Evans and Lisa Kahler. 
Abstract 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been active in Africa for 
several decades. In the early 1980s both institutions expanded the role that they play 
in the restructuring of African economies through the introduction of structural 
adjustment loans. These programme loans sought to provide the basis for sustainable 
economic expansion following a period of near economic collapse in the region. In 
the case of the Fund, public expenditure reducing and expenditure switching policies 
were encouraged. The Bank, also, was active in these areas and focused on long-term 
measures to restore efficiency to the ailing economies. These policies, although not 
novel, were implemented on a large scale were perceived to have a pervasive 
influence on the economic and social performance of African countries. 
It was theorised by some that such programme lending would have a long-run 
beneficial impact on social development. However, other authors, observers and 
researchers have criticised the activities of the Bretton Woods institutions. First, the 
loans have been heavily criticised in the past for the supposedly heavy handed nature 
that Bank and Fund staff use in implementing their programmes. The main idea is 
that the institutions have too much leverage when bargaining with African 
governments to undertake reforms. Second, it has been said that the use of 
programme loans will have adverse consequences for national welfare. UNICEF, the 
main critic, has pointed out, and provided evidence, to indicate that vulnerable groups 
in society may suffer under adjustment schemes. 
This thesis looks at the areas of macroeconomic reforms and the impact that 
they may have on one part of the social area: the health sector. The thesis examines 
the pre-adjustment situation in Sub Saharan Africa and reviews the role and the tools 
that the Bank and the Fund have at there disposal to tackle economic problems. The 
thesis then moves on to explore the linkages between these policy weapons and 
changes in health care development. In order to fully understand the implications for 
Africa considerable attention is devoted to exploring the health problems that the 
region faces and the health care delivery systems and health conditions that are 
prevalent in many of the countries. The last part of the thesis provides an aggregate 
study and a case study analysis of the impact of adjustment in Africa. Although, it is 
determined that the impact, overall, has not been nu.avourable, recommendations for 
the future design of adjustment programmes is ofAred in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The impact of economic development on improvements in health status or health 
conditions is not easy to quantify. This is for several reasons. First, the relationship 
between development and changes in health status in not in a one way causal 
direction. Economic development and health status changes are more properly 
thought of as acting synergistically. Improvements in health status depend upon what 
is occurring on both macro and micro levels. Changes in national economic 
performance can offer the opportunity or may impede improvements in individual or 
household health status. For instance, as economic development increases, in the 
aggregate, the incomes of householders rises and the additional income obtained by 
householders may be spent directly on health improving activities such as the 
purchase of provider care or the consumption of nutrients deemed to be beneficial for 
improving health status. Indirectly, increases in incomes may be spent on improving 
the health conditions or the environment that surrounds individuals. Money may be 
spent on improving household stock or on the installation of water, sanitation and 
sewerage facilities. 
Moreover, increases in national income offer the opportunity for governments 
to increase tax revenues. Such increases may be spent on improving and increasing 
health services or in providing improvements in health conditions. These 
improvements may take several forms. For instance, in the health services, the 
number of doctors may be increased, which may serve to improve health status in 
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urban areas but not in rural areas. Health conditions might be improved if additional 
revenue can be directed to improving water quality or in improving roads which 
would be beneficial to urban and rural groups. On the other hand, changes in health 
status are likely to affect economic development through increases or decreases in 
worker productivity. 
However, this is not meant to suggest that improvements in economic 
development will necessarily lead to positive or large improvements in health status. 
For instance, increases in income may not be spent on health improving activities, but 
may be squandered on other consumption goods that do little to improve health status. 
Indeed, and most obviously increases in GNP per capita mask the distributional 
aspects of development. As GNP per capita is simply calculated by dividing GNP by 
the population of a particular country in a particular year, it is possible that a small 
portion of the population is reaping the benefits of growth in income, while a large 
segment of the population is experiencing little change in their welfare. A further 
problem arises to the extent that there is little information available about household 
activities in developing countries. Even if increases in national income were spread 
evenly in a country, it is possible that some households may prove more adept at 
apportioning the increased income in such a way as to maximise improvements in 
health status, while some households may choose to spend the extra income in a way 
so that the lifestyle of one family member is enhanced at the expense of other family 
members. For instance, income may be controlled by the senior male in a family. If 
he chooses, in the extreme, to gamble or drink or otherwise waste the family's budget 
there is likely to be no improvement in the health status of other family members. 
But, in general, improvements in economic performance are hypothesised to 
lead to improvements in health status. However, there are enough exceptions to make 
one weary of forming a rule or recommending policy changes based on such 
evidence. Two effects appear to work simultaneously in this area. For instance, life 
expectancy at birth has been demonstrated to increase with national income. 
However, there is an effect quite independent of changes in national income. It has 
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also been shown that life expectancy at birth increases approximately every thirty 
years irrespective of income level. Similarly, infant and child mortality rates have 
been shown to decline with increases in national income. Yet, there are several 
countries that do much worse or much better than expected on health status indicators 
based on evidence regarding their gross national products. 
Nonetheless several international agencies have taken a rather axiomatic 
approach to health care development in African countries. The International 
Monetary Fund, and to a lesser degree the World Bank, treat economic progress as the 
key to improving the health status of millions of people in African countries. The line 
of reason taken by the Fund is that poor economic policies formulated by national 
bureaucrats are the main reason that Africa has failed to make sufficient progress on 
social indicators. In the view of the Fund staff, national governments have failed to 
emphasise agricultural growth, instead favouring inherently flawed industrialisation 
strategies. In addition, direct government ownership of industry or control of 
agricultural marketing boards has led to several managerial and technical 
inefficiencies. Moreover, governments have tended to favour overvalued exchange 
rates, which benefit national elites, over-use of subsidies which are mistargeted, and 
allow inflation to reach uncontrollable levels. The advice offered by the Fund 
concentrates on offering a firm anti-inflationary stance, the promotion of a realistic 
exchange rate, reform of public enterprises and the liberalisation of the economy. 
Once these reforms are made then the foundation for sustained economic growth has 
been established. This foundation becomes the precursor to social improvements. 
The Bank operates under much the same ideological orientation. However, 
the emphasis on causes and possible solutions is different. For instance, the Bank 
recognises that internal problems are a major factor in the poor performance of 
African economies. However, the Bank notes that exogenous shocks can hurt African 
economies in the short run. In addition, the Bank, in recent years, has conceded that 
economic reforms, even where improving the overall economy are likely to have 
adverse consequences for different sectors of the economy, and on different income 
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and occupational groups. Thus, the Bank promotes alongside traditional economic 
reforms, such as tariff reform and export incentives, tax reforms, public expenditure 
control and the removal of price controls, the promotion of social safety nets that 
should mitigate against the adverse effects of reform programmes. This idea, which is 
more closely associated with UNICEF has been termed "Adjustment with a Human 
Face" (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987). The main notion is that economic reforms 
and social advances need not be mutually exclusive, Both may be pursued 
simultaneously and the twin benefits of growth and health care development may be 
achieved as long as the policy mix is correct. 
Such economic reforms promoted by the Bank and the Fund have been 
lumped under two main headings: stabilisation and structural adjustment. Stabilisation 
policies are run be the IMF while structural adjustment programmes are mainly 
pursued by the Bank and more recently jointly with the Fund. There are two central 
problems associated with stabilisation and structural adjustment policies. First, the 
question arises as to whether they are effective tools in promoting economic growth. 
The second issue relates to the way they are promoted in developing countries. 
Conditionality has always been the most contentious issue surrounding Fund 
and Bank lending. Several authors, as well as many African governments, take the 
view that the two institutions take a heavy handed approach to policy based reform. 
The critique is that in return for financial assistance — assistance that cannot always 
be obtained from other sources — African governments and other developing 
countries are required to undertake severe economic reforms, often bordering on 
shock treatment, in the short run. The governments facing these reforms are doubly 
critical in so far as they view that the reforms as being imposed upon them instead of 
being agreed upon in advance through a consensus based procedure. The use of 
conditionality is further derided in that it has been hypothesised that growth 
promoting reforms may in fact lead to a deterioration in living standards. 
The degree and length of such a decline is subject to dispute. Bank staff 
believe that economic reforms will only have a temporary or frictional impact on the 
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social sector. Moreover, this transitional stage will not hurt all groups in society 
equally. Some groups will benefit while others will become relatively worse off. 
However, the impact is not clear cut. For example, a devaluation, probably the most 
powerful tool at the disposal of national governments, sends powerful signals, 
amongst other things, to labour markets. Labour markets will adjust in favour of 
tradable activities at the expense of nontradable activities. However, if labour is 
relatively immobile or there exist other structural factors that work to prevent the 
expansion of the tradable sector then unemployment might actually increase in both 
sectors. However, this may not be the actual outcome as employment may increase in 
informal sector activities. Yet, again, reliance on the informal sector to mop up 
excess employment in the formal sector may only serve to drive down wages 
(incomes) in informal activities. Thus, the net effect will not always be positive; 
instead dependent on the unique situation of individual African economies and the 
mix of policy reforms utilised. 
The income changes, and price changes, as well as alterations in physical and 
social infrastructure, will, it is believed, have an impact on health status, health care 
delivery and health conditions. For those individuals who are fortunate to face 
declines in the prices that they pay for goods and services and increases in incomes it 
is reasonable to assume that health status will improve, and those that face the reverse 
situation the opposite is likely to transpire. For those individuals that face a mixed 
situation; concomitant increases in prices and decreases in incomes, the situation is 
not clear at all. For these individuals the net change in health status will be dependent 
on the relative strength of the changes as well as any additional offsetting mechanisms 
available to families. These offsetting factors may take the form of changes in 
government health care provision or survival mechanisms deployed by the family. 
Such coping strategies may take the form of seeking additional employment, 
increasing the household labour supply, reliance on extended family networks and 
friends for support, or the switching of health care providers from expensive to 
cheaper ones. 
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This thesis explores the relationship between macroeconomic reform and 
changes in health status, health conditions and health care delivery. The aim of this 
thesis is to investigate the linkage between the reforms sponsored by the IMF and the 
World Bank and health care development in Sub Saharan Africa. This thesis does not 
attempt to provide a cause and effect explanation, but aims instead at providing a 
reasoned explanation as to how health care delivery, health conditions and health 
status alter during periods of macroeconomic reform. 
More specifically, Chapter two of this thesis provides a background to the 
economic, political and social crisis in Africa from the 1970s to the early 1980s. The 
chapter makes the distinction between external and internal causes for economic 
collapse and structural factors which work to inhibit the growth of African economies. 
The chapter provides an examination of the demographic characteristics of Africa and 
trends in their development. The economic situation is then explored to highlight the 
reasons for continued stagnation. For instance, it is shown that the agricultural sector 
despite being the largest area of economic activity for the African labour force 
continues to remain the Achilles heel to future economic progress. In addition, the 
performance of the manufacturing sector is reviewed to show that the progress has 
been extremely slow and overall the development of industry remains far behind other 
regions. Chapter two concludes with a broader account of the factors that have 
worked to keep Africa from obtaining substantial positive growth rates. Amongst 
these factors are exogenously generated problems related to oil price increases and 
interest rate rises, and internal conflict caused by political instability and differences 
in religious convictions. 
Having established the basic framework for analysing the crisis in Sub 
Saharan Africa chapter three focuses on the activities of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. The chapter begins with a brief description of the 
history and the philosophy of the Bretton Woods institutions. This is done in order to 
show how the approach of the institutions to developing countries differ in important 
respects, however it is shown that in recent years that activities of the Bank and the 
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Fund have become similar even though the distinction between global development 
bank and a multilateral body concentrating on exchange rate and balance of payments 
support remains in place. The second section of chapter two provides a glimpse into 
the workings of the institutions. Decision making, membership, financing and 
assistance to developing countries are examined. In this section considerable 
attention is paid to structural adjustment facilities run by the Bank and the Fund. The 
chapter then moves on to a comprehensive discussion on the criticisms directed at the 
Bank and the Fund. The focus of this criticism is towards the policy of conditionality: 
the provision of concessional finance in return for a promise to undertake substantial 
policy based reform by borrowers. The most common critiques are reviewed and an 
analysis is performed to determine the relative merits of the arguments. Chapter three 
concludes with a review of the literature that deals with the effectiveness of World 
Bank and IMF programme lending on improving economic variables and providing 
the framework for substantial and continued economic growth. 
Chapter four lists the main tools used by the Bank and the Fund and African 
governments to promote economic reforms. The linkage between macroeconomic 
reform to labour and product markets, government investment and infrastructure are 
established in order to show the theoretical impact that adjustment measures will have 
on the population of Africa. In addition a poverty typology is established in order to 
show that different groups in society will likely be affected differently in the face of 
similar adjustment measures. Amongst the areas examined are exchange rate reform, 
budget and public expenditure control, fiscal policy changes and trade policy reform. 
In chapter five of this thesis the discussion turns to the health care delivery 
system, the health conditions prevalent in Africa and the health status of the 
population. The discussion on health status is in terms of African specific health 
problems and as a comparison of health problems within the region and between other 
developed and developing regions. The health care delivery system is then examined. 
The familiar pattern of urban-based curative care is examined and a review of the 
more recent initiatives at rural-centred, non-technical interventions is also provided. 
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The continuing controversy surrounding the "right' health care delivery system is also 
analysed. Given that much of, but not all, of the problems surrounding the health care 
delivery system in Africa can be traced to underfunding of the social sector, recent 
initiatives in health care financing reform are reviewed. The impact that this may 
have, as well as other factors, on utilisation is then examined. 
Chapter six aims to bring together the elements reviewed in chapters two 
through five and relate them to changes in household welfare. The chapter starts with 
the elements apparent in a household or individual health production function and the 
utility function of households. The chapter, having established that the reduced-form 
demand equation for health depends on prices of food goods, non-food goods, the 
price of health care, wages, the health environment and other factors, examines how 
changes in any of these variables may influence health status. For instance, this 
chapter will show how increase in the price of food may hurt nutritional status. The 
chapter also shows that the linkages between macroeconomic reforms to health status 
changes is by no means clear. In essence there may exist several ways for households 
to offset one or several health threatening changes with one or more offsetting 
mechanisms. In addition, macroeconomic reforms may not work in one direction 
only. For instance, it is possible that reforms may simultaneously increase the price 
of health care provision while at the same time drive down the prices of some of the 
basic goods consumed by households. The limitations in this approach is then 
examined and intrahousehold behaviour is reviewed. This discussion concentrates on 
how household autonomy, control and budget allocation may be important factors in 
influencing health status. In addition the importance of education, especially for 
women, is examined. 
Chapter seven moves on to an original analysis of the impact of adjustment on 
health care development. The chapter begins with an analysis of the previous studies 
done on the impact of Bank and Fund reforms on health status. The weaknesses of 
these studies are pointed out as are their strengths. The second part of the chapter 
aims to improve upon the previous studies both in comprehensiveness and in 
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methodology. In this chapter countries are compared on the basis on control and non 
control pairings. That is countries that have undertaken adjustment programmes in 
Africa will be compared with other African countries that have not undergone 
economic reforms sponsored by the Fund and the Bank. Furthermore, countries are 
not merely matched in terms of adjusters and non-adjusters, but are matched 
according to GNP per capita in 1981, average annual growth rate prior from 1970-
1981 and the distribution of GDP to agriculture. Once the matches have been 
established the chapter proceeds to analyse the performance of the adjusters relative to 
the non-adjusters in terms of the conventional before-after approach and the with-
without approach. This is done against data on government support for the health 
sector, health care delivery indicators, such as immunisation of infants and population 
per physician ratios, health condition indicators, information on nutrition status, and 
indicators on life expectancy and infant mortality rate, and data on education 
enrolment. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings and shows 
how this analysis differs from previous studies. 
Chapter eight moves away from a regional analysis of the impact of 
adjustment on health care development and focuses on one country. The case of 
Ghana's adjustment from 1983 to the present is examined to determine how health 
status, health conditions and health care delivery have held up in a time of economic 
reform. In common with chapter seven, the before-after and with-without approaches 
are taken. However, this chapter differs in that it also examines how prices and 
incomes have changed during the adjustment period. Moreover, the chapter makes 
more explicit the short term impact of adjustment on health care development by 
breaking Ghana's reform programme into two stages: the transition period from 1983 - 
86/87 and 1988 to the present. The chapter concludes with a commentary about 
adjustment in this west African county and offers some explanations as to why the 
programme has been successful in some areas and failed in other areas. 
Chapter nine is the conclusion of this thesis. It takes a broad approach to the 
question of adjustment in Sub Saharan Africa and offers some recommendations as 
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well as caveats about the design and performance of World Bank and IMF sponsored 
programme lending as relates to health care development. 
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Chapter 2 
The Crisis in Sub Saharan Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
The process of decolonization of Sub Saharan Africa began in 1957 and has continued 
through the 1980s. The prospect for the region looked good during the 1950s. 
African governments were optimistic about the future, and they began to make slow, 
and sometimes uneven, progress in economic and social development. However by 
the mid and late 1970s the countries in the region began to show worrying signs that 
economic growth and social advances were not sustainable. As Sub Saharan Africa 
embarked on the 1980s it was confronted with many of the problems familiar to it; 
inferior soils and harsh, fluctuating climates that led to droughts and poor harvests, 
low levels of investment in human capital and physical infrastructure, persistent 
poverty and unrepresentative and corrupt governments. However, what made the 
1980s a noteworthy decade in African history is the scale of the problem and the 
novelty and pervasiveness of the solutions brought to bear on the region. 
In recent years it has become common to talk of the 1980s in Africa as the lost 
decade for development. Sub Saharan Africa is viewed as unique amongst nations in 
that economic and social progress has, at best, been slower than in other countries and 
in many cases previous advances have been wiped out altogether. The problems that 
face Africa are complicated and there are two schools of thought that predominate 
discussions on Africa. The first view is that the current crisis in Africa is an offshoot 
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of poor national planning with its roots in flawed internal political and economic 
policies (World Bank 1981b, Demery and Addison 1987 and De Rosa 1991). The 
second holds that the problems that face the region arise from the global economic 
system (Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantara 1991; Svedberg 1993 and Tarp 1993). 
The World Bank, in the Berg Report (World Bank 1981b), noted that the 
cause of Africa's poor performance was rooted chiefly in poor economic policies that 
relied heavily on state control of the agricultural and industrial sectors and reliance on 
over optimistic national development plans. These endogenous factors included lax 
and inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies that led to high taxes on exports and 
overvalued exchange rates. Price distortions, state enterprises that were run 
inefficiently (if they should be run by the government at all), inappropriate (excessive) 
protection policies and excess foreign borrowing were also viewed by experts as 
unsustainable policies that would not create the prospects for future growth. In 
addition, internal conflicts, wars with other countries and corruption have also played 
an important role in contributing to the poor economic and social performance of 
African countries. 
Although, previously, the IMF and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank, 
approached Africa from the point of view that the crisis there was caused by problems 
of domestic mismanagement, there has been an increasing awareness that much of the 
problems were caused by external shocks. As Helleiner (1990, 107) notes: 
[While] mutual interaction and cumulative processes frequently render it 
difficult to disentangle the separate impacts of [domestic and external] 
influences...there is no disagreement however, with the proposition that 
several external shocks have imparted heavy blows to the balance of payments 
and growth, and created problems of macro-economic management for all of 
the non-oil developing countries. 
This is the notion that if problems in a nation's economy are rooted in 
domestic factors then the country should bear the burden of adjustment. If the 
disturbance is caused externally then the burden should be assumed by Western 
governments or by the UN system. But this brings into question what is to be 
considered an external factor and an internal factor. To wit, acts of nature, such as 
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floods and droughts, occur within a country but cannot truly be said to be generated 
there. Similarly, increasing the supply of exports may be hindered internally by 
marketing boards or it may be due to a genuine fear that industrialised countries will 
limit exports through protectionism. 
Taylor (1988, 20) expands on this idea that Africa's performance is intertwined 
and, to an extent, dependent to that of developed countries. He views interest rate 
increases in the North as leading to a contraction in growth in the South because it 
increased amounts owed on floating rate debt. Furthermore, recession in the 1980s in 
developed countries lead to a reduction in demand for exports from Africa; especially 
in the area of agricultural products and minerals. For example, Svedberg (1993, 23) 
notes that Sub Saharan Africa's share in primary commodities markets for sugar, 
timber, cotton, copper, cocoa beans and coffee declined between 22 and 38 per cent 
from 19704988 and the market for vegetable oils declined by 85 per cent during the 
same period. The retrenchment in foreign aid and the withdrawal of large private 
multinational banks are seen as further explanation of the decline of Africa (Taylor 
1988, 20). 
It is against this backdrop that the World Bank and The International 
Monetary Fund rose to an unprecedented degree of prominence in the economic, 
political and social affairs of Africa. Given that past economic recommendations 
were viewed as failures these two institutions increased the role that policy based 
lending plays in the reform of ailing economies. 
This chapter examines this crisis in generalised terms; the demographic 
characteristics, the nature of the African economy, problems in food production and 
dependence on external assistance. In doing so it loses some of its specificity. A 
region composed of so many different nationalities, cultures, historical traditions, and 
geographic and climatic conditions is not likely to fit into a neat category. For 
instance, countries in the Sahelian belt and the Horn of Africa are subject to a greater 
degree of uncertainty in their weather patterns than other Sub Saharan countries, and 
countries within the Franc Zone, with their pegged currency arrangement, have ceded 
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some of their control over monetary and exchange rate policies. In short, the 
economies and political conditions of Africa, as elsewhere, differ considerably. 
However, that disclaimer made, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa share 
several common characteristics and face many of the same problems — in broad 
terms, and in understanding the underlying trends and prospects for the region, the 
following discussion will provide a useful background. Although if one country was 
examined in light of the following discussion many exceptions would undoubtedly be 
found. 
However before preceding directly to the problems facing the region two more 
potential problems need to be discussed. First, data on Sub Saharan Africa is 
notoriously unreliable. Often there are substantial gaps in countries' data and the 
presence of a large unrecorded informal sector means that a degree of caution is 
advisable when examining the record of the regions performance. The volume of 
subsistence production is only ever a subjective estimate. Bernstein (1991) 
emphasises this point with respect to food production, when he reports that in many 
Sub Saharan countries food production is only known within a broad range of plus or 
minus twenty per cent. Per capita estimates suffer from the problem that total 
populations are not known with certainty. Occasionally population estimates have 
had to be scaled up, as in the case of Ethiopia, which moved from 35 million to 42 
million in 1984 (O'Connor 1991, 8) and Nigeria whose population was scaled down 
considerably in the early 1990s. Second, this chapter concentrates on the more recent 
causes or contributing factors to the current crisis in Sub Saharan Africa. The colonial 
legacy is not considered. Although colonialism has no doubt played an important role 
in the (under) development of Africa, its effects are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2.2 Demographic Characteristics 
Sub Saharan Africal with 489 million people, is the most underdeveloped region in 
the world. The crude death rate and birth rates in Africa are higher than in any other 
region. In Sub Saharan Africa the crude birth rate was 46 per 1000 population in 
1991, while in the next worst region, the Middle Fast and North Africa, it was 38 per 
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1000. In OECD member countries the figure was only 13 per 1000. The crude death 
rate was 16 per 1000 population in Africa in 1991. In South Asia, the next worst 
region, it was only 11 per 1000. The total fertility rate, which represents the number 
of children that would be born to a female provided that she survived to the end of her 
childbearing years and had children consistent with age specific fertility rates, is also 
the highest of any other region (World Bank 1993). Although some other regions 
have seen substantial declines in their fertility rates, Africa's rate has remained high 
and constant: in 1970 the rate was 6.6 by 1991 this had only fallen to 6.4. Life 
expectancy at birth is 51 year as compared to 68 years in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and in East Asia and the Pacific and 70 years in Europe and Central Asia. 
A lack of concern by national governments in previous decades, and the desire 
of parents for a large number of children to work in order to support the household 
and provide a social security net in their old age has led to a rapid increase in 
population during the 1980s. The age structure of the population in Africa supports 
this fact. Nearly half of the total population is under 15 years old. Moreover, there is 
no major variation from this figure for any African country. This age structure has 
important implications for services as increasing burdens are placed on the social 
sectors by the young. 
Although infant mortality rates have been decreasing continuously in the 
region, they remain high relative to other developing regions. This factor explains 
why population has expanded so quickly given that fertility rates have remained 
constant. The regions annual growth in population, one of the highest in the world, is 
3.1 per cent for the period 1980-1991. Population in the region currently doubles 
approximately every 21 years. The increase in population in the region, obviously, 
means that per capita income growth will remain minimal, if at all. In addition, it can 
stifle future economic prospects, it can lead to degradation of the natural environment 
(which in turn can lead to a scarcity of fuel woods), and can put pressure on already 
inadequate health and education services, and drive down wages (World Bank 1986a, 
3). There is an assumption by the World Bank (1986a) that birth rates will eventually 
16 
decline in the region if they follow the same path as other regions. The model based 
on demographic transition, where birth rates decline following increasing prosperity 
may not be applicable to the region. O'Connor (1991, 48) remains sceptical if this 
will occur in this century. 
Sub Saharan Africa contains 9.1 per cent of the total world population. The 
area of the region comprises 23,066,000 square kilometres or 20.7 per cent of the 
world total. This makes Sub Saharan Africa the most sparsely populated region in the 
world with relatively low population density. However, although there are several 
areas that are under populated there also exists areas of high population density and, 
consequently, population pressure. The main nodes of population in Sub Saharan 
Africa are central Ethiopia, inland areas around the Gulf of Guinea from Cote d'Ivoire 
to Cameroon, Rwanda-Burundi and areas surrounding Lake Victoria (Grigg 1985, 138 
and Griffiths 1994, 26). The Zaire/Zambia copperbelt also contain high levels of 
urban population (Griffiths 1994, 26). Several portions of the region are for all 
practical purposes uninhabited: the Sahara, Kalahari and Namibian deserts. 
Population pressure in high density areas is relieved somewhat by outward migration. 
From Rwanda and Burundi people move North into Uganda (Griffiths 1994, 26). 
From 1970, at least, there has been a high level of rural-urban migration 
(ECA/ATRCW and ILO 1990, 186). Approximately 29 per cent of the population 
lives in urban areas, as compared to 16 per cent in 1970. 
The average annual growth rate of urban population has been nearly six per 
cent from 1970-1991. This represents the second highest growth rate in the world 
next to East Asia and the Pacific. Several African cities have seen major increases in 
urbanisation following independence. Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Swaziland saw urban growth rates balloon to ten per cent per annum from 1970-1990. 
Where urbanisation has been pronounced it has tended to be heavier in capital cities. 
One third of all urban population is located in African capital cities. Conkery, Dakar, 
Dar es Salaam, Harare, Kampala, Lome, Luanda and Maputo account for more than 
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50 per cent of the total urban population of their countries respectively (Griffiths 
1994, 160). 
2.3 Economic situation 
The total GDP of Sub Saharan Africa in 1991 was only $164 billion (World Bank 
1993). This is approximately equal to the GDP of Austria. The average annual per 
capita income for the region is $350 (1991 dollars) as compared to $2,390 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and $21,530 for OECD members. However, per capita 
income is a crude measure to use as it does not capture the inter-regional distribution 
of this paltry level of income. For instance, the low-income countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa had, in 1980, a per capita income of only $239 compared to $3,155 for upper-
middle income countries in the region. Generally, the poorest countries are in the 
Sahel and the Horn with poor natural resources or countries ravaged by war: Liberia, 
Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and the poorest country, Mozambique. 
Due to the high level of unemployment and underemployment 7 out of every 10 
Africans, in 1980 was either "destitute" or near the poverty line (UNECA 1983, 8). 
Some countries in the region have fared relatively well during the crisis years. 
Botswana, an outstanding example, due mainly to its mineral resources, has 
weathered the crisis and has been able to boast of an average annual growth rate of 
GNP per capita of 5.6 per cent from 1980-1991. This points out that it is possible to 
have favourable shocks. That is, a temporary windfall for an increase in the price of 
an export, say due to a bumper harvest. But, even here, the picture is not completely 
beneficial. Although the increase in the price of the export will increase tax revenues 
and encourage bank lending, this could in the long run lead to more being spent on 
imports, a bloated government and higher indebtedness. This occurred in Kenya and 
COte d'Ivoire when export prices collapsed (Killick 1993, 41). However, the majority 
of countries have shown declines in per capita GDP over the same period. Table 2.2 
outlines the differences in per capita GDP growth rates in Sub Saharan Africa. Thus, 
the main characteristic of almost all Sub-Saharan African countries during the 1970s 
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and early 80s has been the low or negative levels of growth and population growing 
faster than output growth (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP for 35 Sub Saharan African Countries  
Average Annual 
	
Countries with populations of 
growth rate of per 	 Greater than 
capita GDP 1980-1991 0-5 million 	 5-10 million 	 10-20 million 20 million  
Greater than 2 % 
	
Botswana 	 Chad 
Cape Verde 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Cape Verde 
1-2% 	 Guinea Bissau Burundi 
Burkina Faso 
0-1% 	 Malawi 	 Kenya 
Senegal 
0- -1% 	 Benin 	 Mali 	 Cameroon 	 Tanzania 
Congo 	 Zimbabwe Ghana 
The Gambia 	 Mozambique 
Lesotho 
-1 - -2% 	 CAR 	 Ethiopia 
Comoros 
Mauritania 
Namibia 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Less than 2% 	 Sao Tome & 	 Niger 	 Cote d'Ivoire Nigeria 
Principe 	 Rwanda 	 Madagascar 
Source: World Bank (1993) 
Table 2.2. Economic Indicators for Sub Saharan Africa (percentage) 
Indicator 	 1970-1980 	 1980-1991 
Average Annual Growth 
Rate GDP 
	
4.0 	 2.1 
Average Annual Growth 
Rate of GNP per capita 	 0.5a 	 -1.2 
Average Annual Growth 
Rate of Agriculture 	 1.5 	 1.8 
Average Annual Rate of 
Inflation 
	
13.9 	 18.4 
Average Annual Growth of 
population 
	
2.8 	 3.1  
Source: World Bank (1993 and 1985); a figure is for the period 1973-80, World Bank 
(1989). 
2.3.1 Agriculture 
Agriculture has been characterised as the Achilles' heel to future economic progress in 
Sub Saharan Africa (Eicher 1990, 503). The exploitation of the land and its resources 
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play the dominant role in Sub Saharan Africa. Although the soils are mainly poor, 
except in the major rift valleys, the use of fertilisers and pesticides low compared to 
other regions, the use of capital equipment limited in favour of hoc, machete and oxen 
and the climate subject to wide fluctuations, agricultural activities are the main source 
of employment and foreign exchange. 
Eventhough the contribution of agriculture to GDP is only 31 per cent, 
approximately 60 per cent of the labour force is engaged in agricultural activities 
(Table 2.3). This suggests that, overall, productivity of the agricultural labour force is 
low. However, this pattern is not true to all of Sub Saharan Africa. Mozambique's 
agricultural share of GDP is 64 per cent and Tanzania's 60 per cent, while Kenya's 
share is 27 per cent and Lesotho's only 14 per cent. 
Table 2.3. Percentage of Labour Force Engaged in Economic Activity in Sub 
Saharan Africa 
Sector 1965 1981 
Labour force in agriculture 
Labour force in industry 
Labour force in services 
70 
11 
19 
60 
16 
24 
Source: World Bank (1985a) 
The proportion of women in the agricultural labour force is higher than that of men 
except in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho and 
Swaziland (ECA/ATRCW and ILO 1990, 165). The service sector is dominated by 
males. However, recent years have seen an expansion in female participation. In 
Senegal the proportion of women in the service sector has increased from 3 to 8.3 per 
cent, from 7 to 13.6 per cent in Cote d'Ivoire and 19.8 to 30.5 per cent in Nigeria 
(ECA/ATRCW and ILO 1990, 167). 
Progress in the area of agriculture is limited due to marginal and erratic 
rainfall and the increasing pressure put on arable land. In Sub Saharan Africa drought 
is endemic in the Sahel (or Saharan Margins), in the area around the Ethiopian 
Highlands and in portions of southern Africa. In 1980 severe drought hit the Ogaden 
in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Karamoja district in Uganda (Griffiths 1994, 20). The 
period 1983-85 saw drought again in Ethiopia and parts of Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
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Zambia. During the period 1991-1992 droughts occurred in Southern Africa and 
Somalia. Efforts to diversify out of crop growing and into livestock production is 
hindered by the prevalence of the tse tse fly. This also hinders the use of horses and 
oxen in production. Trypansomiasis spread by the fly effects over four million square 
miles in Africa (Kamarack 1988, 265). 
Rainfall in Africa rarely occurs in the right amount: it is either too much or too 
little. Rainfall on an annual basis fluctuates considerably. Torrential rains often 
destroy exposed soils and wash away essential minerals (Kamarack 1988, 20). 
Exposed soil also suffers the ravages of the sun which kills microrganisms that 
maintain the soils fertility. Exposed soil may become laterite; almost devoid of 
minerals with only iron oxides and hydroxides of aluminium left. Such soil becomes 
as hard as rock and absolutely useless for farming (Kamarack 1988, 204). Advances 
in agricultural techniques are hindered by the lack of frost which means that many 
pests are kept alive that hinder agricultural expansion. Desert locusts in west and east 
Africa, red locusts in southern, central and eastern Africa, and brown locusts in 
southern Africa periodically attack tropical plants and devastate agriculture (Kamarck 
1988, 204). 
Due to population pressures more land is being cultivated. Once cleared the 
soil loses much of its organic materials that made it fertile in the first place. Fertility 
can be maintained by extending the fallow periods, however increases in population 
have led to a shortening of the fallow period thus leaving little time for the soil to 
recover (Ohse 1988, 232). The threat of desertification by an expanding population 
moving into marginal areas is real and the Sudan-Sahel region has suffered ecological 
degradation. 
The policy of governments towards the agriculture sector during the 1970s and 
early 1980s was weak. Producer prices were set so low as to discourage investment. 
Government marketing arrangements were inefficient and serve only to provide a few 
well-paid jobs to the politically elite. Kamarack (1988:, 202) provides Nigeria as an 
example of a country that has neglected agricultural development. Nigeria benefited 
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from the oil boom of the 1970s. This led to an increase in domestic incomes and 
coupled with the fact that the Naira (The Nigerian currency) was kept artificially low, 
foreign goods became relatively cheaper. Thus, incomes were spent on imported 
foods such as rice and wheat instead of locally available cassava and yams. In 
Tanzania under Nyerere's socialist Ujamma villagization policy agriculture was run 
inefficiently. Kamarck (1988, 202) notes that the policy of centralised purchase of 
crops was run inefficiently by parastatal organisations. This led farmers to cutback 
production to just enough to feed themselves. 
However, the agricultural situation in Africa need not be viewed in the biblical 
terms of famine and disease. Given that water is plentiful; sunlight for growth is 
abundant, plants in rain forests produce five times as much organic matter than 
temperate plants and the absence of frosts lengthens the growing season (Kamarck 
1988, 206). Improved varieties of maize or hybrid strains, which offer drought and 
pest resistance offer some hope of improvement. However (Ohse 1988, 233) notes 
that the use of hybrid maize SR52 in Zambia requires a long growing season and is 
sensitive to small environmental fluctuations. Thus, the adoption of one maize variety 
may effectively limit farmers' responses to drought. 
Table 2.4. GDP and Other Economic Indicators (percentage)  
Indicator 
	 1970 	 1979 1983 1989 1991  
GDP (millions of dollars) 
	 40,073 	 161,820 164,339 
Agriculture in GDP 
	 35 
	
32 	 26 	 32 	 31 
Industry in GDP 
	 23 	 31 	 33 	 27 	 29 
Manufacturing in GDP 
	 8 	 8 	 11 
Services in GDP 
	 41 	 37 	 42 	 38 	 40 
Share of fuels, minerals metals 
	 92 	 89 	 92 
and other primary commodities 
in merchandise exports  
Source: World Bank (1993; 1991a; 1985a) and World Bank (1981b) for 1979 figures 
Note: manufacturing is a subset of Industry. 
Export earnings are heavily reliant on the exploitation of raw material and primary 
commodities. Ninety per cent of merchandise exports are composed of primary 
commodities, fuels, minerals and metals (Table 2.4). The heavy reliance on 
agriculture as a source of export earnings and employment is at the core of the crisis. 
Changes in consumption patterns, dependence on only a few primary commodities to 
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generate revenue and price decreases have all adversely effected the region. 
Consumption of Sub Saharan Africa's exports to developed countries has declined in 
recent years due to changes in industrialised countries (Musiolek 1992). In 
industrialised countries, over the past decade, manufacturers have begun to use 
materials and energy more economically (Musiolek 1992, 35). In addition, new 
technologies have led to savings in energy and materials and the replacement of some 
materials with others (for instance, the use of synthetics) (Musiolek 1992, 35). 
Export revenues for Sub Saharan countries remain heavily reliant on primary 
products (World Bank 1994, 221). Revenues earned from primary commodities are 
vulnerable due to the fact that each African country specialises in a narrow range of 
commodities. For example, in 1982-1984 twenty out of thirty countries earned fifty 
per cent of their export revenues from just one primary commodity, and of the twenty 
nine earned more than 75 per cent from one commodity (Gersovitz and Paxson 1990, 
4). In addition all but four countries earned at least 50 per cent of their revenues from 
no more than three commodities. Table 2.5 outlines the share of commodities in total 
exports for selected Sub Saharan African countries. 
Table 2.5. Shares of Commodities in Selected Countries Total Exports (percentage) 
Country/product 1974-79 1980-81 1982-1984 
Burundi 
Coffee 88 89 87 
The Gambia 
Groundnuts & 
processed products 84 54 50 
Ghana 
Cocoa 60 56 57 
Wood 8 3 3 
Aluminium 8 20 
Kenya 
Coffee 26 21 25 
Tea 12 11 19 
Petroleum prod. 19 32 22 
Mauritania 
Fish 11 29 48 
Iron 81 71 52 
Tanzania 
Coffee 29 27 34 
Cotton 13 11 14 
Sisal 9 6 4 
Uganda 
Coffee 85 99 92 
Source: IMF cited in Gersovitz and Paxson (1990) 
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According to Stewart, Lall and Wangwe (1992, 30) there are several disadvantages to 
concentrating on a narrow range of primary commodities; 
Specialization on primary product offers less in the way of economies of scale 
and learning than manufactured exports. Moreover, the large share of world 
exports of African economies in certain commodities, together with the low 
price elasticities, mean that increases in output result in less than proportionate 
increases in earnings. 
Due to the high elastic supply of primary products and price instability in 
international markets (UNECA 1983, 13) Africa's export earnings have been 
adversely effected. 
Of Sub. Saharan Africa's 20 major agricultural products, 17 have experienced 
declines in export volumes (ODI 1987, 1). In addition, real commodity prices from 
1980-85 declined (Comia 1987, 14). This process has continued throughout the 
decade. In 1992, the prices of primary products have continued to remain depressed 
and the value of exports has increased by only 2 per cent in 1992, following several 
years of decline (United Nations 1993, 64). Prices for food, tropical beverages, 
agricultural raw materials and minerals have declined in 1992. Since 1980, due to 
weak demand for raw materials and increased supply from the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, even in the area of primary commodities Africa's share of 
international trade has been declining (United Nations 1993, 65). Indeed world trade 
in agricultural products had grown slower than the growth in trade in manufactures 
from 1965-1988 (Killick 1993, 19). 
Based on problems in agriculture the terms of trade, which measures the 
relative movement of export prices against a countries import prices, declined through 
out the 1980s. Taking 1980 as the base year, the terms of trade index for the region 
had fallen to 91.2 in 1985, fell to 69.8 and 70.2 in 1986 and 1987 respectively, rose to 
92.0 in 1988 before falling back to 73.0 in 1989 (Tarp 1993, 21). By the early 90s 
the situation was not much better, and some countries, notably Nigeria, Uganda and 
Burundi were doing much worse than the numbers suggest (World Bank 1993). 
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An examination of the domestic part of the agricultural problem reveals a 
bleak situation as well. Although output of food has increased since 1960, the rate of 
increase has declined. During the 1960s the increase was 2.6 per cent per year. By 
the 1970s this had fallen to 1.5 per cent per year. The problems in this area are 
exacerbated due to the fact that population growth has outstripped food production. 
During the 1970s when food production in all of Africa was rising by approximately 
1.5 per cent while the population was growing at around 2.8 per cent (UNECA 1983, 
8). Production of cereals, meat, roots, tubers and pulses, during the 1970s, stagnated, 
while food demand was increasing in line with population expansion (UNECA 1983, 
8). The World Bank (1986a) estimates that in order to sustain current nutrition levels, 
which are already poor, agriculture production in the region would have to grow by 3 
per cent for the next 20 years — a highly unlikely scenario. 
The 70s and 80s saw Africa becoming increasingly reliant on food imports and 
aid. Food imports doubled in the 1970s. This placed an increasing burden on African 
countries because the price of cereals, a large component of food imports, increased 
sixfold. By 1980 the cost of food imports was equivalent to Sub Saharan Africa's 
export earnings from agricultural products (Grigg 1985, 136). By 1980 food aid 
reached 1.5 million tons (UNECA 1983: 8). During 'the Great African Famine', 1984-
85 12 million tons of food grain imports (commercial plus food aid) found its way to 
Africa. Despite this massive increase, and due to poor distribution and storage 
problems, in food imports, Africa, as a whole, remains deficient in calories and 
around 20 per cent of the population experiences food intake levels below the critical 
minimum level (UNECA 1983, 9). 
2.3.2 Industry 
The poor performance of the agricultural sector has been matched by laggard 
performance of the industrial sector. Traditional manufactures utilising simple 
technologies with high labour intensities dominate the structure of production. The 
production of intermediate and capital goods is not done on a large scale, instead the 
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Although Africa's energy resources are substantial with 8.5 per cent of world's 
proven reserves in crude oil, 7.9 per cent of world's proven reserves in natural gas, 
approximately 2 per cent of world's estimated coal reserves, 25 per cent of world's 
resources of uranium, and 35.4 per cent of world's potential hydroelectric capacity 
(UNECA 1983, 9), the large increases in oil prices 1973-1974 and 1979 did not help 
matters as most Sub Saharan countries are reliant on oil as a major component of 
energy consumption as most are importers of petroleum (except Angola, Cameroon, 
Congo, Gabon and Nigeria which are oil exporters). 
2.3.3 Other Factors 
The poor performance of the agricultural and industrial sectors are not the only factors 
that explain the crisis in Sub Saharan Africa. Recession in developed countries, lack 
of private external finance, substantial increases in interest rates, the appreciation of 
the dollar, and domestic turmoil have also played a pivotal role. Compared with the 
period 1976-80, the early 1980s saw a slowdown in economic growth in developed 
market economies. This fed through to African countries who saw potential export 
markets contract. When economic recovery began to improve in developed countries, 
Sub Saharan countries were unable to benefit substantially. For instance, as world 
trade expanded, 90 per cent of the increase was made up of manufactured products; 
mainly going to the United States. Thus, Sub Saharan Africa, reliant on primary 
commodities was unable to reap many benefits (Cornia 1987, 14). 
The weak performance of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors have 
resulted in a worsening of the current account deficit. This is a reflection of the 
decline in price of many agricultural and mineral exports in the early 80s. Oil 
exporters in the region were hit particularly hard by the decline in crude prices (ODI 
1987, 1). Conversely, countries dependent on outside supplies of oil were hit by an 
import shock when prices jumped in 1973-74 and 1979-80. In previous decades 
governments were able to finance their balance of payments deficits by increased 
taxation on exports of primary commodities or by increasing the level of borrowing, 
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by the early 80s this option was no longer available to the bulk of countries. 
According to Sutton (1985, 2) from 1973-74 commercial banks were able to loan 
some non-oil producing developing countries OPEC surpluses in order to finance 
their current account deficits, however after the second oil shock this option was 
limited due to high exposure levels and a sharply deteriorating debt and debt service 
ratios (Table 2.6). 
Table 2.6 Debt Service and Interest Payments 
Indicator 	 1980 	 1989 	 1991 
Total debt service as a 
percentage of exports of goods 
and services 	 10.0 	 20.8 	 22.1 
Interest payments as a percentage 
of exports of goods and services 	 5.7 	 10.5 	 10.2 
Source: World Bank (1993; 1991a; 1985a) 
The debt problem has been made that much worse due to the fact that the net flow of 
financial resources has been reversed: new inflows of foreign capital trail interest 
payments on accumulated external debt in developing countries (Helleiner 1990, 107). 
The appreciation of the dollar, in which most of the region's debt is 
denominated, made it more expensive to pay back variable interest rate loans. The 
creditworthiness of borrowing countries was under question by large multi-national 
private banks due to widespread defaults on debt payments. During this period, due 
to relatively high interest rates, the United States was able to attract capital flows from 
other countries in order to finance its growing current account and budget deficits. 
This contributed to a net transfer of resources which favoured developed countries, at 
the expense of developing countries. 
An increase in inflation in the 1970s in industrialised countries did not help 
developing countries either. Interest rates during the same period rose, but not by as 
much as inflation, which encouraged countries to go into debt. By the 1980s inflation 
began to fall, but interest rates did not decrease by a like amount (Krugman 1988, 57). 
The increase in interest rates had an obvious impact on floating rate debt. However, 
for debts with short maturities part of the debt would have to be rolled over into a new 
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loan at a higher interest rate to pay off the old debt (Krugman 1988, 61). However, it 
should be noted that such interest rate volatility may have little impact on Africa 
because most of it's debt is fixed rate with long maturities. 
Coup d'e- tats have undoubtedly played a role in the instability of the region.2 
Most African governments are not democratically elected or for that matter even 
civilian. Military rule and one party states constitute the governments of the majority 
of countries. Under military rule leaders may have little or no experience in domestic 
economic management, may prefer patronage to hiring qualified bureaucrats, and be 
more concerned with staying in power (and sometimes in amassing a fortune) than in 
providing social reforms. 
However, this should not be looked upon as necessarily bad, at least in the 
sense that one evil is merely replacing another evil. Corruption is prevalent in civilian 
rule as much as it is in military or one party political systems. The problem is rooted 
in the fact that the coups tend only to lead to new coups once the original group has 
broken into factions (Griffiths 1994, 83). This leads to abrupt policy changes and lack 
of consistent attention to the economy. Green (1990, 5) notes that although African 
governments are responsible for the plight of their people this must be viewed in the 
context that "these [policy] decisions were taken on external advice and are now being 
attacked by those who pushed them." 
The commencement and continuation of wars in some African states has led to 
the immiseration of millions of people (Green 1990, 5).3 War disrupts normal 
patterns of living, it prevents crops from being planted, it reduces the labour force 
through conscription and death, and leads to wide scale migration. Government 
resources that could be spent on investment in human capital or on promoting 
industrial development are diverted to domestic military expenditure and the import 
of armaments. Violence contained in one area often has implications for other areas 
as wide scale refugee movements place hardship on neighbouring countries. 
Kamarck (1988, 212-23) reports that the competition between Islam and other 
religions has led to conflict in several countries. Islamic convictions contributed to 
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the conflict between Christian Ethiopia and Moslem Eritrea. Guerrillas in 
Mozambique have allegedly been financed by Islamic sources. As of 1987, UNICEF 
(1990, 192) estimates that over 140,000 Mozambiquen and Angolan children under 
the age of five died due to war in their countries. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of 
Angolans have suffered displacement and nearly four million Mozambiquens were at 
risk of famine due to internal conflict. The coups in Nigeria and the Sudan have also 
involved rivalries between Christians and Moslems. Ethnic rivalries and minority 
persecution have often led to violent conflict in Rwanda (1959 and 1994), Burundi 
(1972), the expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria, non-Ghanaians from Ghana and 
Asians from Uganda and Tanzania. 
2.4 ODA 
Moreover, aid flows from multilateral and bilateral resources retreated during the 
early 1980s, which hindered the ability of government to make progress in social and 
development areas (Table 2.7). The amount of overseas development assistance was 
stagnant in the early 1980s and has not made any major advances since 1988. In real 
terms ODA began a decline in 1987 (Africa South of the Sahara 1989, 26). 
Table 2.7. Net disbursements of ODA from all sources in millions of dollars to Sub 
Saharan Africa 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
6,889 7,102 6,889 7,941 9,006 11,093 12,500 14,077 14,505 16,810 
Source: 1981-1983 figures from World Bank (1989). All other figures from World 
Bank (1992). 
Note: consists of loans and grants made on concessional financial terms by all 
bilateral official agencies and multilateral sources to promote economic development 
and welfare. 
The amount of overseas development assistance means that donors may be able to 
exercise control over African countries. Development assistance is not always an 
altruistic exercise. with the promotion of export markets being a primary objective of 
donor countries. Flows to all Sub Saharan countries totalled 10 per cent of GNP or 
approximately $33 per capita in 1991. Two countries in the region showed that ODA 
comprised a substantial portion of GNP; Mozambique with 69 per cent and Tanzania 
with 39 per cent in 1991. The contribution of ODA to some countries' GNP remains 
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low; Nigeria with less than one per cent of ODA as a percentage of GNP and 
Mauritius with only 3 per cent. 
Although flows to the region have been increasing steadily, as a percentage of 
donor's GNP flows have declined. In 1965 the countries that comprise the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) devoted 0.47 per 
cent of their GNP to ODA. However, by 1991 this figure had declined to 0.33 per 
cent. For OPEC members ODA was at 2.3 per cent of GNP in 1965. By 1980 the 
assistance had declined to 1.9 per cent and by 1991 ODA comprised only .21 per cent 
of GNP. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The structure of production in Sub Saharan Africa is dominated by agriculture, mainly 
peasant agriculture, and services, which together account for approximately 70 per 
cent per cent of the total gross domestic product of the region as a whole. The poor 
performance of the agricultural sector feeds through to the industrial sector in so far as 
revenues generated from the export of agricultural commodities are used to finance 
the expansion of the industry. Thus the region's industrial base remains small, 
fragmented, and only weakly linked to the region's natural resource base. Advances 
in industrialisation is inhibited by protection and poor public sector management. 
Skills and technical knowledge have not met the requirements of manufacturers or 
proven capable of competing in a global environment characterised by rapid change. 
The decline in primary commodity volumes and prices has led to a shortage of foreign 
exchange. This lack of foreign exchange forces output and investment to be cut due 
to the lack of imported inputs. Further damage has been done to the extent that 
inflation has ensued due to commodity shortages which could not be offset by 
purchases from abroad (Taylor 1988, 18). 
Due to the openness and smallness of the countries in the region external trade 
constitutes the single major stimulus to Africa's internal socio-economic progress 
(UNECA 1983, 15). The favourable commodity prices in the early 70s was replaced 
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with a dramatic shift in prices in the 80s with falling volumes and prices. The limited 
range of export commodities and inherent technological content of imports has 
continued to impede growth prospects in the region. Continued high birth rates in the 
region has led to stagnation, and in some cases decline in per capita incomes. 
The combination of a sharp increase in interest rates, recession in the West, 
lower commodity prices and higher oil prices (for some countries) contributed to the 
problems Sub Saharan countries had in servicing their debts. When oil prices 
declined some oil exporters were hurt, particularly those with large external debts. 
With such a level of debts, the region continues to suffocate under the burden of debt 
servicing. 
As the 1980s came to a close, Sub Saharan Africa found itself in a period of 
economic and political transition every bit as significant as the change that took place 
when the colonial powers seceded their sovereignty over the area several decades 
earlier. Whereas in earlier decades the dominant powers in Africa were seen as 
Western governments acting individually in their own national interests, the 1980s are 
viewed as a time when international organisations began to exert considerable 
influence in the area. Whether or not national sovereignty has again been infringed 
upon and the consequences of this new type of intervention will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund Policies 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the early 1970s the Fund and the Bank have come under attack from academics, 
journalists, non governmental organisations, and other United Nations agencies. The 
reason for this assault is perceived to be the incompetence of both agencies in the 
lending arrangements and the technical assistance they provide to developing 
countries. This intense debate has continued into the 1980s and has focused on the 
effect that IMF and World Bank lending arrangements have on improving economic 
growth and social conditions. 
This chapter, thus, seeks to provide a background to these two controversial 
institutions. A brief history of the Bank and Fund are provided to show how the 
ideological orientation of these institutions has been altered since their creation. 
Decision making and control of the institutions is also reviewed. Major lending 
arrangements to Africa are highlighted and their effectiveness in restoring growth is 
examined. Criticisms of the institutions are examined to determine their merit and to 
see how firmly they are rooted in fact. 
3.2 History and Objectives 
The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development were established at the United Nations Financial and Monetary 
Conference held July 1-22, 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire under the 
34 
of gold. However, this system came under pressure by the mid 1960s. By 1967 the 
pound was devalued and in 1971 the United States suspended the convertibility of 
officially held dollars into gold. This led to the par value system being replaced with 
one dominated by floating exchange rates. Also, during the late 1960s the IMF 
introduced the standard drawing right (SDR) and the stand-by arrangement became 
the primary way in which member governments could utilise fund resources. During 
this time access to resources was made conditional on an agreement being reached 
between the Fund and the member country on monetary and fiscal policies. 
The 1970s saw the concerns of developing countries beginning to emerge in 
the thinking of IMF officials. As indebtedness increased in developing countries, oil 
and food prices increased, and recession gripped the world (1974-75) the IMF began 
to establish facilities that would directly benefit developing members. In 1974 the oil 
facility and the extended facility providing medium term assistance were established. 
However, it was not until the early 1980s that the Fund began large scale 
interventions in developing countries. 
Prior to the 1980s the Fund was viewed as disclaiming any role in the 
determination of income distribution or the formulation of a long-run development 
strategy4 (Cassen 1986). The World Bank, and other regional development banks, 
were seen as the institutions most capable of dealing with 'development' problems. 
However, a concern for social progress is becoming increasingly apparent in IMF-
sponsored publications. The current managing director, Michel Camdessus believes 
that there are seven "pillars" that support strategies for achieving sustained growth. 
They are (IMF 1993): 
(1) fiscal consolidation and government's efficient use of scarce resources; 
(2) in monetary matters, a firm anti-inflationary policy, liberalization of the 
financial sector, and a realistic exchange rate; 
(3) opening up the economy to international trade and foreign capital; 
(4) price liberalization; 
(5) the reform of public enterprises; 
(6) a creative adaptation of social policies, to improve the working of the 
labour markets and enhance the effectiveness of social safety nets; 
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(7) 'good governance'; "meaning accountable governments, which not only 
respect human rights but also endeavour to establish adequate institutional 
conditions for the participation of all sectors of society..." 
While the first five "pillars" are traditionally associated with the workings of 
the Fund, the last two represent a foray into an area normally associated with World 
Bank activities. Indeed, Camdessus goes further in redefining the role of the IMF. 
Breaking with the traditional view of the IMF as an organisation constrained by a 
strict reading of the Articles of Agreement, he states (IMF 1993) that the goal of the 
IMF is to achieve "high quality growth". That is, "growth that is sustainable, that 
brings lasting full employment and poverty reduction, that reduces excessive income 
inequalities, and that respects human freedom and the environment" (IMF 1993). 
Although, currently, the rhetoric of the Managing Director is running ahead of 
a real commitment to poverty alleviation in almost all areas, there are some instances 
where it has become evident that the IMF is attempting to assist member countries. In 
the area of technical assistance provided to member countries, for instance, the Fund 
has provided assistance to Bolivia and Brazil on social security reforms. The 
changing nature of Fund facilities is also demonstrated as leaning towards the 
problem of poverty alleviation. The creation of the Structural Adjustment Facility 
and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility in 1986 and 1987 are two examples 
of this. 
The World Bank, in contrast to the activities of the IMF, has from its outset 
had a broad mandate over promoting development in developing countries. The first 
years of the IBRD were dominated by reconstruction loans to Europe, with loans 
totalling $497 million approved for Denmark, France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands in 1947 (Williams 1994, 112). However, once the Marshall Plan was in 
operation the IBRD's role in European reconstruction diminished quickly. By the 
early 1950s the Bank was a full fledged development institution that sought to 
promote economic growth by improving industrialization and infrastructure. By the 
1960s the main recipients of loans were Latin American countries. The International 
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Development Association (IDA), the 'soft loan window', so named because of its 
highly concessional credits, was established 1960 as an affiliate of the World Bank. 
The establishment of the IDA allowed lending to be expanded into the 
agriculture and social sectors. Loans and credits for poverty alleviation began to take 
prominence in the mid-70s under the then President Robert McNamara (April 1968-
June 1981). During this time period there was a realisation that improvement in 
economic conditions would not necessarily 'trickle down' to poorer members of 
society. A more egalitarian approach was proposed that emphasized redistribution 
rather than growth for growth's sake. The International Labour Organization, an early 
proponent of a basic needs approach, stressed that employment generation should be 
given priority over economic growth (Hettne 1990, 167). However, Chenery et al 
(1974) of the World Bank and the Institute of Development Studies did not see the 
two goals as incompatible and proposed a strategy of redistribution with growth. This 
strategy was viewed as being capable of delivering a 'development guarantee' (Hettne 
1990, 170) to the poorest members of society through a mix of instruments targeted at 
them. Efforts to increase the productivity of farmers and increase labour intensive 
processes to benefit the urban poor as well as land reform, changes in the distribution 
of education and other public services, the provision of basic consumer services to the 
entire population and the redistribution of assets to poverty groups were all part of this 
plan (Chenery et al 1974, xvi and Clayton 1983, 34). 
Subsequently, the primary target of lending was reoriented to the rural poor 
and resources were redirected in that area. The main impetus of this move was to 
raise the productivity of small farmers and give the rural poor greater access to public 
services. The research wing of the Bank focused its energies on poverty issues, and 
the concept of human capital was accepted within the Bank. During the 1970s Bank 
funds and technical assistance were increasingly channelled to the poorer segments of 
society. By end of 1970s lending to infrastructure had fallen to one third of total 
lending and nearly half of Bank lending directed to sectors such as agriculture and 
rural development, education, population and nutrition, urbanisation, and small scale 
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industries (Selim 1983). By the end of the decade research experience had 
demonstrated that outlays in the areas of primary education, family planning, nutrition 
and basic health care produced gains in productivity that made them worthwhile 
economic investments as well as justifiable on humanitarian grounds (World Bank 
1983a). Thus, poverty alleviation and growth became complements. In addition, 
lending was focused on a scctoral level and commitments were shifted regionally. 
In the early 1980s McNamara left and was replaced by A.W. Clausen (July 
1981-June 1986). By this time the Redistribution with Growth strategy was 
discredited due to its overreaching nature and lack of realistic goals (Clayton 1983, 
355). Consequently the focus on poverty shifted to a 'balanced strategy' — one of 
faster economic growth combined with pragmatic measures to reduce absolute 
poverty (Annis 1986). In line with IMF thinking, a greater emphasis on the free 
market and the private sector to fuel development was also discernible. Mosley et al 
(1991, 23) state that "if growth in the 1970s had been pursued regardless of stability, 
stability must now be pursued regardless of growth: hence the new policy objective 
becomes structural adjustment with growth—as much consistent with stability." 
Clausen's Bank elevated the importance of the neo-liberal approach to development. 
Neo-liberalism in its pure form is an ideology that is more of a reaction against failed 
economic policies based on the welfare state and the power exercised by unions and 
state bureaucracies rather than an active endorsement of a particular set of values 
(Hettne 1990, 215). However, this is not to suggest that its importance is limited —
far from it. Neo-liberalism presents a counter revolution in development thinking 
(Hettne 1990, 216). The central tenant of neo-liberalism is that economic 
management and central planning by the government should be replaced with a 
philosophy of letting markets operate without intervention. The implication is that the 
state must disengage from ownership or control of industries and lessen its regulatory 
activities. 
Such thinking began to dominate the Bank's agenda during the 1980s. 
However, this does not mean that the Bank is a 'neo-liberal monolith' (Mosley 1991: 
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24). The Bank, as is consistent with its development role, has never embraced 
liberalism to the extent that the IMF had. The Bank continues to carry out studies that 
encourage some form of social engineering (Mosley 1991, 24) and appears to tolerate 
some government control and the provision of social security networks. 
By the late 80s under the presidency of Barber Conable a consensus was 
beginning to emerge over the approach the Bank (and the Fund) should take in Sub 
Saharan Africa. This approach, termed pragmatic neo-structuralism, holds that the 
markets role in Africa should be increased, but at the same time remains sceptical 
about the benefits this may produce (Helleiner 1986, 58). The role of governments is 
still castigated but there is a belief that with reform there is a "potential for a 
productive and selective role for the state" (Helleiner 1986, 58). In addition, Conable 
re-elevated poverty alleviation and the social costs of structural adjustment onto the 
Bank's agenda. 
The role of women in agricultural development also began to gain attention. 
In 1991 Lewis T. Preston replaced Conable at the helm and the focus on poverty 
alleviation was again at the forefront of Bank thinking. Overall, throughout the 1980s 
lending for poverty alleviation increased substantially. However attention to 
agriculture and rural development began to stagnate, whereas lending to the education 
and health sectors increased significantly. Table 3.1 outlines this change. 
Table 3.1. World Bank Lending for Poverty Alleviation (millions dollars) 1981-93. 
Sector Average 1981-83 Average 1987-89 Average 1991-93 
Education 603 (4.5) 756 (4) 2047 (9) 
124 (*) 362 (2) 
Population, health 57 (*) 303 (2) 1,447 (6) 
and nutrition 78 (*) 221 (*) 
Agriculture and rural 3,513 (26) 3,638 (19) 3,623 (16) 
development 612 (3) 507 (2) 
Water supply and 	 60 (4) 765 (4) 	 1,097 (5) 
sewerage  
	
115 (*) 	 207 (*) 
Total Bank lending 
to all sectors 	 13,261 	 19,421 	 22,696  
Source World Bank (1993a) 
Notes: numbers in parenthesis represent sectors percent of total. Numbers in bold are 
for Sub Saharan Africa. * denotes less than one percent. 
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Currently the World Bank operates in twelve areas. The sectors receiving attention 
are; (in shorthand; non-poverty based lending) development finance companies, 
energy, industry, telecommunications, tourism, transportation, urbanisation, and 
(poverty-based lending) water supply and sewerage, agriculture and rural 
development, (primary) education, small-scale enterprises and health and nutrition. 
Operations in developing countries occur mainly through lending money or providing 
credits for development projects or by the use of structural and sectoral adjustment 
loans in an effort to provide countries with higher growth rates that are sustainable. A 
full listing of structural adjustment and sectoral adjustment loans sponsored by the 
Bank in Sub Saharan Africa are located in the Appendix (table A.2). Outside of the 
conventional lending operations the Bank also provides technical assistance to 
member governments, and also provides a "consciousness raising role" for individuals 
in both developed and developing countries through the publication of the World 
Development Reports. 
3.3 Structure and Decision Making 
3.3.1 IMF 
Membership in the IMF is open to any country regardless of the domestic economic 
system or state ideology. Membership in the IMF in 1993 comprised 177 countries 
with three applications pending. Fach member country is required to pay to the Fund 
the amount of its initial quota and subsequent increases partly in the member's own 
currency and the remainder in the form of reserve assets. A members quota is 
determined by its current account transactions, size and composition of foreign trade, 
export dependence and GNP. A members quota can only be increased with the 
members consent. The quotas are used in determining voting rights. 
The ultimate decision-making body is the Board of Governors, on which each 
member is represented (usually by the finance minister of a country). But, in practice, 
most decisions are taken by the Executive Board, currently with 22 members; the five 
largest members based on the size of their quota are automatically represented, the 
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other countries are grouped into constituencies. The percent of total Fund votes 
controlled by the largest member, the United States, is 17.82 per cent. Germany and 
Japan control 5.55 per cent each and France and the UK. control 4.99 per cent each 
(IMF 1993, 166). The two African constituencies (which comprise all Fund members 
in Sub Saharan Africa except Ghana) control only 4.09 per cent of all votes (IMF 
1993b, 168-69). Decisions in the IMF are made, usually, by simple majority or 
reached by consensus. The Board is chaired by a managing director. 
The Fund makes its resources available to its members in accordance with 
policies on the use of its resources by selling to members, in exchange for their own 
currency, SDRs, or currencies of other members. The use of Fund resources is 
dependent on a balance of payments need, and access to Fund resources is meant to be 
temporary. When members make purchases, they incur an obligation to repurchase, 
within the periods specified by the Fund, the Fund's holdings of their currencies by 
the payment to the Fund of SDRs or the currencies of other members specified by the 
Fund. A listing of the relevant loans to Sub-Saharan Africa is located in the appendix 
(table A.1). 
The IMF (IMF 1992, 932) derives its finances from the following areas: 
(1) resources in the General Resources Account, which may be used to provide 
balance of payment support to all members, and are derived from members' 
subscriptions and the IMF's borrowing. General resources are used to finance 
stand-by and extended arrangement as well as special facilities, 
(2) resources in the Special Disbursement Account, which are used for 
concessional balance of payments assistance to low-income developing 
countries through SAF and ESAF, and are derived from the reflow of Trust 
Fund resources; and 
(3) resources from the ESAF Trust, which are used by the IMF as trustee, for 
concessional balance of payments assistance to low-income developing 
countries through the ESAF, and are derived from members' loans and 
donations. 
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3.3.2 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
The International; Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the first unit 
created in the World Bank Group, had a membership of 176 in 1993 with applications 
pending for 4 countries. Each country joining the IBRD is assigned a capital 
subscription following consultation between the Bank and the applicant and approval 
by the Bank Board of Governors. Upon joining a country pays in ten percent of its 
subscription (one per cent in gold or US dollars and nine per cent in the country's own 
currency) and the remaining 90 percent of its subscription is callable; not paid in but 
subject to call by the Bank if it is required to meet Bank obligations for borrowings or 
guaranteeing loans. The capital base supplied from subscriptions is used as collateral 
to enter national and international bond markets with the sale of its securities. The 
callable capital is solely for the protection of bondholders; it cannot be used in the 
Bank's operations, for disbursements, or to cover administrative expenses. 
The IBRD's Articles of Agreements lay upon it an extremely conservative 
proviso, that outstanding and disbursed loans cannot exceed 100% of its subscribed 
capital plus reserves and surplus. In other words, the IBRD has an extremely 
conservative 'gearing ratio'. The Bank has made a profit every year since 1947, for 
the past five years the profit has been $1 billion each year (this contributes to the high 
credit standing). 
The lending rate for IBRD loans has a spread of approximately .50% above 
IBRD's cost of borrowing. This cost (weighted by amount and maturity) is estimated 
for a twelve month period, using the actual cost of borrowing during the preceding six 
months and the estimated cost of borrowing for the succeeding six months. The 
repayment period is 15-20 years, the grace period is 3-5 years and a guarantee by the 
member government is required (Selim 1983). This means that this type of 
multilateral finance is provided on a non-concessional basis . Funding is provided on 
quasi-commercial terms since the IBRD raises a major portion of its capital from 
private markets and charges an interest rate that although below commercial rates is 
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still above the amount necessary to qualify for a grant equivalent clement. Because of 
this, IBRD loans are categorised as Other Official Flows (not ODA). 
3.3.3 International Development Association 
Membership to the Internationall Development Association (IDA) is available to all 
members of the IBRD. The principal resources of the IDA are subscriptions, the 
periodic replenishments, grants to IDA from wealthier member countries, and from 
profits from Bank loans transferred to IDA. Replenishments are appropriations from 
wealthier member governments. If there are no replenishments then there is no IDA. 
The periodic replenishment of finances by the industrialized countries means that the 
IDA is occasionally on precarious ground. Recent years have seen the level of 
replenishments questioned. The tenth replenishmentfor the period 1994 to 1996 was 
for $18.0 billion. There is no interest is charged on IDA credits, although there is a 
service charge of 3/4 of 1%. Repayment period is 50 years, the grace period is ten 
years and a government guarantee is required (Selim 1983). 
For both the IBRD and the IDA creditworthiness applies to a country's access 
to private capital markets. Some indicators used to assess creditworthiness are; (1) 
the debt service ratio (the higher it is the lower the creditworthiness), the public sector 
deficit as a percent of GDP (the higher it is the lower the creditworthiness), a 
country's total savings and investment, a country's savings and investment rates (the 
higher the rates the higher the creditworthiness). Creditworthiness, level of per capita 
income, and a subjective estimation of a borrowers commitment to repay loans, 
determines whether a country receives IDA credits or a IBRD loans. As of 1992, 
countries with per capita GNP less than $610 were permitted access to IDA credits. 
'Absorptive capacity', which is the ability of a country to use loans or credits 
effectively, also plays an important role. "Blend countries" are those that receive a 
mix of IDA credits and IBRD loans 
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3.4 Activities of the Bank and Fund 
3.4.1 The Fund 
Stabilisation of a country's economy is traditionally handled by the IMF. The Fund 
takes action when there is, in their view, a problem of short-term macroeconomic 
disequilibria which is the result of an imbalance between aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply capacity. Intervention by the IMF follows a period of a persistent 
payments deficit where limits of domestic financing have been run-down (through 
borrowing or depletion of reserves). The causes, as we have seen, of the payment 
deficit are seen to come from two areas; domestic mismanagement and external 
factors. 5  
The policy packages the Fund uses consists of the reduction of domestic 
absorption relative to national income (reduction in aggregate demand) in order to 
correct a current account deficit. Normally accompanied by supply-side measures 
designed to promote the production of export and import substitutes. The focus is on 
aggregate demand because, in general, aggregate demand can be cut more quickly 
than income can be increased. Demand restraint policies have the objective of 
checking expenditures on imports and on releasing resources for export (Stewart, Lall 
and Wangwe 1992, 5). Moreover, effective control over the money supply, coupled 
with demand restraining policies, is believed to be essential for the control of inflation 
(Stewart, Lall and Wangwe 1992, 5). 
Payment imbalances are corrected by using a combination of expenditure - 
reducing, expenditure-switching policies and supply-side measures. Expenditure-
reducing measures frequently focus on targeting the public sector (which is viewed as 
a major source of excess demand). Also, there is the notion that a reduction in budget 
deficits can reduce major inflationary pressure but this will lead to cutbacks in 
services (and possibly a decline in welfare). The main policy instruments are 
domestic credit restrictions, reductions in government expenditures, and increases in 
taxation. Expenditure-switching is designed to increase national and international 
demand for domestically produced goods and the encouragement of the production of 
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tradable goods instead of non-tradable. Here, the tools used are devaluation, the 
liberalisation of price controls, trade restrictions and wage controls. Liberalisation 
and price reforms are also seen as significant in raising long-term efficiency of an 
economy (Stewart, Lall and Wangwe 1992, 6). 
The above methods of overcoming these problems are usually lumped under 
the heading of stabilisation policies. A United Nations6 (1992) publication defines 
stabilisation as normally a short-term measure oriented mainly to aggregate demand 
management. It refers to (p. 1); 
The correction of excessive inflation that has disrupted normal economic 
relationships, increased uncertainty, redistributed incomes away from people 
who have less control over the prices at which they sell their labour or by their 
sustenance, and in extreme cases, caused the currency as a unit of account or 
even as a means of payment to be abandoned. 
The General characteristics of Fund programmes according to Doorodian 
(1993, 850) are an increase in the real interest rate, ceilings on domestic credit 
expansion, on credit to the public sector, and on foreign borrowing, and in an effort to 
switch resources to tradables, exchange rate devaluations or depreciations, and the 
reductions of distortions caused by subsidies, trade restrictions, monopolies and price 
rigidities. Cassen (1986) believes that almost all programs have similar elements, this 
he terms the "universal prescription approach" or the "three Ds"- devaluation, 
deflation, and decontrol (a short-term demand reducing approach to the balance of 
payments). Once a member country has agreed to undertake economic reforms it is 
permitted access to Fund facilities. 
3.4.1.1 Stand by Arrangements? 
The most common form of access to Fund resources is through stand-by agreements. 
Under a stand-by agreement the IMF assures a member that it will be able to borrow 
foreign exchange during a specified period and up to a specified amount, provided the 
member abides by the terms of the arrangement. Typically stand-bys are for one to 
two years in duration with a concentration on macroeconomic policy. 
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A members access to Fund resources is expressed in terms of credit tranches. 
The first tranche available to members is the reserve (gold) tranche. Funds from here 
are available automatically on request without any conditions due to the fact that they 
are considered as a part of the member's external reserves. A member has a reserve 
tranche position to the extent that its quota exceeds the IMF's holdings of its currency 
in the General Resources Account, excluding holdings arising out of purchases under 
all policies on the use of the IMF's general resources (IMF 1992, 933). Reserve 
tranche purchases are not regarded as the use of Fund credit. 
The first credit tranche consists of the first 25 per cent of a members quota. 
The conditionality on the use of these resources is typically low, and the only 
requirement is that a member country makes a reasonable effort to overcome balance 
of payments difficulties. The upper credit (second, third and fourth) tranches (over 25 
per cent of quota) require a willingness to accept agreed upon conditions of a 
stabilisation programme in return for finance from the Fund. 
Substantial evidence of a member's willingness to overcome balance of 
payment problems is required and borrowers are expected to adhere to a mutually 
agreed upon performance criteria. Performance criteria typically cover exchange and 
interest rate policy, credit policy, government or public sector borrowing 
requirements, policies on trade, payments restrictions and foreign debt (IMF 1992, 
935). If a particular performance criteria has not been met then further purchases are 
permitted only after the IMF and the member reach an understanding. Purchases 
under a stand-by arrangement in the upper credit tranches or under an extended 
arrangement available in instalments and specified time periods (that is, they are 
phased in). 
Stand-by arrangements (or extended arrangements) are signed during first 
through fourth tranches. Repurchases (repayment) of drawings under the credit 
tranches and stand-by arrangements are made in 3 1/4 to 5 years (IMF 1992, 935). 
The period of stand-by arrangements has normally been between 12 and 18 months in 
recent years, but may extend up to three years (IMF 1992, 935). Most Fund lending is 
46 
at market interest rates. As of 1990 approximately 50 per cent of IMF financial 
assistance provided to Sub Saharan Africa was in the form of Stand-by arrangements 
(Osunsade and Gleason 1992, 15). 
3.4.1.2 Extended Fund Facility 
The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was created (1974) to deal with world economic 
changes in early 1970s. The main purpose of these arrangements is to help countries 
with severe payment imbalances stemming from structural mal-adjustments in 
production and trade, and imbalances owing to a combination of slow growth and an 
inherently weak balance of payment position, constraining a country's pursuit of 
active development policies. Resources are meant to be used in the medium term. A 
country is permitted to draw (purchase) beyond its quota for up to 2-3 years 
(exceptionally up to four years), if it implements an economic stabilisation 
programme agreed to by the Fund and adheres to performance criteria. The 
borrowing country has access to 140 per cent of quota with repayment periods of 4-10 
years. Stand-bys and E1-1-s are sometimes lumped together under the term tranche 
policies. As of 1990 12.5 per cent of IMF assistance to Africa was of this type 
(Osunsade and Gleason 1992, 15). 
There was a great expansion in EFFs 1979-1981 so that a 'viable' balance of 
payments position could be restored. Wohlmuth (1984) states that; "the viable balance 
of payments position was defined as a deficit on the current account which can be 
financed by capital imports consistent with longer-run development perspectives, so 
that the debt servicing capacity of the government is taken care of." The IMF now 
considers the EFFs as a burden and replaces the EFFs with one-year and multi-year 
stand-bys, arguing that a medium-term perspective is still maintained (Wohlmuth 
1984). 
3.4.1.3 Enlarged Access Policy 
The Enlarged Access Policy (EAP) provides additional financing from borrowed 
resources, in conjunction with ordinary resources, to members whose payments 
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imbalances are large in relation to their quotas (IMF 1992, 937). The EAP is used 
when the member requires financing in excess of what is available to it in the four 
credit tranches or under the EFF (IMF 1992, 937). The EAP is subject to phasing and 
performance criteria. The policy on access is reviewed annually; as of June 1990, the 
current access limits on stand by or extended arrangements, individually or combined, 
are 90 - 110 per cent of quota annually; 270 or 330 per cent of quota over three years; 
and a cumulative limit of 400 or 440 per cent of quota However, limits may be 
exceeded in exceptional circumstances, and include drawing under the CCF and BSFF 
(IMF 1992, 937). 
3.4.1.4 Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility 
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) was designed in 1963 for 
raw material exporting countries whose balance of payments were, at least partly, 
connected with export earnings reductions for which the countries themselves were 
not responsible (IMF 1992, 939-941). Resources are made available to member 
countries in order to cover export shortfalls and excesses in cereal import costs and in 
oil import costs. Repurchases are made in 3 1/4 years to 5 years. As of 1990 23.4 per 
cent of cumulative drawings were in this area (Osunsade and Gleason 1992, 15). 
3.4.1.5 Oil Facility 
Oil Facility (1974-1976) was designed to ease the impact of rises in oil prices on the 
balance of payments of Non-Oil Producing Exporting Countries (NOPECs) in African 
countries. 
3.4.1.6 Buffer Stock Financing Facility 
The Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF) was established in 1969 in order to 
provide assistance to members with balance of payments need for financing their 
contributions to approved international commodities agreements. Repayments are 
made within 3 1/4 years to five years or earlier. Currently, the BSFF may be used to 
finance eligible members contributions to the 1987 International Natural Rubber 
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Agreement. This facility is rarely ever used and the cumulative drawings total only 
0.1 per cent as of 1990 (Osunsade and Gleason 1992, 15). 
3.4.1.7 Concessional Credits: 
The Trust Fund (1976-1981) provided loans in connection with Stand-by agreements 
to the poorest countries. It was financed primarily by the sale of parts of the IMF gold 
reserve. The Special Disbursement Account was activated in 1981 to receive transfers 
(repayments of loans and interest) from the Trust Fund which is in the process of 
being wound up. The Final Trust Fund Loan instalment was due 1991. 
3.4.1.8 Structural Adjustment Facilities 
The purpose of the SAF is to provide long term assistance to low income countries 
with balance of payments problems. The Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) which 
was launched March, 1986 as part of the Baker initiative is operated jointly by the 
Fund and the Bank. Created with about SDR 2.7 billion of resources to support 
adjustment in low-income countries. 
The Funds available to SAF come mainly from repayments of loans from the 
Trust Fund. Loans are highly concessional — 1/2 of one per cent interest with the 
principal amount repayable over 5 1/2 to ten years with a five year grace period. 
Disbursements are made annually and are linked to the approval of annual 
arrangements. Members receive the equivalent of 20 per cent of quota under the first 
annual arrangement, 30% under the second and 20 per cent under the third. 
Approximately six per cent of IMF financial assistance is provided to Sub Saharan 
Africa under this system (Osunsade and Gleason 1992, 15). 
The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) was created in 
December, 1987 in response, in part, to the inadequate financing of the structural 
adjustment facility and to provide a facility for low income countries to refinance their 
obligations to the Fund (Williams 1994, 78). It was established with SDR six billion 
in additional loanable resources. The disbursements and monitoring are semiannual. 
Eligible members can receive up to 250 per cent of quota over a three year 
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programme, with the provision for up to 350 per cent in exceptional cases. The 
repayment terms are highly concessional — the same as SAF. 7.4 per cent of IMF 
assistance to Africa is made up of this type of lending arrangement (Osunsade and 
Gleason 1992, 15). 
Both the Structural Adjustment Facility and The Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility provide concessional resources to help low income countries with 
protracted payments problems, and to help them change the structure of economic 
activity so that they can achieve a high level of economic growth. In order to ensure 
that Fund resources are not squandered the IMF requires borrowing countries to 
adhere to policy framework papers (PFPs). In addition, the PFPs contain an analysis 
of any possible social and distributional impact that the adherence to the adjustment 
program may have. If any problem areas are identified then the PFP includes 
measures that the domestic government will undertake to eliminate it (Williams 1994, 
79). These documents provide in general terms the measures a country proposes to 
take during the program period and identifies sources of problems as well as potential 
remedies. These papers are prepared by representatives of the national government 
with joint consultation by the Fund and the Bank. 
3.4.2 The World Bank 
3.4.2.1 Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) 
Although there is a pre-cursor to the modern SAL found in India 1963-64 for balance 
of payments support (Mosley et al 1991, 28), structural adjustment loans were 
formally established in 1980 by the World Bank. There is no clear, or even dominant 
definition as to what constitutes structural adjustment. As a starting point, the aim of 
a structural adjustment loan is to achieve the highest level of growth by increasing 
efficiency of resource use. The World Bank (1988a, 11) defines structural adjustment 
as reforms aimed at flawed policies and inefficient institutions. The reforms are 
aimed at improving resource allocation and increasing economic efficiency in order to 
expand growth and increase resistance to external shocks. The adjustment lending is 
50 
targeted at both microeconomic (such as tax reform) and macroeconomic (such as 
fiscal imbalance) level and at public sector, inefficiencies. Demery, Feroni and 
Grootaert (1993, 2), World Bank employees, go further and say that the purpose of 
structural adjustment is to open up the national economy and this is accomplished 
through a combination of demand and supply-side policies. On the supply side trade 
liberalisation and currency devaluation (also on the demand side) are used to restore 
the incentive structure to favour exports and import substitution. On the demand side, 
fiscal, monetary and programmes that encourage wage restraint are advocated to 
increase competitiveness and efficiency. 
Stewart, Lall and Wangwe (1992, 5) say that the aim of SALs is " to reorient 
the structure of the economy towards greater efficiency in the medium term." 
According to Mosley et al (1991, 9) structural adjustment of the developing 
economies is intended to bring down developing countries' payment deficits to the 
level that could be financed by stagnant aid flows plus rapidly dwindling private 
commercial lending. Another viewpoint is put forward by (Easterly 1991, 12), who 
says that the new growth theory says that aid finance (here SALs are included: but 
more likely project loans and sector adjustment loans) provides the money to help to 
the cover "start-up costs" to development. That is money must be invested, in the first 
instance, in "building a market infrastructure and forming an educated entrepreneurial 
elite or educated labour force" (Easterly 1991, 12). According to the United Nations 
(1992) adjustment refers to; 
Policy changes needed to put the economy on a sustainable growth path. [It 
is] necessary when external conditions change in an irreversible manner, 
particularly if changes are adverse and lead to an unsustainable current 
account deficit. 
Killick (1993, 68-70) also attempts to define adjustment as a planned adaptation that 
will create flexibility in a country's economy. His notion, as others, is that adjustment 
is a response to an external shock that necessitates policy changes over the medium 
and long term focused at the economy's basic structure (Killick 1993, 70). 
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The objectives of structural adjustment are normally defined (Streeten 1987, 
1470) as the reduction or elimination of balance of payments deficits, the achievement 
of high rates of economic growth that are sustainable, thereby eliminating the 
possibility of future payment crisis' and stabilisation policies. These goals are to be 
pursued in tandem with the goals of increased access to social services most notably 
in health care and education and in the alleviation of poverty. 
In general all definitions of adjustment have several elements in common: 
adjustment will lead to a sound macroeconomic position in the medium term and set 
the path for future sustainable growth; adjustment will lead to increased efficiency 
and in the long run because a higher growth rate will lead to a higher per capita 
income welfare will be improved. This approach supported by the World Bank has 
been characterized as Growth Oriented Adjustment (or Growth Oriented Adjustment 
with Safety Nets). 
The above objectives can be obtained by concentrating action in the following 
areas (Summers and Pritchett 1993,383); 
(1) trade reform which is comprised of tariff reform and export incentives, 
(2) domestic resource mobilization which consists of tax reform which usually 
means broadening the tax base through increased collection or the reduction of 
certain taxes, public expenditure control and interest rate policy, 
(3) public sector policy, or fiscal adjustment, encompassing public enterprise 
reform, market deregulation which consists of the removal of price controls 
and subsidies, a reduction in transfers, public investment programming and a 
decrease in public employment, 
(4) institutional reform based on strengthening (weakening) of public and 
para-statal organizations in support of policy changes, and 
(5) reform of the financial system. 
In order for SAL money to be dispersed there must be an agreement on 
objectives and measures, as well as a timetable. To this end a Letter of Development 
Policy is signed. In addition, in practice, an agreement with IMF is necessary in order 
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to proceed with a SAL operation although there is no formal arrangement between the 
two.8 The maximum amount of SALs that may be dispersed to a country is five. 9 
Mosley (1987, 5), while reminding the reader that the World Bank stresses the 
idea that no two countries are alike when receiving SAL finance, there are clearly 
areas held in common to all borrowing countries. Table 3.2 gives a breakdown of 
these areas: 
Table 3.2. Types of Policy Measure Requested in Return for SAL Finance, 1980-
October 1986 
Measure 	 Percentage of SALs subject 
to conditions in this area 
Trade policy: 
Remove import quotas 	 57 
Cut tariffs 	 24 
Improve export incentives and institutional support 	 76 
Resource mobilization: 
Reform budget or taxes 	 70 
Reform interest-rate policy 
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Strengthen management of external borrowing 	 49 
Improve financial performance by public enterprise 	 73 
Efficient use of resources: 
Revise priorities of public investment program 	 59 
Revise agricultural prices 
	
73 
Dissolve or reduce powers of state marketing boards 	 14 
Reduce or eliminate some agricultural input subsidies 	 27 
Revise energy prices 	 49 
Introduce energy-conservation measures 	 35 
Develop indigenous energy sources 	 24 
Revise industry incentive system 	 68 
Institutional reforms: 
Strengthen capacity to formulate and implement 	 86 
public investment program 
Increase efficiency of public enterprises 	 57 
Improve support for agriculture (marketing, etc.) 	 57 
Improve support for industry and subsectors 	 49 
(including price controls)  
Source: Mosley (1987: 5) 
Figures provided by the World Bank provide a similar picture for Sub Saharan Africa 
(Table 3.3). There is a high level of activity by the World Bank in the areas of trade 
policy, fiscal policy, budget and public expenditure, public enterprises, industrial 
policy and agricultural policy. Since the IMF has responsibility for exchange rate 
policy, the percentage of loans with conditions in this area is an underestimate, and 
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consequently the importance of exchange rate conditionality in the Bank's adjustment 
lending appears less than it actually is. 
Table 3.3. The policy content of World Bank Lending Operations (percentage of 
total number of loans with conditions in various policy areas) 
SSA All countries 
Exchange rate 30.8 15.7 
Trade policies 76.9 78.4 
Fiscal Policy 61.5 64.7 
Budget/public expenditure 69.2 51.0 
Public enterprises 61.5 52.9 
Financial sector 38.5 39.2 
Industrial policy 53.8 25.5 
Energy policy 7.7 23.5 
Agricultural Policy 76.9 49.0 
Other 23.1 13.7 
Note: Lending operations under structural adjustment and sector adjustment loans in 
Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia) and 11 other countries. 
Source: World Bank (1988a: 58) 
3.4.2.2 Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs) 
Although SALs receive the bulk of the attention Sector Adjustment Loans, after 1984, 
have made up a greater percentage of Bank/IDA commitments than SALs. The first 
SECAL was to Pakistan 1983-1984. In Africa, in 1991 IDA SALs totalled $438.4 
million while SECALs totalled $687.7 million. In 1992 $570.8 million and $928.1 
million were devoted to IDA SALs and SECALs respectively. In 1993 the gap 
narrowed and SAL finance comprised $389.2 million while finance devoted to 
SECALs was only $287.9 million. 
The distinction between the two is not always clear, although, as the name 
implies, SECALs more narrowly focused on specific sectors. They are similar in 
nature to SALs but differ in the number of institutional and policy reforms required. 
Generally SECALs are less complex and less intrusive than SALs. SECALs, have an 
advantage over SALs as they are viewed as having a better chance of achieving 
political sustainability. They are also accepted more readily in 'problem countries' or 
in countries that are able to exercise some leverage because of their large debt 
positions (i.e. Brazil, Mexico and Argentina). In addition, SECALs can be 
implemented without an arrangement being reached with the IMF. 
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3.4.2.3 Special Facility for Sub Saharan Africa 
The special facility for Sub Saharan Africa (SF) began operating July 1, 1985 (World 
Bank: 1985). It is funded with two types of resources: direct contributions from 
donors, and resources for special joint financing (originally from Federal Republic of 
Germany, Japan, Switzerland, UK and Saudi Arabia). The Bank has also mobilized 
some resources. As of June 30, 1988 resources available for SF operations totalled 
approximately $2 billion. Funds from the SF are used to provide "African Facility 
Credits' (AFC) and special joint financing to IDA-eligible countries with debt service 
ratios in excess of 30 per cent in Sub Saharan Africa. Countries, also, have to be 
implementing a policy-reform program supported by the IMF and World Bank and an 
agreement has to be reached on a PFP. 
AFCs arc made on IDA terms (50 year maturity, including 10 year grace 
period, subject to an annual .75% service charge and .50% commitment charge). The 
purpose is to finance quick-disbursing lending operations in support of structural and 
sectoral adjustment, as well as economic rehabilitation programs. Most AFCs 
cofinanced with IDA. All operations administered by the Bank staff and subject to 
the approval of IDAs Executive Director. 
3.4.2.4 Project Lending 
Finances provided for project loans make-up the majority of financial assistance to 
Sub Saharan Africa. Virtually all project lending to Africa comes from the IDA. The 
Bank, generally, finances the foreign exchange costs of projects only [however, in 
higher income and mid-income countries it may, exceptionally finance a portion (say 
35 per cent) of total costs]. In lower income countries, the Bank will frequently 
finance a portion of local costs. In the poorest countries the Bank finances up to 95% 
of project costs). A typical IDA cycle for a project goes through six stages; 
identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiation and approval, supervision and ex 
post evaluation (Selim 1983). The entire time span of a project cycle lasts 
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approximately eleven years. Ex post, the overall aim of project lending is to increase 
the productivity of a large number of people below the poverty line while attaining a 
'good' economic rate of return on the initial investment. The benefits of project 
lending are not meant to be transitory, but are designed to incorporate simple 
technical and production techniques that are easily understood by the recipients and 
affordable to operate once the initial funding has expired. 
According to Mosley et al (1991, 46), ideally, ex ante, project appraisal should 
be used to rank projects according to their calculated social rate of return, and all 
those projects should be undertaken whose rate of return exceeds the marginal social 
cost of funds; or, if the funds are constrained, projects should be undertaken in rank 
order until the investment budget is exhausted. However, in practice, the Bank does 
is set its own sectoral allocation of investment funds, and within sectors set a 
minimum rate of return which each project undertaken has to satisfy. 
World Bank project lending has been heavily criticized in the past by Hayter 
(1971), Hayter and Watson (1985), Goldsmith (1985), George (1991 and 1992), Bello 
(1994), Hancock (1989), and Bello, Kinley and Elinson (1982). The most trenchant 
criticism has been levied at World Bank participation in projects relating to dams and 
flood management outside of Africa (The Independent 1992, The Financial Times 
1992, The Observer 1992). The Ecologist (1992, 218-220) have roundly criticized 
World Bank involvement in the Sardar Sarovar project in Western India for the lack 
of attention paid to the environmental impact and the resettlement of indigenous 
people, In, addition, Custers (1992, 241-47) believes that the World Bank's Flood 
Action Plan in Bangladesh does not adequately address the displacement of the rural 
landless in that country. Most of the criticism directed at project lending in Africa is 
directed to bilateral donors who concentrate on tied aid, large and expensive projects 
utilizing inappropriate technologies. 
Lee (1985) critiques development projects, in general, for a lack of attention to 
the strains that they may place on existing water and sanitation facilities, the possible 
increase in the transmission of disease and the additional burdens placed on housing 
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and medical facilities. For instance, dangerous insects may be (re)introduced to a 
project area by "tagging" along with aid workers (Lee 1985, 73). In addition, the 
mosquito population often increases during the clearing stages of a project. 
Schistosomiasis might also increase as the snail vector favours slow to still water 
behind hydroelectric and irrigation projects (Lee 1985, 75). Weil et al's (1990) review 
of the literature on the impact of agricultural policies, points out that irrigation 
schemes are associated with the spread of more than 30 diseases. The most important 
of which are vector-borne diseases such as schistosomiasis, malaria, onchoceriasis 
and Japanese encephalitis. The changes in the environment, that occur with the 
introduction of irrigation projects, such as an increase in surface water, a rise in the 
water table, a change in the rate that the water flows and urban development are all 
associated with a possible increase in vector breeding (Weil et al 1990, 40). 
The use of pesticides, fertilizers, herbicides and fungacides, which my be 
encouraged as part of project loans, have been traced to certain health problems. Weil 
et al (1990, 44-45), based on previously reported evidence, state that the use of 
pesticides can lead to direct poisoning, a loss of fish stocks and pesticide build-up in 
the food chain. A rough estimate of the problem indicates that pesticide poisoning is 
not a small problem: the number of acute cases of poisoning has been estimated at 
over one million with a mortality rate of 0.4 to 2 per cent (Weil et al 1990, 44). 
However, in practice, project lending is difficult to evaluate (Cassen 1986). It 
is easy to say a project is successful in its physical output (number of schools built, 
number of enrolments, number of health clinics, etc.), but much more difficult to 
estimate the rate of return. This is particularly true of education, where it is generally 
accepted that (primary) education has a high rate of return, but the specific rate of 
return remains hard to quantify because investment in education takes a relatively 
long time to raise productivity. More problems arise to the extent that it is difficult to 
gauge whether or not projects have been sustained in the long-term; due to poor 
follow-up and the reluctance of project administrators and authors of reports to admit 
to poor performance (Cassen 1986, 105-107). Although the evidence is mixed, on the 
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whole, project lending seen as successful. Projects that aim to assist the poor directly, 
have been found to have rates of return equal or better than other non-poverty based 
lending (Cassen, 1986). 
There is also a problem of fungability where there exists the possibility that a 
government in receipt of finance for a particular project is seen as benefiting, 
inadvertently, because the finance for that particular project would have been 
provided for anyway. The downside is that an undisclosed project may be financed 
instead — a project the donor may not necessarily approve of (Mosley 1991, 29). 
3.5 Conditionality 
In order to ensure that funds borrowedw under the above arrangements are repaid, and 
that the countries undertake reforms consistent with the wishes of Bank and IMF staff 
(and by implication their major shareholders) the recipient countries are required to 
make a commitment in writing to these two institutions. In the case of structural 
adjustment loans a Letter of Development Policy is executed setting out the 
objectives, measures and timetable of reforms and disbursement of finance. 
This is similar to what occurs when a borrowing country applies to the IMF 
for Funds. Under stand-by agreements borrowers are expected to adhere to a 
mutually agreed upon performance criteria. If a country fails to meet some or all of 
the criteria then further purchases are prohibited until the IMF and the member 
government reach an understanding. Under the Structural Adjustment Facility and 
Enhanced Structural adjustment facility member countries are required to adhere to 
policy framework papers. 
Before proceeding to a discussion on conditionality that is applicable to both 
institutions it is useful to draw a distinction between the two. In the case of the IMF 
conditionality focuses on the demand side (Sarkar 1991). That is, the Fund is most 
likely to require cuts in government spending, currency devaluation, the raising of 
interest rates and trade liberalization. The IMF is also an institution that encourages 
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'cross conditionality' (Sarkar 1991), where approval of an IMF package opens up 
additional lending from the Bank and other agencies. 
The Bank, on the other hand, tends to concentrate its conditions on the supply 
side (Sarkar 1991). It focuses its activities on a country's investment programme, 
system of incentives, pricing, and financial and trade liberalization. Mosley, Harrigan 
and Toye (1991, 43) state that a particular SAL can have over 100 different policy 
conditions. The enormous amount of conditions are seen as leading to administrative 
overload and confusion in the minds of recipient governments. Loxley (1986, 100) 
believes that neither Fund conditionality nor Bank conditionality should be viewed as 
dominant — they are complements that serve to consolidate the position of both 
institutions. 
It is obvious then that use of loans from the Bank and the IMF does not 
constitute a simple lending arrangement. Resources provided by the two institutions 
are only dispersed provided certain economic reforms arc undertaken. This is called 
conditionality and it is the most contentious issue surrounding the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
The idea that the use of resources from the Bretton Woods Institutions is 
conditional on policy reform has been the subject of a heated debate for several 
decades. At an extreme level, the Fund and the Bank are viewed as pawns of the 
industrialized countries. Hayter (1971 and 1981), Hayter and Watson (1985), Harris 
(1986), Bernstein (1991), Dowden (1993), George (1991 and 1992), George and 
Sabelli (1994) and Bello (1994) all share the view that the interests of developing 
countries are subordinated to that of developed countries. Harris (1986, 86-88) faults 
the IMF for its promotion of a world system of multilateral trade and payments based 
on market forces rather than on state regulation. He believes that African countries 
are being cajoled into a system that they do not believe in (Harris 1986, 88): 
The IMF's objective, reflected in the conditions imposed on borrowers and 
requiring them to 'liberalise' is not so much to return those countries to a 
normal relationship with the international economy, is not in fact to correct 
'distortion' from the norm or, in the wider view to maintain a free market 
international system. It is, instead, to construct such a system. 
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Bello (1994) offers one of the most radical attacks on the Bank and the Fund. His 
contention is that the two institutions are ideological crusaders that seek to force a 
Reaganomic-Thatcherite economic system on the rest of the world. He states that (p. 
67): 
... judged by [structural adjustment's] underlying strategic goals a shoring up 
of the interests of the North and resubordinating the South within a Northern 
dominated international economic system, structural adjustment has 
undoubtedly been a tremendous success. 
George and Sabelli (1994) echo the view that instead of pulling the strings of their 
own economic policy African governments have become the puppets of the Bank and 
the Fund. Their conception is that the Bretton Woods institutions are supranational 
crusaders that impose their ideology without any concern for dissenting opinions. To 
quote their cumbersome analogy (p. 5): 
this supranational [the Bank], non-democratic institution functions very much 
like the Church, in fact the medieval Church. It has a doctrine, a rigidly 
structured hierarchy preaching and imposing this doctrine and a quasi-
religious mode of self-justification. 
Hayter and Watson (1985, 244), in a slightly less dramatic voice, support this notion: 
[adjustment programs] end up as austerity programs whose major emphasis is, 
always, on squeezing the poor: through cuts in public expenditure, increases in 
the prices of basic goods and wage cuts. The prospect that they will lead to a 
resumption of growth in the Third World and the ability to service and repay 
existing debts, let alone reduce the incidence of poverty is minimal. 
However, adherence to this view is by no means universal. The conservative critique 
proffers that Bank and Fund activities promote Socialism and their lending operations 
serve only to undermine capitalistic development. Helleiner (1990, 10) states that the 
conservative political forces are characterized by an "insensitive and intolerant 
ideology of individualism and the 'magic of the market place' [which] generated new 
cynicism about governments, indifference to poverty, suspicion of international co-
operation and myopia about global and national prospects". An extreme example of 
the above argument can be found in the pages of the decidedly conservative journal 
American Opinion. Here, the IMF is viewed as an agent promoting a socialist super 
state (Allen 1979, 12). John Maynard Keynes, perhaps the most influential 
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participant at the Bretton Woods Conference, is in Allen's (1979, 13) opinion, "an 
aggressive homosexual, that had been the darling of the British Fabian Society, a gang 
of Socialist conspirators." Allen (1979, 13) does not pull any punches on Harry White 
when he states that "there is no doubt that [he] was a Soviet agent." Allen (1 979, 101) 
commenting on the International development Association says: 
soft loans are those that no one in his right mind would make — something 
akin to lending your new Cadillac to Leon Spinks or asking Roman Polanski 
to look after your daughter while you take a vacation. 
The general notion is that funds provided by these institutions "may actually reach the 
poor, contribute to their empowerment, and possibly even result in changes of regimes 
away from capitalism" (Ayers 1983, 12). 
However, both critiques of the Bank and the Fund are fundamentally weak. 
The use of information to advance arguments is selective and alternative frameworks 
are not provided (Nowzad 1981, 9). The radical conservative critique has virtually no 
foundation in fact and its demagogic voice is reminiscent of McCarthyism. There is 
little evidence to support claims of utilising conditionality as a tool for Third World 
exploitation. In addition the role of corrupt recipient governments is often played 
down. However, in recent years there has been a recognition of this problem, albeit 
stated in such a way as to inflame passions more than present a cogent argument. 
Hancock (1989), a journalist and a staunch critic, offers: 
for such people [adjustment money] has probably never been easier to obtain 
than it is today, with no complicated projects to administer and no messy 
accounts to keep, the venal, the cruel and the ugly are all laughing literally all 
the way to the bank. For them structural adjustment is like a dream come true. 
No sacrifices are demanded of them personally. All they have to do —
amazing but true— is screw the poor, and they already have plenty of practice 
at that. 
A more centrist and relevant critique of the Bank and Fund conditionality 
concentrates on the following areas: the system favours the interest of developed 
countries and allows them through majority voting power to obtain considerable 
concessions from African governments, the approach of the institutions is 
paternalistic or grandmotherly, the package of reforms is uniform, conditionality is 
only applied to the poorest countries, the conditions are too tight, surplus countries are 
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not required to adjust along with deficit countries and distributional consequences are 
not adequately addressed and often ignored. 
Some analysts of the IMF and the World Bank claim that from the inception of 
these institutions there has been a bias in favour of developed countries. Nowzad 
(1981, 2) claims that this line of reasoning is flawed because it ignores the fact that of 
the 45 countries represented at the International and Monetary Conference (1944), 28 
countries were developing and only nine of these countries were what are now 
considered to be industrialized. However, at the drafting conference in Atlantic City, 
New Jersey, that preceded the formal conference, only five developing countries were 
present; Chile, China, Cuba, Mexico and India (not yet independent) (Garritsen de 
Vries 1986, 9). Thus active participation by developing countries was minimal and 
for African governments non-existent. 
The Permanent Peoples' Tribunal (1990) extends this notion that there is bias 
in favour of developed countries to the conclusion that the use of conditionality by the 
Bank and the Fund is illegal. This body (the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal 1990, 337) 
has reached the conclusion that Fund conditionality violates the principal of equal 
sovereignty and a State's right to "choose fully its political, social, economic and 
cultural system" as enshrined in international law by Resolution 2625 of the United 
Nation's General Assembly. Furthermore, the Tribunal, quite idealistically and 
unrealistically, believes hat the Bank and the Fund have failed to promote a high 
standard of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development as they are bound to do under the UN charter. 
Another criticism of the two institutions is that voting power favours the rich 
Northern states and this allows them to exert pressure on the South through 
conditionality (Nowzad 1981, 3). Part I members (all Western oriented industrialized 
countries) control 61.5 per cent of the total votes in the IDA. The United States is the 
largest shareholder and its voting power was 21 per cent of IBRD and 31 per cent in 
the IDA for 1981 (currently the figure is 17.2 and 16.1 per cent). Through this power 
and the fact that by convention the presidency of the Bank always goes to an 
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American the Bank takes on a strong pro-American, pro-Western stance. Although 
decisions are reached by consensus in the Bank, Williams (1994,107) reports that the 
largest shareholders are capable of exerting subtle influence by signalling disapproval 
or preventing certain issues from reaching the Board. For example, the United States 
is reported as having been able to halt loans to Chile, Vietnam and Afghanistan (Payer 
1982: 43). In addition the Gonzalez Amendment (1972) prevents the US executive 
directors from voting for loans to any country that has nationalized or restricted the 
use of property held by Americans (Payer 1982, 14). Much the same can be said of 
the IMF. As previously noted the five largest members control nearly 40 per cent of 
the votes in the Fund. Although most of the decisions are reached by consensus 
special provision has been made for special majorities of 70 to 85 per cent in some 
instances which, in effect, provides the US and the European Union (EU) effective 
veto power. The veto power is also available to all LDCs if they were able to bloc 
together but this has not occurred. Yet, it should be noted that US influence can work 
both ways. Parfitt (1990, 35) relates that the US pressured the IMF to reduce 
conditionalities to Zaire after president Mobutu broke with the IMF in 1986. 
Similarly, US intervention was obvious in obtaining unconditional finance for the 
Sudan under Nimeiri (ODI 1992, 3). In more recent years due to criticism developing 
countries have been instrumental in establishing operating guidelines, the general 
direction of the two institutions. 
On the question of whether the IMF is being grandmotherly depends on how 
the word is defined. For some the word might imply a degree of overindulgence if 
this is the case then the Fund clearly is not grandmotherly. If it is defined in the sense 
that the Fund offers guidance and technical assistance to member countries then it 
does exist. However, this is not the same as suggesting that the Fund has absolute 
control over the members' economy. Member countries, as it is shown later, do have 
an active dialogue with Fund staff. Moreover, member countries are able to influence 
overall policy. In the case of the Fund the establishment of the Extended Fund 
Facility followed claims by developing countries that short-term finances based on a 
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shock treatment were not enough given the poor conditions of the countries (Dell 
1981, 26). In addition, following the assertion by developing countries that their 
economic problems were being determined exogenously the Fund established the Oil 
Facility (Dell 1981, 26). However, the use of PFPs has been criticized because 
African member governments feel that they are being "confronted by a Washington 
Monolith (ODI 1993, 2). Yet, the biannual review missions to countries allows the 
Fund the ability to modify conditions in light of new data. Helleiner (1990, 151) 
complains that Bank and Fund missions to developing countries suffer from a lack of 
knowledge of local circumstances and "professional rigidity". Mamdani's (1991) 
study of Uganda and Wuyt's (1991) exposition on Mozambique, represents the 
critique that the IMF's approach to countries fails to take into account the unique 
situation that each African country faces. 
As to whether the reforms and conditions are standardized across countries is 
not as contentious as it seems. Some uniformity is expected provided that the 
problems that face borrowing countries are similar. Given that problem countries 
have in common large public sector deficits and a lack of willingness to adjust 
exchange rates and producer prices the solutions offered are likely to concentrate on 
cutting government expenditure and on devaluing the currency. However, even 
within this framework the reform measures are country specific (Osunsade and 
Gleason 1992, 9). For instance, a cutback government expenditure may be mandated 
by the Fund and Bank, but it is left to the country to decide whether or not to do this 
in military, investment or social areas (Nowzad 1981, 12). 
The criticism that conditionality is only applied to developing countries is 
partially untrue. For the World Bank it is axiomatic that resources and conditionality 
is extended to developing countries as it has no remit to lend to developed countries. 
However, for the IMF the situation is different. For example, in 1967 the United 
Kingdom approached the IMF for $1.4 billion in finances. The Fund withheld the 
resources until the pound was devalued. In 1976, problems with the payments 
situation resurfaced and financing was only made available once agreement with the 
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IMF was made on fiscal measures (Finch 1989, 10-11). However, it should be noted 
that the scale is quite different. In the UK advances to the IMF were viewed as a 
"straightforward financing need" (Finch 1989, 11), however, in African countries the 
perception is that financial sovereignty is being usurped. 
The critique that adjustment is asymmetrical, where surplus countries are not 
required to adjust while deficit countries must undergo reform has some merit 
(Havnevik 1987 and Wohlmuth 1984). Although the Fund is obligated to encourage 
countries with undervalued exchange rates to revalue and encourage the elimination 
of imporUexport subsidies it is not obvious that it has been successful in this area. 
There is little effective pressure on developed countries that have surpluses on their 
current accounts to reduce their surpluses by increasing their imports of goods from 
Sub Saharan Africa. Related to this is the lack of progress in multi-lateral trade 
negotiations. The European Union's Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and the 
policies of other major industrial nations, notably the United States and Japan, serve 
to limit access to lucrative markets in developed countries. Tariffs that are charged at 
a higher rate on processed goods than on commodities (Woodward 1992, 157) serve 
to discourage industrialisation in developing countries. The Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
also hurts developing countries by placing quotas on textiles and textile products 
(Woodward 1992, 157). However, it should be noted that former colonies in Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific (so called APC countries) receive preferential treatment 
under the Lomb Convention. Similarly the United States operates the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative. In addition, during the oil shocks the Fund was instrumental in 
getting the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to recycle surplus 
funds (Mikesell 1983, 60 and Garritsen de Vries 1986). Yet, this should not 
necessarily be viewed as advantageous to African oil importers because monies 
borrowed from this surplus pool would later have to be paid back — thus contributing 
to the debt crisis in the region. 
The largest criticism directed at the Fund and the Bank related to 
conditionality is that in the pursuit of major economic reforms these institutions 
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ignore the distributional impact of stabilisation and adjustment. As this thesis deals 
directly with this question more fully in later chapters, the discussion here will be 
limited. Both institutions, in a broad sense, take a growth oriented approach to 
structural adjustment. Woodward (1992) critiques this approach because it does not 
deal directly with the distribution of income. The criticism concentrates on the fact 
that even if national income increases in the long run, and this is by no means a 
certainty, an increase in income may benefit those who were previously better-off. As 
Woodward (1992, 73) puts it "if future growth benefits the rich more than the poor, 
the growth rate of welfare will be lower than the growth rate of income." 
In defence of the Bank and Fund, the Bank has a long history of concern with 
poverty alleviation. From time-to-time the importance of this has ebbed and flowed 
but it has always been a central concern of the Bank. For example the Bank has 
established a unit to monitor the social costs of adjustment in some African countries, 
has provided specially designed interventions in the Central African Republic, Congo, 
Gabon, Gambia, Madagascar, and established pilot projects in Ghana (Program of 
Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment, Guinea (Social Economic 
Development Support Project) and Guinea-Bissau (Social and Infrastructure Relief 
Project) (Kakwani, Makonnen and van der Gaag 1990, 53). 
The Fund, by virtue of its Articles, on the other hand, has been less concerned 
with the distributional aspects of its reforms. However, as previously shown in this 
chapter increasing awareness has been placed on this matter in recent years 
(Osunsade and Gleason 1992, 9). Nonetheless, the framework for monitoring the 
impact of adjustment and stabilisation has been criticized by Bank employees for its 
weak analytic underpinnings and ad hoc nature (Kakwani, Makonnen and van der 
Gaag 1990, 48). 
However, complaints expressed by academics, journalists and aid workers in 
developing and developed countries do not form the only relevant point of view 
concerning conditionality. Since the criticisms levied against the Fund and Bank are 
complete, the perspective of the IMF and the World Bank will be examined. The 
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World Bank and the IMF see conditionality in a different sense. From their 
perspective some form of lender control is desirable in order to ensure repayment 
under conditions where loans are not collateralized. Since finance provided by the 
IMF is of a revolving nature, a guarantee to make repurchases is necessary in order to 
ensure its continual operations. For the World Bank repayment is required to prevent 
the Bank from eating into its callable capital with the possibility of jeopardizing its 
excellent credit rating. 
Moreover, from a banking point of view there is still a problem. Although 
monies lent by the Bank under structural adjustment arrangements require a 
government guarantee of repayment, there is no legal mechanism for the Bank to 
recover arrears if a borrower country should fail to make its payment instalments 
(Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1991, 66). The moral hazard in this situation is that 
African governments may borrow or purchase from the Bank and the Fund without 
any serious effort to undertake reform programmes. What is available to the Bank 
and the Fund is a carrot and stick approach. That is, they can either continue, or 
refuse to provide finance to borrowers, and failing that, the IMF may, additionally, 
refuse to provide finance to countries with questionable economic policies. If a 
country fails to obtain the IMF's "seal of approval" then finance from other 
multilateral and bilateral private and public sources may dry up. 
Thus, the Bank and the Fund have three powerful weapons at their disposal to 
ensure repayment and compliance with policy reform. They can provide funds in 
instalments (known as tranching), and withhold later instalments until they are 
satisfied that reforms have been undertaken. Second, since 1985, Mosley, Harrigan 
and Toye (1991) report that front loading of conditions is becoming more common 
place for Bank loans. That is, it requires that key conditions are implemented before 
disbursing finance. Finally, the IMF can refuse to allow purchases of Fund resources 
thus scaring away other lenders. Thus, it would seem that there is some merit in the 
argument that the Fund and the Bank have enormous scope and leverage to ensure 
compliance with their economic reforms. However, this is not the case. 
Tightness of 
conditions A D4 implemented 
Ti 
DI 
Tj 
Donor's planning 
allocation 
Planned disbursement 
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Mosley (1987) and Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1991) view conditionality as a 
bargaining process. Governments attempt to minimize the number of conditions 
attached to loans while maximizing the amount of finance they receive. The World 
Bank, on the other hand, attempts to counteract this by tranching loans. Thus, the 
donor attempts to maximize conditionality. Given this conditions attached to loans 
may be less strict than they might seem. Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1991, 74) 
illustrate the above concept in terms of a utility function. 
Note: Subscripts 1 to 4 on R and D curves represent increasing levels of recipient and 
donor utility respectively 
Thus the government wishes to minimize conditions attached to loans in order to 
avoid domestic political strife while maximizing the inflow of funds. In contrast, the 
Bank attempts to maximize conditionality. Assuming that the Bank only has a fixed 
amount available to lend to anyone country then all possible outcomes will lie 
between Ti and Tj. 
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Therefore, conditionality is not so much the usurpation of African 
government's financial sovereignty as much as a process of compromise and trade-
offs. This is not to say that the actors are completely honest in their dealings with 
each other. There are obvious advantages for governments to renege on their 
agreements with the Fund and the Bank. Moreover, Bank and Fund staff may 
incorrectly assess the degree of conditionality required due to a lack of information, 
poor planning or an overzealous willingness to secure reform. For instance, the 
onerrousness of the conditions can, and are, often avoided due to the length of time it 
takes the Bank to determine if they have been implemented (Mosley 1987, 31). 
However, this is less of a problem for the IMF which sets easily monitored and 
unambiguous performance indicators. In addition there is pressure to meet lending 
targets by Bank and Fund staff. Killick (1993, 326) believes that conditionality, under 
such pressure is a paper tiger; the two institutions lend money to ensure that the 
repayment of past loans and credits are made. The provision of future finance is also 
ensured by the commitment of country missions to make sure that their programmes 
work. This leads to "evergrecning", the provision of future finance without the 
plausible threat of conditionality (Killick 1993, 326). Furthermore, there appears to 
be no direct relationship between slippage on reform and the tightness of conditions 
on following loans (Mosley 1987, 31). Therefore, conditionality once accepted, is not 
necessarily to be considered undesirable. It is the degree of conditionality that is 
disputed. The contentiousness of the issue is aggravated to the extent that the Fund, 
acting as a lender of last resort, exercises control not only over its own funds but 
resources provided by other agencies. 
The early history of SAL and SECAL conditionality shows that loan 
conditions are usually implemented fully. The World Bank (1988a, 7-8) study of 15 
countries that received adjustment lending from 1980-87 finds that 60 per cent of 
those countries fully implemented and 84 per cent of the same countries made 
substantial progress in adhering to loan conditions. However, the implementation of 
conditions in the areas of trade policies, fiscal policies, industrial and agricultural 
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policies were below 60 per cent (but still greater than 50 per cent). For the countries 
in Sub Saharan Africa (Ghana, Cbte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia) the 
full implementation of Bank conditionality dropped to 52.4 per cent. However, the 
percentage making substantial progress in implementing conditions rose dramatically 
to 84.6 per cent. 
3.6 The Record 
The record through the 1980s of African countries attempting to adjust to the 
internally created and externally generated shocks has been poor. Table 3.4 gives an 
indication as to the extent of the continuing problem. 
Table 3.4. Macroeconomic indicators in SubSaharan Africa* (annual percentage 
change) 
1965-1980 1980-1986 
GDP 5.6 0.0 
Agriculture 1.6 -1.2 
Industry 9.4 -1.5 
(Manufacturing) (85) (0.3) 
Services 7.5 0.1 
Government consumption 8.1 -1.0 
Private consumption 4.9 0.7 
Gross domestic investment 8.8 -9.3 
Exports 6.6 -2.1 
Imports 19.5 -7.7 
Source: cited in Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantara (1991: 17). Originally from World 
Development Report 1988. 
* Not including Nigeria. 
The above table while useful in giving an overview of the problem also suffers from 
vagueness. Thus, a more comprehensive effort must be made to assess the impact that 
structural adjustment programmes and stabilisation policies have had on African 
economies. However, any effort made to assess the impact that Bank and Fund 
programmes have on macroeconomic variables is likely to face serious 
methodological problems. The problems stem from the fact that it is nearly 
impossible to distinguish the effect that Bank and Fund programmes have on African 
countries from other factors. One approach examines the change that has occurred 
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after Bank and Fund programmes have been implemented. This is flawed in that it 
presupposes that pre-existing policies would have continued indefinitely and 
governments would not have made the necessary corrections later on. A second 
approach compares countries that have received financing from the institutions with a 
control group of countries that have not received assistance. A major weakness with 
this approach is that any difference in economic performance is attributed to the 
Bank's or the Fund's intervention. 
However, this said, some lessons have been learned about the effectiveness of 
Bank and IMF policy based lending. A United Nation's (1992, 43) publication reports 
that the early experience of the IMF in Africa was not effective in achieving the 
desired reforms. Of 22 countries in Sub Saharan Africa only 20 per cent obtained the 
targeted level of growth, only 30 per cent were capable of decreasing the gap in the 
balance of payments to the targeted level, and only one half of the countries were 
successful in reducing inflation to the agreed level (UN 1992, 43-44). Killick (OEM 
1992 and Killick, Malik and Manuel 1991, 28-33) argues that Fund programmes, 
overall, are successful in securing improvements in the balance of payments, not only 
through curbing imports but in promoting exports. However, they are relatively 
unsuccessful in promoting growth, curbing inflation, or in attracting additional 
inflows of capital. Loxley (1986, 96) shares this view that IMF programmes have not 
noticeably restored growth in low income countries. Moreover, service payments on 
past IMF credits exceeded the value of new lending from 1986-1991 in the region. In 
this sense, the Fund can be viewed as increasing the financial problems of African 
countries rather than reducing them (OIDI 1992, 4). 
Colcolugh and Green (1988) find that stabilisation programmes have been 
successful where net resource flows have increased (as in Ghana and Malawi) but 
have been unsuccessful when there has been no increase (as in Sierra Leone, Togo, 
Zambia and Madagascar). 
Khan's (1990, 220) empirical analysis of the effect of Fund programmes from 
1973-1988 on 69 developing countries finds that there is an improvement in the 
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balance of payments (the current account deficit was reduced), inflation rate 
decreased (but not statistically significant) and that the growth rate declined in the 
program year but that this diminished in further years. However, as Khan (1990, 222) 
concedes his study has an important drawback in that the degree of implementation of 
policies was not taken into account. 
Helleiner (1986, 47) finds that short-term demand-oriented programmes have 
been successful in solving balance of payments difficulties only when the problems 
have been short-term in nature. Where problems are longer-term and originate 
externally demand-side approaches have not been successful. Even when long term 
policy lending is used through El -s or SALs the results are "mixed at best" (Helleiner 
1986, 48). The lack of success, is partly related to cancellations of EFF arrangements 
for non-compliance with conditions, and to a lesser extent, cancellation of SALs. 
Killick, Malik and Manuel (1991, 22) find that between 1980-1990, for all recipient 
countries, 48 per cent of stand-bys, 86 per cent of EFFs and 16 per cent of SAFs were 
uncompleted. For Africa, out of 106 programmes 48 per cent were uncompleted 
(Killick, Malik and Manuel 1991, 23). 
The Bank's first major analysis of adjustment lending found that the average 
performance of countries that received SAL or SECALs was better that countries that 
did not receive adjustment lending (World Bank 1988a). The before-after analysis 
found that 30 adjustment lending countries, from 1980-86, performed "mostly better" 
than non-adjustment lending countries in the area of growth, external balance, internal 
balance and external debt. However, the modest improvements did not apply to Sub 
Saharan Africa where investment ratios declined, thus jeopardizing the prospects for 
future growth, and budget deficits were higher. Indeed, Sub Saharan Africa saw 
annual GDP growth decline from 2.7 per cent in the before period to 1.8 per cent in 
the after period. 
Mosley, Harrigan and Toye's (1991) regression based analysis of the 
effectiveness of SALs finds only a weak, but positive effect on GDP and export 
growth and a negative effect on investment. The analysis of IMF stand-by credits 
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revealed a neutral effect on real GDP growth and investment and a positive impact on 
real export growth. Utilizing the with-without evaluation methodology the same 
authors find that for structural adjustment loans, in all regions, in the period 1980-87, 
the effect on GDP growth was weak and negative, on real export growth positive and 
on investment negative (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1991, 203-206). Greenway and 
Morrisey (1993, 251) state that the best results were obtained from countries that 
started out in a better economic condition and those that did worse were countries 
with high slippage rates. 
The World Bank and UNDP (1989) has found that structural adjustment 
programmes have had beneficial effects on growth of GDP and export volumes when 
compared to non-reforming countries. Parfitt (1990) following the criticism of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) states that this study has 
several flaws. First, by measuring GDP over a longer period (1980-87) and utilising 
weighted averages the Bank's "strong reformers" had declines in GDP of -0.53 per 
cent, while "weak performers" attained growth of two per cent, and non-adjusters a 
growth of 3.5 per cent. Second, some francaphone countries were classified as strong 
reformers even though they had not been required to devalue their currencies. Third, 
countries that did not suffer strong shocks but were high reformers did best. 
Summers and Pritchett (1993, 384), World Bank employees, advise against 
making any sweeping statements about the effectiveness of adjustment lending. They 
believe that adjustment can and has worked in several countries. To wit, those 
countries which received at least two structural adjustment loans or three SECALs (so 
called intensive adjusters) by 1990 and implemented them by the middle of 1986 
benefited from higher export and savings shares, faster growth and lower fiscal 
deficits when compared with other countries and when compared to previous 
performance. Summers and Pritchett (1993, 385) further qualify their statement by 
pointing out that adjustment tends to lead to higher growth rates in middle income 
countries than in low income countries. 
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Doorodian's (1993) analysis of 27 developing countries that received IMF 
resources between 1977 and 1983, of which Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Senegal, Zaire and Zambia were the only African countries studied, found that the 
current account balance improved significantly. In line with Khan's (1990) study the 
improvement in the inflation rate was only moderate and it was not definite if the 
adoption of an IMF programme was responsible for any reduction in inflation 
(Doorodian 1993, 860). In addition the effect on the overall level of economic 
activity was only minimal. 
A recent study by the World Bank (World Bank 1994 and Jones and Kiguel 
1994) finds that countries that improved their macroeconomic policies the most 
between 1981-86 and 1987-91 experienced a two per cent increase in growth of GDP 
per capita. In addition, export and industrial growth rates improved by eight per cent 
and six per cent respectively for countries that saw large improvements in 
macroeconomic policies. Countries that failed to improve their economic policies 
suffered a two per cent decline in GDP. More specifically, an in-depth analysis was 
performed on seven countries; Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Tanzania, and all of them except the Cote d'Ivoire, which has exchange 
rate problems stemming from membership in the CFA, experienced an average 
growth rate of 4.5 per cent post 1986 as compared to one per cent from 1981-86 
(Husain 1994, 6). Of the seven countries only one, Tanzania, failed to show a rise in 
per capita food production. In all seven countries average food imports either 
declined or remained the same (Husain 1994: 6). In addition, the export sector 
showed a strong recovery as well as a diversification of he export base (in Ghana and 
Tanzania). However, the study notes that African countries still have a long way to 
go before a "sound' macroeconomic environment is achieved. 
On the whole the impact of adjustment and stabilisation packages on 
macroeconomic reforms remains debatable and subject to continued controversy. The 
results in the case of the Fund suggests that "the evidence is mixed, does not provide 
exclusive support to any single school of thought, and that it is easy to exaggerate the 
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amount of impact which IMF programmes have, for good or ill" (Killick, Malik and 
Manuel 1991, 35). Similarly, the evidence of Bank effectiveness is subject to 
criticism and it is not yet clear, in a definitive sense, that SAL lending has been 
successful. 
For both the IMF and the Bank programmes that have been created with the 
active involvement of the recipient government have faired better. Governments that 
'own' their programmes have, generally, had a greater degree of programme success 
(ODI 1992: 3). Those that feel that programmes were forced upon them in a crisis 
situation or were not adequately consulted during the design stage were likely to 
suffer from a lack of political support and, consequently, a will to follow through with 
reforms. This, then, places the country that has experienced a failed programme in a 
precarious position. 
In Africa reform programmes can be biased towards only a minority of the 
politically influential population. Groups that typically oppose reforms in Africa, as 
has occurred in the Cote d'Ivoire, are student groups and civil servants (UN 1992, 
45). Other groups are unable to wield political influence. Smallholder farmers, the 
majority of all Africans, are a disperse group and rarely organize effectively. Small 
organized competitive businesses, who would be the chief beneficiaries of reforms are 
small and not politically influential. Adjustment and stabilisation packages, then, will 
not always be successful in achieving the reforms considered desirable by the Bank 
and the Fund. 
Adjustment and stabilisation packages must be 'sold' to the populations of Sub 
Saharan Africa. In part the success of this selling action depends on the degree of 
adjustment required and on the ability of national governments to mobilize popular 
support or control social dissent. Woodward (1992, 68) sums up the problem: 
Many countries are forced to undertake macroeconomic adjustment at such a 
pace that it impinges on the political constraints affecting its implementation; 
imposes unduly high social costs; and seriously undermines its on 
effectiveness. Where this results in the adjustment process failing or being 
abandoned, this means that still further adjustment needs to be undertaken 
later, to overcome the counterproductive effects of the previous over-rapid 
adjustment, in addition to the original need for adjustment. The problem is 
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compounded to the extent that foreign lenders and investors react to the 
apparent failure of adjustment by reducing the availability of foreign 
exchange. 
This idea is represented below, 
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Figure 3.2. Support for Adjustment Measures 
Thus if conditionality is not properly planned and does not take into account the 
reluctance of governments to accept short-term financing and their limited ability to 
implement substantial reforms the effectiveness of policy based lending may be 
imperfect or fail. The problem is aggravated to the extent that resistance to reforms 
by leaders and bureaucrats is mirrored in the population at large. Such adjustment 
fatigue (Nelson 1989) limits the political sustainability of programmes. This creates 
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problems for all parties. The IMF is prevented from attaching as many conditions as 
it might like. For the poor in Africa their interests may not be directly addressed 
because there is severe pressure to prevent additional conditions related to child 
welfare and poverty from being attached to loans (Helleiner 1991, 1828). 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the policies of the Bank and the Fund from several 
different perspectives. It has been demonstrated that both institutions follow a liberal 
economic ideology in providing finance to African countries, and that this is most 
prominent in the case of the IMF. The facilities provided for finance, in the case of 
the Bank, have changed in light of this. The Bank now devotes considerable 
resources to so called policy based lending in an effort to get African countries to 
adhere the liberal economic international system. The IMF continues to provide 
finance consistent with its Articles of Agreement in an effort to promote the 
expansion of international trade and to shorten the duration and degree of 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments of its members. The IMF has been shown 
to be an adaptable institution and has made some reforms to its lending operations. 
The ideologies of the two institutions by the late 1980s and early 1990s began to 
merge into a common "Washington Consensus" that urged African countries to 
liberalize the domestic market, foreign investment and trade and to undertake relative 
price corrections and policies to support a balanced budget (UN 1992a and 1992). 
Notwithstanding the reforms, criticism continues to be directed at both Bretton 
Woods institutions. Conditionality remains an important concern of many African 
governments. Although some of the criticisms can be discounted others remain 
persistent. The reluctance of the Bank, and more importantly, the Fund to encourage 
surplus countries to adjust opens the institutions to charges that all the costs of 
adjustment must be borne by African countries while benefits accrue to developed 
countries as well as African states. 
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The effectiveness of structural adjustment programmes and stabilisation 
packages to improve macroeconomic performance still remains subject to debate. 
Some improvements are noted in some areas while the impact in others remains 
neutral or negative. Moreover, incomplete implementation and slippage on reforms 
continues to be a major problem with adjustment. A definitive programme for 
economic success continues to remain elusive. 
The impact of adjustment on the social sector and on individuals well-being 
remains, relatively, under-researched. Following chapters explore some of the 
difficulties involved in establishing a link between macroeconomic reforms and 
changes in an individuals health status. 
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Chapter 4 
The Intersectoral Linkages of World Bank and IMF 
Programme Lending 
4.1 Introduction 
As has been demonstrated in the previous two chapters, economic crises in Sub 
Saharan Africa has led to widespread and often pervasive intervention by the World 
Bank and the IMF into the affairs of African countries. This intervention has taken 
two main forms: adjustment and stabilisation programmes. Recent evidence suggests 
that, overall, in all developing countries, these reform programmes are beginning to 
work, at least in improving the current account and exports. However, the evidence 
has been relatively scarce as to the social impact of economic reforms. 
This chapter looks at the initial linkage between macroeconomic reform and 
the effect that it may have on labour and product markets (where changes in relative 
prices of farm commodities is of primary concern) and on government investment and 
promotion of social infrastructure. Particular attention is paid to the agricultural arena 
as this constitutes the most important sector in Africa. A poverty typology is 
developed in order to show how different groups of people are impacted by reform 
measures. In addition, this chapter is broken down into four main headings; budget 
and public expenditure, the exchange rate, trade and fiscal policies, as these areas are 
subject to substantial reform under policy based lending arrangements. The possible 
impact of reforms are discussed under each heading, as well as the shortcomings 
involved in trying to draw any definitive conclusions as to the effect of reform 
measures. 
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4.2 Poverty Typology 
In order to examine the impact of multilateral programme lending on health status the 
necessary linkages must first be established. These linkages, for the purpose of these 
thesis, and in order to ease analysis, are broken down into two stages. The first stage, 
dealt with in this chapter, concerns the link from macroeconomic reform to labour and 
product markets and to social infrastructure, or in World Bank parlance; macro-meso 
analysis (Demery, Ferroni and Grootaert 1993, 1-14). The second stage, which is 
reviewed in chapter seven, is mainly concerned with the impact on households. 
Since changes in household welfare is central to this thesis it is useful to move 
away from an aggregative analysis to one that focuses on the different groups in 
society. That is, it is assumed that any changes in welfare will not be evenly 
distributed, but will affect different groups unequally. In essence, some people may 
benefit from reform while others will suffer. Furthermore, that any changes may be 
temporary in nature, existing in the short-run only, or may be long-term. 
Therefore, it becomes clear that the construction of a typology is necessary in 
order to disaggregate the impact. Commander (1989), Streeten (1989), Johnson 
(1989) and Duncan and Howell (1992) advise that the agricultural sector should take 
prominence in analysis due to its large size (Green 1989), both in employment and 
export earnings, and in the concentration of Bank and Fund lending in this area. 
Demery and Grootaert (1993), Demery and Addison (1987), Woodward (1992a) and 
Eicher (1992) provide a basic framework for the agricultural or rural sector. In Africa 
it is conventional to break the rural sector into five groups: farmers, pastoralists (or 
herders), landless labourers, non-agricultural workers, and, although strictly not rural, 
fishermen/women. 
Farmers can be broken down into three main subgroupings. First, there are 
farmers that own their own land, employ unskilled labour, utilise machinery and carry 
out production on a large scale; perhaps on a plantation, estate or commercial farm. 
The produce of large farms is mainly for export. Second are middle size farms that 
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produce for export and/or the domestic market with the help of hired labour, 
machinery or livestock. Third, there are small farmers. Smallholder farmers, and in 
particular women, are the major producers of food crops in Africa (Duncan and 
Howell 1992, ix). They are generally resource poor and work the land without aid of 
advanced machinery. They produce for the domestic market and in order to satisfy 
their own families consumption needs and for the export market. For example, 
Duncan and Howell (1992, 7) estimate that in Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar and Malawi 
smallholders play a dominate role in the production of export crops. Such 
smallholders are likely to sell some family labour to larger farms and/or engage in 
non-farm activities in an effort to secure a minimum standard of living. Taken as a 
whole agricultural activities employ between 70 and 80 per cent of the total labour 
force in African countries (Bagachwa and Stewart 1992, 147). 
Pastoralists obtain most of their income from herding activities and are 
resource poor in that they often do not own any land. Pastoralists may supplement 
their income from non-farm trading activities. The lifestyle is nomadic and their 
standard of living is subject to fluctuations based on rainfall. Landless labourers and 
non-agricultural workers are another category of resource poor individuals in rural 
areas. Landless labourers hire their labour to larger farmers that produce either for the 
export or domestic market and their ability to find work may be subject to seasonal 
shifts. Non-agricultural workers in rural areas are primarily engaged in market-based 
activities. Non agricultural work can consist of mining, manufacturing, construction 
or service related activities. Much of the work carried out in non agricultural 
activities is of a part-time or seasonal nature (Bagachwa and Stewart 1992, 147). In 
Africa, the non-agricultural sector provides primary employment for between six and 
26 per cent of the total rural labour force (Bagachwa and Stewart 1992, 147). Fishery 
activities, obviously, are based around coastal areas, and are generally small scale 
with the household composing the main labourers. Fish produce may be carried into 
rural areas either by household members and by market traders. 
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Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below provide estimates of the sources of and types of 
income for rural smallholders in Sub Saharan Africa. 
Table 4.1. Source of Income of Rural Smallholders: Select Regions/Countries in Sub 
Saharan Africa (per cent) 
Type of income 
Forest 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Savannah: 
COte 
d'Ivoire 
Coast: Plateau: 
Madagascar 
South: South: 
Malawi 
Tanzania 
Agricultural 
income 76 81 42 39 48 51 73 
Non-agricultural 
earned incomea 21 17 55 58 49 13 25 
Non-earned 
incomeb 3 2 3 3 3 36 2 
Source: Sahn and Sams (1991) based on various studies therein 
Notes: a includes wages, salaries and own account earnings 
b includes income from transfers and remittances 
Table 4.2. Source of Agricultural Income of Rural Smallholders: Select 
Regions/Countries in Sub Saharan Africa (per cent) 
Source of 
agricultural 
Forest: 
COte 
Savannah: 
Cate 
Coast: Plateau: South: South: Tanzania 
income d'Ivoire d'Ivoire Madagascar Malawi 
Traded fooda 14 32 23 30 36 53 35 
Non-traded 
foodb 41 46 46 69 58 24 61 
export crops c 45 22 31 1 6 23 4 
Source: Sahn and Sarris (1991) based on various studies therein 
Notes: a rice, maize, millet, groundnuts and others 
b millet, cassava, sweat potato, yams and other 
c cocoa, tobacco, cotton, coffee, cola nuts, rubber, sugar and other 
A similar framework for urban areas is also useful in analysis. The urban sector can 
be broken down into formal and informal areas. The formal sector consists of 
individuals involved in private employment or with the government. Formal 
manufacturing is concentrated in a small number of urban areas in most African 
countries. For example, in the late 1970s, 42.6 per cent of total formal manufacturing 
employment in Kenya was located in Nairobi, a city with only 5.3 per cent of the total 
population (Bagachwa and Stewart 1992, 147). In Ghana, 54 per cent of total 
industrial employment was in the capital Accra in 1977 (Bagachwa and Stewart 1992, 
147). Similarly, in Tanzania, 50.3 per cent of total large scale manufacturing 
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employment and 53 per cent of small scale manufacturing employment was located in 
Dar es Salaam (Bagachwa and Stewart 1992, 147). 
Unfortunately the composition of the informal sector is less clear. Heller 
(1988) states that the informal sector is comprised of individuals engaged in small 
scale subcontracting such as the production of intermediate goods for the formal 
sector. Small scale manufacturing is also included in informal sector activities. The 
main activity would be the production of consumer goods for the domestic market 
which are purchased by low- and middle-income households in the formal and 
informal sector. Activities in retail trade, small-scale transport, and personal services, 
such as repairs, tailoring and the like would also be included. 
Gin (1990, 11-113) offers a more fluid definition of informal sector 
enterprises. He characterises informal sector activities under several headings. The 
most significant ones are provided. First, they are extremely heterogeneous ranging 
from illegal activities such as prostitution and trade in drugs to the provision of wood 
to household and craft activities. Low capital intensity and lack of access to modern 
forms of credit is another salient feature. Other hallmarks include simple production 
techniques, access to limited markets (based upon a direct relationship with 
customers) and low productivity. However, the most striking feature of the informal 
sector is its large size. Table 4.1 gives a breakdown for selected Sub Saharan African 
cities: 
Table 4.3. Percentage of Labour Force Engaged in Informal Sector Activities, 
Selected Cities in Sub Saharan Africa 
Percentage of labour force in 
City 	 informal sector  
Abidjan 
	
30 
Lagos 
	
>50 
Accra 	 80 
Ouagadougou 	 73 
Dakar 	 >50 
Source Gin (1990, 113) 
The relation of integration of the informal sector to the formal sector determines how 
quickly the effects of crisis are transmitted to the informal sector (Heller, 1988). That 
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is, if the informal sector is relatively autonomous, with weak linkages to the formal 
sector, the effects of adjustment and stabilisation are unlikely to be transmitted 
quickly. Girl (1990, 113) believes that the informal sector is relatively dependent on 
the formal sector, however there exists some informal sector activities that are 
separate from the formal sector. Moreover, Heller et al (1988) warn that "the 
presence of an informal sector may obscure the channels through which policies 
influenced the poor and thus must raise questions about the validity of inferences 
based only on official statistics." 
4.3. Theory of Adjustment and Stabilisation 
4.3.1 Introduction 
As chapter two indicated Sub Saharan African countries during the 1970s and 80s 
faced an external environment that was inamicable to the promotion of sustainable 
growth in the countries' economies. These problems were compounded to the extent 
that governments were unstable and often acted in the best interests of a minority of 
its citizens. Furthermore, where governments were relatively stable domestic 
mismanagement of the micro and macro economy was undertaken by a poorly trained 
bureaucracy. 
Given this, and the pressing need for external finance, the IMF and the World 
Bank undertook to initiate or promote reforms in African states. Chapter three 
indicated that reform measures concentrated in several areas. In the case of the Bank 
reforms focused on increasing the efficiency of resource use, balance of payments 
difficulties of a long run nature, the promotion of infrastructure development and 
increased access to social services in order to encourage high rates of economic 
growth. Subsequently, the Bank focused on trade, tax, public sector, financial sector 
and institutional reform. The IMF, in contrast, dealt with short term macroeconomic 
disequilibrium and problems with the balance of payments. The Fund expanded its 
role in developing countries from one that merely provided short term finance to 
troubled economies to one that encouraged expenditure switching programmes. 
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While such a distinction in the roles of the two institutions proved useful in 
analysis in chapter three, the distinction in this chapter is blurred. The reason for this 
is that co-operation between the two institutions has led to cross-conditionality of 
objectives. Moreover, the construction of adjustment facilities within the Fund has 
further confused the distinction between the two institutions. 
Underlying both institutions is the ideological notion that open economies, 
which most Sub Saharan countries are, must adapt to the world economic system. To 
do this they must become more flexible and outward oriented. Implicit here is a 
rejection of the closed economy; with its incentives for production to occur for the 
home market, the promotion of import substitution schemes and food self-sufficiency 
(Killick 1993, 86). Instead, the closed economy would be replaced with one where 
producers would be able to effortlessly switch between the production of goods for 
export and goods for the domestic market, and demand would shift readily between 
imports and home goods. Under such a flexible system the exchange rate would, 
ultimately, be encouraged to move freely. 
Thus, the IMF and the Bank, have encouraged policies that would lead to 
more flexibility. Amongst these are exchange rate policies; fiscal policies that 
concentrate on taxation and tariffs and on food subsidies, social services and 
infrastructure; and price and wage controls. 
4.3.2 The Exchange Rate 
Amongst policy instruments used by the two institutions, and here primarily the IMF, 
the exchange rate is the most likely to affect adjustment of African countries (Killick 
1993, 139). However, before proceeding to a full discussion of the exchange rate two 
observations are worth making. First, any changes in a countries exchange rate points 
to the fact that the IMF has moved away from its traditional role of financing a 
balance of payments deficit. It is therefore noticeable that the Fund views the shocks 
that affect African countries as not temporary in nature, but having longer run 
consequences. Second, to ease analysis, for most of this chapter, goods will be 
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broken down into two categories: tradables and nontradables. Tradables are goods 
that are either imported or exported only. Nontradables are goods that do not trade 
and are produced solely for the domestic market. The definition employed here has 
an important implication: goods, in real life, do not fit neatly into two classifications 
of freely tradable and nontradable.11 There is a spectrum of tradability and as Killick 
(1993, 139) warns, changes in the exchange rate "will clearly affect the prices of 
almost everything in varying degrees; and thus can be expected to have rather 
complex effects..." 
However, the distinction having been made, the purpose of a change in the 
exchange rate is to encourage expenditure switching. In the context of adjustment in 
African countries this has, invariably, meant a real devaluation of the currency which 
will act as a signal for resource allocation. A devaluation is considered appropriate 
when the current account deficit becomes unsustainable. That is, the current account 
deficit cannot be financed by borrowing or drawing down reserves. The World Bank 
takes a long term view of the benefits of a devaluation. The Berg Report (World 
Bank 1981b, 30) states that "policy changes to restructure incentives might not always 
have an immediate and direct impact on economic performance, but the cumulative 
long-term effects will be critical to Africa's effort to raise agricultural and export 
growth rates." The effect of a real devaluation, in the orthodox view, is that prices of 
tradable and nontradable goods will change. Tradable goods will see an increase in 
their prices following a devaluation. The reverse occurs, in relative terms, for 
nontradable goods (Commander 1989, xii). Thus a real devaluation will lead to a 
reduction in domestic demand for imports and exports, thus allowing more goods to 
be exported and creating an incentive for producers to switch to the production of 
tradables, while domestic demand shifts to non tradables. This switching helps cure 
some of the problems associated with an overvalued exchange rate. 
4.3.2.1 Overvaluation 
According to Killick (1993), Dornbusch (1988) and Pfefferman (1985) an 
overvaluation causes several problems. First, it discourages export industries by 
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decreasing profitability of production for world markets and reduces external 
competitiveness if goods are homogeneous and there are many producers waiting to 
steal market share. Second, the production of importables is discouraged because the 
local currency costs of imports is artificially cheap. Although this problem can be 
partially offset by protectionist measures geared at protecting domestic industries 
these measures have a tendency to lead to inefficiency in those industries (Pfefferman 
1985, 18). Because domestic inputs cost more than competing imported inputs, 
domestic producers have an incentive to substitute imported inputs for domestic ones. 
This can mean, in Africa, that imported fertilisers are substituted for domestic labour 
(Dornbusch 1988, 81). 
Third, as an overvaluation acts as an implicit tax on exports, exporters who 
receive foreign exchange are forced to surrender it for an artificially low amount of 
domestic currency (Gersovitz and Paxson 1990, 42). Thus, a devaluation may lead to 
an increased willingness to produce for the export sector. Gersovitz and Paxson 
(1990,42) note, though, this effect will be less important to countries that tie their 
currency to the French Franc via the FCFA, than in countries that do not. 
Fourth, the distribution of income, at least in African countries, will be skewed 
to urban groups because an overvalued exchange rate will favour nontraded activities 
instead of rural producers of tradables. This is due to the fact that an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate affects factor markets. It encourages capital and labour to 
move out of tradables and into nontradables because to relative prices of nontradables 
has increased. In this sense an overvalued exchange rate leads to cutbacks in 
employment in the traded sector. This feeds through to the nontraded sector in so far 
as individuals employed in the traded sector have lower incomes and consequently 
less money to spend on nontraded goods. Through the multiplier effect this can lead 
to cuts in production and employment in the nontraded sector. 
Fifth, an overvalued exchange rate, if it lasts over one year, and in the absence 
of effective controls, may encourage capital flight, as wealthy individuals and 
companies may desire to purchase relatively large amounts of foreign exchange 
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before a (predicted) devaluation. This capital flight encourages disinvestment in 
industry. In addition, speculation over a possible devaluation can lead companies to 
purchase more, cheap, imports and withholding exports that would following a 
devaluation fetch higher prices. If the overvaluation is viewed as short-term in nature 
then the pressure on the current account may be offset by compensating capital 
inflows. In the medium to long term this may increase the debt service burden for a 
particular African country (Pfefferman 1985, 18). 
Therefore, there are several, quite serious issues associated with an overvalued 
exchange rate. The obvious prescription is a devaluation. A change in the exchange 
rate offers a couple of advantages over other policy tools such as the administration of 
commercial policies. First, changes in the exchange rate are simple to administer and 
do not require large bureaucracies to run (Krugman 1988, 72). Second, a devaluation 
provides a decentralised incentive to producers. The chief disadvantage is that 
governments find it an unpopular measure to implement. 
4.3.2.2 The Impact of a Devaluation 
In order for a devaluation to be successful in inducing expenditure-switching it must 
lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and not just the nominal exchange rate. 
The aim of a devaluation is to reverse the damage done by having an overvalued 
exchange rate by encouraging domestic consumers to switch their demand from 
foreign produced goods to ones that are produced domestically and to get foreigners 
to purchase exports. Thus if a real exchange rate rises, indicating a devaluation or 
depreciation, imports become more expensive, which in turn leads to a reduction in 
demand, and encourages producers to produce more import substitutes and goods for 
the domestic market because they are relatively cheaper. Thus an increase in the price 
of tradablcs causes domestic demand to switch from traded goods to home goods. 
The production of exports increases because the have become more profitable. 
Thus a real devaluation sends powerful signals to both producers and 
consumers. However, the benefits of a devaluation should not be overstated as there 
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are several adverse effects associated with it. First, and most importantly, a 
devaluation tends to be inflationary (Krugman 1988, Helmers 1988, Fischer 1988, 
Singh 1986 and Bond 1980) and possibly stagflationary (Killick 1993). For countries 
in Sub Saharan Africa imports are likely to be important in providing raw materials, 
inputs for industry and finished consumer goods. Since a devaluation will normally 
raise the local currency costs of imports and hence the domestic prices of these goods 
the costs to producers using imports and the prices paid by consumers who purchase 
imported goods increases. 
Another one of the main criticisms of devaluation is that increases in export 
revenues are used primarily to service external debt. Stein (1992), a critic of the 
World Bank and IMF adjustment model, states that devaluation (and tightening of 
credit) can greatly increase the cost of obtaining foreign and domestic funds for the 
purposes of investment. In fact a devaluation could lead to a worsening of the budget 
deficit when a large portion of government expenditure is devoted to foreign debt 
obligations. In essence, it "raises the cost of government foreign exchange 
expenditure in domestic currency terms" (Woodward 1992a, 45). 
Sarkar (1991), points out another failing of utilising devaluation as a policy 
tool. Based on evidence from 29 Highly Indebted Countries, he shows that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the percentage rates of real devaluation 
and the percentage change in export volumes. Furthermore, that there is no guarantee 
that increased production of tradables can be sold because of protectionism in 
industrial countries and the fact that the world market for agricultural raw materials 
and minerals is determined by buyers demand. The problem is made worse to the 
extent that a devaluation in one developing country often leads to a spiral of 
competitive devaluation among other developing countries producing the same type 
of products (Sarkar 1991, 2309). This is the "fallacy of composition" argument. The 
idea behind this is that the effect of one country's devaluation should not be seen in 
isolation of other adjusting countries, and that the aggregate effect of several 
devaluations may be different (and less desirable) than the effect of a single 
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devaluation. Since the Bank and the Fund lean heavily towards the promotion of 
exports in Africa as a way of improving the current account, the net effect of 
encouraging exports from many countries may serve only to increase supplies and 
decrease the prices paid for the exports. Indeed, the fallacy of composition problem 
can be extended to adjustment programmes overall. For instance, there may be two 
adjusting countries A and B. Country B may not be able to import A's goods due to 
its adjustment programme. This occurred in the case of Mali, a land-locked country 
with a limited ability to compete on world markets, which was restricted from 
increasing its exports of livestock to neighbouring countries due to their adjustment 
programmes and lack of foreign exchange (Woodward 1992a 63). 
But to counter Sarkar's (1991) belief that contemporaneous devaluations 
worsen the terms of trade of Sub Saharan African countries, DeRosa and Greene 
(1991) state that this is not necessarily the case. Only where the combined share of 
African exports is high in relation to world supply, and the share of a particular 
commodity is high in the devaluing countries' total exports are the effects expected to 
be negative, and then only in the short-run. Their study suggests that, "overall 
contemporaneous devaluations have raised total export earnings from individual crops 
in Sub-Saharan Africa" (DeRosa and Greene 1991, 33). The World Bank (1981b)12 
in one of the earliest reports that brought attention to the crisis in Sub Saharan Africa 
and the need for adjustment suggests that "[mainly agricultural] exports can be 
diversified and Africa's share of world trade in most commodities could be increased 
with relatively small effects on prices." In so far as this is a carefully worded 
statement it is true. 
However, looking at two commodities, coffee and cocoa, that are important in 
generating income in Sub Saharan Africa, an increase in the volume of exports will 
lead to a decline in the world price of these commodities. Godfrey (1985, 170) states 
that a one per cent increase in Sub Saharan Africa's exports of coffee would lead to a 
1.14 fall in the world price. For cocoa a one per cent increase in exports would lead 
to a 2.17 per cent fall in the world price. This is potentially a big problem due to the 
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fact that investors and producers will have an incentive to increase production of 
products that require little investment and only a small amount of foreign exchange, 
and where output is likely to increase quickly (Woodward 1992, 67). Basically the 
incentive is to increase the volume of primary products. However, this view is 
slightly flawed insofar as the increased production of agricultural products takes time 
(at least a year) and for some crops considerably more time. Killick (1993, 306) 
reviewing evidence from Africa finds that this argument only holds for cocoa, where 
returns are likely to be negative. However, even in countries that produce cocoa (of 
which Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for greater than 50 per cent of the world exports), 
such as Ghana and the C6te d'Ivoire, devaluation is likely to have a positive long-run 
impact as earnings from other exported commodities would increase (DeRosa and 
Greene 1991, 33). 
A further problem relating to improvements in a country's trade balance can 
be viewed in terms of how much exports are encouraged and imports discouraged by 
a change in price. The Marshall-Lerner condition states that the elasticity of supply of 
exports and the elasticity of demand for imports must sum to unity. Taylor (1983) 
offers evidence that in developing countries the elasticity of supply of exports and 
elasticity of demand for imports are too low to satisfy the Marshall-Lerner condition. 
For example, Chhibber (1985) reports that in developing countries the aggregate 
supply elasticity of agriculture with respect to prices lies in the range of 0.3 to 0.9. 
However, for the poorest developing countries with minimal infrastructure the range 
is from 0.2 to 0.5. This means that if real farm prices increased 10 per cent output 
would only increase by 2 to 5 per cent. Beynon (1989) reports that aggregate 
agricultural supply response in the short run of approximately 0.2, and long run 
elasticities of 0.4. Bond's (1983) study of nine Sub Saharan African countries 
estimated the aggregate elasticity of supply of between 0.05 and 0.22 in the short run 
and 0.07 to 0.34 in the long run. If this is occurring a devaluation may lead to a 
worsening of the balance of payments position. Moreover, note should be made of 
the possibility that a J-curve effect may be operating; where devaluation in the long 
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run may be successful, but in the short term the balance of trade would worsen before 
it improved. If either is occurring then the implications of improving the standard of 
living, in the short run at least, is poor. 
4.3.2.3 The Structuralist Factor 
Also, in the area of expenditure-switching policies, there is also reason to believe that 
there are some effects which might offset the possibility of a positive outcome. 
Structuralist factors, here, prevent supply from responding to increased price 
incentives. The World Bank (Demery and Addison and World Bank 1981b) tends to 
play down the structuralist perspective in the role of increasing supply. Structuralists 
(Taylor 1983 and 1988) believe that technological backwardness and the "structure of 
institutions and the behaviour of members make some patterns of resource allocation 
and evolution substantially more likely than others" That is, markets will not 
necessarily be price clearing as under neo-classical economics. Instead non-economic 
or non-maximising behaviour may occur by individuals or institutions that are 
recognised to have political and social characteristics as well as economic ones. For 
example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, Smith (1989, 28-29) believes that many of the 
measures may not have the desired beneficial effect even in the long-run. He says 
that due to the fact that markets are extremely fragmented and a large percentage of 
goods are not traded price reforms will not work because they assume resources and 
commodities are traded in markets that are integrated and competitive. There is also 
the notion of the 'food security syndrome', where farmers give priority to foods that 
will ensure self-sufficiency. Due to this action on the behalf of farmers, they become 
less likely to switch from non-tradables to tradables. The effect of this is to dampen 
the positive effect that changes in prices are supposed to bring about under a 
devaluation. That is, due to the 'food security syndrome' production decisions taken 
by farmers will not be very responsive to changes in price and the improvement in net 
foreign exchange earning, consequently will be lower than predicted. Finally, many 
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African governments lack the proper administrative and well-trained bureaucracy that 
is necessary to effectively intervene in the price mechanism. 
Smith (1989, 26) also states that the full effect of devaluation may not be 
passed back to the producer because the producer may have unequal bargaining power 
vis-a-vis purchasers. Related to this is, if the product market is monopsonistic, traders 
may not pass price increases on to the farm gate (World Bank 1990, 5) thus reducing 
the incentives for farmers to make the switch to tradables. That is if commodity 
marketing boards act as intermediaries between producers and foreign importers, and 
they only pass on a small portion of the price gain to producers then the full benefit of 
a devaluation will not be enjoyed by the producers. Furthermore, changes in supply 
may be hindered by non-price factors such as a lack of investment (or disinvestment) 
in transport and communication, lack of credit (United Nations 1992, 44), lack of 
irrigated water and poor research and extension services (Chhibber 1988, 44). The 
incentive to produce is further diluted to the extent that the availability of consumer 
goods is limited and the proceeds of marketed surplus cannot be spent (Beynon 1989, 
329) in the satisfaction of householder demands. Structuralist factors in the area of 
technological backwardness and capital constraints also tend to limit increased 
production in the face of favourable price changes. Agriculture, in Africa, as shown 
previously shown in chapter two, is not highly advanced and fertiliser consumption, 
mechanisation and irrigation lag well behind other regions (Beynon 1989). The 
quantity of credit available to African farmers is limited in rural areas and, at times, 
non-existent for smallholders (Beynon 1989). Kamarck (1988, 215) believes that the 
lack of individual ownership of land and clouded title claims hinders the expansion of 
agricultural export. 
It is useful to make a distinction in agricultural crops. Annual crops, such as 
cotton and rice, can be put into or out of production relatively quickly. The acreage 
planted for tree crops, such as coffee, cocoa, palm oil rubber and tea, takes time to 
increase which translates into output changing in the medium or long term. For 
industry, a devaluation can cause problems as well. Following a devaluation the cost 
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of obtaining foreign and domestic funds for investment increases greatly (Stein 1992, 
88). The supply response by manufacturers depends on this and the degree that 
imported inputs are used in the production process. Switching from imported inputs 
to domestic ones may take months or years to occur (Johnson 1987, 25) so any 
benefits may only be observed in the long run. 
4.3.2.4 Other Problems with a Devaluation 
Bassett (1988) also attacks the World Bank position that the movement to export crop 
production will not hurt food security. He says that, in the World Bank's view, there 
are three areas where food crops and export crops are complements of each other. 
First, food crops that are rotated with cash crops benefit from the fertiliser used for 
cash crops. Second, technology introduced in cash cropping schemes can be used to 
improve food crop production. Third, institutional arrangements such as agricultural 
extension and marketing services used for cash crops can be used to improve food 
crops. 
Basset's (1988, 50-54) limited study on the Cote d'Ivoire destroys some of 
these assumptions. First, farmers do not always alternate food and cash crops. In 
Cote d'Ivoire only 25 per cent of the cases (out of 38 households in one village) did 
food crops alter with cash crops. Moreover, the use of fertilisers should not be viewed 
as a benefit as fertilisers applied to savannah soils may lead to increased acidification 
(p.51). Second, the introduction of mechanised production was limited to only one 
per cent of cotton growers and maintenance costs of tractors is likely to curtail the 
long-term sustainability of the programme (p. 52). Third, marketing arrangements 
introduced into the COte d'Ivoire have not benefited locally grown food crops: 60 per 
cent of total caloric value of food comes from imported rice. 
Inflation may also occur because as exports grow this leads to increased 
demand and a shift from foreign goods to home goods produced by domestic 
residents. This can translate into a push against limited supply and prices of domestic 
goods increasing (Krugman 1988, 69). In addition, as previously noted prices of 
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imported inputs and consumer goods will increase which will likely fuel inflation. 
The possibility of high inflation following a devaluation becomes more pronounced to 
the extent that organised labour take defensive action through wage indexing in order 
to protect their standard of living. Since wages in the formal sector are likely to be 
indexed they too increase, which feeds through to domestic prices (assuming 
producers follow cost-plus pricing rules), and in turn leads to further wage increases. 
To borrow the Latin American terminology, the wage earning sector can be broken 
down into two components: wage-fix and wage -flex (Demery and Addison 1987a, 
1493). The wage-flex sector, which corresponds loosely to the urban informal sector, 
clears through a fall in real earnings. The wage-fix sector, or the urban public and 
private sectors, adjust by cutting employment rather than real wages. Thus, the urban 
informal sectors share of total unemployment will tend to increase faster than total 
unemployment (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987). However, Behrman (1988, 113) 
notes that pressure on wages may not be that significant in Sub Saharan Africa where 
wage indexing and unionisation is not as prominent as it is in Latin America. 
Addison and Demery (1994, 186) report that the wage rigidities in Africa emanate 
from government intervention in labour markets; either through minimum wage laws 
or the setting of public sector wages. Killick (1981, 216) notes that the increase in 
inflation need not be severe, but can be gradual depending on if the devaluation is 
large and discontinuous or if the devaluation occurs in steps. 
Godfrey (1985, 176) states that the benefits of devaluation were more than 
negated by domestic price inflation in Kenya in the period 1980-82. This is attributed 
to the fact that producers were able to pass on price increases in the prices of imported 
inputs to consumers quickly (Godfrey 1985, 177), rather than due to increases in the 
money wage. However, in any case, in Africa this may not be a serious problem as 
organised labour makes up a relatively small percentage of the workforce. Moreover, 
it is possible to remove imported goods from the wage index or to suspend the index 
altogether during a devaluation (Fischer 1988, 119). In addition as the prices of some 
goods increase this may lead to higher inflation, at least in the short run. From an 
95 
orthodox view, this does not really matter as price increases should be matched with 
decreases in prices assuming that the money supply remains unchanged. However, if 
the velocity of circulation increases with inflation then there will be a problem 
(Woodward 1992a, 47). If imports decline as a result of a devaluation this may effect 
the amount of money collected in taxes if import tariffs make up a large portion of 
government revenue. 
The conventional wisdom, while explaining that exports will eventually 
expand and imports will decline, thus leading to increases in income and an improved 
balance of payments position, does not offer any steadfast rules as to how long this 
may take. If capacity is fully utilised the response may be slow. Moreover, if 
increases in exports are expected to come from the mining and agricultural sectors, 
ore extraction and the cultivation of some crops (those with long gestation periods) in 
particular, take a long time (Behrman and Deolalikar 1990, 334). Thus, slowing 
down the positive effects of a devaluation from reaching producers. 
However, a devaluation need not, necessarily, be inflationary. A real 
depreciation means that local importers have to sacrifice more local currency in order 
to obtain a given quantity of imports. This increase in the amount of local currency 
that is given up in order to purchase foreign exchange will decrease the money supply 
and, subsequently, reduce inflationary pressures (Killick 1981, 217). In fact a 
devaluation may be recessionary. The price increase that follows a devaluation may 
reduce purchasing power and increase the costs to domestic industry (Killick 1993, 
158). There are two force at work; inflationary and recessionary. The net result may 
be higher inflation with lower economic growth (Killick 1993 158). Yet lower 
economic growth is not a definite outcome: there will be a net injection into the 
economy so long as the increase in tradables is larger than the decrease in 
nontradables (Killick 1993, 159). 
To measure the impact on prices, incomes and product markets the orthodox 
view is maintained; that is, a devaluation leads to an increase in the price of tradables. 
According to Winters (1991, 291) a devaluation can have three effects on income. 
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Firstly, there is the idle resource effect, where devaluation will lead to a price effect 
that will stimulate the production of importables and exportables. If there are spare 
resources expansion in production will not be at the expense of nontradable goods 
and incomes may increase directly. Secondly, there is the terms of trade effect where 
given production, a deterioration in the terms of trade leads to a decline in income. 
Finally there is the real resources effect. If the exchange rate was previously 
overvalued this may distort production; reducing the output of tradables relative to 
nontradables. A devaluation is seen as correcting this distortion, and thus a 
devaluation raises output. 
A devaluation, then will represent an income benefit for exporters, farmers, 
processors and manufactures producing for export. The effect of a devaluation will 
make the price of non-tradables fall, in relative terms. Thus, the incomes of farmers 
who grow non-export crops will fall. However, the strength of the effect will be 
dependent on the labour intensity of production in the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors, and lags in relocating workers and raw materials (Huang and Nicholas, 1987). 
If, for example, domestically produced importables or exports are largely produced by 
the poor, a labour intensive activity in most developing countries, as would be the 
case for rural agricultural producers of some basic foods, the factor intensity will be 
beneficial to the poor (Behrman and Deolalikar 1990, 334). Conversely, if tradables 
are produced in capital intensive industries, then the factor intensity effect will favour 
the owners of capital in the formal private sector. However, Demery and Addison 
(1987, 1488) caution that it is possible for production to be labour intensive in the 
informal sector, but capital intensive in the formal sector. The net effect on the 
production side for rural and urban groups depends on the weight of tradable and 
nontradable activities in the generation of income and the ratio of tradable and 
nontradable goods and services in a households consumption basket (Demery, Ferroni 
and Grootaert 1993, 4) Agricultural growth consisting of expanding non-food cash 
crops may mean that growth is accompanied by falling food supplies and rising food 
prices, with implications for household food security (see chapter six). 
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The effects of a devaluation feed through to the labour market by encouraging 
individuals to hire their labour in the sector that will generate the most income. 
Workers cannot remain unemployed for long in Africa due to the absence of a social 
security network, thus workers are motivated o seek employment in agricultural and 
informal activities (Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar 1994, 34). In general, rural 
households in the region make extensive use of the labour market to increase income 
by selling what is often their only asset (Duncan and Howell 1992, 10-11). The 
possible benefit of hiring labour depends on the number of workers seeking 
employment and the wages offered and demanded (Duncan and Howell 1992, 11). 
Employment prospects in rural areas are more favourable than in urban areas. The 
supply of labour grows more slowly in rural areas than in urban centres. In urban 
areas the supply of labour can grow 5 to 6 per cent a year. A devaluation (and trade 
liberalisation) favours rural areas through increases in producer prices, while in urban 
areas the cut in demand slows growth in the formal sector which feeds through to the 
informal sector as this sector acts as a refuge for displaced workers as most African 
countries do not offer unemployment benefits (Bourguignon and Morrison 1992, 12). 
For instance, the supply of labour to the urban formal sector grew by 7.7 per cent 
annually from 1980-85 in Cote d'Ivoire, while during the same period the demand for 
labour fell by 20 per cent (Bouguignon and Morrison 1992, 33). This lead to a 
swelling of the informal sector so that unemployment in the formal sector could be 
mopped up. Bernstein (1991, 23), however, interprets the impact on smallholders 
differently. He believes that the modernisation of agriculture in Africa may offer few 
benefits to the rural poor. He believes that reforms will lead to rural producers being 
crowded out by a new capitalist class with the result that large parts of rural areas will 
become refuges for subsistence farmers suffering from declining opportunities for 
petty commodity production and casual wage labour (Bernstein 1991, 22). 
Outside of possible income effects, there will be increases in the prices of 
imports and goods produced for the domestic market will rise in relative terms. The 
implication on the standard of living depends upon the consumption basket of 
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individuals and price elasticities of demand. Although this argument is covered fully 
in chapter six, some important points are worth making here. An increase in staple 
food prices promises a perverse effect for nutrition. An increase in the price of 
imported medicines may mean that some groups may have to go without essential 
treatment. The situation is similar for food; if imported staple foods constitute a large 
portion of the consumption basket of the poor then the consumption effect will work 
against the poor (Behrman and Deolalikar 1990, 334). However, it should be noted 
that the consumption effect needs to be weighed against the factor intensity effect 
(Behrman and Deolalikar 1990, 334). That is, the positive effects of being involved 
in a labour intensive activity that benefits from a devaluation may offset any negative 
effects associated with the consumption effect. Locally produced goods that use 
imports or import substitutes in their production process will also, likely, see an 
increase in price if increases in production costs are passed onto consumers 
(Woodward 1992a, 46). 
In the urban formal and informal sector, Braverman and Kanbur (1987) state 
that the conventional role of agricultural pricing has a clear urban bias; 
[it] is essentially a method of taxing the rural sector in order to finance the 
(internationally non-traded) activities of the urban sector, and is a method of 
keeping down the price of agricultural goods to urban consumers. 
Governments in Africa appear to display a special concern for the standard of living 
for those in the urban sector. Reforms proposed by the IMF and the World Bank can 
effectively reverse this bias if implemented carefully. 
Gunatilleke (1991, 350-352), who describes the situation in Sri Lanka, but 
offers general comments applicable to all developing countries, believes that certain 
macroeconomic reforms that aim to increase agricultural incomes may lead to an 
increase in the cost of urban wage goods and adversely affect those with unstable and 
low incomes in the urban sector. In nominal terms the average income of the urban 
sector will be higher than in other sector. However, members of the typical urban 
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household will not be able to spend time growing produce for their own consumption 
and is, therefore, reliant on the market to provide essential foods. 
However, Braverman and Kanbur (1987) point out that the effects of reform 
programs may not hit the urban sector as much as some people think. They believe 
that a "political economy" effect exists such that attempts to redress (say through cost 
of living adjustments) the adverse effects on the standard of living of those who lose 
from agricultural price reform; "essentially the problem may be characterised as being 
one of too many claims on too few resources. The political system adjudicates these 
claims, and as things stand the winner in most developing countries seems to be the 
urban sector" (Braverman and Kanbur 1987, 1183). For example the World Bank 
(1990a) found that the government in Cameroon showed an unwillingness to cutback 
on public sector employment during a period of adjustment. From 1985-87 the share 
of salaries in total recurrent health spending rose to 99 per cent (World Bank 1990a, 
117). 
In addition, the inflationary consequences of devaluation may mean that any 
real increases in producer prices may be eroded over time (Smith 1989, 26). 
Moreover, Smith (1989, 26) views the timing of devaluation as having an important 
effect on the benefits that tradable agricultural producers receive. He says that "if the 
devaluation occurs after harvest has been sold, and the prices of purchased food and 
agriculture inputs increase immediately, low-income farmers without reserves or 
access to credit may have to reduce their purchases of them." Moreover, if 
devaluation leads to lower urban wages then the demand for food products may fall. 
However, it is important to note that "changes in agricultural performance and hence 
overall economic performance are influenced as much, or more, by the weather and 
by changing international terms of trade as by deliberate policy changes" (Smith 
1989). 
The impact of a devaluation on government revenues and expenditures 
depends on the circumstances of each country. Where government revenues are based 
on international trade the impact of a devaluation will be such as to increase revenues. 
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If government revenues are based to a large extent on income taxes the initial effect 
may be to reduce revenues. As no African country relies exclusively on one type of 
tax regime the impact will be complex and dependent on the net effect of 
simultaneous increases and decreases in government revenue. 
On the expenditure side the effect of a devaluation, again, will be dependent 
on how the government spends its revenues. Assuming that revenues remain 
unchanged during a period of adjustment then the impact will likely be negative. For 
example, if the government is a large consumer of imports then the effect of a 
devaluation will be negative in so far as import prices have increased. In addition, the 
government might decide, under political pressure from organised labour and national 
elites that face the possibility of a decline in real income, to shore-up salaries in the 
public sector. Moreover, if a particular African country has a large external public 
debt a devaluation will serve to raise the local costs of servicing that debt (Killick 
1993, 161). 
Since inflation is possibly an unwanted by-product of the devaluation then 
other tools must be used in order to counter the adverse effects. This takes to form of 
expenditure reducing and commercial policies carried out by the government. 
4.3.3 Budget and Public Expenditure Reform 
Given that a devaluation is likely to be inflationary the Bank and the Fund encourages 
member governments in Africa as part of structural adjustment programmes to 
undertake expenditure reducing policies. The aim of expenditure reducing policies is 
to reduce domestic expenditures on consumption goods and investment so that 
exports minus imports can rise while leaving GDP unchanged (Helmers 1988, 65). 
The government does this in three different ways (Krugman 1988, 65). First, it may 
reduce its own expenditure by cutting government programmes and/or reducing 
public investment. Second, it can reduce private consumption by raising taxes or 
cutting subsidies. Third, it may reduce private borrowing by limiting credit creation 
by the banking system. 
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4.3.3.1 Cutbacks in Government Programmes 
Macroeconomic reform programs sponsored by the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank have both an immediate and direct impact on government employees 
by altering the level of employment in the public sector. This may lead to declines in 
income overall if wages are frozen and prohibited from adjusting to inflationary 
pressures generated by expenditure switching reforms. Individuals in the urban 
formal sector that are made redundant will suffer most, if they are unable to find 
replacement employment quickly. Indirectly, reforms aimed at curbing public 
expenditure, by reducing the government payroll, can be passed on to other parts of 
the formal sector, because demand for their goods and services will be diminished. 
Activities in the informal sector will also be adversely affected in as much as former 
government workers, and recently redundant formal sector workers, consumed their 
goods and services. If public enterprise are privatised then financial resources may be 
diverted from the government in an effort to cover redundancy payments (Woodward 
1992, 54). 
Thus, those most likely to be harmed are higher income urban groups. There 
is no direct implication for poverty groups in the rural sector or in the urban informal 
sector in the long-run. Evidence from Africa suggests that the poorest individuals 
derive little income from public employment and are therefore not affected by 
government cutbacks (Demery, Ferroni and Grootaert 1993, 3). However, if urban-
rural remittances are significant then there may be some adverse effects (Heller 1988). 
In the short run, lower employment in the formal sector raises the supply of labour to 
the informal sector, thereby reducing the real earnings of the poor engaged in the 
informal sector. 
According to Stein (1992) cutbacks that occur on infrastructure development 
and maintenance will inhibit export-oriented activities. Manufacturing and 
agricultural activities that are carried out far from urban centres or ports, may be 
indirectly penalised due to increased costs of transport. If public expenditure 
translates into cuts in the social sector numerous effects are expected, and they will be 
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discussed in chapter six. Figure 4.1 below provides a framework for analysing the 
above linkages. 
Figure 4.1. Budget and Public Expenditure reform linkage 
The impact on the rural agricultural sector in Africa may also be negative. First, a 
contraction in the domestic credit available to borrowers may limit the seasonal and 
long-term finance available for agricultural production and marketing (Smith 1989, 
25). Second, the reduction in spending on infrastructure can negatively affect 
production and marketing (Smith 1989, 25). Third, attempts at cost-sharing with the 
private sector by the government may lead to a reduction in the cash available for 
food and agricultural input purchases which may adversely affect agricultural 
production in the short-and long-run (Smith 1989, 25). 
4.3.3.2 Reductions in Private Consumption 
Revenue measures such as increases in taxation on income, profits, and property will 
effect well off groups only, as taxation in Sub Saharan Africa is confined mainly to 
civil servants and employees of large, private, modern companies.13 Because income 
taxes are narrowly based, revenue derived from this source does not provide the 
government with much flexibility (Gersovitz and Paxson 1990, 42) In as much as 
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governments rely on taxes on goods and services, increases in value added taxes, or 
sales taxes, will hit the poorest groups the hardest as these taxes are regressive. If 
important items, such as food, medicines, and household fuel, in the consumption 
basket of the poor are VAT-exempt then the impact will likely be negligible. During 
periods of macroeconomic reforms the government would be incapable of increasing 
income taxes, say, to fund severance payments or otherwise maintain the standard of 
living of government employees, because the tax increases will fall mainly on the 
government employees. Figure 4.2 below outlines these linkages. 
Fiscal Policy 
change in level of taxation 
taxes affecting individuals import/export taxes 
decrease in incomes 
of urban formal 
no change in incomes 
for informal if 
protected 
Figure 4.2. Fiscal Policy linkage 
Taxes that are applied to exports, will allow increases to occur in the government 
coffers, only if exports increase as a result of devaluation. Gersovitz and Paxson 
(1990, 42), also state that a decrease in export prices will lead to a fall in government 
revenues that is more than proportional to the decrease in export earnings. This is due 
to the fact that state marketing boards attempt to keep the prices that they pay to 
producers relatively constant in real terms, so that they must bear the brunt of any of 
the fall in real export prices. Additionally, marketing boards must continue to meet 
marketing costs, costs that are independent of the price of a particular commodity. 
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Overall contractionary fiscal and monetary policies will restrain demand in the 
short-run and will lead to a decrease in the real purchasing power of the economy, 
leading to a decrease in demand for labour and a reduction in output, which will 
probably mean a decline in the real incomes of the poor (Behrman and Deolalikar 
1990, 335). However, the duration of any negative effects will be dependent on how 
long it takes supply to shift, and whether or not the government is willing and able to 
protect certain members of the population from the adverse effects (Behrman and 
Deolalikar 1990, 335). 
The lifting of subsidies can have a severe effect on poor groups depending on 
how subsidies are removed. If they are removed in their entirety, it is expected that 
the all groups would be made worse off. If the removed subsidies are done carefully, 
then the effects would be limited to certain groups. In addition, when subsidies are 
removed prices of previously subsidised goods rise thus adding to inflation that 
perhaps began under expenditure switching policies. More specifically, the lifting of 
general food and subsidies related to health care would harm the poor the most. The 
lifting of subsidies on energy and transport would most likely hit urban groups the 
most, and among them the more well off. However, the lifting of transport subsidies 
would also hurt the poor if it was used to travel to and from market or in order to seek 
medical care. Even the removal of energy subsidies could have a perverse effect on 
the poor if, for instance, the subsidy was on kerosene. 
Behrman (1988, 115) notes that the removal of price controls will lead to 
supply expansion, a reduction in government expenditure and discourage demand. 
Obviously, a contraction in demand may have serious consequences, however the 
removal of price controls may in some respects be advantageous. In many countries 
where price controls have operated parallel markets have cropped up. Given the 
existence of parallel markets, that charged above the official price, the removal of 
controls or an increase in price ceilings only serves to reduce the incomes, legal or 
not, or parallel marketers and monitoring organisations (Behrman 1988, 117). 
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Chapter six will show that the removal of subsidies requires those affected to 
make up for the loss by either seeking additional work, depleting savings or going 
without. To the extent that individuals are able to cope with this, depends mainly on 
their pre-removal income. Thus, the well-off are expected to suffer little hardship, 
and the rural and urban poor to suffer the most. The targeting of individuals, will be 
shown later, may offset for any cutbacks, but this is not necessarily the case. 
Overall, The chief problem with expenditure reducing policies is that by 
reducing the domestic demand for goods produced by consumption and investment 
industries unemployment and excess capacity may occur. The net result may be that 
the balance of payments improves but that growth may suffer. The problem is 
compounded, at least in the short run, to the extent that export industries take time to 
expand and may not increase at all if wages and prices are inflexible (Helmers 1988, 
17). Obviously, this is a complicated situation. As Krugman (1988, 70-71) suggests, 
governments should use "expenditure switching policies to reduce imports and 
increase exports by the desired amounts and use expenditure reducing policies to cut 
domestic demand by just enough to keep overall domestic demand from exceeding 
excess capacity." However, Killick (1193, 168) cautions that it is "difficult to get the 
policy mix right and more evidence is needed before making a final judgement." 
4.3.4 Trade policies 
Trade policies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank concentrate on 
liberalisation. Liberalisation often refers to the removal of price controls. If price 
controls are in effect transactions are often shifted to parallel markets (due to 
corruption, etc.) where poor consumers cannot get official market prices. As official 
market prices are likely to be lower than those in the free market, poor consumers will 
benefit if liberalisation serves to shift prices back, and urban groups who had access to 
official prices will lose. Undifferentiated liberalisation, which is an important 
component of structural adjustment, tends to have a negative effect on industrial 
activity, "since the previously highly protected industry cannot compete with 
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international competition [companies]." (Stewart, Lall and Wangwe 1992, 26). 
Although some of the negative effects can be offset by a devaluation, overall the 
tendency is to deindustrialisation (Stewart, Lall and Wangwc 1992, 26), thus harming 
the prospects for long-term economic development. 
Financial sector liberalisation is supposed to have the effect of encouraging 
domestic savings. However, it is uncertain if on the balance this will occur (cited in 
Helleiner 1992). However, as Helleiner (1992, 75) points out, if the increase in the 
interest rate is 
undertaken crudely in the midst of a macroeconomic crisis and widespread 
insolvency, such 'reforms' may well drive more institutions, notably financial 
ones, into insolvency, breed increased concentration of private financial power 
(and frequent malpractice), and increase in macroeconomic problems. 
For example, in Ghana, Tanzania, and Malawi increases in the nominal 
interest rates lcd "to the virtual disappearance of borrowers for a time and continuing 
severe impediments to the effective functioning of the productive system (Helleiner 
1992, 75). 
Liberalisation of trade is not necessarily to be viewed as beneficial from a 
governmental perspective. The reason for this is that commercial policies, designed 
to control imports and promote exports are used by governments instead of a 
devaluation or in conjunction with a devaluation, and these policies are more 
acceptable to the population. Commercial policies usually take three main forms: 
export subsidies, exchange controls and import quotas. 
Export subsidies are payments to exporters which encourage the selective 
production of exports. It is advantageous to the extent that it may encourage the 
production of tradables, but it obviously raises the home price of export goods. 
Exchange controls mandate that foreign exchange earnings be turned over to the 
Central Bank, which, in turn, restricts the availability of foreign exchange. Import 
quotas are a restriction on the quantity of particular goods or classes of goods that can 
be imported. The result, similar to a devaluation, is that imports are reduced. The 
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difference is that consumption goods may not suffer large price increases because the 
brunt of commercial policies will fall on goods of a less sensitive nature (Krugman 
1988, 72). However, DeRosa (1991, 43) believes that restrictions on imports acts as 
a tax on exports; 
when a country restricts its imports, the import-competing sector increases 
its use of domestic resources in order to expand output to meet a larger 
share of local demand for traded goods. This causes the costs of domestic 
resources to rise, making exports based on those resources less competitive 
and, as a consequence, results in the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
of the country. The subsequent decline in exports often will match the 
protection-induced fall in imports, with the result that there is no 
improvement in the external balance to the extent that the stance of 
macroeconomic policies remain the same. 
When trade is liberalised the opposite occurs. "Lowering tariff and other 
barriers to imports reduces the implicit taxation of exports by reducing the extent of 
import substitution in the local economy, thereby lowering the cost of domestic 
resources and causing the real exchange rate to fall" (DeRosa 1991, 43). Focusing on 
the agricultural sector, Stein (1992) notes the elasticity problem of agriculture; where 
there is a possibility of declining revenues due to an increase in supply. A decline in 
revenue would lead to lower foreign exchange earnings. During the 1980s, as has 
been shown, the prices of non-food exports have not been favourable in Africa. 
Figure 4.3 outlines these linkages. 
Trade Policy 
liberalization 
price controls  
subsidies (energy, transport, 
health and food) 
decline in income 
for former "winners" 
increase in income & 
consumption for 
former "losers" 
change in 
consumption 
Figure 4.3. Trade Policies linkage 
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Another main component of liberalisation is privatisation. The objective of which is 
to improve management through the removal of x-inefficiency, and to increase 
allocate efficiency thereby halting the losses that so often characterise state-owned 
enterprises and thus create a burden on the budget (De Mel 1988, 69). The spread of 
ownership and worker participation — leading to a property-owning democracy can 
be seen as another advantage (De Mel 1988, 69). The benefits of privatisation are 
longer term because they are based on efficiency arguments. The short-run impact, on 
the contrary, is ominous as laid-off workers in the formal sector will see real declines 
in income and their consumption. 
If trade liberalisation is viewed on its own, the benefits in the long run could 
be substantial. The initial costs of trade liberalisation would be borne by managers, 
workers, owners and investors in the formal private sector as protection is removed 
(Bruno 1988, 230 and Bourguignon and Morrison 1992). In the long run the effect of 
liberalisation would likely be beneficial as goods would become cheaper (Bruno 
1988, 230). However, trade reform may conflict with other World Bank and IMF 
programmes. For instance, trade liberalisation may conflict with fiscal policies. 
Under adjustment a government may be encouraged to increase its tax revenues, 
however trade liberalisation could reduce tariffs, in which case government revenues 
may fall (Woodward 1992, 54). Bruno (1988, 230) notes that liberalisation will be 
beneficial and less costly when factor mobility between sectors is high and external 
assistance is available. Whether the effect occurs sooner rather than later depends on 
the sequencing of reforms. For instance, import quotas, which amount to a 
quantitative restriction, may be replaced with tariffs in which government revenues 
will increase in the short run (Woodward 1992, 54). Liberalising trade may also have 
important implications for a country's current account. If liberalisation makes imports 
easier to obtain through the elimination or reduction of import quotas and tariffs then 
the trade balance could actually worsen. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the main linkages between macroeconomic reforms and 
changes in product markets, prices and incomes. This chapter has indicated that such 
changes are highly complex. Reform in one area, for instance the exchange rate, may 
encourage export expansion but it is not sufficient in itself to ensure overall success. 
Other policies must be introduced to aid the restructuring of African economies. It is 
this fact that adjustment programmes are multifaceted that leads to one major 
difficulty: reform in one area can often hinder reform in another area, and the 
'benefits° of one reform may be negated by policy changes in another area. For 
instance, the benefits of a devaluation in encouraging expenditure switching, and the 
subsequent shift to the production of tradables may create employment opportunities 
in rural areas, but this effect may be offset by a time lag inherent in switching, poor 
weather patterns and soil conditions and cutbacks in public investment in 
infrastructure. Moreover, an increase in inflation may hit producers in so far as the 
price of their inputs rise. 
In another area, trade liberalisation may conflict with fiscal policy. 
Government revenues that are collected from trade may decline following economic 
reform thus limiting the ability of the central government to provide investment in 
physical and social infrastructure and to protect the real wages of government 
employees. However, trade liberalisation need not be in conflict with all the 
objectives of adjustment. Trade liberalisation may lead to a decrease in the price of 
importables, thus negating the (expected) effect of a rise in the domestic currency 
price of imports following a devaluation. Import prices may fall due to a reduction in 
custom duties or excise taxes on imports, or through the suspension of monopoly 
rights to import, or any combination of these. However, note again must be made that 
certain liberalisation policies may serve to increase the price of imports during a 
depreciation. The lifting of price controls and the elimination or reduction of 
subsidies on imported goods are two examples. 
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A more serious criticism relates to the ideology that motivates structural 
adjustment and stabilisation policies. The Bank and the Fund have both been shown 
to favour free competition trace the roots of the crisis in Sub Saharan Africa to 
policies that distort the agricultural sector. However, switching from nontradables to 
tradables and increasing producer prices of tradables may not produce the desired 
effect. This is because the crisis in agriculture has its foundation in non-price or 
structuralist factors which leads to low aggregate supply elasticities. 
Another potential problem arises in the adjustment process and this relates to 
the costs associated with economic reform. Frictional costs exist where employment, 
consumption and output contract in the short run while resources are being reallocated 
between sectors. Distributional costs exist to the extent that various sectors utilise 
various factor proportions in the production of different goods and services. Thus, 
expanding sectors, such as that of tradable goods benefit to the extent that it is 
relatively labour intensive and incomes will improve following the increase in the 
price of exportables. However, distributional costs will likely exist in the urban 
formal sector in so far as government employment is reduced. Whether these 
distributional costs will be frictional in nature as well, or more permanent depends on 
the ability of urban workers to find employment in other sectors. 
Thus, the adjustment process is intricate and complicated and subject to 
potentially high social costs. Chapter three demonstrated that the success of reform 
programmes in meeting economic targets is by no means assured in African countries. 
The following chapters review whether or not the frictional and distributional costs 
have carried over into the health sector. 
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Chapter 5 
Health Care Delivery, Health Conditions and Health 
Status in Sub Saharan Africa 
5.1 Introduction 
The health situation in Sub Saharan Africa is the worst of any other region. On 
almost every indicator relating to health status Africa performs poorly. James Grant, 
the former Executive Director of UNICEF, has used the analogy of plane crashes to 
describe the situation in Sub Saharan Africa. He has said that the number of Nigerian 
children who die each day from six communicable diseases — polio, diarrhoea, 
tetanus, meningitis, diphtheria and whooping cough is equivalent to five jumbo jets 
crashing into the country's airspace killing all 2000 passengers (Lancet 1989, 774). 
The examination of any health care system and health status of any region, and 
in particular Africa, is of great importance. Health care, when viewed as a 
consumption good enters directly into individual's utility function. People purchase 
health care so that they may enjoy life or obtain satisfaction from the consumption of 
nutrients. Health care looked at as an investment good also enters into a person's 
utility function. The purchase of health care by an individual may permit productivity 
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to increase. If this occurs there is room for improvement in an individual's income 
and potentially health status. Second, an improvement in health conditions may allow 
for individuals to exploit agricultural areas that were previously off limits due to the 
prevalence of disease. Third, improvements in health status lead to increased school 
enrolment rates and a better capacity to learn. Finally, in the long run, an 
improvement of health allows for faster national economic growth. 
This chapter examines the health situation of this poor and laggard region. 
The chapter starts with a review of the various definitions of health. The concept of 
basic needs is introduced at this point and is used as a foundation for further 
discussion towards the end of the chapter. Next, the scale of the health problem is 
reviewed and comparisons are made on the differences in health status between 
regions and countries in Sub Saharan Africa. Third, the major health and nutritional 
problems affecting the region are then examined. Fourth, health care provision and 
delivery in the Sub Saharan countries is inspected and the debate between traditional 
versus modern health care and primary versus selective health care paradigms are 
critically assessed. This chapter continues with a discussion of the government's role 
in financing the health sector and surveys alternative methods of paying for health 
care. The conclusion looks at the evidence on access, availability and utilisation. 
However, before proceeding to the discussion the familiar warning must be 
noted. Statistics relating to the health sector in Africa are notoriously unreliable. 
Differences in data are often striking; World Bank and WHO figures are frequently 
revised and their research data often conflict with other reliable sources such as the 
Institute for Resource Development. The figures provided in this chapter have to be 
accepted to suffer from a degree of inaccuracy. The base upon which many of the 
measures used, particularly in relation to population figures, are of suspicious 
character (Baylies 1986, 85). Figures relating to the prevalence of disease may also 
be unrepresentative because they are dependent on the correct diagnosis of illness and 
on the number of people who seek treatment where statistics are recorded (Baylies 
1986, 85). Furthermore, data on births and deaths often go unrecorded or are 
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registered without sufficient detail (Phillips 1990), and birthweights are often 
recorded falsely due to inaccurate weighing (Cameron 1991, 219). 
5.2 Defining Health 
Various definitions exist for what constitutes health. There is a tendency when 
examining the question of health status to confuse the terms health with health status 
or health state. Of primary concern is health status; for most of this thesis health is 
not considered. The reason for this rests in viewing health as an end state. Health 
refers to a condition. Health cannot be purchased but health care can. This may lead 
to healthiness or it may lead to no change or even ill health. Thus it is more 
appropriate to consider the end state in terms of changes in health status. An ideal 
health status, defined in a limited sense, simply means the absence of disease. This 
implies that if there are diseases afflicting individuals or the population of Africa they 
can either be averted or cured using medical or traditional health interventions. The 
intervention, assuming that it is successful, will restore the individual or groups of 
people back to the state when the disease was not prevalent or prevent them, in the 
first place, from coming into contact with the disease. This definition of health status 
is a technical one: people are assumed to have obtained the highest level of health 
status possible if they do not suffer from disease. If they have contracted an illness 
then they have a lower level of health status. 
This definition is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, it does not consider 
the health problems that may arise from poor nutrition. The absence of a sufficient 
amount of nutrients lead, often, to the same problems that occur when someone 
suffers from a poor health status. For instance, malnutrition or undernutrition may 
impair the productivity of adult workers and reduce a mother's ability to adequately 
care for her children thus jeopardising their health status. Second, the first definition 
of health status does not consider the physical surroundings of individuals. It 
excludes, for example, considerations of housing and environment. If the physical 
structure is sufficient enough to prevent illnesses then it is considered adequate. 
However, much of the housing in Africa, while adequate in such a respect, would fail 
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in other areas. Overcrowding, while not necessarily a cause of disease, or noise 
pollution would substantially affect individuals adversely. 
This points to the fact that health status need not be concerned solely with a 
physical condition but also with the social and mental conditions of individuals . This 
definition has some usefulness in that it points to the fact that ill health may not be 
caused directly by biological factors but may lie in other areas. For example, ill 
health may be caused by lack of food or purchasing power to secure sufficient 
nutrients. This may, in turn, be caused by civil strife, poor distribution, corrupt 
officials, or poorly constructed agricultural policies and reforms. However, a 
definition of health that is so broad in its scope is rather unwieldy in practical terms. 
Implicit in such a definition is the notion that the quality of life of individuals is high; 
that they have shelter that is sufficient to protect them from illness as well as provide 
for other activities, that the water is always clean, that waste is safely and regularly 
removed, that the work effort expended by individuals is not too strenuous and too 
boring, that there is sufficient time to partake in leisure activities and that disease and 
malnutrition do not visit a family. Although desirable as a goal it is highly unlikely 
that many people in Africa, or for that matter in developed countries, experience such 
an exhalted state or will in the foreseeable future. 
Thus given that the two definitions of health status are inadequate. A third is 
offered and one that is considered in this thesis. Health status relates to basic needs 
(Gish 1983). Although basic needs is a nebulous concept (Hettne 1990, 168-72), in 
one interpretation the main element is to ensure minimum requirements that are above 
the subsistence or survival level but somewhat below complete contentment. Implicit 
is that poor individuals will obtain a guarantee of a certain level of, at least 
conceptually, undefined, services until their incomes can be raised to a level where 
they are able to meet their own human needs without intervention. This suggest that 
an improvement in health status does not require a massive improvement in physical, 
social and mental well-being nor does it require the simple absence of infirmity. It 
requires that interventions are carried out on several levels; that preventative and 
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curative care are sufficient given financial constraints, that housing, sanitation and 
water quality are good (but not perfect) and that the food available is sufficient to 
meet dietary requirements even if they fail to meet requirements of taste. This 
definition of health, then, does not require a maximising solution as in the WHO 
version, or for that matter a minimising one, but a satisficing solution. 
A second important point that the basic needs approach raises is that the 
clinical manifestation of disease and malnutrition is of secondary concern. Central to 
the problem of health care is not the incidence of infection, disease, malnutrition or 
undernutrition but how these manifestations were caused. It is by looking at the 
causal links that possible solutions can be offered. At the most basic level the causes 
of poor health status are biological. As will be shown in a following section 
biological causes interact synergistically to make the outcome worse than if one (for 
instance, infection) worked alone to cause an incidence of poor health. However, it is 
important to ask if there are other factors that affect the biological incidence. 
The answer to this question is positive. Most obviously, the availability of 
food, and more important food of high nutrient content, affects nutritional status. 
Health status, similarly, is affected by the availability of health facilities. However, 
availability, alone is not enough to ensure a healthy population. The resources 
available to families is of utmost concern. For instance, income, availability of 
shelter, and access to safe water and sanitation will all have important influences on 
health. 
Related to this is how food and health care is distributed within the household. 
Thus, the household becomes an important focus for analysis; not only is there the 
possibility for the normal transmission of disease, but there is the possibility that there 
exists factors at the household level which may affect the incidence of malnutrition 
and infection. There may be, for example, a household health care pattern that is 
culturally specific and that has implications for health status. For example, where 
males are the decision makers and control the household budget, they may be able to 
deprive women, who are often regarded as the best providers of health care, the means 
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to obtain food or health care. In addition, households may be poorly educated and thus 
unable to effectively provide health care within the family. For instance, weaning 
may be stopped early and water may be withheld from children with diarrhoea. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the household in the production of health 
care for the family, there is a need to take a macroscopic view of health care. Here 
health status is seen as a result of the direct interaction of households and 
communities to the national governments and an indirect relationship with the entire 
international setting — whether it be with the large international financial institutions 
(private, bilateral or multilateral), international trading regimes (the GATT, the EU, 
the Commonwealth, the CFA zone, etc.) or in the broad context of North-South 
economic relations (New International Economic Order). 
Therefore, there are three spheres that must be considered when analysing 
health and health care; the biological, household resources and production, and the 
overall socio-economic context. To only concentrate on the biological causes of poor 
health, a recommendation for improving health would be based on direct health 
interventions— such as vaccination programmes, Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) 
and hospital care. If the view is widened to include activities at the household level, 
account must be taken of the biological causes as well as the problems of accessibility 
and the production of health care. If we choose to view health and health care 
macroscopically then the above is taken into account as well as how national and 
international relations can affect an individuals health status. The first sphere is 
considered in the following sections, the second in chapter six, the third sphere will be 
considered in the conclusion. 
5.3 Inter-regional and Inter-country Comparisons 
5.3.1 Basic Social Indicators 
As a starting point Africa does poorly when compared to other regions on basic social 
indicators. Gross National Product per capita of $340 in 1990, a broad measure of 
welfare, was the second lowest of any other region. South Asia has the lowest 
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average at $333 per capita GNP. However, Latin America and the Caribbean, another 
so-called developing region, did substantially better. That region enjoyed GNP per 
capita of $2810 in 1990, over six times higher than Africas'. Moreover, growth in 
GNP per capita during the 1980s in Africa has been negative. The average annual 
growth rate in GNP per capita from 1980 to 1992 in Sub Saharan Africa was -0.8 per 
cent. This poor performance was exceeded only by the Middle East and North Africa 
which saw GNP per capita decline at an average annual 2.3 per cent. Indeed, while 
world GNP per capita was expanding at 1.2 per cent Africa's was declining (World 
Bank 1994, 163). 
Adult illiteracy, in Africa is amongst the highest of all regions. Sixty two per 
cent of adult females and 50 per cent of adult males are illiterate. In East Asia and the 
Pacific only 34 per cent and 24 per cent of adult females and males respectively are 
illiterate, while in Europe the relevant figures are only 22 and 15 per cent. Therefore, 
education in Africa is amongst the poorest of all regions. The provision of education 
for males is inadequate and only 50 per cent are literate. Gender bias is evident in 
education in so far as there is a substantial difference in illiteracy. Recent World 
Bank (1994, 216-18) evidence reveals that enrolment rates are the lowest of any 
region. The percentage of school age children enrolled in primary education is only 
66 per cent in Sub Saharan Africa. In South Asia, the percentage of school age 
children enrolled in primary education is 89 per cent. Moreover, the primary/pupil 
teacher ratio is amongst the highest of any other region indicating that educational 
instruction may be of relatively poor quality. There is one teacher for every 41 
primary school students in Africa, whereas the ratio in Latin America is one teacher 
for every 26 primary school pupils. Enrolment in secondary and tertiary education in 
Africa is also the lowest of any region and is below 20 per cent for the relevant age 
groups. 
On basic health indicators, discussed more fully later, Africa falls far behind 
other regions. Life expectancy at birth is the lowest of any other developing region. 
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The infant mortality rate in Latin America and the Caribbean is approximately half 
that of Africa. Table 5.1 outlines the inter-regional differences in social indicators. 
Table 5.1. Selected Inter-Regional Social Indicators 
Region 
GNP per 
capita 
(1990) 
Adult illiteracy 
(percent 1990) 
Female 	 Male 
Life 
Expectancy 
at birth 
(1990) 
Infant mortality 
rate (per 1000 
live births) 
(1990) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 340 62 50 51 107 
East Asia and 600 34 24 68 34 
Pacific 
South Asia 333 67 53 58 93 
Europe 2,400 22 15 70 30 
Middle Fast and 
North Africa 1,790 60 47 61 79 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 2,180 18 16 68 48 
Source: World Bank (1992) World Development Report. 
Note: all numbers are weighted averages 
5.3.2 Health Care Delivery Indicators 
The poor performance of Africa on aggregate measures of health, are due to a variety 
of factors. Most obviously, from a Western point of view, the region is underserved 
by medical personnel. For instance, in 1984 the population per nursing person, which 
includes graduate, practical, assistant and auxiliary nurses, as well as 
paraprofessionals such as health workers and traditional birth attendants, was only 
2,180 as compared to 1,010 in Latin America and the Caribbean region. In Europe, 
the population per nursing person was nearly five times lower than that found in 
Africa (World Bank 1992). 
Po
pu
la
tio
n
 
 
pu
t'.
 
 
N
ur
si
ng
 
 
Pa
rs
o
n
 
 
(1
98
4)
 
 
119 
3000 
Figure 5.1. Population per Nursing Person (1984) 
Source: based on data from World bank (1992) 
However, note also should be made of the differences within Africa. Tanzania and 
Ethiopia have population per nursing person in excess of 5,000, well above the 
number for the worst performing region South Asia. However, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
and Botswana have one nursing person for every 1,000 population or under. This puts 
these countries on par with Latin America. 
Population per physician is also substantially higher than in other regions. 
While Europe enjoys one physician for every 420 members of the population, Africa 
must make do with one physician per 23,540 individuals in the population. The next 
highest region is East Asia and the Pacific with one physician for every 6,170 
members of the population. This means that the second poorest performing region 
still has nearly four times as many physicians per population as Africa. 
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Figure 5.2. Population per physician 
Source: based on data from World Bank (1993) 
Yet, again, the use of aggregate measures tends to obscure the true reality. Relatively 
well-off countries enjoy lower ratios. For instance the population per physician in 
Botswana is 5,150 and in Zimbabwe 7,180. In general, poorer countries or countries 
subject to internal turmoil have higher ratios. For example, Ethiopia and Chad had 
population per physician figures of 32,650 and 30,030, respectively in 1990. 
However, Madagascar deviates from this with a ratio of one physician for every 8, 
130 members of the population. 
5.3.3 Health Condition Indicators 
The supply of clean, potable drinking water is important in determining the 
healthiness and survival of individuals. It is used not only to sustain life directly but it 
is use indirectly has consequences for health status. Water is used for general 
hygiene, for food preparation and production. Assuming that it is not contaminated at 
the source, or contaminated within the household as part of storing process, water will 
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play a key role in determining the healthiness of individuals. Approximately 55 per 
cent of the population in Sub Saharan Africa lacks access to safe water (World Bank 
1993, 91). The range of population with access to drinking water in Africa varies 
from a low of 18 per cent in Ethiopia, 11 per cent in Mali, 21 per cent in Madagascar, 
22 per cent in Mozambique to 70 per cent in Togo, 69 per cent in Cote d'Ivoire, 90 per 
cent in Botswana and 95 per cent in Mauritius (World Bank 1994a, 146-147). 
In every African country where data is available, with the exception of Chad, 
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic and Cote d'Ivoire, the percentage of the urban 
population with access to safe drinking water exceeds the rural populations access, 
and in some instances by striking amounts. For example in Ethiopia the percentage of 
rural dwellers with access to drinking water is only 11 per cent, while the urban 
population enjoys access of 70 per cent, in Somalia the figures are 50 per cent and 29 
per cent for urban and rural areas respectively, in Zimbabwe the difference is not so 
great where 95 per cent of urban dwellers and 80 per cent of rural dwellers have 
access to drinking water, however in the Congo the disparity is large; 92 per cent of 
urban residents and only two per cent of rural residents have access to drinking water 
(World Bank 1994a, 146-147). 
Inadequate water supply or contaminated water are responsible for several of 
the diseases common to Africa. First, lack of water leads to poor hygiene and 
explains why diseases transmitted by faeces are prevalent in the region. Trachoma, 
intestinal worms, and skin and eye infections have all been traced to inadequate water 
supply (World Bank 1993, 91). Drinking water from unprotected sources is also a 
major cause of water borne diseases such as typhoid, cholera, amoebic and bacillary 
dysentery and infective hepatitis (Yimam 1990, 145). Improvements in water supply 
and hydrological schemes through irrigation programmes can translate into a higher 
nutritional status if more agricultural land is created. However, these same schemes 
may lead to quite serious side-effects. Increased incidences of malaria and 
schistosomiasis are associated with irrigation and hydrological projects (Phillips 1990, 
15). 
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Sanitation facilities also play a key role in preventing illnesses. The lack of 
sufficient sanitation facilities can lead to diarrhoea and intestinal worms. The lack of 
facilities also allow vector breeding to occur where sewerage is dumped. The picture 
for access to sanitation facilities in Africa is also bleak. Approximately 62 per cent of 
the African population lacks access to sanitation services. For example, in 
Mozambique only 21 per cent of the total population has access to sanitation services, 
in Ethiopia the figure is 17 per cent and in Burkina Faso the figure is a paltry 7 per 
cent. However, in Tanzania the per cent of the total population with access to 
sanitation rises to 77 per cent and in Botswana the comparable figure is 88 per cent 
(World Bank 1994a). As one would expect the inter country differences favour urban 
areas. In Africa, where data is available, sanitation services favour urban areas in all 
but two cases: Uganda and Cote d'Ivoire. For instance, 97 per cent of the urban 
population has access to sanitation in Ethiopia while only seven per cent of the rural 
population has access. In Burkina Faso and Niger 81 per cent and 71 per cent of the 
urban population respectively have access to such services while only 10 per cent of 
rural Burkinabe and only 4 per cent of Nigeriens have access to sanitation (World 
Bank 1994a, 146-47). 
5.3.4 Health Status Indicators 
A comparison of Africa to other regions reveals that Africa lags behind other regions 
in food supply per capita. In the early 1960s Asia had the lowest supply of food per 
capita; a position it held until the early 1980s. However, by 1988, due to rapid 
population expansion and poor harvests, Africa was only able to secure 2,348 calories 
per person per day, the lowest of any other region (FAO 1992). In addition, although 
food supply was expanding from 1960-1990, the increase was only an anaemic eight 
per cent, from 2,155 to 2,348. Also, compared to other regions, the percentage of 
calories available to the consumer has recently fallen far behind that available to 
consumers in developed countries. For the period 1988-90 the United States' food 
supply consisted of 3,642 calories per person per day. In Europe the comparable 
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figure was 3,452. This translates to mean that Africa's food supply is 64 per cent of 
the United States' and 68 per cent of Europes'. Although part of this reflects the 
gluttonous nature of western consumption the figures do not fail to conceal the overall 
disparity. Table 5.2 sets out the quantity of food available in each region. 
Table 5.2. Regional Comparison of Food Supply: Calories Per Caput per Day 
Region/Country 1961-63 1969-73 1979-1981 1988-90 
Africa 2155 2211 2315 2348 
S. America 2391 2518 2657 2624 
Europe 3088 3239 3371 3452 
Asia 1888 2086 2302 2494 
USA 3067 3250 3353 3642 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook 1991 (Tables 105 and 106) 
Note: Data in table includes North Africa. The Table reflects quantities of food 
reaching the consumer but not necessarily the amount of food actually consumed (due 
to storage problems and loss during cooking and preparation) amount consumed may 
be less than the table indicates. 
Kamarck (1988, 201) estimates that, excluding times of famine, when the figure is 
considerably higher, the number of people in Sub Saharan Africa who suffer from 
inadequate nutrition, of at least 90 per cent of the FAO/WHO requirement, is 150 
million. However, since the figures in table 5.2 are aggregate they fail to reveal food 
supply differences within countries and between countries in Africa. Cote d'Ivoire, 
for instance, has a substantially higher food supply than other Sub Saharan countries. 
The amount of calories available per day per person in that country is 2,844. This 
puts the COte d'Ivoire ahead of Asia and South America in food supply. However, 
other countries within the region fare far worse. Burkina Faso and Mali arc able to 
secure only 1,815 and 1,898 calories per caput per day. The Comoros, the worst 
performing country in the region, can only obtain 1,783 calories per person per day. 
For the three countries this means that there food supply situation is below that of 
Africa's in the 1960s and on par with Asia's situation during the same time period. 
UNICEF (Carlson and Wardlaw 1990, 20) provide estimates, based on data 
from various years in the 1980s, on the regional prevalence of malnutrition in children 
under five. The per cent of underweight children, as determined by weight for age, is 
the highest in South Asia at 45.2 per cent and is much lower in Africa at 26.6 per cent. 
Stunting, as measured by height for age, is also highest in Asia (but not South Asia) at 
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46.2 per cent. However, wasting, as measured by weight for height is 10.2 per cent in 
Africa and only 1.3 per cent in the Americas. Figure 5.3 shows the inter-regional 
disparities in malnutrition. 
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Figure 5.3. Regional Prevalence of Malnutrition in Children under Five 
Source: Carlson and Wardlaw (1990, 20) 
Note: Malnutrition is the per cent below minus two standard deviations of the 
reference median 
Output measures, such as infant mortality rate, life expectancy at birth and child 
mortality rate also show Africa to have fallen behind other regions even though some 
progress has been made in recent decades. The infant mortality rate in Sub Saharan 
Africa in 1992 was still the highest of any other region. It was more than twice that of 
Latin America and more than three times that of Europe and Central Asia. Compared 
to the rate in South Asia more than one extra infant in one hundred can be expected to 
die before age one in Africa. However, it should be noted that some countries in 
Africa do particularly poorly on this indicator which serves to distort the overall 
picture. Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi and Mali are all outliers with rates 
exceeding 140 per 1000 live births. 
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Figure 5.4. Comparison of Infant Mortality Rates 1992 
Source: based on data from World Bank (1994a) 
Notes: SSA is Sub Saharan Africa; EA & P is Fast Asia and Pacific; E is Europe; ME 
is Middle East; LA & C is Latin America and Caribbean. Infant Mortality Rate is per 
1000 live births. 
An examination of life expectancy at birth reveals that Africa, while making recent 
improvements still falls behind other regions. In 1960 life expectancy was 43 years 
by 1990 this had risen to 52 years. This is still the lowest of any other region. The 
population in Latin America and the Caribbean has a substantially higher life 
expectancy at birth at 70 years. Also, life expectancy in developed market based 
countries (76 years) exceeds that of Africa by an astounding 24 years. The rate of 
improvement in life expectancy has also been slower than in other developing 
regions. Although the improvements in life expectancy in developed countries was 
relatively slow from 1960-90, reflecting the problems associated with further 
improvement once the demographic transition has been made, in other countries the 
improvements have been notable. For the period 1960-90 Africa added only nine 
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years to life expectancy at birth while Latin America and the Caribbean added 16 
years and the Middle East 17 years. Indeed in 1960, Latin America's life expectancy 
was higher than it is today in Africa. Figure 5.5 below compares the progress that has 
been made in recent decades. 
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Figure 5.5. Comparison of Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 
Source: based on data from World Bank (1993) 
Notes: SSA is Sub Saharan Africa; LA & C is Latin America and the Caribbean; 
MEC is Middle Eastern Crescent; FSE is Former Socialist Economies of Europe; 
EME is Established Market Economies; 
Improvements have also been made in Africa in decreasing the number of deaths of 
children. In 1960 the child mortality rate stood at 251 per 1000 live births. By 1975 
this had fallen by 39 to 212 and by 1990 further progress was made and the rate 
currently stands at 175 per 1000 live births. However, similar to the progress made in 
life expectancy, the advances were not as strong as those made in other developing 
regions. Latin America and the Caribbean saw their child mortality rate fall by 101 
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points for the period 1960-1990. In the Middle East the child mortality rate was 
similar to that of Sub Saharan Africas' in 1960, however the Middle Fast saw its rate 
fall by 131 while Africa saw its rate decline by only 66 in the same period. In 
absolute terms, the child mortality rate is excessively high and exceeds the rate found 
in established market economies (11 per 1000 live births in 1990) by nearly 16 times. 
Figure 5.5 contrasts the improvements in child mortality rates for the last three 
decades. 
Child Mortality Rate 1960-1990 
1960 	 1975 	 1990 
year 
Figure 5.6. Comparison of Child Mortality Rates (per 1000 live births) 
Source: based on data from World Bank (1993) 
However, although some progress, as measured by aggregate statistics, has been made 
in increasing the health status of individuals in Africa, there is a tendency to view 
overall increases as effecting all individuals equally. While such aggregate increases 
are important, attention in recent years attention has focused on how increases and 
decreases in health status are distributed throughout the population. Using the 
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typology presented in chapter 4 changes in health status need to be considered based 
on the dichotomies of rural and urban areas. Table 5.3, for example, shows the 
differences in health status between rural and urban areas for three African countries. 
Table 5.3. Rural and Urban Poverty in the 1980s. 
Rural 
population Rural poor Access to safe water 
as % of as % of Infant mortality (per (percentage of 
Country total total thousand live births) population) 
Rural Urban Rural 	 Urban 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 57 86 121 70 10 	 30 
Ghana 65 80 87 67 39 	 93 
Kenya 80 96 59 57 21 	 61 
Source: World Bank (1990a, 31). 
Note: Actual year that data is obtained is not specified in the source publication 
It is clear from the above that efforts to decrease the urban bias in health care is still 
persisting. In addition, the use of basic indicators do not show if increases were 
reached by the use of the most efficient solution (Malek et al 1993). Moreover, 
measures that show increases in health, based on mortality data, tell us little about 
possible increases or decreases in morbidity (disease prevalence). So that it becomes 
possible to have an overall positive picture, while ignoring the fact, for instance, that 
some people may be chronically undernourished or subject to recurring illnesses. As 
Myrdal (1968, 1555) pointed out over two decades ago, 
[the data] tell us next to nothing about many other important health 
deficiencies: physical infirmities like blindness, incipient illnesses, and, more 
generally, physical and mental weaknesses caused by malnutrition, intestinal 
worms, and other infestations and diseases that are usually not fatal in 
themselves. It is [therefore] conceivable that a large part of the population 
may be diseased, or at least lacking in normal vigour, all or most of the time, 
even though rates of mortality are decreasing and life expectancy is increasing. 
It is even conceivable that people live longer to suffer debilitating conditions 
of ill health to a greater extent than before. 
5.4 Nutrition Problems in Africa 
Taking the problem of malnutrition first, in a very basic sense, is viewed as both a 
cause and an effect of underdevelopment (Berg 1987, 2). A cause in the sense that a 
poorly fed population makes for a human capital base that is viewed as inadequate as 
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a supply of labour to the business and agricultural sectors. An effect in that an 
economically backward country is unable to produce and distribute the quantities of 
food necessary to meet daily caloric requirements. Malnutrition is a broad concept. It 
encompasses many areas. Malnutrition narrowly defined is a "chronic state of under-
nutrition or malnourishment caused by a deficient intake of calories and/or protein 
relative to body requirements" (Bryceson 1989, 425) or more broadly as: " a state in 
which the physical function of an individual is impaired to the point where she or he 
can no longer maintain adequate performance in such process as growth, pregnancy, 
lactation, physical work, or resisting and recovery from disease (Pacey and Payne 
1988, 25). It can be further broken down into undernutrition and malnourishment. 
For children undernutrition is defined as between 80 to 100 per cent of weight-for-
age, malnourishment 80 per cent weight for age. In a broad sense malnutrition 
includes the notion of seasonal (temporary) declines in nutritional status due to 
limited periods of harvest and the ability to store agricultural products. The 
percentage of children in Africa affected by stunting, or low height for a given age, is 
approximately 40 per cent (World Bank 1993, Table A6). The percentage of wasting, 
or low weight for a given height, is approximately 10 per cent in Africa. 
Approximately 25 per cent of children under five suffer from PEM, 60 per cent suffer 
from nutritional anaemia (UNICEF 1990, 175). Approximately 63 per cent of 
pregnant women suffer from nutritional aenemia (UNICEF 1990, 195). 
Nutritional problems in Sub Saharan Africa arise for a number of reasons. 
Food surpluses on the national level are not sufficient to ensure food security at the 
household level (see Christensen and Stack 1992 on Zimbabwe). The individual 
resource endowments place an upper limit on the availability of food. Economic and 
climatic changes can also influence food availability and prices. Dietary practices 
where some foods may be preferred to others is also an important factor. The 
knowledge of householders on how to choose a nutritious diet and the use of 
breastfeeding are important factors in securing an adequate level of nutrition. For 
instance, as has been previously pointed out, World Bank and Fund programmes aim 
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to encourage the agricultural sector to move away from subsistence production to 
(partial) food commodization; where agricultural goods are produced to be sold in the 
market. The impact on individuals in Sub Saharan Africa depends on the extent that 
this type of reform is carried out. Lack of income by householders is also an 
important component in the obtainment of food. Well-off individuals as one would 
expect, suffer little from malnutrition, while the burden is carried by lower income 
groups. 
The main nutritional problems facing Sub-Saharan African countries are : 
(1) protein-energy malnutrition (PEM) which leads to reduced activity, weight 
loss, stunting and even starvation during acute instances. The main types are 
marasmus, characterised by muscle wasting, loss of subcutaneous fat, loose 
skin, eye lesions and skin rashes; marasmic-kwashiorkor and kwashiorkor — a 
type of protein deficiency where the hair reddens and straightens, the body 
swells and the skin develops rashes.; 
(2) iron-deficiency anaemia which leads to sluggishness, impaired resistance 
to infection, and reduced work and cognitive performance; 
(3) Iodine-deficiency disorders which can lead to reduced growth and reduced 
intellectual and neurological capacity. Takes the form of endemic goitre and 
cretinism; and 
(4) vitamin A deficiency (Xeropthalmia) which can lead to blindness. 
(5) Pellagra due to lack of Niacin (vitamin B group) 
(Cornia 1990, 166) 
Interventions aimed directly at PEM take several forms. Food supplementation for 
pregnant women would prove to be an effective means at combating malnutrition. 
However, problems might arise in reaching the target population and preventing 
leakages and the overall cost of such a scheme (Jamison 1993). Clinical 
interventions at the district level that provided treatment and education for mothers 
would relieve the symptoms of PEM but would do little to address the overall cause 
of malnutrition, and in any case may not be cost-effective as figures are not available 
(Jamison 1993, 26). Food aid would be another way of alleviating the symptoms, but 
in many cases is only a stop-gap measure. 
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Iron deficiency the most common form of micronutrient deficiency reduces 
both productivity and the ability to learn. Iodine deficiency has been traced to cause 
retardation, delayed development, stunting and speech and hearing disorders. 
Micronutrient deficiencies in the population would normally, where financially 
feasible, be addressed by oral iron supplementation of pregnant women and six 
month doses of children between the ages of zero to five years (Jamison 1993). 
Severely anaemic patients could be cured by blood transfusion but the high cost 
would limit this intervention. 
The impact of poor nutrition on health status is larger than it may seem. While 
it is clear that sever malnutrition will lead to a compromised health status or to death, 
mild and moderate PEM and micronutrient disorders have been demonstrated to raise 
the risk of death (Pelletier 1991 cited in World Bank 1993, 77). This is related to the 
synergistic relationship between malnutrition and infection (section 5.6, this chapter). 
Children who are malnourished die of six main diseases: measles, diarrhoeal and 
respiratory diseases, tuberculosis, pertussis and malaria. 
5.5 Health Problems in Africa 
Similar problems are evident in the realm of health. Poor access to health facilities, 
understaffing, and a persistent urban-bias in the distribution of services is evident in 
almost all African countries. Additionally, the exodus and migration of experienced 
health workers (mainly physicians) has worsened already poor circumstances. Over 
reliance on imported pharmaceuticals also places the health care system in a 
precarious state. The fact that the health problems of Africans, in some cases, are 
resistant to treatments only serves to exacerbate the problems confronting Africa. To 
wit, the main health problems that face African countries today are (Cornia 1990 and 
Yimam 1990, 140): 
(1) birth related problems, such as tetanus neonatorum, trauma and asphyxia; 
(2) faecally transmitted water-borne diseases, such as diarrhoea, typhoid, 
dysentery and cholera; 
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(3) infectious diseases; such as type A ones — measles, meningitis, whooping 
cough, diphtheria, TBC and poliomyelitis that are preventable through the use 
of vaccines, and type B ones, such as hepatitis, that is not vaccine preventable; 
(4) infections of the respiratory tract such as pneumonia, pharyngitis and otitis; 
(5) vector-borne diseases such as malaria, onchocerciasis, trypansomiasis and 
yellow fever; and 
(6) preventable contact diseases, such as gonorrhoea, syphilis and AIDS 
The solution to each health problem must address each type illness based on its cause 
and the factors that promote the spread of it. For instance, water-borne diseases are 
best handled by improving sanitation and sewerage facilities. Air-borne diseases, 
such as tuberculosis, pneumonia, diphtheria, bronchitis and influenza are best 
addressed using curative care and preventative measures. Sexually transmitted 
diseases require curative care and preventative care through education in order to slow 
down the spread. The best solution to many of the health problems in Africa takes the 
form of assaulting diseases on many levels. The use of interventions will be in part 
determined by their costs and effectiveness (Jamison 1993). 
For instance, on the preventative level, the control of diarrhoeal diseases 
requires that sanitation and water supply infrastructure be upgraded. In addition, 
public health campaigns and education aimed at promoting good weaning practices 
and breastfeeding would be required. In addition, the use of effective vaccines against 
cholera and measles would offer benefits (Jamison 1993 17). Breastfeeding 
interventions offer several benefits, not isolated to protection against diarrhoea. 
Improvement in child growth, protection against childhood diseases, postponement of 
pregnancy and cognitive benefits for the infant are all postulated to provide secondary 
benefits (Jamison 1993). On the curative side the use of the use of oral rehydration 
salts or antibiotics would be required. For vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, the 
primary intervention would require chemical control by spraying insecticide in order 
to kill adult mosquitoes and controlling the vector by draining wet lands. The use of 
antimalarials would offer some benefits assuming that they were used correctly and 
drug resistance was not a major problem. 
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The control of poliomyelitis would best be assured by mass immunisation of 
children under one year of age with the polio vaccine given in conjunction with the 
diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus DPT immunisation (Jamison 1993, 18). However, 
not all diseases require this straightforward approach. The control of HIV infection 
and other sexually transmitted diseases requires action on several fronts. First, to 
prevent spread blood screening would be necessary albeit potentially not cost-
effective. Second, activities aimed at encouraging behavioural change, such as 
education aimed at sexual abstinence, monogamy or the use of contraception, would 
be warranted. However, this would have to address two problems: cultural distaste 
for the use of condoms and the lack of information on high risk groups (Jamison 
1993, 21). At the clinical level treatment of sexually transmitted diseases with 
antibiotics would be required and the treatment of AIDS at the clinic or district 
hospital may provide some benefits. In the long run, income generating schemes for 
women would offer benefits in so far as women move out of prostitution as a trade. 
Although advances in Africa have been notable in the previous three decades, 
the health situation is under constant attack. The presence of drug resistant diseases 
and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS promise to place further strains on an already 
overburdened health care delivery system. The prevalence of HIV in Sub Saharan 
Africa is the highest of any other region. As of 1990, it is estimated that 5.8 million 
Africans had contracted HIV of which 300,000 died AIDS-related deaths (World 
Bank 1993, 33). In 1990, 1.1 million new infections of HIV were recorded in Africa 
— 64 per cent of world total new HIV infections. The prevalence of HIV is projected 
to be 12 million by the year 2000. As there is currently no cure for this disease, and 
the production of a vaccine considered to be years away, the impact on the health and 
economic situation is likely to be substantial in coming decades. By the year 2000 
projections indicate that one million more Africans will die each year of AIDs-related 
disorders. 
The evolution of drug resistant diseases also poses problems for Africa. Drug 
resistant bacteria has been noted in the treatment of diarrhoeas, pneumonias, 
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tuberculosis and malaria. Not only have older antibiotics lost their effectiveness but 
newer remedies are also proving less useful. Chioroquine-resistant malaria has been 
observed for several years and recently widespread resistance to multiple treatment 
regimes has been noted. The control of malaria is further compounded by the reduced 
effectiveness of vector control due to insecticide resistance by mosquitoes. The WHO 
and the World Bank (World Bank 1993, 34) project that if malaria becomes resistant 
to all known drugs then the number of death attributable to malaria could jump from 
1.5 million to 2.3 million by the year 2000. 
5.6 The Relationship Between Malnutrition and Infection 
While the above analysis divides health and nutrition into two distinct areas, 
increases and decreases in health and nutrition status should not be seen in isolation of 
each other. For instance, as shown above, protein-energy malnutrition is one of the 
main problems facing individuals in Africa. However, whether or not someone 
suffers from this form of malnutrition is not based solely on the amount and quality of 
food consumed. It is determined by two factors: food intake (including breast 
feeding) and infections (Chen, Huq and D'Souza 1981, 58). The Kasongo Project 
Team (1981) provide evidence, for instance, that measles plays an instrumental role in 
causing malnutrition. Infections are critically important to nutritional status because 
infections cause a loss of appetite, gastrointestinal malabsorption of ingested 
nutrients, and metabolic wastage of available nutrients in the body (Chen, Huq and 
D'Souza 1981, 58-59). Infections , in turn, are basically determined by two factors: 
host susceptibility and exposure to disease transmission. The ability of the host to 
defend himself against infection is known to be at least in part determined by 
nutritional status. Exposure to the disease is believed to be affected by the quality of 
the physical (water, sanitation, and housing) and personal (child care and hygiene) 
environment. 
Malnutrition and infections are thus believed to be synergistic; "a bi-
directional causal relationship is postulated in which malnutrition and infection each 
predisposes and exacerbates the other, resulting in an effect that is more deleterious 
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than either alone" (Chen, Huq and D'Souza 1981, 59). In other words a feedback 
mechanism operates where one factor reinforces another (Pacey and Payne 1985, 111) 
Figure 5.1.1 sets out this relationship. 
nutrition (malnutrition) 	 health status (infection) 
Synergestic relationship. Bi-directional causal relationship. Each pre- 
disposes and exacerbates the other 
Infection — malnutrition cycle 
Wilson, et al (1986) cited in Philips, D. (1990) with addtions 
Figure 5.6. Relationship between infection and malnutrition 
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Thus, malnutrition increases the likelihood of catching a disease. This is especially 
true for diarrhoea in children who are wasted (< 80 per cent weight/height), but 
perhaps not in underweight children (< 75 per cent weight/age) and stunted children 
(< 90 per cent height for age) (Tomkins, 1981, 860-861). In all cases studied in 
Nigeria, of wasting, stunting and underweight children the duration of diarrhoea 
increased with malnutrition (Tomkins 1981, 861). In turn diseases, such as diarrhoeal 
diseases and intestinal parasites, can lead to increased losses of vital nutrients, thus 
leading to greater nutritional requirements (Oftedal and Levinson 1977, 388). The 
problem of malnutrition can be further compounded by lack of clean water and poor 
sanitation. This leaves individuals in a possible situation where, even if food is 
readily available, they may not be able to utilise it effectively due to the presence of 
disease (Oftedal and Levinson 1977, 388). Grosse (1980) views the synergism 
between malnutrition and infection not in terms of a cycle but as malnutrition-
diarrhoea-respiratory infection triad. Under this system malnutrition is the 
preconditioning factor which may lead to lower respiratory tract infection or 
diarrhoea. The two illnesses act together to exacerbate the condition which will 
ultimately lead to death through dehydration or pneumonia. 
However, it should be noted that the relationship between malnutrition and 
infection has not been settled. It is unclear, for instance if malnutrition precedes or is 
a result of severe PEM ( Lancet 1983a, 661). It is believed by some (see Mann 1980) 
that a person who is in a malnourished state may obtain some protection from 
pathogens because organisms may be deprived of nutrients essential to their 
proliferation. Reporting the results of other studies Mann (1980, 1238-39) claims that 
the incidence of malarial infection increased after a Sahaelian famine when people 
were able to obtain nutrients again, and, in Ethiopia, poorly nourished hospital 
patients had less than the expected amount of bacterial infection. 
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5.7 Health Care Delivery 
5.7.1 Introduction 
Health care delivery in Africa has a mixed history. During the colonial era the health 
system was oriented towards urban areas to provide service for relatively well off 
natives and colonial administrators. The services provided were, given the 
technological constraints, oriented towards medical interventions and hospitalisation 
(see Nsekela and Nhonoli 1976 on Tanzania). The poorest individuals relied on 
traditional methods of healing and, where available, medical treatment provided by 
missionaries. Once the European colonies had obtained their independence control of 
the health care sector was transferred to the national governments. However, these 
governments were unable to immediately eliminate the poor distribution of resources 
due to poor organisation, incorrect priorities, lack of funds, political pressure and bad 
advice. The chief criticisms levied at the African health care system is that it is biased 
to urban areas, has a curative rather than a preventative orientation, and favours 
relatively well-off members of the population. 
It has been commonplace to describe the formal health care delivery system in 
Africa, as in most other developing countries, as being dominated by hospitals that are 
located in urban areas. Although comparison of health care expenditures devoted to 
hospitals in developing countries suffer from a lack of data, problems in the age of the 
data when available, and what constitutes hospital care versus non-hospital care, Mills 
(1990, 110) estimates that hospitals in developing countries receive approximately 30 
to 50 per cent of public and private total health care expenditure. Unfortunately, data 
for Sub Saharan Africa is hard to come by, and recent estimates suggest that the 
figures for the region may be slightly lower. For instance, Malawian hospitals absorb 
28.1 per cent and hospitals in Swaziland consume 23.7 per cent of total health sector 
expenditure (Mills 1990, 111). 
The governments portion of total health care expenditures devoted to 
hospitals, however, is higher. For developing countries (not including Latin America) 
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the range has been calculated between 50 and 60 per cent. Data analysed in the early 
1980s for the Sub Saharan countries suggest that government current health 
expenditures devoted to hospitals is close to this estimate (Hecht and Musgrove 1993, 
7). For example the figure for Botswana is 42 per cent, in Malawi 57.6 per cent, in 
Swaziland 57.4 per cent, 64 per cent in Tanzania and 69.0 per cent in Zimbabwe 
(Mills 1990, 111). Dor and van der Gaag (1993, 194) report that in the Cote d'Ivoire 
urban areas benefit the most of the health service regions. Urban areas receive 89 per 
cent of the recurrent health budget, but service only 50 per cent of the population. 
Moreover, 36 per cent of Ivorian doctors work in two University hospitals and 70 per 
cent of nurses work in urban facilities. 
Thus, the available evidence suggests that hospitals eclipse other health 
facilities in the ability to attract funding. On the face, this would be viewed as a 
universally bad way to promote health care delivery given the dominance of rural 
populations in Africa. However, in the extreme, this would only be the case if all the 
expenditures were concentrated in central hospitals offering a full range of speciality 
care. Again, the picture is somewhat mixed. For example, Tanzania distributes 70 
per cent of the money to the district level and only 23 per cent at the central level 
(Mills 1990, 113). On the other hand, based on figures analysed in the early 1980s, 
Malawi and Zimbabwe show that 54 and 60 per cent of hospital funds, respectively, 
go to the central hospital. However, some caution is needed in this area. The 1980s 
has seen a concerted effort to devolve health care expenditures away from central 
hospitals to district level ones. Jamison (1993a, 5), for instance, notes that Zimbabwe 
has halted new investment in central hospitals and is now concentrating on district 
level infrastructure and health centres. Lowenson, Sanders and Davies (1991, 1084) 
relay that Zimbabwe made a substantial commitment to expanding rural health care 
after independence; a total of 274 new rural health centres were built by 1987. In 
Tanzania, the movement to a rural health care strategy was earlier. Gish (1975, 53) 
reports that from 1961-1971 government hospital beds increased by 50 per cent while 
the number of rural health centres expanded by 300 per cent. 
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Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that though there is an urban bias in 
hospital facilities this does not mean that for specific diseases, and in some cases, 
perhaps for nutrition, that urban inhabitants are healthier. For instance, tuberculosis 
rates in the Cote d'Ivoire are higher in urban areas then rural ones (Phillips 1990, 131) 
and the incidence of AIDs in most urban areas in African is likely to be higher than in 
rural areas. Mosley (1989, 273) notes that in the case of Kenya, Nairobi, despite 
being better served by medical facilities, has a higher child mortality rate than 
surrounding rural areas. He believes that this is due to the fact that the environmental 
conditions in the capital are much poorer than in rural areas. 
Due to the presence of some bias in the health care delivery system in Africa 
efforts were undertaken within Africa and with the advice of outside experts to reform 
the health sector. The first changes showed up in national development plans and 
were later emphasised by all African countries as part of a strategy of primary health 
care. The goal was to make health care more accessible to the entire population. This 
would be done by encouraging the participation of subprofessionals, such as village 
health workers and traditional healers, the community, and professional doctors and 
nurses in an effort to provide adequate health care to everyone who desired it. The 
approach taken was integrative: preventative care was promoted alongside curative 
care, sanitation and sewerage improvements were required and improvements in 
nutrition, education and social advances were encouraged. 
However, this approach was viewed by many an unviable given financial 
constraints, a lack of skilled manpower in government bureaucracies and poor co-
ordination. This led to a watering down of the PHC approach and an attempt was 
made to replace it with one concentrating on selective health interventions. This 
approach was criticised, in the main, for taking health care and separating it from the 
wider area of development and concentrating on medical interventions to the 
detriment of preventative care. A compromise between the two approaches began to 
emerge in the 1980s which promoted some aspects of preventative care and targeted 
the most vulnerable groups. Its advantage was that it was not over optimistic in its 
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goals as the PHC approach and was not as narrowly focused as selective health care 
was seen to be. 
5.7.2 Traditional versus Modern 
The modern health care delivery system in Africa has its basis in an organisational 
hierarchy. This hierarchy is normally thought of in terms of a pyramid. The facilities 
and personnel are funded mainly by the national government through the Ministry of 
Health and, to a lesser degree, by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies in 
developed countries or by missionaries. The facility hierarchy has at its apex a small 
number of relatively large urban- (capital-) based hospitals. These hospitals usually 
offer curative care along western lines and specialised operations, and act as a referral 
magnet for lower level facilities. Below the specialised hospitals lie general hospitals 
that offer a range of non-specialised curative services at the district level. Below the 
district hospitals there is a tier of smaller, mainly rural health centres and health posts 
that provide a range of non-technical curative health care an offer preventative 
services. The health centres are often staffed by qualified physicians and nurses, 
whereas posts are manned by volunteers and semi-qualified health workers. Below 
this tier lies health care interventions that occur at the household level. Although this 
technically falls out of a Ministry of Health dominated pyramidal hierarchy it is 
included as much of the health care interventions in Africa initially occur in the home. 
Referrals in this standardised framework, occur up the health care hierarchy 
depending on the nature of an individual's illness. However, in practice, the referral 
system frequently breaks down and by-passing facilities is common in all African 
countries. Figure 5.7 provides a schematic representation of the modern health care 
hierarchy which lists the facilities, personnel, administration and the size of the 
population served (Phillips 1990): 
50,000-500,000 
2,000- 
6,000 
1-10 
500,000-5,000,000 
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Figure 5.7. Modern Health Care Hierarchy 
Modern facilities provided by religious groups, charitable organisations or 
international aid agencies exist parallel to the national hierarchical structure or, are 
sometimes, formally integrated with it (Phillips 1990, 64-66). The facilities provided 
by these groups range from (popular) hospital based services to rural health centres. 
The use of fees to cover their costs is sometimes used, particularly in the case of 
mission hospitals. The facilities provided by external agencies often fill an important 
gap in national health care systems. Medecins Sans Frontieres, Save the Children, 
UNICEF and United Nation's High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) all provide 
emergency health care facilities and coordination in order to provide relief during 
times of famine or civil strife. Outside of emergency assistance modern facilities 
have been established by donor agencies that provide health care on a permanent 
basis. For instance, Phillips (1990, 66) reports that missionary societies provide 
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nearly all the rural health care in Zambia and approximately 75 per cent of rural health 
services in Zaire. 
Modern facilities are also provided by the private sector. Health care delivery 
by private providers tends to have a strong curative orientation. In addition it is not 
integrated in the Ministry of Health system and its activities remain uncoordinated 
with the Ministry's health care objectives. 
Parallel to the modern health care system in Africa is a traditional sector that 
concentrates on rural areas. The traditional medical system acts to counterbalance the 
urban orientation of modern facilities and provides some health care where otherwise 
there would be none in severely resource constrained economies. It is difficult to 
assess how much use of traditional medicine is made by individuals due to the limited 
number of studies and under-reporting of use by patients (Csete 1993, 1290). Phillips 
(1990, 73) provides an estimate for the prevalence of basic health care of this type in 
Africa of the magnitude of 80-90 per cent of the rural population. Traditional or 
indigenous medicine has a long history in Africa and its practitioners are the main 
providers of basic health care in Africa after household level treatment (Phillips 1990, 
75; Ndeti 1976 and Kiteme 1976). For example, Phillip's (1990, 75) research has 
revealed that the ratio of traditional medical practitioners to population is often lower 
than other medical personnel ratios. In Swaziland the traditional medical provider to 
population ratio is 1:120 as compared to the Sub Saharan average of one physician for 
23,540 members of the population in 1990, and one nursing person for every 3,460 
members of the population in 1970. In Malawi, the traditional medical provider to 
population ratio is 1:1,600 compared to the doctor to population ratio of 1:45,740 in 
1990. In Nigeria approximately 70 per cent of the population consult traditional 
healers (Phillips 1990, 83). In Africa it is estimated that nearly three quarters of 
health care takes place at the household or individual level (Leslie, Lycette and 
Buvinic 1988, 307). 
The therapeutic options offered by traditional medical practitioners are wide 
ranging. At the level of lowest medical efficacy arc fortune-tellers, astrologers and 
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hypnotists. Above such dubious practices would lie herbalists, healers and witch 
doctors who utilise mainly locally grown medicinal plants that are either historically 
believed to have medical value or proven by science to be useful in some treatment 
regimes. For example, in Rwanda traditional medicine is consulted most frequently 
when the cause of illness is believed to come from "poisoning"; or when food is 
tampered with (Csete 1993, 1286). At the pinnacle of traditional medicine, at least 
from a western point of view, are traditional birth attendants (TBAs). They are almost 
invariably females who have become skilled in childbirth through self-training or by 
tutoring with other TBAs. Their knowledge relates to both childbirth and information 
concerning prenatal health. They are viewed as more sophisticated health workers in 
so far as they have been integrated into the formal health care delivery system in 
many African countries, whereas other traditional healers lie on the periphery of the 
formal health care sector. 
The coexistence of the traditional medical sector alongside the modern health 
care sector has been termed medical pluralism. This name is fair in so far as it 
suggests that there are two systems running parallel to each other. It is misleading to 
the extent that it implies that access to both systems is equal. Health care delivery in 
Africa, as in other parts of the developing world, is usually viewed in terms of a 
dichotomy of urban-modern facilities versus rural-traditional health care. This 
distinction is useful in gaining a picture of the overall health care delivery system, but 
it is inadequate in describing the picture of individual countries. Some countries such 
as Tanzania and Lesotho (due to geographic size) are better able to provide a mix of 
traditional and modern facilities to their populations. 
5.7.3 Three Systems: Primary, Medical and Selective 
In response to the inequality apparent in the delivery of health care considerable 
attention was devoted, and continues to be paid, to developing an alternative health 
care delivery system appropriate to African countries. The hierarchical system, 
replete with bias, was, and is, seen as failing to provide adequate health care to the 
144 
majority of Africans. Gish (1983, 1962) relates this 'new' health care delivery system 
to the basic needs approach. The basic needs approach stresses access to consumer 
goods, employment and social services by the entire population of developing 
countries. Within the health sector, a strategy based on a mix of promotive, 
preventative and curative care aimed at addressing community health problems 
through education, medical intervention and local participation, was viewed as 
ensuring that basic needs would be satisfied — at least as far as health status 
improvements were concerned (Gish 1983, 1962). 
Commonly, the alleviation of poor health and nutritional states in Africa is 
done through the use of a strategy based on primary health care (PHC). According to 
the World Health Organisation (WHO)14, primary health care is defined as (quoted in 
Mahler 1981, 7): 
essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially 
acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible to individuals 
and families in the community through there full participation and at a cost 
that the community and the country can afford to maintain at every stage of 
their development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination. It forms 
an integral part both of the country's health system, of which it is the central 
function and main focus, and of the overall social and economic development 
of the community. It is the first level of contact of individuals, the family and 
community with the national health system bringing health care as close as 
possible to where people live and work, and constitutes the first element of a 
continuing health care process. 
and as (Lee 1983, 93-94), 
Education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods of 
preventing and controlling them; promotion of food supply and proper 
nutrition; an adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation; maternal and 
child health care, including family planning; immunisation against the major 
infectious diseases; prevention and control of locally endemic diseases; 
appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and provision of 
essential drugs. 
According to United Nation's specialised agencies (WHO, IBRD and 
UNICEF) and numerous authors [such as MacDonald (1993); Phillips (1990); Yimam 
(1990); Leslie, Lycette and Buvinic (1988); Gwatkin, Wilcox and Wray (1980); 
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Djukanovic and Mach (1975); Nangawe et al (1987) on Tanzania; Orubuloye and 
Oyeneye (1982) on Tanzania and Nigeria; Matomora (1989) on Tanzania; Gish 
(1983) on Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania; Nsekela and Nhonoli (1976) on 
Tanzania; Gish (1975) on Tanzania] the successful implementation of the PI-IC 
strategy is dependent on the active participation of the community, the use of 
paramedical personnel using simple technologies to promote healthiness and cure 
minor diseases and injuries, intersectoral collaboration, and the incorporation of 
indigenous health systems alongside the modern sector. Community participation, 
with its roots in the International Labour Office's approach to basic needs 
(MacDonald 1993, 88) views the community as the principal actor in ensuring their 
own health care through local control over the contents and implementation of a PHC 
programme (Mosley 1989, 262). Thus, para medical personnel and low-cadre health 
workers (normally termed community health workers) become the main agents of 
change (as is the case with Ethiopian village health workers; Lancet 1992a, 661). The 
approach requires active grassroot participation, not simply the community taking 
orders for the centre and then implementing them within the community. 
Intersectoral collaboration is viewed as a means of ensuring that health is 
viewed it its wider context. That is, poor health is not merely the result of an absence 
of a medical intervention, but is based on problems originating outside of the health 
sector. Under this guise health status is effected by changes in agricultural 
production, education, housing, water supply and sanitation disposal. This means that 
a multidisciplinary approach to health is required in order to ensure the well being of 
a population. The incorporation of native health systems recognises to problems with 
health care delivery in developing countries. The first is that resources are scarce and 
it is best to incorporate inexpensive systems of curing into the PHC strategy due to 
their cost savings. Second, the use of traditional methods of healing recognises the 
broader cultural context of health, and the reluctance of some members of society to 
utilise a modern health system that they are unfamiliar with or that costs too much. 
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However, this picture of comprehensive health care is idealistic. It has yet to 
be successfully implemented in any country on the scope imagined. There are several 
reasons for this. First, although there are several anecdotal examples of participation 
(Lancet 1992b, 967), active community participation in PHC has been limited due to 
the lack of democratic and autonomous communities in rural areas. As W. Henry 
Mosley (1989, 263) observes, "the principal difficulty lies in the highly centralised 
control that is exercised by the bureaucracies of national governments, thus the path 
of least resistance is chosen, and existing community systems are swallowed up under 
the new programme." Countries, like Tanzania, that have used ideology as a basis to 
motivate socio-economic change have been able to secure active and maximum 
community participation in health programmes. Gish (1983) believes that the 
socialist orientation of Tanzania, Ethiopia and Mozambique and their commitment to 
the New International Economic Order have fostered an environment that promotes a 
successful switch over to PHC. In Nigeria, although PHC is promoted at the 
grassroots level, active and widespread community participation has been limited due 
to a lack of ideological commitment by the government (Orubuloye and Oyenye 
1982, 685-86). 
Bureaucratic barriers are also important in explaining the collapse of 
intersectoral collaboration. Each ministry sees itself as semi autonomous from other 
ministries and actions by one ministry often go unreported to others. The general lack 
of resources necessary to foster successful collaboration is also a significant factor 
(Mosley 1989, 264). Chen (1986) has warned, for instance, that primary health care 
may fail where bureaucracy is more concerned with procedure than performance. 
Indeed, the replication of successful pilot PHC projects may be put into jeopardy 
when "applied to bureaucratically dense, professionally dominated, poorly responsive 
systems" (Chen 1986, 1264). 
The attempt by the WHO and UNICEF to keep health care culturally relevant 
has met with mixed results. Although there are notable examples where PHC has 
successfully adopted some aspects of traditional medicine (for instance China), on the 
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whole the record has been rather poor — with the preference for modern western 
medicine. However, this is not to say that native medicine has been wiped out, far 
from it, in most countries it still exists, the difference being that it runs side by side 
with other health programs, rather than enjoying the benefits that would arise from 
incorporating it within an overall health strategy. 
Additionally, the strategy put forward by the WHO and UNICEF as part of its 
global strategy of "Health for All by the Year 2000" has come under criticism for its 
unrealism (Prescott and De Ferranti 1985, 1238) and its "muddled thinking on 
fundamental issues" (the Lancet 1983). The PHC strategy has also been estimated to 
be extremely costly to implement. The original estimate for extending PI-IC to 
developing countries on a permanent basis was an additional $40-$80 billion (Phillips 
1990, 156). The cost to the poorest countries was estimated between $20 and $33 
billion. This compares to total annual health care expenditure of around $12 billion in 
1990 for all of Sub Saharan Africa, and total development assistance for health to 
Africa in 1990 of $1.2 billion (World Bank 1993). Given that aid flows have recently 
stagnated, a lack of willingness by most donors to reach UN aid as a percentage of 
GNP targets, and a lack of domestic financial resources it is highly unlikely that PHC 
will be constructed as originally envisaged. However, Wang'ombe's (1984) study of 
a PHC scheme in Western Kenya has noted that there may be a sufficiently positive 
rate of return on establishing and coordinating primary health services alongside 
community health worker schemes. Gwatkin, Wilcox and Wray (1980) also believe 
that PHC programmes can have substantial benefits. Their review of previous 
research reveals that in small populations infant and child mortality can be reduced by 
between 33 and 50 per cent over one to five years at a cost of less than two per cent 
per capita income. 
On a more practical level, PHC may never achieve full implementation due to 
political resistance by beneficiaries of the current urban-based system. Moreover, 
administrative and managerial problems are likely to arise at the lower levels of health 
care delivery (Orobuloye and Oyenye 1982 and Phillips 1990, 156). Orobuloye and 
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Oyenye (1982) note that constraints in the delivery of PHC in Nigeria have existed in 
the structure of government with the national implementing agency having little 
control over finances. In addition, commitment to the PHC scheme varies from state 
to state, with some states providing free care for basic services and others charging for 
such services. 
Due to the incredibly broad scope of the WHO message attention has turned to 
the use of selective cost effective approaches (Nations et al 1984, 1612) and selective 
primary health care (Walsh and Warren 1979, 145). The selective primary health care 
(SPHC) approach concentrates on targeting and addressing specific health problems. 
The main strength lies in the fact that it views the health care system in Africa as 
constrained in terms of finance, managerial expertise and an absence of a political 
commitment to change by national elites. Its focus is on conditions that can be cured 
or averted at the least cost. The SPHC approach attempts to prioritise diseases based 
on the cost of effective control and based on prevalence and mortality and morbidity 
indicators. Diarrhoeal diseases, measles, malaria, whooping cough, schistosomiasis 
and neonatal tetanus receive a high priority (Walsh and Warren 1979). Hookworm 
receives a medium priority due to its low mortality and difficulty in controlling. The 
alleviation of malnutrition also receives a medium priority even though it has a high 
prevalence and high morbidity, its control is viewed as excessively complex (Walsh 
and Warren 1979). Amoebiasis, Giardiasis, Filariasis and Dengue receive a low 
priority due to the difficulty inherent in controlling these conditions (Walsh and 
Warren 1979). 
Phillips (1990) points out several serious flaws in the selective approach to 
primary health care (SPHC). First, concentrating on specific and selective 
interventions runs the risk of diverting attention away from basic underlying health 
needs relating to health conditions in favour of a vertical health care delivery system. 
Second, the SPHC approach limits the degree of community involvement with the 
choice of interventions are chosen by outside experts and ministry of health officials 
with little knowledge of local conditions or community needs (Wolffers 1991, 739). 
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Third, there is a feeling by some experts that the use of medical inputs has only an 
indirect relationship on health outputs. That is, social and environmental 
improvements may do more to improve health status than purely technical solutions. 
Moreover, such improvements offer the advantage in that the effects are not isolated 
to a specific disease but may spillover into other improvements in health. For 
example, as previously shown, nutritional improvements can prevent the incidence of 
tuberculosis and diarrhoea, and improvements in water supply and sanitation have far 
reaching effects. 
The United Nation's Childrens Fund promotion of the GOBI (Growth charts, 
Oral rehydration therapy, Breastfeeding and Immunisations, and in its expanded form 
GOBI-FFF; Food supplements, Female schooling and Family planning) method of 
selective health interventions has been praised on one hand because of its 
complementarity with PHC and also roundly criticised because it is dependence on 
foreign inputs which cannot be replaced locally and the technology used 
(immunisations) is imposed on the population concerned (Seaman and Poore 1987, 
1334). The GOBI approach appears to fall in between the PHC approach and 
selective health interventions. It has been viewed as a complement to PHC in that it is 
operational until the full PHC strategy can be implemented (Wisner 1988, 120). 
However, the criticisms of GOBI-FFF follow those of the selective approach. That is 
GOBI-FFF fails to address the underlying causes of poor health in developing 
countries; low incomes, lack of services and poor environments. As Wisner (1988, 
146) states: 
Since GOBI as it now stands does nothing by way of encouraging social 
transformations that would work toward the eradication of poverty, and since 
it actually seems to block transformative participation and the strong version 
of PHC, it can really be seen as nothing more than a handy way of mopping up 
the excess mortality created by economic adjustment. 
The Economist (1986, 98) reports that lack of co-ordination is another important 
drawback of selective primary health care. Leslie, Lycette and Buvinic (1988, 311) 
while generally praising the GOBI approach, warn that the time costs may be high. 
For instance, an immunisation may only take seconds to administer, but the time spent 
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travelling to and from the health centre and queuing may be great. Randall, Wisner 
and Bossert (1989, 406) believe that the selective nature of GOBI, which focuses on 
breastfeeding ignores the roles of women in urban areas and women in the rural 
workforce. Raikes (1989, 448) mimics this notion as he believes that maternal and 
child health (MCH) over concentrates on women's reproductive role while ignoring 
their wider health needs. 
Moreover, the impact of the selective approach on child and infant mortality 
may have been overestimated (De L. Costello 1988, 186 and Lancet 1990, 1310.). 
The Kasongo Project Team (1981) found that survival for unvaccinated patients was 
similar, in the long run, to patients that received a measles vaccine, in Kasongo, Zaire. 
Although their study did provide important information on the cost-benefit of a 
measles vaccination program — the authors of the report believed that it would be 
"useful to think twice" before allocating scarce resources in view of the operational 
difficulties and the high costs of the program — it also demonstrated the potential for 
limited "success" of selective primary health care (the Kasongo Project Team 1981, 
767). 
As one of the "pillars' of PHC is intersectoral collaboration the selective 
approach has been criticised for its over emphasis on technical interventions 
(MacDonald 1993, 78). Due to the concentration on one intervention at a time, the 
selective approach fails to include linkages to other sectors that may offer, perhaps 
larger, improvements in health. Additionally, selective PHC does not include the 
very people that it is meant to help in the decision making process, and thus becomes 
a mere extension of low-cost existing medical services (Macdonald 1993, 78). 
Phillips (1990, 163) believes that the most compelling criticism directed a 
SPHC relates to its Western orientation and its over use of technocratic solutions. 
The SPHC approach is criticised by him due to its failure to include the community 
and their local initiatives. This idea has been extended to include the broader Marxist 
framework of continued exploitation and control of the South by the North This 
criticism, is to an extent unfounded. First, the current "medical" model is as much an 
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outgrowth of the thinking of elites and trained practitioners in developing countries as 
it is an imposed ideal from the North. Second, the primary health care approach was 
not developed exclusively in developing countries. Although there is an admirable 
history of "primary health care" in national development plans (Orubuloye and 
Oyenye 1982, 675) that pre dated Alma-Ata, several UN organisations, allegedly 
dominated by the interests of developed countries, and many bilateral agencies, kick-
started the PHC approach. In this sense, developed countries cannot truly be viewed 
as attempting to control developing countries in so far as the approach effectively 
encourages mass participation in developing countries. Third, the SPHC approach 
can be viewed as part of the PHC system. Interventions that appear on the SPHC list 
would undoubtedly make up part of the PHC system. 
Rifkin and Walt's (1988) critique of the Walsh and Warren approach is 
especially telling. Rifkin and Walt accuse Warren's attempt to return to the 'old' 
definition of health "as the absence of disease" as fundamentally flawed because it 
ignores the real reasons why health improves (p. 744): 
Medical advances, technology and research are necessary but not sufficient 
factors. They can and do become irrelevant when they do not respond to the 
socio-economic/political conditions in a given country. Improvements in 
health depend on understanding the entire environment and on encouraging all 
living in that environment to take decisions to change it for the better. 
In essence the criticisms directed to the PHC strategy focused, in the first 
instance, on the definition that is used in defining health. The much repeated phrase 
that health is a state of "complete physical, mental and social well being, and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity", while offering the World community and 
national governments a comprehensive definition that deals with not only problems of 
health but also with development, also, at the same time, offers an enormously 
difficult challenge to national governments and populations in the developing world. 
The challenge is that with their scarce resources and with technical and financial 
assistance from developed countries that they not only tackle problems of health but 
that they also attempt to correct every social and economic problem within their 
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boundaries, regardless of whether the causes of these problems are generated 
externally or institutionalised. In this sense, the primary health care strategy is not 
really about health at all, but about underdevelopment. 
However, this is not necessarily a problem, for surely health and development 
are intertwined, and improvements in one are likely to lead to increases in the other, 
as are declines likely to feedback through the system. The problem occurs in its 
ambition. It lacks in any reasonable acceptance of the present situation; current 
constraints on development caused by extremely complicated economic arrangements 
between Southern and Northern states that cannot for a moment be expected to be 
changed in the near future. Thus the strategy of primary health care is reduced to a 
trap with a key. A key in the sense that the problem is correctly identified with a 
reasonable solution, a trap because the solution cannot be implemented without the 
co-operation of actors in the developed countries. 
Thus, the health system in developing countries, and in particular sub-Saharan 
Africa, have failed to implement the PHC strategy as originally envisaged by the 
WHO and UNICEF, while at the same time, failing to find a more viable alternative 
to the resource saving (but perhaps not health improving) strategy put forward by the 
proponents of selective primary health care. The health care strategy followed by 
sub-Saharan counties, thus, becomes hard to quantify. Some countries are further 
along in implementing the original PHC strategy with its emphasis on community 
participation, Tanzania was a notable example with its Ujjama programme 
(Orubuloye and Oyenye 1982, 683-85); and others still rely on centralised decision 
making. While at the same time, some countries have found themselves the recipients 
of selective health interventions, while pursuing the overall objectives of PHC. As 
Mosley (1989, 264) says, without attention to social relevance, intersectoral co-
operation and community participation; "PHC essentially becomes a top-down 
strategy to reach the community with some simple but theoretically effective 
preventive and curative technologies using various types of village level workers." 
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Due to the criticisms directed at selective primary health care and the failure of 
many African governments to successfully implement the full PHC package, a more 
realistic approach to African health systems is currently being undertaken. Although 
explicit reference to basic needs is not always made, the current "consensus" has 
much in common with that approach to development thinking. It was pointed out 
earlier that the basic needs approach is difficult to quantify, and it is likely that it 
means, or is defined differently by different groups of people (Hettne 1990, 168-172). 
As a starting point, it is useful to think of the basic needs approach to health 
care as lying somewhere between the extremes of PHC and a system of health care 
that focuses on urban, curative-based care. The basic needs approach is conceptually 
closest to the GOBI-FFF plan proposed by UNICEF. The World Bank (1994a) 
provides an "Agenda for Action" that developing countries should follow if they wish 
to improve their health systems. This agenda falls short of promoting the full PHC 
package as originally envisioned, but instead offers a list of areas that should be 
focused on by member governments. This list provides the foundation of basic needs 
as it relates to health care. 
The Bank (World Bank 1994a) has identified several areas that are of varying 
degrees of priority for Africa. The expansion of female education and the provision 
of finance to ensure the delivery of public health packages are given a high priority. 
Of moderate concern are the pursual of economic growth packages that benefit the 
poor, the political and economic empowerment of women and a decrease in spending 
on tertiary care and a concomitant increase in finance for clinical services for the 
impoverished (World Bank 1994a, 157). Thus, the Bank's "Agenda of Action", shys 
away from embracing fully PHC while also keeping well away from clinical services 
that serve only urban groups. 
Similar to the Bank's recent approach to African health care systems the World 
Health Organization (Ttirmen 1995, 13) and Young (1995) also recommend a basic 
package of health care delivery for African governments to follow. Young (1995) 
believes that infants and children should be at the forefront of health care reform. Her 
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analysis of the health care problem notes that basic needs can be satisfied by 
providing "adequate" shelter, health care, nutrition and education. Under her proposal 
it would be unnecessary, in order to satisfy basic needs, to provide for a large number 
of clinical services to infants and children. Instead her priority areas are the provision 
of basic foods, immunisation, safe shelter and appropriate education. Table 5.4 below 
outlines the areas she has identified as being of critical concern and the best solution 
to the basic needs problem. 
Table 5.4. Basic Needs and Required Inputs  
Age 	 Basic Needs 	 Inputs 
Birth - 1 year 	 Protection from physical danger Safe shelter 
Adequate nutrition 
Adequate health care 
Attachment with an adult 
Motor and sensory stimulation 
Food and micronutrients 
Basic health care 
(Immunisations, ORT, hygiene) 
Age appropriate development 
curriculum 
Appropriate language stimulation 
1 - 3 years Support in acquiring motor, 
language and thinking skills 
Develop independence 
Learn self-control 
Play 
Safe shelter, food and 
micronutrients, basic health care 
(in addition to the above 
deworming) 
Age appropriate development 
curriculum 
3 - 6 years Opportunity to develop fine 
motor skills 
Expand language skills 
Learn cooperation, helping and 
sharing 
Experiment with prewriting and 
prereading skills  
Safe shelter, food and 
micronutrients, basic health care 
Age appropriate development 
curriculum 
Young (1995) 
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Ttinnen (1995) complements Young's approach, through the exposition of the WHO's 
Mother—Baby Package. The key elements of this programme are that equity in 
access to care should be provided at the lowest level of the health care system, and 
that health care resources should be redistributed to the periphery and interventions 
and reforms should, as under the PHC system, occur with the involvement of the 
community. The essential components, which have much in common with MCH 
programmes are (Ttirmen 1995, 13): 
(1) family planning to prevent unwanted pregnancies, 
(2) community based pre-natal care for early detection and treatment of 
complications, 
(3) community-based care for normal deliveries and newborn care, 
(4) access to essential obstetric care for high risk pregnancies and maternal 
and newborn complications 
Thus, it has become clear that many academic researchers, experts and other parties 
are currently steering away from, at one extreme a full PHC package and at the other 
extreme a system based purely on clinical services. Instead, certain priority areas 
have been identified and the attention paid to these areas should allow for the basic 
needs of Africans to be fulfilled. 
In essence there is not one model that has been adopted across Africa, but a 
multiplicity of models, some leaning more towards comprehensive health care and 
others closer to selective primary health care, and with the majority using elements of 
consistent with basic needs Elements of community participation are encouraged by 
all major international agencies and are evident in most African countries, but the 
degree of implementation varies. The same also holds true for intersectoral co-
operation. 
5.8 Health Care Financing 
During the 1980s, in many African countries, the role of national governments in the 
financing of health care came under pressure. This was caused by a combination of 
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factors. First, many Ministries of Health were allocated a smaller percentage of total 
government revenues to cover their existing operations. The problem was 
compounded to the extent that even where there were increases in total revenue going 
to the health budget these increases were being diluted by the growth in population 
(Vogel 1991, 167 and McPake 1993, 1397) and the appearance of new infectious 
diseases such as HIV (McPake 1993, 1397). For example, Vogel (1993, 168) reports 
that PPPR adjusted per capita government health expenditures, following an increase 
from 1975-80, declined 12.4 per cent in Sub Saharan Africa. Finally, following the 
recommendation the World Bank (1987) and WHO and UNICEF, as part of the 
Bamako Initiative, countries were encouraged to move away from a system of free 
health care provision to a system where at least a portion of the recurrent costs and/or 
drug supplies could be recovered. 
Since the governments in Africa were faced with a problem of underfunding in 
the health budget alternatives were proposed and examined. Shepard and Benjamin 
(1988, 402) state that these alternatives were (1) lower existing services to a level 
which they could be sustainably financed with the possibility of more equitable 
distribution of services, (2) provide services more efficiently, thus cutting back on the 
need for increases in health care expenditure, and (3) raise revenues to finance 
existing services with the potential to redistribute revenues to the most important 
services. The first option is viewed as difficult to achieve because at a time of 
economic crisis politicians would be reluctant to (further) reduce services in the face 
of opposition from the population. Only the second and third options are seen as 
viable. In the macro realm only the increase in revenues is viewed as obtainable. 
Any increase in funding to the health sector has to come from one or a 
combination of the following areas: (1) missions (Shepard, Carrin and Nyandagazi 
1993, 141), (2) grants and/or loans from multilateral or bilateral agencies, (3) 
additional tax revenues or (4) private payment (Shepard and Benjamin 1988, 404). 
The first two suffer from a practical limit to the amount of money they may yield to 
the total health sector budget. For instance, grants and loans are often tied to specific 
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projects. Moreover the is a political boundary to the amount of money that may be 
raised through additional taxation without encouraging tax evasion, political upheaval 
and discouraging production (Shepard and Benjamin 1988, 404). 
Consequently attention was placed on making consumers pay a portion of 
health care costs. The advantage of mandating private payment for health care was 
that it would, as a demand side measure, decrease the frivolous use of services (i.e. 
decrease moral hazard with user fees), potentially increase equity (in so far as the 
urban-rural bias was decreased or eliminated with the additional revenues), increase 
quality and allow for the recurrent costs to be recovered. However, there are also 
several disadvantages to the promotion of private payment of health care. First, 
charges may lead to a reduction in utilisation and may be regressive in as much as the 
effect is most evident in low income groups. Second an increase in moral hazard and 
adverse selection could be an unwanted outcome with the promotion of insurance 
schemes. Third the overall household budget could be put into jeopardy. Finally, the 
fees raised would not be enough to sustain high quality services. 
Vogel (1991, 172) notes that health care financing in Sub Saharan Africa takes 
many different forms. Provision of health care is characterised by a multiplicity of 
providers with traditional healers existing alongside doctors, nurses, health workers, 
paramedical staff and drug sellers. Moreover, the private sector exists along side 
government and mission run facilities. 
Where health care has a monetary cost there are a variety of pricing practices. 
These may include user charges, where payment is made when treatment is received, 
prepayment schemes, health insurance schemes or national health cards, where 
payment is made in advance of treatment (Ahrin 1993), and charges only for drugs 
(McPake, Hanson and Mills, 1993). The pricing practice can vary within a country 
and may be dependent on the service consulted. For instance, most community 
financing schemes allow exemptions for the very poor and physically and mentally 
handicapped individuals (McPake, Hanson and Mills 1993, 1388). Furthermore, as in 
the case of Kenya, charges may be levied at community pharmacies but not at 
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government facilities, or there may be separate fees for consultation and drugs as 
occurs in Burundi (McPake, Hanson and Mills 1993, 1388). The evidence concerning 
the effects that community financing has on utilisation is presented in the next section 
and in chapter six. 
5.9 Availability, Access and Utilisation 
Availability of, access to, and utilisation of health facilities can be effected by 
adjustment programmes. Availability of services applies to the supply side; the 
provision of services by the state, missions, non-governmental organisations and the 
private sector. Availability of services implies that income, prices and opportunity 
costs will play an important role in utilisation. Even if health services exist they may 
not be utilised because of the low incomes of households, high prices or high 
opportunity costs. Access refers to any physical impediments to getting to a health 
facility. If the facility is too far away or the infrastructure poorly maintained access to 
health facilities may severely limited. On the demand side, utilisation of health 
facilities is concerned with the extent that health facilities are actually used. 
The most obvious factor influencing utilisation of health care facilities is the 
price of health services and the distance to health facilities. Akin et al's (1986) study 
of the Bicol region of the Philippines found that prices were not an important factor in 
determining demand. Nearly half of their sample used private or traditional fee-for-
service medicine even though free services provided by the public system were as or 
more accessible. Akin et al's (1985) larger analysis also reached similar conclusions 
using data from Mexican and Malaysian patients. They suggest that the provision of 
free medical care will not "necessarily improve health conditions, it only makes 
medical care cheaper." (Akin et al 1985, 176). This is the concept of distance decay; 
where the rate of utilisation (interaction) tends to vary inversely with distance (Stock 
1983, 563). The price of health care is related to the distance that must be travelled in 
order to seek health care. Where no fees are charged for services, utilisation of 
services would be quite high, barring any problems of access. However, the cost of 
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consumption is not the only cost associated with seeking health care. The time it 
takes to travel to a health facility is also an important cost, as measured not only by 
the actual costs associated with such travel (such as bus fare) but the opportunity cost. 
Gertler and van der Gaag (1190, 88) provide travel time elasticities for adults 
in rural Cote d'Ivoire, where the monetary costs for medical care is zero: 
Table 5.5. Arc Travel Time Elasticities for Adults in Rural Cote d'Ivoire 
Hours of Income Quartile 
Travel Time 1 2 3 4 
Clinic 
0-1 -0.35 -0.32 -0.28 -0.14 
1-2 -1.61 -0.57 -0.50 -0.24 
1-3 -0.85 -0.83 -0.72 -0.33 
3-4 -1.10 -1.09 -0.95 -0.42 
Hospital 
0-1 -0.25 -0.23 -0.21 -0.11 
1-2 -0.44 -0.42 -0.37 -0.99 
2-3 -0.65 -0.62 -0.55 -0.27 
3-4 -0.85 -0.84 -0.74 -0.34 
Mean Incomea 33.28 64.44 99.52 222.8 
Source: Gertler and van der Gaag 1990: 88 
a in thousands of Ivorian CFAFs 
The table demonstrates that the poorer the individual is the more sensitive he is to the 
opportunity cost of time. Indeed, children's utilisation in the same study were 
revealed to be more sensitive to time than adult's utilisation (Gertler and van der Gaag 
1990, 88). The implication is that time, while creating a barrier to health care 
utilisation is important, its role is more significant for poorer individuals than richer 
ones (Gertler and van der Gaag 1990, 89). Csete (1193, 1289) study of Rwandan 
households in the Giciye Commune also notes that distance may be an important 
factor. Her research demonstrated that distance, as measured by altitude affected 
utilisation: mothers who lived at higher altitudes were less likely to seek treatment 
than those that lived at lower altitudes. However, Akin et als (1985 and 1986) 
analysis of the Bicol region of the Philippines did not find distance to be an important 
factor in deterring utilisation. They suggest that these unusual findings may be due to 
the fact that the region is relatively well served by roads and transport, thus cutting 
down on time costs. However, this is a rather poor explanation as the values for travel 
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time were high; 1.25 hours to a traditional healer and approximately four hours to a 
private or public facility (Akin et al 1985, 171-172). UNICEF's (1989) review of the 
situation in Kenya found that distance from immunisation facilities was less important 
in affecting utilisation. However, they noted that for households that faced distances 
greater than 15 km utilisation dropped substantially.15 
Okafor (1983, 592) in a case study of Afenmai in the Bendel State, Nigeria, 
showed that waged labourers, such as civil servants and teachers used hospitals more 
often (over half visited more than three times in the specified time period) than non-
waged labourers, such as farmers, traders and craftsmen (where over half only visited 
a hospital once). A possible explanation of this behaviour is that waged labourers 
were able to secure paid time off from work whereas non-waged labourers could not 
(p. 592). Here, it is believed that farmers and the like are reluctant to take time off of 
work as it will mean a reduction in their income. Okafor (1983, 593) believes that age 
plays an important role, with those aged between 21 and 50 the least likely to visit 
hospitals because they are active in the labour force. Although it should be noted that 
this may simply be due to the fact that these individuals are healthier than under 20s 
and over 50s. 
If this is the case then there is no such thing as "free" health care. Indeed as 
Abel-Smith and Rawal (1992) point out: 
It is often tacitly assumed that the only costs of using health care are any 
charges which may be levied by providers. But an important additional cost is 
time away from other activities, which can be very important not only for 
those who lose cash earnings when away from work, but also for subsistence 
farmers and, not least, mothers taken away from household duties. A further 
cost is that of travel for some patients. 
In other words, when medical care is free or subsidised, as it is in many 
developing countries, time becomes a mechanism to control demand. If the 
opportunity cost of time is high, then there will be a reduction in demand for activities 
that are time intensive; when monetary prices are zero, time prices ration the market 
and replace monetary prices in determining the choice of medical provider (Gertler 
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and van der Gaag 1990, 20). From a pricing point of view it would be expected that if 
fees for health services are free or subsidised demand will become relatively more 
sensitive to changes in time prices. Thus, the demand for free health care is more 
sensitive to changes in time prices than services which require out-of-pocket 
payments (Acton 1975, 598)16. 
The cost of treatment therefore is likely to vary depending on an individuals 
location relative to a health facility and his economic position. Table 5.5 outlines the 
costs of treatment for various sectors: 
Table 5.6. Cost of treatment in various sectors 
Area and Sector 	 Total Cost of Treatment 
Cost of treatmentt + travel cost + 
Rural 	 opportunity cost (income from, say, 
working in fields that is foregone) 
Cost of treatment + travel costs + 
Urban formal 
	
opportunity cost (e.g. cost of child 
minding) 
Cost of treatment + travel cost + 
Urban informal 	 opportunity cost (income from trading 
foregone)  
t Cost of treatment includes visitation and cost of pharmaceuticals 
If the cost of treatment is based on travel and opportunity costs as well, then it 
is expected that an economically rational individual will visit the health facility 
closest to him, provided that the route itself is open (i.e. that a road to proximate 
health facility is not washed out). As most health facilities are concentrated in urban 
areas it is likely that communities in rural areas will face the greatest time costs. To 
take but one example, in Abidjan, the capital of Cote d' Ivoire, approximately 60 per 
cent of all doctors are based there (Gertler and van der Gaag 1990, 29). However, 
cost of treatment is not the only factor influencing utilisation. There also exists an 
income effect which influences utilisation. 
If income increases it is expected that demand for health care will also 
increase. For instance, in Kenya increases in income led to increases in visits to 
mission clinics and government hospitals (that is income elasticities are highest for 
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these two types of hospitals) 17 (Mwabu 1989, 389). However, it is important to note 
that this income effect may offset the effect of time; "an increase in earnings per hour 
produces an income effect, which acts to increase demand. It also raises the 
opportunity cost of time, which reduces the demand for time intensive activities" 
(Acton 1975, 599 and Mwabu 1989, 391). The net effect on the demand for health 
care will be based on "the time intensity of the price of medical services relative to the 
time intensity of the price of all other goods and services" (Acton 1975, 599). 
Mwabu (1989, 391) notes that the time costs of treatment vary from season to 
season. In the wet season when there is most likely to be a high opportunity cost of 
time, due to the amount of agricultural work that must be accomplished, "the disutility 
of time cost of medical treatment increases far above its level in the dry season" — 
about four times its level in the dry season (pp 389-391). Thus during the wet season 
individuals are less likely to seek treatment, especially if the illness is not perceived as 
severe (p 391). However, Stock's (1983, 567) analysis of essentially the same 
problem in a different area of Nigeria did not find any significant seasonal variations 
in the distance travelled. 
However, fees for treatment, distance and changes in income do not explain 
health care utilisation on their own. There are several non-monetary factors to 
consider when talking about health care utilisation. Egunjobi (1983) has identified 
other factors: quality of services [and Stock (1983), Vogel (1988), McPake, Hanson 
and Mills (1993) and Livack and Bodart (1993)1, religion (and Stock 1983) relative 
living in a hospital town, and connections with medical staff. Mwabu (1989) believes 
that environmental factors, severity of illness, experience with a health facility, age, 
education and sex also play important roles. 
Based on interviews with patients in four hospitals in the Oyo Health Zone in 
Nigeria, Egunjobi (1983, 586) believes that the quality of service offered is important 
in determining utilisation (second only to nearness of facility). Hospitals that arc 
perceived as providing the highest quality of service are viewed by individuals as an 
important factor in visiting. Indeed, Stock (1983) confirmed that there exists a 
163 
positive relationship between the position that a health facility has in the service 
hierarchy and the mean length of journey for treatment. That is, patients are willing to 
travel furthest for hospital treatment and the least for a visit to a government 
dispensary. In his study area in Nigeria the predominately rural, and agricultural 
population experienced per capita utilisation declines of 25 per cent/km for local 
government dispensaries, 20 per cent/km for hospitals and rural health centre 
outpatients and 9 per cent/km for inpatients at hospitals. 
Vogel's (1988) comprehensive study of cost recovery in West Africa found 
that quality of care was important in decisions relating to willingness to pay for health 
care. His case study of Senegal noted that if poor quality care was coupled with a 
positive price for treatment then individuals may bypass public facilities in favour of 
traditional healers. In Mali, Vogel (1988, 81) found that willingness to pay was based 
on the quality of medical care: "if people perceive that they are not 'treated like dogs' 
they will willingly come and pay." Overall, Vogel's (1988) research revealed that 
improving quality of care was important in encouraging utilisation and should go 
hand-in-hand with a movement to cost recovery in the health sector. 
Litvack and Bodart's (1993) pre-test post-test controlled experiment in five 
public health facilities in the Adamaoua province of Cameroon found that when user 
fees were increased without quality improvements utilisation at health facilities 
dropped. However, when fees were introduced with a concomitant increase in 
quality, utilisation jumped. Moreover, the effective price of treatment fell even 
though user charges increased. This is due to the fact that high quality care was 
available locally whereas prior to the improvements high quality care entailed travel 
and time costs (Litvack and Bodart 1993, 379). However, the studies applicability 
may be limited. First, the measurement period of the study was only five months, 
thus it is unclear what the longer term consequences will be. Second, the study does 
not consider if the extra health care costs are being met out of the food budget — with 
implications for nutrition status. 
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Religion, as a factor explaining utilisation, in this case, is only relevant for 
mission hospitals and the Christians that patronise them (Egunjobi 1983, 587). The 
reason for this is hypothesised to be "pride of ownership" that goes with being part of 
a religious organisation and the influence of church leaders. In Stock's study of a 
predominately Muslim society, spatial mobility of females was found to be restricted 
due to cultural guidelines where women needed to obtain the permission of their 
husbands in order to travel and were prohibited from travelling by bicycle, 
motorcycle, horse or donkey (p.566). 
The fact that a relative lives in a hospital town is an unexpected factor, but can 
be explained by the fact that relatives often accompany patients, so that they can 
check on their progress and provide meals, and having free accommodation can 
greatly reduce costs associated with an illness (Egunjobi 1983, 586). Connections 
with hospital staff was seen as important to a few people (1.2 per cent) because it 
gave them the chance to obtain preferential treatment. 
Comparing the use of modern clinics with traditional ones Mwabu (1989, 389) 
found that as the severity of illness increased modern clinic were preferred to 
traditional treatments. If the visit to a modern facility for treatment was seen as 
unsuccessful then the attractiveness of modem clinics fell (p. 389). Moreover, that 
contrary to normal beliefs, older the preference for modem clinics to traditional ones 
increases with age (p.389). Also, compared to males, females preferred modem over 
traditional clinics (p. 390). 
Stock (1983) believes that it is not merely the severity of the illness that helps 
explain the choice of modem treatment over traditional, but the type of illness. For 
instance fractures are viewed as being appropriately treated by traditional methods 
based on the fact that distance is an insignificant determinant of the utilisation of 
Western style health facilities for this type of injury (p. 567). Along the same lines, 
skin rashes were much more likely to be treated locally (p. 567). For diseases such as 
Tuberculosis, which are viewed by the inhabitants as a disease of European origin and 
thus not amenable to traditional therapies, distance had no impact on utilisation rates, 
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and everyone within the catchment area (30 km) sought treatment at the hospital (p. 
568). 
The effect of education on the use of traditional medicine is a little more 
cloudy. Okafor's (1983) study finds that the better educated people tend not to be 
favourably disposed towards traditional medicine, whereas between 65 and 70 per 
cent of the less literate and illiterate household in his study had a positive attitude 
towards 'native medicine' (p. 594). However, the finding deserves a caveat. The 
greater use of modern facilities by the educated may be a function of nearness to 
hospitals as the educated are more likely to be in paid employment in large 
settlements, whereas illiterates are most likely to be in rural areas far from hospitals 
(p. 594). Additionally, the propensity to lie by respondents cannot be discounted as 
some individuals may want to appear to be modern, and their 'dislike' of traditional 
medicine may be superficial (p.594). 
5.10 Summary 
This chapter has examined several issues relating to the health sector in Africa. First, 
it is obvious that the health situation differs markedly from that of developed 
countries, and in many respects lags behind other developing regions. The health 
problems that face Africa today are much the same as those that faced the continent 
decades ago. While other regions have made the epidemiological transition, 
characterised by noncommunicable diseases and injuries overtaking common 
infections as leading causes of death, many parts of Africa remain confronted with a 
health situation that has failed to change for the better. Indeed by any objective 
standard, poverty, and poor health status, remains a persistent problem. Although 
improvements have been made in infant and child mortality rates, these improvements 
must be viewed against faster improvements in other regions. 
Moreover, such improvements need to be viewed against the backdrop of a 
major effort by national governments and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies to 
improve the welfare of Africans. This has in recent years taken the form of a heated 
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debate as to the 'correct' or 'best' health care delivery system for the continent. On one 
side are proponents of a health care delivery system that seeks to equate 
improvements in health status to overall improvements in welfare. That is the goal of 
a health care delivery system should improve mental and social conditions as well as 
health status. Given that the goal is a sweeping one the primary health care solution 
offered requires action on many fronts: promotion of food supply and nutrition, the 
provision of sanitation facilities and clean water, education leading to health 
promoting activities, immunisation programmes, an appropriate mix of preventative 
and curative services and the provision of essential drugs. All of this to be 
accomplished with the full and active participation of the community with the help, 
advice, collaboration and guidance of ministries of health and aid agencies. 
Unfortunately such a health care delivery approach, while admirable, could 
not be accomplished due to a lack of finance and administrative expertise at the 
national and local levels. Therefore, proponents of a second system, selective primary 
health care, suggested that the targeting of specific diseases would offer large benefits 
with the possibility of lowering overall costs. However, such a system was criticised 
for its narrow focus and its lack of attention to other development problems that 
influenced health conditions, health care delivery and health status. 
Given that on one hand the problem was correctly identified by the adherents 
of PHC approach, and the solution, at least as far as there was a realistic view of the 
financing of health care, was offered by the proponents of selective primary health 
care, attention turned to alternative sources of health care financing. The use of some 
cost recovery in order to ensure that basic needs are met is currently receiving a lot of 
attention. Initially it was thought that utilisation of health care would not drop if user 
charges were introduced. However, as the 1980s wore on it was becoming 
increasingly evident that this only applied to the richest Africans. Moreover, two 
other important factors became evident. First, quality is an important component in 
health care delivery. Second, the price of health care is only one factor that affects 
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utilisation. Utilisation is also sensitive to travel and opportunity costs, the religion of 
users, assistance by family members and education. 
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Chapter 6 
The Household and Health 
6.1 Introduction 
Adjustment programmes influence health conditions and health status by altering the 
wages and profitability of urban and farm households and businesses, the prices that 
they pay for consumption goods and by altering the ability of African governments to 
finance health facilities. This chapter begins with a conceptual framework outlining 
the health production function of an individual and the utility function of households. 
Reference to this framework is extended throughout this chapter. For instance, there 
will be a discussion of how changes in prices (or expenditure) and incomes affect 
household delivery of health care and thus the household's health status. Since 
considerable public resources are devoted to programmes that improve health status, a 
review of the role that changes in government expenditures or changes in the price of 
health care will have on health status will be provided. This chapter will also 
investigate how households cope with these changes, and whether or not there exist 
any offsetting mechanisms in non-financial areas that might mitigate against any 
adverse effects following these macroeconomic changes. 
However, before proceeding further it is useful to make reference to the 
framework established in chapter four. Given that the effects of International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank policies surrounding programme lending depend on 
the pre-change level of income, the composition of a given individuals consumption 
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basket, whether or not a person is employed in the formal or informal sector, or lives 
and works in an urban or a rural area, it useful to disaggregate the analysis to a 
sectoral level in order to gauge the distributional impact. For instance, the following 
questions are considered; do cutbacks in subsidies hurt the rural poor the most? Are 
these people able to compensate for this loss through increased employment 
opportunities in tradable agriculture? Or do they find that any possibility for income 
gains are quickly dissipated through an increase in the price of basic foodstuffs? 
6.2 Economics and Household Health 
Eeele, Hay and Hoddinot (1993) and Behrman (1988: 117) state that there are two 
interrelated issues that must be addressed when analysing the main determinants of 
health for household members in African countries and how adjustment measures 
may affect their health status. The first issue relates to the modelling of household 
behaviour and the second issue involves the development of a reduced-form demand 
equation for health. As a starting point, a health production function is developed to 
determine the factors that influence an individual's health status. Some of these 
factors are fairly obvious. For instance, health status will be affected by the amount 
and quality of nutrients consumed (Ni), preventative and curative health care 
consumed (Yi), health conditions surrounding an individual, such as sanitation 
facilities, water quality and adequate housing (G). The amount of time an individual 
has to spend in health related activities such as food preparation (Ti) and the possible 
ill health effects that result from working (ei) are also significant factors determining 
health status. Regional attributes, which consist of temperature, altitude, humidity 
and propensity to parasitic infection also affect health status ( A ). Finally, the innate 
healthiness of an individual ( ) based on genetic endowment affects health status 
(Korjenek 1992). This health production function, then can be expressed as (Eele, 
Hay and Hoddinot 1993:155): 
i=1,...T 
	 (1) 
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This health production function shows that health status is affected by the 
consumption of food, health care, health conditions surrounding the household and 
factors beyond an individual's control. 
Assuming that households aim to maximise utility, an assumption dropped 
later in this chapter, the health production function (Hi) enters into a utility function. 
This utility function takes the form of (Eele, Hay and Hoddinot 1993: 155): 
U= 	 Z',e') 	 i=1,...,T 	 (2) 
Where a household consisting of T number of individuals derives satisfaction from 
health and food consumption (C'), which are separated because foods may be 
consumed for reasons of taste and ritual as well as nutritional value. This function 
also includes the leisure of individual household members (Li), the consumption of 
non-food goods (Zi) by household members and their work effort (ei). 
In any individual household the total time available to the household member 
(Q') must be allocated in one of three ways. It must be divided between wage labour 
(Ji), to household activities (Ti) or to leisure (Li). In farm households labour can be 
further divided into activities of crop production and processing (Fl). This exposition 
gives a time budget: 
52` =F' +T` +J`+L` 	 (3) 
As health status affects the productivity of labour and if labour markets reward 
individuals who are in good health, or healthier than other individuals, then the wage 
of an individual, i, is a function of his health. In addition, the wage is also a function 
of energy expended in working (work effort) in the individual's occupation (ei), and 
the personal characteristics (di) of the person, such as level of education. This 
relationship is: 
= Wi (1-1` , , d`) 	 (4) 
In agricultural households, health status also directly influences agricultural 
productivity. Farm output (Q) is also a function of on-farm household labour (F), 
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hired agricultural labour (Fh), a vector of agricultural inputs (X), land under 
cultivation (A), a vector of capital inputs (K) and the personal characteristics of 
household members (u). Thus the farm production function is: 
Q = Q(F, Fr` , X, A, K, H,y,u) 	 (5) 
Households then seek to maximise the household utility function (2) subject to the 
health production function (1), a time constraint that lays down the amount of time 
that an individual can allocate between work leisure an household activities (3), the 
wage function (4), the farm production function (5) and an income constraint that 
prevents the household from spending no more on goods and on health inputs than 
what they earn in the labour market and in own-farm production (Eele, Hay and 
Hoddinot 1993: 142): 
T 
	
T 	 T 
+ V + = 	 k(ICIC) Pz1Z PyIY" 	 (E + r ) 	 (6) 
and where farm profit is: 
H = pQQ -P,X — 	 —Wh Fh 
In the above equation V is non-labour and non-farm income, Wh the wage paid to 
hired labour, Pz the price paid for non-food consumption goods (Z), PQ the price paid 
for the farm output (Q), PK the price of inputs for farm material and PK the price of 
food K. 
The idea that households seek to maximise utility leads to a reduced-form 
demand equation (Eele, Hay and Hoddinot 1993,141). This reduced-form demand 
equation states that the households demand for health depends on, or is a function of, 
all the exogenous variables: the prices of all food goods (P1 through PK), the wages 
of T individuals in the household (W1  through WT), the prices of non food goods 
(Pz), the price of health care (Py), the price of obtaining public resources that 
improve health conditions (PG), the innate healthiness of each of the T members of 
the household (m through 1AT ), the health environment (X ), the price of the output 
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produced by household members (PQ), the prices of the inputs used in producing the 
output (PX), the wage paid to hired labour (Wh), the personal characteristics of each 
of the T members of the household (dl through dT) such as gender, for farm 
households the quantity of land available for cultivation (A), productive capital (K), 
and any unobserved characteristics of the land and the cultivator that affects 
productivity (u). The reduced-form demand equation is (Eele, Hay and Hoddinot 
1993, 143): 
H' = DH' 	 , Pz, PG, Py, 	 ,Pc, P,,W h , dT, A, K, it) 
The economic view of the household, then, sees household members as trying to 
maximize their satisfaction or utility. Satisfaction is maximized when the highest 
level of well-being is obtained — that is, when the highest level of income, wealth, 
health and, as non-measurable variables, love and happiness is achieved. In order to 
obtain the highest level of satisfaction households must make decisions about the 
allocation of resources. The resources available to the family consist of two types; 
human and financial. Human resources are dependent on the skills of individual 
members, the time available to them and the level of energy required. Financial 
resources (or non-labour income) comprise liquid assets, savings and other assets that 
can be sold for money. In theory at least, resources are distributed in such a way as to 
ensure that they are used in activities where they are most productive (Bryant 1990, 
Although there is no archetypal household, household members are seen as 
pursuing the objective of satisfaction maximization in two ways (Bryant 1990, 2). 
First, they sell or rent household resources (such as labour) in an effort to gain income 
which can be used to purchase goods and services used to improve their level of 
satisfaction (Bryant 1990, 2). Second, the household can use resources within the 
household in an effort to produce goods and services that contribute to well being 
(Bryant 1990, 2). For instance, the household can produce its own food, clothing, and 
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improve the general level of living by making improvements to the home or carrying 
out simple health interventions. This suggests that the household must make some 
tradeoffs in order to obtain the highest level of satisfaction. They must decide how 
much time to devote to market activities, which earn income, and how much time 
should be spent in household work, where the goods and services produced are 
consumed, and how much time should be left to pursue leisure activities. 
6.3 Time Allocation 
The diagrams below show the budget line that faces the household and the 
equilibrium allocation of time among market work, household work and leisure 
activities (Bryant 1990, 131): 
MP 
	 He 	 T 
Figure 6.1. Time Allocation and the Household Budget Line (DEBT) 
In the figure above the household production function18, for a one individual family, 
is represented by the line AB. Reading from right to left, the horizontal axis denotes 
the number of hours (T) during a time period (say a week) that is spent in household 
work (He) and, on the vertical axis, the amount of household goods produced with 
that labour, in this case VJ goods 19. The line DE represents the market portion of the 
total household budget line20, any point along this line, in this case P, depicts the total 
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quantity of market and household goods purchased if the individual works THe hours 
per week in the household and HeMp hours per week in the market. So at point P, JF 
represents the total amount of market goods which can be purchased with earnings 
from HeMp hours of market work. 
The line DEBT, then allows us to see the amount of goods produced within 
the household and the amount purchased from non-labour income and market income. 
When speaking of agricultural producers in Sub Saharan Africa points to the right of 
E on the line EB indicate subsistence production, where agricultural goods are 
produced for home consumption. Points to the left of E on the line DE represent food 
commodization; where agricultural goods are produced and sold to the market. The 
line DEBT suggests that so long as the marginal product of labour is greater than the 
real wage rate household work will be carried out. Time is initially, more 
productively, spent in household work; as the hours worked increase the extra time is 
spent more productively in market work. In order to find equilibrium in the model the 
household preference map is introduced. Figure 6.2 shows this: 
MP 	 He 
Figure 6.2. Equilibrium allocation of time among household work, market work and 
leisure, and equilibrium of total consumption of goods 
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The family maximizes satisfaction21 at point P. A total of OF goods are consumed by 
the household: OV goods are purchased by non-labour income, V7 goods are 
produced in the home and JF goods are purchased with earnings from working in the 
market. The total amount of goods consumed, OF, is determined by the amount of 
time spent in a variety of activities. In the diagram THe hours per week are spent in 
household production, HeLp hours per week are spent in market work and OLp hours 
per week are spent in leisure (non-productive) pursuits. 
Although the diagrams are simplified by assuming that the household or 
family is a single individual, figure 6.2.1 can show the time allocation of either the 
husband or wife if both are employed. If both members are employed the non-labour 
income (OV) is the income of the spouse not analysed (Bryant 1990, 131-134). 
However, these activities are constrained by scientific, legal and socio-cultural 
factors (Bryant 1990, 8). Taking the economic or resource constraint first, neither do 
individuals have an infinite amount of skills at their disposal nor do they have 
limitless income and assets. Second, "[productive] processes must obey the laws of 
biology, chemistry or physics" (Bryant 1990, 9). To illustrate, the quality of food 
obtained by a household is dependent on the process of preparation. The process has 
to conform to certain natural laws, where, for instance, nutrients may be lost in 
heating or boiling certain foods. Third, legal requirements (such as a ban on 
prostitution or illicit drug production), where enforced, may prevent the household 
from engaging in certain activities. Finally, socio-cultural activities act as a break on 
satisfaction seeking in that individuals must adhere to certain cultural norms. For 
instance, women may be prevented from engaging in certain productive pursuits due 
to religious doctrines. 
As we saw when examining health care utilisation, time, as expressed as 
opportunity cost, acted as a break for the demand for health care consumption. At the 
household level time also acts as a constraint. Time involves certain trade-offs. Time 
spent working in fields, trading in the market or in other income generating activities 
means that time may have to be sacrificed in the production of health care; whether it 
176 
be in food preparation, allocation, the collection of water, attendance at a health clinic 
for illness or information. In addition pressure on time can lead to increased physical 
stress which can lower resistance to disease or reduce the time available to household 
members to seek medical treatment. 
Berio's (1984) analysis of time allocation and activity patterns in COte d'Ivoire 
and the Central African Republic demonstrates that the role of women in household 
and agricultural work is of primary importance. 
Table 6.1. Time Allocation for Men and Women 15-59 Years in Rural Areas of Cote 
d'Ivoire (1979)  
Activity 	 Males 	 Females 
Food Related Work 	 3h 35 min 	 3h 17 min 
Domestic Work 	 40 min 	 3h 45 min 
Domestic Activities 	 39 min 	 2h 46 min 
Cooking Meals 	 1 min 	 lh 50 min 
Total Work Burden 	 4h 15 min 	 7h 2 min 
Rest/Leisure 	 6h 58 min 	 5h 28 min 
Source: Berio (1984, Table 8; p. 61) 
Berio's study reveals that it is women who spend most of their time in domestic 
activities and food related work and suffer from a lack of leisure time. For instance, 
females do nearly all of the wood collection and water fetching, and devote a much 
larger percentage of their time in food transformation that men (p. 62). Men spend 
more time hunting, clearing trees and land, while other agricultural activities are split 
evenly. This confirms the results of previous research which revealed that men were 
mainly responsible for land clearing, turning of soil, trimming tree crops and hunting 
while women concentrated their labour effort on feeding and caring for children, 
canying water and food and processing crops (Wkwi 1987, 312). 
Berio's (1984, 54) review of a previous study done in the Central African 
Republic reveals a similar pattern. Domestic activities are overwhelmingly in the area 
of women's responsibility. Women in the Madomale village spend 12.2 per cent of 
their time in domestic activities, while men only spend 1.1 per cent of their time in 
similar activities. However, the main difference between the two studies is that 
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women spend more time in all working activities than men. For example, women 
spend 13.5 per cent of their time in agricultural activities while men only devote 9.8 
per cent of their time in agriculture (Betio 1984, 54). Men, however, spend more time 
in non-work activities and in rest and sleep than women. Men spend 55 per cent of 
their total time in rest and sleep compared to 46 per cent for women (Berk) 1984, 54). 
Women in Sub Saharan Africa, in particular, face a situation where they 
continually make tradeoffs to fulfil various roles. Popkin and Doan (1990, 683) 
believe that women must fulfil three main types of roles; economic, biological and 
social. The biological role of women is related to pregnancy, lactation, nurturing of 
dependent children and the maintenance and improvement of their own health status. 
The economic role of women, as has been shown, is based on the dichotomy of 
household work versus market production. The cultural role of women is broken 
down into three areas (Popkin and Doan 1990, 683) The 'wife' role which may 
include deference to her husband, sacrifice and obedience. The 'daughter-in-law' role 
where women have to obey the edicts of their husband's mothers, and the 'mother' 
role where women are responsible for children's well-being and socialisation. Table 
6.2 below outlines some of the possible tradeoffs that occur for mature women: 
Table 6.2. Role conflicts in Women's Lives Affecting Health and Nutrition 
Role Biological Economic Cultuinl 
Biological Close spacing of births leads to 
less time available to 
breastfeed earlier siblings 
Culture may demand many 
children or female circumcision 
Economic Physical labour vs. time 
resting during pregnancy, 
decrease in time spent in 
breastfeeding, close spacing of 
births 
Household production 
vs. market (income) 
work 
Cultural Income generation vs. 
'wife' and 'mother' 
activities 
'Self' vs. 'mother' and 
'wife'. Demands of 
mother and wife roles 
leads to less time 
available to pursue own 
economic activities 
'Daughter-in-law' role vs. 
"mother. Time spent following 
mother-in law's orders leads to 
decrease in time spent in 
mothering role. 
"Mother' and 'wife roles in 
conflict with family planning 
services. 
Source: Adapted from McGuire and Popkin (1989) cited in Popkin and Doan (1990) 
with additions. 
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Thus, not only do women face absolute limits to their activities they also face conflict 
between the roles that they have to carry out. That is, individuals face an definite 
resource constraint in that the level of income and assets available will always have an 
upper limit, and they face conflict over the best way to achieve this level given the 
differing roles that they play. Given this, the level of income available to households 
becomes of paramount concern. Any alterations in the income obtained by 
households, following World Bank and IMF programmes, will have important 
consequences for the family. 
Wandel, Holmbe-Ottesen and Manu's (1992) research reaffirms the notion that 
women's allocation of time plays an important role in health and nutrition care. Their 
study carried out in the Rukwa region, Tanzania, an area that consistently produces a 
surplus of maize, posits that during the seasons (mainly pre-harvest) when women are 
active in agriculture household food intake may suffer. The main findings of their 
research reveals that increased work in fields leads to less time spent in meal 
preparation and distribution, personal care and leisure (p. 6). During the harvest 
period, children often helped out in household chores, but men were not reliable 
helpers. In addition, their research noted (Wandel, Holmbe-Ottesen and Manu 1992, 
14) that energy intake was highest when mothers had a sufficient amount of time 
available to devote to household work, and during the harvest energy intake declined 
even though food availability was at its highest. 
Chambers (1982) mirrors the view that seasons matter in time allocation and 
food intake. In his article he suggests that the onset of the wet season means that 
women may take less responsibility for child welfare in anticipation of hard work in 
agriculture. Chambers (1982, 221) believes that, in rural areas, during the wet season 
labour time has to be reallocated with several implications for health status. First, 
easy to prepare meals may be served with low nutritional value in order to save time. 
Second, sanitary conditions may decline in so far as household activities are neglected 
in favour of agricultural activities. Third, access an use of health facilities may 
All other 
goods (Y) 
At 
Maize (x) 
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decline due to washed out roads and the interruption of drug supplies. However, it 
should be noted that the adverse impact of seasonality on nutrient intake may be 
limited in subsistence households. Babu, Thirumaran and Mohanam (1993, 1317) 
provide evidence from South India that market-oriented agricultural households tend 
to increase their marketed output when yields are poor thus leaving less for home 
consumption. Subsistence households, that grow food for their own consumption do 
not suffer this problem. 
6.4 Income Effects 
In order to analyse the effects that changes in incomes have on the level of satisfaction 
constrained indifference analysis will be used,22 which is represented by the diagram 
below: 
Figure 6.3. Maximization of satisfaction 
The above diagram shows that satisfaction is maximized at point B; at the point of 
tangency between the budget line (AC) and the highest attainable indifference curve. 
Here qx quantity of maize is consumed and qy quantity of all other goods is 
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consumed. Since the household has no incentive to change its purchase pattern it is at 
equilibrium at point B. 
If income increases (assuming preferences and prices are held constant) then 
the budget line will shift to the right of AC to A IC1.23 When this occurs the 
household's consumption opportunities will increase; it will be able to purchase more 
maize (here assumed to have properties beneficial to health status) and 'other goods'. 
The new equilibrium will be at Bj, with qx and gyi goods consumed. This then, is a 
positive income effect, where, for normal goods, an increase in income leads to an 
increase in maize demanded or where a decrease in income leads to a decrease in 
demand. If demand for a good were to decline with an increase in income then it is an 
inferior good. 
A decrease in income, as has been shown, can occur as a result of adjustment 
programmes. Thus one may infer from the above that decreases in consumption can 
be quite responsive to decreases in income. Cornia (1987, 34) notes that "the decline 
in household incomes and/or government expenditures experienced in the 1980s by 
70 per cent of the developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East 
have led to widespread and sharp reversal in the trend toward the improvement in 
standards of child health and nutrition." Pinstrup-Andersen and Caicedo (1978) 
believe that low incomes are probably the most important factor in determining 
malnutrition. As low income group spend a large percentage of their income (budget) 
on food24 [estimated between 60 and 80 per cent; Pinstrup-Andersen (1985, 70); 
Senauer (1990, 409); Gertler and van der Gaag (1990, 11) derive similar estimates for 
COte d'Ivoire, although it is noted that the percentage changes from region to region, 
World Bank (1993, 256) estimates range from 36 to 64 per cent] increases in 
aggregate income may be spent in areas that improve health status. As a very broad 
statement this is true. The World Bank (1993, 39) state that " a higher a country's 
average income per capita, the more likely its people are to live long and healthy 
lives." However this may not be the case. As Pinstrup-Andersen and Caciendo 
(1978, 414) admit, the effects of improvements in nutrition following an increase in 
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income depend on the validity of elasticities estimates, the intra-family distribution of 
food (and nutrients in particular), the ability of the household to obtain access to food 
and the utilisation of food by the individual household (Pinstrup-Andersen 1981, 5), if 
increases in income are met with increases in supply (Pinstrup-Andcrsen 1985), and 
the distribution of income (World Bank 1993, 40). 
As noted in chapter four, World Bank and IMF programme lending often 
recommends that agriculture is commercialized. The commercialization of 
agriculture has important implications for income generating activities by farm 
households. That is subsistence or near subsistence agriculture is replaced with cash 
cropping schemes oriented to the export market. When a food system is 
commodidized three main nutritional consequences may occur. First, the production 
of agricultural goods for market sale as opposed to home consumption, may favour 
large landowners who have access to finance. Commodization usually requires 
investment in capital equipment, fertilisers, pesticides and seeds. Smallholders may 
be unable to switch to commercial crop production due top the lack of access to credit 
markets. This may lead to the marginalization of peasant farmers. Second, the 
production of cash crops may decrease local food availability. If the cash crops are 
exported away from the producing region then supply in the local area will decline 
leading to a increase in local food prices. Third, implicit in the notion of 
commodization is the idea that money income gained will be sufficient to purchase 
the amount of food that was previously produced under a subsistence system. 
However, this may not be the case. Dewey's (1989, 418) study of 
commodization in Latin America and the Caribbean has revealed that commercial 
agriculture may provide less cash income than "the monetary value of food crops 
initially grown in the subsistence system." Indeed even if the monetary value of food 
crops for home consumption equals the cash received for the sell of crops an 
equivalent diet may not be guaranteed. This is due to the fact that earnings from cash 
cropping may be lumpy. That is, the income received from the sell of cash crops may 
only be received once or twice a year after the harvests. If the household is unable to 
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budget carefully then it may suffer a food deficit the nearer it gets to the next harvest. 
Moreover, money earned may not be used to purchase an equivalent diet but may be 
used to purchase different foods of a lower nutrient quality, fertilisers or other 
consumption goods (Dewey 1989, 419). 
However, in the African context, the detrimental effects of switching 
production to export crops may be limited. Bryceson (1989, 428) notes that African 
food systems have a low level of commodization in rural areas, and even in urban 
centres, commodization has not taken complete hold. Indeed since land is relatively 
plentiful in Africa decommodization can just as easily occur and households may 
move to self-sufficiency (Bryceson 1989, 430). Households may take a risk averting 
strategy and keep some of their land in subsistence production to minimize the risk of 
variability in prices and output (Bryceson 1989, 430 and Dewey 1989) 
It is a tenent of World Bank thinking that an increase in cash cropping will led 
to increases in income for those participating in the scheme and that these increases 
will lead to improvements in health status. Von Braun (1988) report that in the 
Gambia participation in irrigated rice schemes have led to increases in household 
income for participating households and that this has translated into greater food 
consumption and an improvement in nutritional status of women. Huss-Ashmore and 
Curry's (1989) research on the impact of commercial maize production in Swaziland 
generally confirms von Braun's findings. Their two-stage stratified random sample 
of 120 households found that the nutritional status of children as measured by height 
for age and weight for age, was marginally better for commercial farmers than 
subsistence farmers (Huss-Ashmore and Curry 1989, 204). Women who produced 
maize for commercial purposes were found to have a slightly higher nutritional status 
(as measured by arm circumference and arm muscle area). However, it should be 
noted that the level of rainfall was determined to be an important factor in ensuring a 
relatively high nutritional status for children. 
Sahn's (1990) study of export crop production in Cote d'Ivoire found that the 
use of land for export crop production did not affect the long-term nutritional status of 
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children. His research also discovered that raising household income would raise the 
nutritional status of children and the diversification of cropping or shifting land to 
export production was an effective way of raising rural incomes (Sahn 1990, 1646). 
However, his research did note that households that had equivalent levels of income, 
those that had larger areas under cultivation, suffered from a low nutritional status. It 
was hypothesised that this was due to the fact that women had less time for child care 
and household activities which would benefit health status. Kennedy and Cogill's 
(1988) research on sugarcane production in southwestern Kenya found that the 
incomes in households that raised sugar cane were approximately 25 per cent higher, 
but that there was no difference in nutrition between 'sugarcane households' and other 
households. The author's note, however, that if sugar prices were not supported by 
the government then it is likely that any income benefit would have evaporated. 
Kurth (1989) also finds that an increase in income will not necessarily lead to 
a positive change in nutritional status. Her research revealed that although 
households that participated in cash cropping schemes had much higher incomes (175 
per cent) than non-cash cropping households there was no difference in nutritional 
status. She speculates that this may be due to the fact that men are controlling the 
household resources. DeWalt's (1993) topical review of recent evidence suggests that 
commercialization of agriculture may have negative impacts on nutrition status. She 
cites (Niemeijer et al) evidence from Kenya that the commercialization of rice 
production has led to a decline in the nutritional status of households which do not 
have access to other resources. She noted that this was most likely due to the fact that 
households that participated in the rice scheme had a much lower percentage of their 
land in subsistence production (20 per cent) than non-participants (66 per cent). 
6.4.1 Income Elasticity 
The calculation of the income elasticity of demand is used to ascertain the effect 
changes in income on demand; in other words it measures the responsiveness of 
quantity demanded to changes in income (holding preferences and prices constant). 
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For normal goods the income elasticity will take a positive value. If the quantity 
demanded increases more than in proportion to the income increase then the value 
will be greater than one (income elastic). If the quantity demanded increases less than 
in proportion to the increase in income then the value will be greater than zero but less 
than one (income inelastic). For inferior goods the income elasticity of demand will 
take a negative value; quantity demanded decreases as income increases. Calorie-
income elasticity derived from food expenditure surveys throughout developing 
countries have been reported in the range of 0.4 to 0.8 (Bouis, Haddad and Kennedy 
1992, 350-51). For instance, Medani (1985, 686) reports that the income elasticity of 
demand for food is 0.681 in the Sudan. A sample of income elasticities for different 
income classes for calorie and protein is found below: 
Table 6.3. Income Elasticity of Calorie Intake by Income Strata 
Strata 
I II III IV V Average 
Calories 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.35 0.23 0.51 
Protein 0.92 0.90 0.73 0.50 0.35 0.65 
Source: Pinstrup- Andersen and Caicedo (1978). 
Notes: Data if from Cali, Colombia. Stratum I is the poorest, stratum V the richest. 
However, more recent estimates have put calorie-income elasticities lower than 0.4 
with many below 0.2 (Bouis, Haddad and Kennedy 1992, 351). The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA 1983, 61), for instance, also, uses a 
relatively conservative elasticity; 0.16 for cereals. Data provided below gives an 
indication of calorie income elasticity for Kenya: 
Table 6.4. Calorie Income Elasticities for Kenya 
OLS 2SLS 
0.20 0.19 
(0.032) (0.094) 
0.23 0.24 
(0.032) (0.093) 
0.37 0.40 
(0.031) (0.093) 
Calorie dependent variable 
family calories* 
total calories" 
total caloriest 
Source: Bouis, Haddad and Kennedy (1992) 
Notes: Standard errors for elasticity estimates in parenthesis 
* data from a 24-hour recall of meals prepared 
** data from a 24-hour recall of meals prepared (less waste) 
1: data from a food expenditure survey 
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Thus, counterintuitively perhaps, increases in income may not lead to significant 
increases in food consumption, and, more importantly, in nutrient intake. Ravallion 
(1990, 489) believes that nutritional levels may be relatively unresponsive to changes 
in income in developing countries. Here, elasticities would be expected to be "a good 
deal less" than the income elasticities of demand for basic foods (Ravallion 1990, 
489). Ravallion (1990, 509), based on household level data for the province of East 
Java, Indonesia, believes that income may be overrated in determining adequate 
nutrition. He shows that income elasticities of calorie intake are fairly low. Although 
several models are provided, his "preferred" one gives an elasticity of about .15 at 
mean points, which can be read as a ten per cent increase in income will only result in 
a 1.5 per cent gain in energy intake (Ravallion 1990, 509). 
The Ravallion study supports the work of an earlier study by Wolfe and 
Behrman (1983). In their study of Managuan women aged 15-45 they found that 
income is not a critical determinant of nutrition in all developing countries. Again the 
income elasticities were quite small, suggesting that income increments would not 	
y. 
have much effect on nutrition (p. 543). However, it should be noted that the 
Managuan sample had a per capita income ($840 in 1978) above much of other 
developing countries, and thus it is unclear how transferable this study is to Sub 
Saharan Africa where per capita incomes are much lower. However, Behrman and 
Deolalikar's (1987) study in India confirms the general trend. They found that 
nutrient elasticities with respect to income or expenditure were fairly low. They 
concluded (p. 505): 
for communities like the one under study, increases in income in the present 
context will not result in substantial improvements in nutrient intakes. Food 
expenditure will increase substantially more or less proportionally to income 
— [i.e. food expenditure elasticities are close to one] — but the marginal 
increments in food expenditure will not be devoted primarily to obtaining 
more nutrients. 
Thus a situation can exist. where programmes such as adjustment policies in 
the long run that are designed to raise incomes do not necessarily lead to increased 
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nutritional and health status. For instance, looking at some West African countries, 
there is variation between measures of nutritional status and health status and GNP 
per capita (table 6.5). 
Table 6.5. Differences in Health and Nutrition Status Related to GNP Per Capita 
Infant mortality 
Country 
Daily calorie 
GNP per capita supply per capita 
US dollars 	 (1989) 
rate per 1000 
live births 
(1990) 
Life expectancy 
at birth (years) 
Burkina Faso 330 2,288 134 48 
Mauritania 500 2,685 121 47 
Senegal 710 2,369 81 47 
Guinea 440 2,132 138 43 
Sierra Leone 240 1,799 147 42 
Cote d'Ivoire 750 2,577 95 55 
Ghana 390 2,248 85 55 
Togo 410 2,214 88 54 
Benin 360 2,305 113 50 
Nigeria 290 2,312 98 52 
Source World Bank (1992); World Development Report. 
Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, which have the highest GNP per capita, do not, in all cases, 
have the highest life expectancy at birth. Ghana has a higher life expectancy at birth 
than does Senegal, and ties Cote d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin and Nigeria, 
also, have higher life expectancy figures than Senegal. Moreover, although Senegal 
has the lowest infant mortality rate, Ghana and Togo still have lower rates than Cote 
d'Ivoire. In terms of nutrition, Mauritania, a low income country using the World 
Bank classification, rates higher than Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, both middle income 
countries, on daily calorie supply per capita. 
6.4.2 Change in the Wage Rate 
Another way to view the problem of changes in income is through looking at changes 
in the wage rate. A change in the wage rate, obviously, affects the resources available 
to the household. This is shown in the figure below: 
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Figure 6.4. Increase in the Wage Rate 
The above diagram which is based on the one used in section 6.3 shows that if the 
wage rate increases, the quantity of goods that can be purchased with the first hour of 
time spent in market work becomes larger than the quantity of goods that can be 
produced with the last hour (point E) spent in household work (Bryant 1990, 138). 
Thus a production substitution effect, where the household budget line shifts from 
DEBT to D'E'BT, occurs where market work is substituted for household work. Such 
a wage rate change can occur under structural adjustment loans when the agricultural 
sector is encouraged to move from non-tradable goods to tradable goods. 
The reorientation of the agricultural sector to produce cash crops has important 
implications for health status. A switch from subsistence food production to the 
production of crops for sale in the domestic and export markets has been shown to 
have negative, neutral and positive effects on health and nutritional status. For 
example, households are encouraged to give up household production of food for 
market work and coupled with a rise in prices (and a loss of household access to land 
and the fact that household expenditure patterns may change) may lead to a negative 
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effect. Health status may be effected in a positive way as increases in income 
(especially women's) may be spent on improving household health status or in 
initiatives to improve the community's health. As has been shown an increase in 
income shifts the budget constraint to the right which opens up more consumption 
opportunities. However the increase in income does not have to be spent on goods 
that improve health and nutrition status it can be spent on other goods. In figure 6.3., 
if preferences change, point C represents a situation where an increase in income does 
not lead to increased consumption of maize, but of all other goods. Thus, increases in 
income can be spent on improving health conditions, on immunisations, and increases 
in income can also lead to reduced activity levels (Kennedy et al 1992), or it can be 
spent on beer, entertainment or other goods that do not improve an individual's human 
capital. 
Thus who spends it is important. Popkin and Doan (1990, 692) postulate that 
a good-for time substitution can occur when additional income from maternal work is 
used to buy goods. Further, how this income is spent is important. If the income is 
handed over to her husband child health may improve little. If the increase in income 
is used to purchase high quality goods, and here high quality good are considered to 
be goods of high nutrient quality or health care, then health status is expected to 
improve. It can be seen that the benefits of additional good depend on its nature. The 
purchase of oral rehydration salts would certainly be a better purchase than 
purchasing some over the counter remedy, similarly, the purchase of bottled milk or 
pre-prepared formula would not be preferred to breastfeeding. If the increase in a 
woman's income, only goes to offset a loss of income from the husband, the there will 
be no improvement in health and nutrition (Popkin and Doan 1990, 695). 
The source of income gain, if any, is also important. If an increase in income 
requires an increase in work effort, then energy requirements would have to be 
adjusted upwards (Ravallion 1990, 497). If the work required to secure additional 
income is less strenuous then the nutrient requirements may be able to be revised 
downward; as may occur in the urban formal sector (Ravallion 1990, 497). 
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There is also a need to ask in what ways an individual's income generating 
activities help improve health care, and in what ways it can lead to a decrease in 
health and nutrition status. More specifically, an increase in male unemployment rate 
can lead to an increase in female labour force participation (Berio 1984, 66). If 
females are more active in employment, this can lead to less attention being paid to 
health education, breast feeding, and can lead to, in the extreme, child abandonment. 
Although, waged employment allows women to earn income that can be spent on 
health care or in obtaining nutrients, but it also leads to a decrease in time available 
for household activities that can increase health status. If this is the case, then the 
ability of women find a quality substitute for her maternal role while working will be 
important (Popkin and Doan 1990, 697). 
Data collected from six diverse countries in Kennedy et al (1992) suggests that 
household participation in cash cropping schemes has no negative impact on child 
health or nutritional status. Income from cash crop production did not significantly 
reduce morbidity in any of the study countries (except Guatemala). Additionally, 
there were no apparent negative effects of cash crop production on child feeding 
practices. Basically, the authors suggest that the counterintuitive argument is correct 
— that increases in income from the participation in cash cropping schemes have not 
been found to improve pre-schooler health directly. This is due, in part, to the fact 
that increases in income are spent on non-food items. Whether or not increases in 
income, that were, for instance, spent on female education, has a long-term positive 
influence on health is unclear from the study (Kennedy 1992). 
In addition, as has previously been alluded to, a situation may exist where an 
increase in an individual's level of income is used for increased expenditure on food 
but may not lead to an increase in nutritional status, if the effected individual uses the 
increase in income to purchase a more expensive type of, say, rice with little or no 
gain in nutrient content. Tastes play an important role in food consumption. Shah 
(1983, 144) believes that since diets for low-income consumers are monotonous, an 
expansion in income will only release pent-up demand for a variety of foods. In 
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essence, even low income levels consumers exhibit a preference for high cost foods 
(Shah 1983, 122). From a nutritional perspective, Senauer (1990, 409) confirms this 
non-optimal behaviour when he states that "even people at low-income levels want to 
increase the variety and quality of their diets an not just maximize nutrient content." 
For instance, since cereals (like rice, maize, millet and sorghum) are staple foods that 
have been consumed for a long time, consumption is unlikely to increase dramatically 
with changes in income (UNECA 1983, 61 and Lipton 1983). 
However, even if it can reasonably be concluded that increases in income only 
lead to slight increases in demand for nutrients this does not mean that health status 
will, overall, suffer. The reason for this is that health status of household members is 
not solely determined by nutrient intake, but by a variety of other factors, such as: 
freshness and cleanliness of foods, storage of foods (to prevent rotting and spoiling), 
how the foods are prepared, availability of potable water and sewerage systems, and 
education. In addition, increases income may be spent on health services. 
Thus, nutritional status may improve with an increase in income even when 
income is only having a small effect on nutrient intake at the household level (Schiff 
and Valdes 1990, 1319), This depends if increases in income are spent on other items 
which affect health status (Schiff and Valdes 1990, 1320). If this is the case, the 
World Bank's view that macroeconomic changes that will eventually lead to increases 
in income may have little impact in slowing or eliminating the number of mal- or 
undernourished people. 
However, the effect of changes in income needs to be disaggregated. The 
notion is that a decrease in income following an increase in the unemployment rate for 
adolescent and adult males has a greater effect on health status, because this group is 
likely to be the breadwinners for the family. With a decrease in real income, the 
number of hours worked must increase in order to purchase the same amount of food. 
Pinstrup-Andersen (1988, 38) says, based on the analysis of a few countries (Costa 
Rica is the only one specified) that reduction in food expenditures are inversely 
correlated with income level and that the highest income levels have not suffered any 
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significant reduction in consumption. Furthermore, given the low levels of energy 
and nutrient intakes by the poor prior to periods of World Bank and IMF adjustment, 
the observed reductions have almost certainly have had negative nutritional 
consequences. 
A decrease in household income can come from a reduction in public sector 
employment. As noted previously the effects are likely to be limited to urban areas in 
the formal sector. If this occurs the loss of income can be countered through 
redundancy payments, liquidating savings or the possibility of obtaining a new job. 
However, the potential for receiving redundancy payments would seem to be limited 
due to the pressure to decrease government expenditure. However, the picture is not 
entirely bleak; a decrease in employment in the government service sector can lead to 
an efficiency gain if the productivity of remaining workers increase. As Woodward 
(1992 a, 132) puts it: 
if the labour force is reduced by ten per cent, and the service provided is 
reduced by only five per cent, this represents an increase in efficiency, in that 
each worker is producing more... 
However, there is a catch, 
the users of the service are still worse off, as they are receiving five per cent 
less services than before 
6.4.3. Changes in Other Income Sources 
As has been shown increases in income do not guarantee a positive change in health 
status. The question now needs to be asked whether or not declines in income lead to 
a decline in health status. If the household is able to increase the number of hours 
worked then the original income level may be retained. If the number of hours 
worked cannot increase then food purchasing power will decrease, resulting in either 
an absolute decrease in consumption or substitution for cheaper foods. Households 
can temporarily maintain previous levels of income by reducing their savings rates, by 
liquidating their assets 25, by expanding the family labour supply 26, running into 
debt, increasing the flow of income transfers 27, and migration of some family 
members.28 29 Pryer (1987, 140) also says that households can also attempt to 
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maximize the diversity of the employment profile, by begging or accepting gifts in 
order to maintain nutritional levels. The effects of such changes is shown in the 
diagram below: 
MP 	 He 	 T 
Figure 6.5. Increase in Non-Labour Income 
Figure 6.5 shows that as non-labour income increases, through the addition of income 
by borrowing, expanding the family supply of labour, increasing income transfers and 
begging, the total household budget line will shift upwards to DUB allowing for 
more resources to become available to the family. However, under conditions 
attached to World Bank and IMF loans, this could shift back to the original position, 
with no net resource gain to the family. If in-kind incomes, where wages are paid in 
part in food and housing, are a significant source of income for some poor households 
nutritional status will be protected during a period of rapidly increasing prices 
(Pinstrup-Andersen 1987, 76) or a decline in income. 
193 
Adjustment and stabilisation measures can also effect household savings. The 
type of assets a household has available to save can influence well-being. If the 
household has saved some of its wealth as financial asset then controlling the inflation 
rate will have a beneficial effect. If, however, the household's savings consists of real 
assets (such as grain and livestock) then the effect is less clear. This is more like the 
case in Sub Saharan Africa where (poor) people have more real assets than financial 
ones. If the real asset is a nontradable good, following a devaluation, its price will fall 
in relative terms. If the real asset is a tradable good its price will increase, and thus 
the household's savings. Thus for the household a change in the price of the real asset 
must be viewed relative to the change in the prices of other goods and services the 
household purchases (Woodward 1992a, 159). 
Such survival strategies are believed to be commonplace in developing 
countries. To take one example, in Malawi, farmers with poor resources and limited 
access to cultivatable land often work on a temporary basis for farmers with larger 
landholdings (Millard, Ferguson and Khalia 1990). This practice, called ganyu, is 
meant to ensure that households obtain the income necessary to ensure their survival. 
However as Millard, Ferguson and Khalia (1990, 303) point out, as a means of 
ensuring food security this strategy may be flawed. This is due to the fact that the 
temporary work is done during the peak of the agricultural cycle, thus depriving 
temporary workers of the time necessary to work their own fields, with the 
implication that this can lead to a food deficit cycle (Millard, Ferguson and Khalia 
1990, 303). 
In addition, if a large number of households seek to increase their income 
through working in another area of the economy then the increase in the labour supply 
may result in depressing the wage level in the market (Woodward 1992a, 41). Thus, 
survival strategies may have only limited use. To take another example, if a 
household decides to liquidate its savings then this is at best only a short-term solution 
as most households in Sub Saharan Africa are likely to have only a low level of 
All other 
goods (Y) 
ql 
qY 
U2 
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savings, if any at all. In addition, the opportunity to borrow money, particularly in 
rural areas, is extremely limited. 
6.5 Price Effects 
However, changes in incomes is not the only variable which effects demand. 
Changes in prices also influence demand. Food prices for poor consumers play an 
important role in determining their health status. Poor consumers, as a whole, spend a 
large proportion of their budget on food items, thus any changes in prices is likely to 
effect their purchasing power (Pinstrup-Andersen 1985, 69). Changes in availability 
and price of items such as wheat, flour, sugar and milk powder, resulting from 
decisions affecting imports tend to transmit adverse effects to the poor urban 
household. However, if prices for foodstuffs do increase, the option exists for those 
affected to substitute cheaper food with the same caloric content for more expensive 
food. However, this option is not open to the severely disadvantaged. The ability to 
adapt to changes in nutritional intake is also an important means of coping with 
declines in food consumption. This relationship, between prices and quantity 
demanded, which is almost always negative, is shown in the diagram below: 
Figure 6.6. The Effect of a Change in Price on Quantity Demanded 
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Following a decline in the price of cassava equilibrium is now at point B1 with ql„ 
and 	 consumed. Since the price of cassava has fallen this will lead to a lower 
relative price of cassava compared to all 'other goods' and an increase in the demand 
for cassava. This is a substitution effect and this is an important way for poor 
households to mitigate against the adverse influences of adjustment measures. 
Assuming that the price of cassava has fallen, and holding satisfaction constant, the 
household has an incentive to substitute the cheaper cassava for some of the now 
relatively more expensive all 'other goods' Furthermore, the more and higher quality 
substitutes that there are for cassava the easier it will be for the household to 
substitute other goods for maize if px increases (in reality an unlikely situation). As 
the price of imported cereals, such as maize and rice, will increase following a 
devaluation the household will have an incentive to substitute cheaper cassava for 
maize (Woodward 1992a, 33). The substitution effect may lead to an increase or a 
decrease in household nutrition depending on what goods are substituted. If an 
inferior staple (such as maize and cassava) is substituted for a preferred staple due to a 
price increase then in the long run nutritional status will decline. Interestingly, in the 
short run the calorie content of an individuals diet may increase leading to an 
improvement in nutritional status as measured against a weight -for-height standard 
(Senauer 1990, 416). 
There also exist cross price effects, which is the effect of a change in the price 
of another good on the demand for a good. The value varies between negative infinity 
to infinity. For complementary goods a price increase in the complement leads to a 
decrease in the quantity of the good being studied (a negative value). A price increase 
for a substitute leads to an increase in the quantity demanded of the good studied (a 
positive value). 
Adjustment measures increase the relative prices of tradable goods due to a 
devaluation. As the price of imports increase this can adversely effect producers who 
use imports in their production process. If the price of imports increase then it is 
likely that the price of the good produced will also increase. In addition, if the 
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imported in its final form, as pharmaceuticals often are, then the price increase will hit 
the consumer directly. Where adjustment programs require the lifting of subsidies 
prices for the previously subsidised good will rise. In addition, as seen in the previous 
chapter, adjustment programs may implicitly or explicitly call for cost recovery in the 
social sector; thus user charges may be introduced for health services which is 
essentially a price increase to the consumer. 
However, an increase in the price of food or health care need not spell disaster 
for farm households in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although it can reasonably be expected 
that non-farm households will suffer from an increase in the prices of foodstuffs, farm 
households may on the whole benefit. If a farm household produces some (or all 
goods) for sale, then an increase in the price of certain goods will lead to an increase 
in farm profits and household income. If this is the case then the "profit effect" may 
offset the negative effect associated with an increase in the prices of certain goods and 
nutritional status may increase (Senauer 1990, 411). Thus, for some groups an 
increase in the price of certain foods may actually lead to an increase in nutritional 
status. 
It was demonstrated in chapter four that inflation in African economies could 
be an unwanted by-product of adjustment policies. However, this is unlikely to be 
disastrous for most Africans. In the non-monetized sector of the economy inflation 
will not occur. In a pure subsistence economy all goods and services are home 
produced and consumed by the household. There is no concern about price because 
prices do not exist. The same is true of households that barter goods and services. 
Although in a barter economy there is, in a sense, a price in so far as there is a rate of 
exchange between one good and another, there can be no general increase in prices 
because even if one or more of one good has to be exchanged for another, this implies 
that the "price" of one good has risen, but the "price" of the other good has declined. 
Thus, people in the monetized sector (the urban formal) will be adversely affected by 
inflation, and people co-existing in the monetized and non-monetized sectors will be 
influenced based upon the degree of their participation in those sectors. 
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However, assuming that households do face a price increase for food or health 
care, McPake, Hanson and Mills (1993, 1390) research into health care financing in 
Kenya, Nigeria, Guinea and Burundi found that when households were faced with the 
urgent need for health care two coping mechanisms were deployed by households. 
The most common was cash from friends and relatives. Households were also found 
to sell assets in order to obtain health care. Twenty per cent of Guinean households 
and 18 per cent of Burundian households sold produce to purchase health care. In 
Uganda 15 per cent, and in Burundi 22 per cent of households sold some of their 
belongings in order to obtain health care (McPake, Hanson and Mills 1993, 1390). 
However, the study does not offer a definitive answer to the coping question because 
it relies on a rapid assessment approach using a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
data. Moreover, the authors admit that there may have been some confusion over the 
interpretation of the questions by the respondents (McPake, Hanson and Mills 1993, 
1390). 
Research conducted by Environment and Development in the Third World 
(ENDA) in the economically and socially diverse regions of Diombel, Kaolack and 
Tambacounda in Senegal, found that nearly three quarters of households surveyed had 
difficulties in purchasing essential drugs from income alone (Essential Drugs Monitor 
1991). Even amongst relatively privileged households, such as civil servants, over 50 
per cent said that they had difficulty in purchasing drugs from their income alone. 
The ENDA research revealed that when incomes were insufficient, households 
attempted to tap other sources for money (Essential Drugs Monitor 1991). Forty five 
per cent of cases immediately made recourse to other sources; 62 per cent of the 
households asked their parents first, 13 per cent asked neighbours for help initially 
and eight per cent asked for assistance from friends. 
Of those households that did not seek immediate assistance 16.5 per cent 
waited before buying the necessary drugs or purchased the prescribed drugs in lower 
quantities. Nearly 13 per cent used vouchers, asked the prescriber for assistance or 
resorted to alternative treatments. Eleven per cent had to make use of credit markets 
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to obtain money, and 13 per cent of these people said that they had to sell off assets or 
reduce expenditure in order to obtain the necessary finance (Essential Drugs Monitor 
1991). 
Where parallel markets exist together with official markets a liberalisation of 
prices following IMF intervention can serve to shift prices back to a normal level. 
Since official markets, where prices are cheaper, may only benefit certain consumers, 
a shift back to free market prices removes the "subsidy" that poor people pay to keep 
the official market running for other consumers. Even where a devaluation leads to an 
increase in the official price of tradable goods, "its impact on actual prices paid by the 
poor may be small or even negative" (Heller et al 1988, 19). 
6.5.1 Measures of Price Elasticity 
The own price effect measures the change in demand for a good in response to 
changes in the good's own price (income, other prices and preferences held constant). 
The value of the price elasticity of demand is from zero to infinity. The more 
responsive quantity demanded is to a change in price the higher the elasticity of 
demand. If quantity demanded changes by a smaller percentage than does price then 
demand is price inelastic (with a value between zero but less than one). If quantity 
demanded changes by a larger percentage than does price then demand is price elastic 
(with a value greater than one but less than infinity). Food, taken as a whole has an 
inelastic demand, although a particular food may have an elastic demand due to the 
existence of close substitutes. For example, Medani (1985, 686) reports that the price 
elasticity of food in the Sudan is 0.32. This suggests that increasing the price of food 
will cause a smaller than proportionate decrease in food consumption. Similarly, 
health care, taken in its entirety has an inelastic demand. 
Gertler and van der Gaag (1990, 85-89) estimate arc price elasticities of the 
demand for hospital and clinical care by income groups for rural areas in COte 
d'Ivoire. Table 6.6 below reproduces there results: 
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Table 6.6. Arc Price Elasticities for Adults in Rural COte d'Ivoire 
Income Quartile 
Fee (in CFAFs) 1 2 3 4 
Clinic 
0-5 -0.61 -0.58 -0.53 -0.38 
50-100 -1.61 -1.03 -0.91 -0.56 
100-150 -1.83 -1.71 -1.57 -0.93 
Hospital 
0-50 -0.47 -0.44 -0.41 -0.29 
50-100 -0.86 -0.81 -0.76 -0.51 
100-150 -1.34 -1.27 -1.18 -0.71 
Mean Income 33.28 64.44 99.52 222.87 
Source: Gertler and van der Gaag 1990 
Notes: mean income in thousands of Ivorian CFAFs per month 
The results of the study of price elasticities of medical care in Cote d'Ivoire indicate 
that price elasticity of demand for medical care falls with income in every instance. 
This suggests that poor individuals will be affected more by increases in user charges 
more than the rich. Gertler and van der Gaag (1990, 87) also state that children's 
demand for clinic and hospital care also follows the same pattern but is more elastic 
than adult's demand. 
Sauerborn, Nougtara and Latimer's (1994) study of demand for health care in 
Burkina Faso confirms Gertler and van der Gaag's (1990) findings. Sauerborn, 
Nougtara and Latimer (1994) found that the demand for outpatient care was inelastic 
(arc price elasticity of -0.79) or that health care utilisation would drop by 7.9 per cent 
with a ten per cent increase in price. The fourth income quartile (richest) had an 
inelastic demand of -0.12, but the first quartile (the poorest) had an elastic demand of 
-1.44. By age groups the authors found that the arc price elasticity of demand for 
outpatient care was only -0.27 for individuals over 15 years of age, but was highly 
elastic at -3.64 for infants under one year of age (Sauerborn, Nougtara and Latimer 
1994, 189). 
However, Shepard and Benjamin's (1988) study of 100 randomly selected 
Rwandan households found that the price elasticity of demand for government health 
facilities was only -0.25. Thus a doubling of fees in their study would reduce 
utilisation from 53 to 50 per cent. Of the lowest income households in their survey 
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more than 80 per cent would be willing to pay higher fees assuming drug availability 
improved. However, this theoretical evidence should be weighted against the fact that 
approximately one third of the poorest Rwandan households had problems with 
paying medical fees. 
An "income" effect also exists, because not only does a change in price make 
the good whose price has changed more or less expensive in relation to other goods, it 
also changes the alternatives open to the household. It can increase choice with a 
price decrease or limit choice with a price increase. Also "the more responsive to 
income is the demand for a good the larger the 'income' effect of any price change and 
the larger the total price effect" (Bryant 1990, 60). Moreover "the more X is 
demanded prior to the change in its price, the larger the change in "income" caused by 
any price change and the larger the own price effect" (Bryant 1990, 67). Pinstrup-
Andersen and Uy [(unpublished document) cited in Pinstrup-Andersen 1985, 71] state 
that in Fanyua and Gasau, Nigeria a 10 per cent increase in the price of food will lead 
to a 7.7 and 9.0 per cent decrease, respectively, in the real income of the lowest 
income decile. The highest income decile, however, only suffers a 6.5 and 5.7 per 
cent decrease, respectively, in real income under the same conditions (Pinstrup-
Andersen and Yu cited in Pinstrup-Andersen 1985, 71). 
In so far as adjustment and stabilisation policies actually control inflation 
through money and credit policies all groups will see a benefit. The poorest groups, 
assuming that they are in the monetized sector, which to begin with, have never had 
the means at their disposal to protect their incomes and assets from inflation will 
benefit once inflation is reduced (Heller 1988, 15). They will also indirectly benefit 
as money stored abroad (due to high inflation leading to capital flight) will come back 
to the home country. However, it should be kept in mind that a devaluation can 
accelerate inflation in the short-run. If this is the case, the situation would initially 
make household welfare worse-off. Rural households that produce their own food or 
are paid in food would not lose unless climatic conditions forced them to seek 
recourse to food markets undergoing rapid inflation (World Bank 1990, 53). 
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Budgetary and public expenditure reform initiated by the Fund and the Bank 
have a direct impact on the well-being of individuals through changes in funding to 
the social sector. Cutbacks in services that are not offset by targeted interventions 
will have a negative impact on all but the wealthiest groups. Figure 6.7 shows the 
basic linkage. 
C 	 Social Sector Policies 
 
Funding of the health care 
delivery system 
provision of health services 
to the population 
consumption of health care 
at the household level 
Figure 6.7. Funding of the Social Sector. 
Cutbacks that directly effect health status would be in health service provision; where 
health facilities are closed due to required reductions in government spending, new 
medical equipment is not ordered and pharmaceuticals are no longer purchased due to 
an increase in import costs following a devaluation. Decreases in the provision of 
clean water and sanitation facilities would also be negatively effected. Since access is 
important in determining utilisation, there is often a reduction in such services causing 
a deterioration in health status insofar as roads are no longer maintained or services 
cease altogether (Woodward 1992a, 37). Cutbacks in expenditure on transport would 
also influence access to services, inasmuch as roads are no longer maintained and 
transportation is no longer available. 
However, the impact on different groups depends on who benefited prior to 
the adjustment imposed change. As health facilities are overwhelmingly centred in 
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urban areas cutbacks are likely to affect the urban poor the most. For evidence of 
cutbacks in services see Hicks and Kubish, Heller and Woodward (p. 207-214). 
First, the introduction of fees or price increases for essential drugs, due to 
increase in import prices following devaluation, will have a direct effect on health 
status. Second, cutbacks in health service expenditure will have an immediate impact 
on individuals by limiting access to health facilities if user charges are introduced. 
The effects of such cutbacks can be transmitted directly to child health status, if the 
mother was deprived of essential medical services while pregnant, or if newborn 
children, who are often in a precarious state anyway, are denied access to essential 
facilities. Cutbacks in educational expenditures that feed into health education will 
have a delayed impact on health and nutritional status by depriving adult family 
members of the knowledge required to raise healthy and active children. If an 
individual is subject to both severance from public sector employment and cutbacks in 
social services the effect is expected to be greater. 
Pinstrup-Andersen (1988, 42) says that large cuts in health expenditures, in 
line with macroeconomic adjustment measures, will seriously affect the poor unless; 
the cuts occur mainly in the services used by the better-off population groups, or are 
accompanied by improvements in programme targeting or efficiency. McPake's 
(1993) review of recent evidence has concluded that the introduction of user charges 
can lead to a reduction in utilisation. Moreover, that eventhough elasticity 
calculations differ from author to author it is " apparent that utilisation is likely to 
decrease most amongst the poorest income groups" (McPake 1993, 1402) and that 
user fees will raise revenues only if the cost of collection and administration is not 
high. She warns (McPake 1993, 1404) that: 
unreserved faith in charges as a panacea in all contexts is clearly misguided 
but it is difficult to see an alternative for those countries whose health systems 
are most degraded, for which there is no prospect for improved public funding 
and which the majority who gain still suffer from 'diseases of poverty' and 
must be regarded as poor by any objective standard. 
The effect of fees and user charges on government provided health services will 
	
1 
depend on the distribution of consumption across income groups. The overall effect 
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of user fees depends on the elasticity of demand for medical care and how the funds 
generated will be used (Glewwe and de Tray, 1991) A reasonable assumption here is 
that the poor have higher elasticities of demand than the non poor, the implication is 
that if fees are raised at communal health facilities the poor are more likely to stop 
seeking medical care than the rich. This would serve only to make a health system 
that already suffers from problems of access even worse. According to Pinstrup-
Andersen ( 1987, 72) if we accept that the price elasticity of demand for health care is 
low then the introduction of fees for health care services is " likely to diminish the use 
of such services relatively little, but instead to increase total expenditures on health 
care." This, he continues will reduce the household money available for other goods 
and services, such as food. 
Therefore, introducing user fees to prevent frivolous use of health services is 
not necessary as, if even a patient lived near a health facility, time spent waiting 
would seem to be sufficient to deter any frivolous use. Indeed the 'free' services in 
Tanzania are placing an unaffordable burden on the poor already. Thus, following the 
author's conclusions, it becomes evident that any recourse made to user charges would 
only serve to increase the burden on the poor. It should be noted, however, that the 
effect of the introduction of user charges will most likely be limited to urban groups 
as rural groups seldom visit doctors anyway (Glewwe and de Tray 1988, 28 on the 
Cote d'Ivoire). 
6.5.2 Subsidies and Nutrition Status 
A reduction or an elimination of food subsidies which may follow IMF and World 
Bank intervention into the macroeconomy results in a sharp increase in the prices of 
(basic) foods available. If this is coupled with declining real incomes due to other 
reforms, then the possibility of switching to cheaper foods of the same caloric content, 
is eliminated as an option. If this is the case, the expected result would be an increase 
in (the first instance) of wasting and stunting in children, mal- or under-nutrition in 
women (possibly due to gender bias at household level in distribution of food), and 
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mal-nutrition in men. In general terms, the linkage from changes in trade policy to 
nutrition can be seen below (Figure 6.8). 
linkage 
C 	 trade 
 
V 
food subsidies 
V 
food prices 
V 
food availability/production in society 
household food availability 
utilisation of food by the family 
nutrition status of the family 
V 
nutrition status of the individual 
well-being 
Source: adapted from Pacey and Payne (1985, 21) 
Figure 6.8. Trade Policy — Food Subsidy — Health Status Link 
Pinstrup-Andersen (1987, 77) says that explicit subsidies, which are usually financed 
by the government, may contribute to excess government spending. Explicit 
subsidies, he believes, contribute to inflation, with the net effect of increasing rather 
than decreasing prices. Thus, the removal of subsidies may shift prices back to a 
more 'normal' level. 
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However, as Pinstrup-Andersen (1988, 41) notes, even if the amount devoted 
to a subsidy program is cut, the impact on food consumption may not be negatively 
effected. A decline in prices for certain foods due to a devaluation can offset a 
reduction in subsidies. In addition, a careful targeting of subsidies can offset possible 
negative impacts. Thus, there are several factors which can serve to offset the 
possibility of a decline in health status (Figure 6.9). 
linkage 
food subsidies eliminated/decreased 
increases in prices of basic food stuffs 
decrease in household food availability 
decline in the nutrition status of the family 
decline in the nutrition status of the 
individual 
(1) wasting and stunting in children 
(2) mal or under-nutrition in children 
(3) mal-nutrition in men 
Offsetting factor 
possibility of switching to cheaper 
foods with the same caloric content. 
Option may be eliminated with a 
decline in real income, and is not 
available to the severly disadvantaged 
Consumption level can be maintained 
by reducing savings, liquidating assets, 
expanding the family labor supply, 
running into debt, and migration 
Targeted intervention by the government; 
feeding programs or food stamps. 
Assistance by aid agencies. Education in 
food preparation and maternal health 
matters. 
Possible reallocation of food within 
the family to favor the vulnerable 
Figure 6.9. Offsetting Factors. 
Furthermore, the decline in real income as a result of general price increases are 
expected to be more pronounced for the urban poor household because they lack an 
ability to become self-sufficient in food Vulnerable groups, such as pregnant and 
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lactating mothers and young children, in both the urban and rural informal sectors, 
can avoid reductions in consumption if they are provided with direct feeding. 
In the area of fertiliser subsidies, where they are removed, and combined with 
devaluation, look for a greatly diminished difference between input and output price 
(see Stein and Nafziger, 1991 on Tanzanian situation). A reduction in fertiliser 
subsidies may benefit the poor, because under fertiliser subsidies the poor lose when 
fertilisers are substituted for labour, thus reducing the income of the landless (Huanh 
and Nichols 1987). However, Milard, Ferguson and Khalia (1990, 304), in the case of 
Malawi, conjecture that when the fertiliser subsidy there was removed (and prices 
rose) as part of a World bank policy less fertiliser was bought and less hybrid maize 
was planted due to the high price elasticity of demand for fertiliser and credit for 
purchases was not readily available. 
Kydd and Spooner (1990, 76) state that the removal of a pan-territorial pricing 
scheme for certain agricultural outputs, a form of transport subsidy, as part of a World 
Bank agricultural liberalisation programme, may "in the short term, prove to be 
disastrous" on locationally disadvantaged areas. For instance in Tanzania, Zambia 
and Malawi incomes of farmers and household nutritional status was raised through 
the increased production of staple food following the transport scheme. As one of the 
rationales for the scheme was that farmers would receive attractive prices for their 
goods, the removal of the transport subsidy led to a cutback in production and in 
distribution to remote areas, thus affecting health and nutrition status in the producing 
area as well as in food deficit areas where the surplus food was exported. 
The targeting of individuals who are exposed to the difficulties arising from 
reform of public expenditure may help to mitigate against these adverse effects, but 
only if the targeting is done effectively and efficiently, and only if the proposed 
recipients know that it exists and have reasonable access to it. Due to widespread 
poverty in Sub Saharan Africa targeting is not as easy as it would seem. The potential 
targeted population is liable to be large (or perhaps even greater than under previous 
programmes) and thereby serve to counteract the effects of cuts in public expenditure. 
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Due to this there may be resistance by the World Bank and the IMF, and national 
government policy makers, to widespread targeting necessary to deal with the social 
costs of this type of adjustment. However, there can be a net benefit, if pre-program 
public spending favoured one group over another, cutbacks may only have their main 
effect on the previously advantaged group. Indeed, ignoring distributional effects, the 
efficiency of pre-program spending may have been low, and post-program spending 
may be more efficient. The upside is reforms in this area may serve to increase the 
rate of growth of the economy, and in the long run (if then) increase the health and 
nutrition status of all parts of the population. 
Yet, it should be noted that adjustment programmes promoted by the Bank and 
the Fund do not always result in the elimination of subsidies beneficial to the poor. 
Bourgignon and Morrison (1992, 42) report that in COte d'Ivoire charges were 
increased on bus, rail, air fares and water and electricity rate and subsidies on rice an 
public housing for formal public sector employees were reduced. Thus, the removal 
of housing and airfare subsidies would only hurt the relatively well-off, whereas the 
reduction in subsidies on water (and to an extent electricity) would hurt the poor more 
as the proportion of the budget devoted to these expenditures is higher for the poor 
than the rich (Bourguignon and Morrison 1992, 42). 
However, changes in incomes and prices are not the only factors affecting 
demand. Secondary factors also work to alter demand by affecting preferences. In 
the household this is dependent on family size and composition (Bryant 1990, 73-74). 
Changes in size (with the addition of members through birth, marriage or adoption or 
the subtraction of members through divorce and death) and changes in composition 
(through family members ageing) influence demand. For example, a family with a 
new baby may be willing to forego consumption of some 'old' goods in order to 
consume 'new goods' such as child care, bottled milk, weaning foods, etc. 
6.6 Intra-Household Allocation 
So far the discussion has been mainly confined to viewing the household a closed 
system. More importantly the household has been viewed as an unit that makes 
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decisions in order to maximize its collective welfare. However, this approach is far 
too limited. Decision-making within the household, in practice, would not fit into this 
model. In common with the structuralist critique examined in chapter four, non-
maximizing decisions may be taken by the household. This leads to the notion that 
households that are comparable in income levels may deploy their resources 
differently (Lipton 1983, 5). Woodward (1992a, 48) and Duncan (1990) identify 
several problems with viewing the household as a single unit that maximizes total 
welfare: 
(1) The model assumes preference are the same for all household members or 
that a 'dictator' make decisions about allocation. 
(2) Maximization of welfare may be inhibited by traditional and religious 
values. 
(3) Decision-making in the household depends on the relative bargaining 
strength and individual objectives of its members. To wit, the bargaining 
strength of males may be greater than females and children. This process 
varies not only from country to country, region to region, but even between 
households. 
(4) Decision-making is of a personal nature and the processes involved are not 
explicitly understood by those involved. 
(5) Non-household members (such as the community) may exert influence on 
decision-making. 
and, (6) Except for the most physically exhausting work there is no a priori 
reason to assume that the marginal utility of women's market work is less than 
that of men.30 Yet, men are often viewed as undertaking market work and 
women as engaged in household production. Thus, the explanation for women 
engaging in household work and men in market work most likely has its roots, 
as shown, in social and cultural areas. 
In addition, what happens within the household is of importance. How individual 
households budget and distribute money and goods will have a significant impact on 
health status. 
There are three main models for analysing the intra-household distribution of 
food. They are functional (physiological), cultural and resource-control (Wheeler and 
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Abdullah 1988 cited in Wheeler 1991, 70). The functional model views the 
household as a unit whose primary function is survival. To this end food allocation is 
determined by the ability of members to produce goods (whether through income 
generation or other activity), and in times of shortage food is allocated to the family 
members that are most productive (Wheeler 1991, 70). This model would predict that 
adult men and women would be allocated first, followed by older adults and children. 
The cultural classification sees allocation (as well as production and 
preparation) as rooted in "the structure and relations of that society" (Wheeler 1991, 
71). Here, the status of an individual is reflected in the amount and type of food he 
eats. In patriarchal societies, the cultural model predicts that men and boys are 
allocated first, followed by women and female children (Wheeler 1991, 71). 
The resource control model is based on the power relations within the family. 
Food allocation reflects the hierarchy of the household, "but the focus is not so much 
on how food follows status, as on who controls the food resources and/or the food 
budget" (Wheeler 1991, 71). Under this model the person with the highest earnings or 
highest productive capacity would control food allocation as long as money earned is 
not turned over to another person (as may be the case with women giving their 
earnings over to men) (Wheeler 1991, 71) 
6.6.1 Autonomy, Control and Budget Allocation 
Of primary concern at the household level for health care is who controls the 
household budget and how decisions are reached. As pointed out previously there are 
several ways of looking at the household. Households that appear to be similar in 
number and composition may have different structures governing their economic 
resources; "they may organise their work and apportion costs and benefits quite 
differently" (Wilk 1989, 25). Wilk (1989) summarising various anthropological 
studies provides several different views of households: 
(1) The "Anglo-American" household where income and labour from 
household members is given over to a general fund. The general fund is 
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used to pay for household necessities while the residual is spent or 
invested according to the edicts of the household head or 'family financial 
officer'. 
(2) "Several Fund" or "non-pooling" households (Fapohunda 1988 cited in 
Engle 1993). Several different funds exist, once one fund is satisfied 
another fund is established an so on. This model of the household assumes 
that the allocation of funds is, in part, predetermined. Thus, for example, a 
household has a fund to cover subsistence, once this fund is satisfied a 
fund may be established with the money left over to cover ceremonial 
expenses. Once all obligations (funds) are fulfilled any money left over 
may be spent with discretion. 
However, it should be noted that the existence of different funds 
does not imply rights to the fund. Households may pool resources or 
women may donate all earnings to the common pool while men are 
allowed to withhold some of their money (Wilk 1989, 34). 
(3) "Duolocal households" In parts of Africa marriage is duolocal; a 
married man stays in his father's house with his brothers, the wife stays in 
her mother's house (Hagan 1983, 192-93). Furthermore, for instance, in 
Winneba, Ghana (a coastal fishing village), at early ages children stay at 
the mother's house where they receive care. Between eight and ten years 
old male children move to their father's house but the mother continues to 
provide food and clothing (Hagan 1983, 193). Whatever the 
circumstances are the women cook food for the men and bring it to them. 
What is left is apportioned to women and children (either separated in 
portions or, communally, from a large pan). 
Economic relationships are viewed as a series of exchanges. In the 
Ghanaian fishing village "women control the husband's purse strings", the 
role of women is to prepare and market the fish caught by men (Hagan 
1983, 195). The monetary arrangements are that women hand over the 
money gained from marketing the fish to the husband, who gives her a 
commission on the fish sold plus enough money (in theory) to cover 
expenses incurred in the upkeep of children. 
Often in Africa household decisions regarding cash expenditures are made by males, 
but decisions about health treatment are often made by women (Csete 1993, 1285). 
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Thus, the ability of women to exercise some autonomy is important. Engle (1993, 
1303) hypothesises that women's control of income may be more important than that 
of men for three reasons. First that as women earn more income they gain more status 
in the household and this translates into greater decision making concerning health 
care. Second, psychological theory predicts "that mothers will be more attentive and 
responsive to their children's needs than will fathers" (p.1303). Third, that some 
studies have revealed a propensity amongst men to spend their money on personal 
consumption goods rather than on interventions that benefit the family. Yet, this need 
not be viewed as a universally bad. Raikes (1989, 453) points out that the issue is not 
as clear cut as far as beer consumption goes. Beer brewing offers some health 
advantages for those that drink it and eat the pre-fermented porridge. Moreover, it 
provides a source of income to women who brew it as an informal activity in urban 
areas. However, it can also be a source of health problems as it is associated with 
verbal and physical abuse of women (Raikes 1989, 453). 
Independence for women is obtained in one of three ways; either by cultural 
acceptance of autonomy within a monogamous marriage, or by setting up a female 
headed household, or through union in a polygamous marriage. Steady's (1987) study 
of polygamy in a Sierra Leone fishing village suggests that polygamy often leads to 
independence and autonomy for women. Women, for instance, take responsibility for 
household activities, fish processing and marketing. The income that they earn from 
these activities allow them some financial freedom. However, it should be noted that 
the freedom may be limited to the first or "senior" wife who has the most autonomy, 
highest status and authority and who exercises control over the junior wives (Steady 
1987, 219). Burnham's (1987) research confirms that autonomy can be obtained 
through polygamy. His study cites earlier research (Robertson 1976) on the Ga 
women of Accra where separate budgets for men and women are the norm and a great 
deal of secrecy surrounds financial matters. 
However, in East and Southern Africa where male controlled budgets are the 
norm even in polygynous marriages due to a strong sense of patriarchy (Orobuloye et 
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al 1991, 191), the separation of budgets is not possible. However, in parts of West 
Africa, separation of budgets is possible. This separation occurs as an outgrowth of 
the practice of polygynous marriages (Orobuloye et al 1991, 190). Under this system 
the central budgetary unit becomes the mother and children, however parents under 
this system do not feel an equal obligation to each child; women are more likely to 
care for their own children rather than children from other marriages or fostered 
children. 
In Orubuloye et al's (1991) study of Ekiti women in polygynous marriages in 
Ondo, Nigeria it was found that women enjoyed separate incomes (mainly from 
trading) and control over its expenditure. As would be expected women contributed 
the greatest fraction of expenditure to child maintenance (clothing and food, but not 
education). Therefore a child's health status is related to the income directly available 
to his mother. However, men made contributed substantially to their wive's (food) 
maintenance (69 per cent of women contributed less than half to meeting their own 
food requirements) (p. 201). 
If a child in the family became sick the decision to seek treatment for children 
was usually (62 per cent) made by the person who paid for the treatment. An 
unexpected finding of Orubloye et al's research was that fathers met the cost of 
treatment 53 per cent of the time, and mothers only 29 per cent (with the balance 
coming from relatives or older siblings). However, mothers tended to pay for lower 
cost treatments (under 15 Naira) and fathers paid for higher cost treatments.31 When 
wives sought treatment for an illness husbands paid for treatment in 45 per cent of the 
cases and women paid for their own treatment in only 29 per cent. 
Overall the research indicated that treatment depends on the ability to pay 
(Orubuloye 1991, 207). In West Africa this creates a thorny situation. Due to the 
separate budget, and the inability of mothers to pay for expensive treatment may lead 
to delays in seeking treatment. As Orubuloye et al state (p. 207): 
In this Etiki village, and doubtless in West Africa as a whole, she cannot rush 
a sick child to the hospital in the knowledge that she has a unified family 
budget behind her over which she has some lights and which she will meet the 
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costs. Inevitably, this means delays in treatment and discussions — even 
haggling —over whether treatment and the consequent of expenditure is 
necessary. 
Csete's (1993) research in the Rwandan highlands reveals that income per se 
may not be the deciding factor. Her study revealed that the presence of a non-farm 
male income earner was not associated with health seeking behaviour. However, the 
control of existing income by women was associated with better health patterns in 
women. Lado (1992), in an interesting article, introduces the notion that women's 
work is "unrenumerated, underestimated, undercounted, uncredited, and undervalued" 
It is undervalued because women's work is critically important to the health of the 
family, and in particular, the health of children. Trenchard (1987, 168) and Lado 
(1992, 800) suggests that there are two main reasons why women's income is more 
significant than men's for household nutritional requirements. First, that women are 
traditionally responsible for their children's food, and it is common practice men and 
women keep there incomes separate. Second, that men's earnings from cash crops can 
be irregular. 
Lado (1992) notes that women make up about 80 per cent of the agricultural 
labour in most rural areas in Africa (when including subsistence food production). 
Women decide how much money can be spent on food, the type, they prepare the 
food and apportion it. She states that "children's health and exposure are determined 
by the home environment, which is mainly the womens' responsibility." Local 
culture, traditions, values and beliefs interact to determine to what extent a woman is 
allowed or expected to withdraw from her work and also whether she is able to eat 
more food, for instance, while in pregnancy or lactating (p. 801). The agricultural 
work cycle may prevent adequate nutrition and health care of the family in general 
and children in particular. 
Kennedy and Peters (1992),32 in an important study of Malawi and Kenya, 
also found that gender plays a crucial role in nutritional and health status. They found 
that female-headed households, in these countries, allocate a higher proportion of their 
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expenditures to food than male-headed households. They also noted that differences 
in expenditure patterns between households seem more a function of the interaction of 
income and gender, rather than strictly one or the other. Further, that in terms of non-
food purchases, male-headed households spent a greater proportion of their incomes 
on productive inputs, such as fertilisers. Moreover, as might be expected given 
differences in income levels, average caloric intake is higher for male-headed 
households than for the aggregate of female-headed households, however, gender also 
plays an important role. Data from their paper demonstrates that in spite of lower 
incomes and lower caloric intake at the household level, pre-school children from 
female-headed households do at least as well as, or significantly better than, children 
from male headed households, according to the longer term measures of nutritional 
status — height-for-age and weight-for-age. That is, lower level of malnutrition in 
female-headed households. 
Moreover, that children in de facto households receive a higher proportion of 
total household calories than children in other household groups. Their findings 
suggest that as household incomes increase, there is not a direct one-to-one effect on 
the caloric adequacy of pre-schooler diets (due in part, to the types of extra calories 
acquired, namely meat and other expensive foods that often do not increase pre-
schooler caloric intake). Additionally, another explanation for the negative 
relationship between household income and the proportion of calories going to 
children may be that at higher levels of income, money is spent on more expensive 
calories rather than on more calories per se. 
In terms of the impact on child health and nutrition, the fact that a woman 
heads the household may be less important than the relationship between the 
household head and the children in the household. Kennedy and Peters (1992) 
suggest three major items for consideration: the female gender of the head 
compensates for the difference in income at low levels of income; as incomes 
increase, regardless of the household head's gender, pre-school children seem to 
benefit proportionately less than one would expect from these changes; and that 
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targeting of interventions should concentrate on promoting nurturing behaviours or 
that exploit incentives for household investment in children. 
The role of women as household providers of health and nutrition care is 
crucial in ensuring the family's health. As Pearson (1987) points out, in the case of 
Nepal, womens' "invisible expertise and role as caretakers of health and gatekeepers 
to health care are crucial", especially where health services are unable to meet the 
expectations of the population. Johnson and Rogers' (1993) multivariate regression 
analysis of household food consumption in the Dominican Republic revealed that 
eventhough female-headed households had significantly lower incomes and lower 
availability of calories than male-headed households, the children from female-headed 
households has a significantly higher nutritional status than children from male-
headed households. Interestingly their study did not find that maternal education was 
a strong influence. However, it should be noted that these results are not generally 
applicable to Sub Saharan Africa as the data comes from a small, urban Caribbean 
island. 
Gender bias in nutrition status has often been noted in India (Babu, 
Thirumaran and Mohanam 1993 and Wadley 1993). Chen Huq and D'Souza (1981) 
postulate that there is a son preference in parenatal care: intra-family food 
distribution, feeding practices, and utilisation of health services are some of the 
behavioural mechanisms by which sex-biased attitudes may lead to higher mortality 
for females during childhood and adolescence. Evidence from a study conducted in 
Bangladesh supports this idea. Duncan's (1990) study utilising data from Brazil 
shows that bias need not only emanate from males. His study revealed that mother's 
income had a significant effect on her daughter's weight for height which was about 
five times greater than the (significant) effect on her son's weight (p.657). Engle's 
(1993, 1310) study of the effect of mother's income on children's nutritional status in 
Guatemala supports the hypothesis that mother's income is an important factor in 
determining the well being of children. His research found that the per cent of family 
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income earned by the mother was significantly associated with height for age, weight 
for age and weight for height. 
Okeke and Nnanyelugo (1989) in their examination of the intrafamily 
distribution of food and nutrients in the Anambra State, Nigeria also observed 
preferential treatment of young male children relative to their female counterparts and 
males served in preference to other household adults. However, eventhough males 
tend to benefit in this society, Okeke and Nnanyelugo's (1989) research revealed that 
males still suffered from negative nutrient balances. This suggests that the 
distribution of household nutrients is not the determining factor, but that overall food 
supply may be inadequate. However, a weakness of this study is that it only examines 
food intake and not differences in nutritional status, and it does not report on the 
incomes of farmers in the sample. 
However, the idea that there is universal sex bias in the allocation of food does 
not hold up to closer scrutiny. Harriss and Watson (1987) state that overall the 
evidence is variable and it is currently impossible to reach a definitive conclusion. 
For instance, in India there is a spatial variation in sex ratio — in the north and the 
west mainly masculine ratios, in the south and the east there are feminine ratios. Sahn 
(1990, 1647) in a study of the Cote d'Ivoire confirms that there is no discrimination 
against female children. Svedberg (1990, 482) analysis of 50 populations in Sub-
Saharan Africa confirms that "females, whatever their age, are not at a disadvantage 
vis-a vis males in anthropometric status." Lipton's (1983, 59) review of evidence 
made a similar conclusion that there appeared to be not discrimination in food 
distribution in Africa. 
However, so far we have mainly talked about rural areas. The question 
naturally arises as to whether or not the situation is the same for urban areas. The 
answer is neither black or white. In Mosley's (1989) study, Nairobi had a child 
mortality rate higher (nearly 35 per cent greater) than the surrounding rural area. 
Given that Nairobi has the largest number of doctors and "best'' medical facilities in 
the country, this is somewhat surprising. However, Mosley postulates that due to 
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squatting and poor environmental conditions in the city there is higher child mortality 
(p. 272-273). This, then, reinforces the conclusion of the above studies that child 
mortality is mainly determined by the social and economic circumstances of the 
family — in particular maternal education. 
Collier et al (1994) report that gender may play a crucial role in labour 
allocation during periods of adjustment in Africa. The reason for this has its roots in 
that skill acquisition by females is lower than that of males (see 5.3.1 this thesis). 
Differences in education have implications for labour allocation to wage employment. 
Although this is most prominent in francophone countries, rather than anglophone 
countries, Collier et al (1994, 279) state that females who are educated less are less 
likely to work for wages. Moreover, women face absolute discrimination; in 
Tanzania where males and females had obtained an equal level of education, men had 
a 75 per cent chance of finding wage employment but women only had half that 
chance (Collier et al 1994, 285). The lack of opportunity to find wage employment is 
compounded by the fact that women face asymmetric rights and obligations: they face 
the demands of reproduction, child care and domestic work alongside the demands of 
agricultural work. 
The process of imitation also explain females limited access to wage earning 
or income generating employment. Given that males follow male role models and 
females female role models, access to wage employment may be limited across 
generations and hinder the adoption of expenditure switching policies. Collier et al 
(1994, 293) state that recent evidence suggests that for every two households that 
switch to tree crop production (coffee, tea, cocoa) as part of an adjustment policy 
another household will follow suit. However, since tree crop production is mainly a 
male pursuit to begin with (Collier et al 1994, 293) female-headed households have a 
lower propensity to take-up income generating tree crop production. The expenditure 
switching by women is further compounded to the extent that income earned has to be 
transferred to men and women have less access to rural credit markets. 
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Thus gender plays an important role in labour allocation and the constraints 
that women may face may slow or otherwise hinder a successful adjustment. 
Furthermore, it may limit their ability to increase their income during times of 
economic change. However, it should be noted that it is likely that men will be hurt 
most by the initial adjustment programme. This is due to the fact that men are far 
more likely to be in the manufacturing and public sectors; sectors that suffer first 
round employment cut-backs during adjustment. Since women are in the wage-flex 
part of the economy (informal and agricultural sectors) their initial employment 
prospects are not likely to suffer as much as mens during the first stages of 
adjustment 
6.6.2 Maternal Education 
The level of education obtained by women is viewed as a "powerful engine of 
demographic change" (Schultz 1993) and the catalyst for successful change (Leslie, 
Lycotte and Buvinic (1988, 313). The reason for this is that it can lead to declines in 
fertility and child mortality. Wolfe and Behrman (1983, 539) on their study of 
Nicaragua show that women's education has a positive effect on nutritional status. 
They found that at the sample means an additional year of woman's education is 
associated with a 0.7 per cent increase in calories, a 1.4 per cent increase in protein, a 
0.6 per cent increase in iron and a 2.7 per cent increase in vitamin A. "This was 
interpreted to mean that more educated women are more efficient in household 
production of nutrition" (Wolfe and Behrman 1983, 539). Furthermore, that the 
returns to women's education may cross generations. Their study found that (p.544): 
The significant coefficient estimates of the mother's education suggests a 
striking intergenerational effect of women's education on the nutritional 
practices of their daughters, which supplements the direct influence of 
daughters' formal education on the nutrition of their own households. 
With reference to health care, for both males and females in a rural area of 
Nigeria, people with secondary or post secondary education were more likely to use 
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hospitals (as measured by the number of visits) than those with little or no education 
(Okafor 1983, 593). The plausible explanation is that illiterate or poorly educated 
people are less likely to be aware of diseases and thus seek treatment at later stages. 
Orububuloye et al (1991, 206) obtained similar findings. 
Mosley's (1989) study of Kenya confirms the relationship between declines in 
child mortality and increases in maternal education. Between 1969-1979, 78 per cent 
of the change in child mortality was accounted for by the education variable alone (p. 
268). However, the incidence of poverty was also important; "increasing poverty has 
a greater impact on mortality levels for children of women with the least education, 
and this effect declines with increasing education" (p. 268). To take another example, 
even after correcting for intercountry differences in GNP, a ten per cent increase in 
female primary enrolment can be expected to reduce infant mortality by 4.1 deaths 
per 1,000 live births (Hill and King 1993, 20). 
According to Cleland and van Ginneken (1989, 90), in a review of the 
literature on maternal education and child mortality state, "that a substantial portion 
of the maternal education effect on survivorship is independent of income and 
material resources and the effect transcends access to modern health services." They 
observe a "truly astonishing" relationship between child survival and formal schooling 
of the mother even after taking account of economic factors; 1-3 years of maternal 
schooling is associated with a fall of twenty per cent in childhood risks of death, with 
successive increases in education further large increases are recorded (p.93). They 
believe that maternal education can improve health of children in the following ways 
(p. 92): 
[Through a] greater protection against infection, primarily by means of 
improved hygiene; reduced susceptibility to infection, primarily through 
nutrition and immunization; enhanced recovery from infection, brought on by 
more effective and external health care; and reduced risks of accidents, 
through supervision. 
Cleland (1990, 402), in summary states that the most significant aspects of the 
maternal education-child mortality link are: 
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(1) There is no threshold: "from the very start of primary education, each 
additional year's retention within the formal school system is associated with a 
fall of 3-5 % (net of economic factors) in childhood mortality. Furthermore, it 
seems to be schooling in general, rather than literacy that is most important; 
(2) the association is observed in all developing regions; 
(3) the link is stronger in childhood (ages 1-5) than in infancy; 
(4) only about half of the association can be accounted for by material 
advantages associated with education; 
(5) reproductive risk factors play a minor, intermediate role; 
(6) equity in treatment between daughters and sons is no part of the 
explanation; and 
(7) the association between maternal education and child deaths is slightly 
greater than that for paternal education and child mortality. 
The notion of maternal education playing a crucial in child survival is best 
summed, in Mosley's (1989) words, as one of social synergy. In order to understand 
how health improves, it is necessary to look beyond the biological causes of disease 
and the modern treatments offered to cure them to the social causes of disease and 
how certain variables affect health status (Mosley 1989, 277-285). Thus the 
importance of education becomes apparent. Education works to alter fertility rates, it 
allows changes in food production and the level of nutrients consumed, and it permits 
people to change the possibility of environmental contamination — whether it be 
from unsafe water, poor sanitary conditions or vector transmission. 
6.7. Adaptation 
Korjenek (1992) points out that there are three broad categories; genetic, metabolic-
biological, and socio-behavioural, that enable an individual to adapt energy output to 
changes in nutritional intake. Genetic adaptability theory suggests that in the long run 
people can adapt genetically to low energy intake environments so as to be small but 
healthy. IvIelabolic-biological changes are another way of adapting. The Basal 
Metabolic Rate (BMR) is the largest component of total human energy needs. It is 
hypothesised that an autoregulatory mechanism exists in the body to adjust the 
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efficiency of metabolism to reductions in food intake. The evidence as to the degree 
of decline in the BMR with undernutrition is mixed. Suffice it to say that metabolic 
rates cannot adjust completely and promptly. Behavioural adaptations, consisting of 
voluntary physical reductions in activity (to zero theoretically) creates a state so the 
body consumes little more energy than the BMR. 
However, such adaptations have their limits, and food security may be best 
achieved by the use of long-run solutions. Helleiner (1992, 62) says that in order for 
food security to be achieved in Sub Saharan Africa at the household level, there is a 
need to concentrate on long run solutions: 
The long-run objective is to move beyond the issues surrounding the efficacy 
of alternative (ex post) famine relief mechanisms, and even beyond early 
warning devices to improve ex ante response to potential problems. The 
object is to generate sustainable and stable (more drought and pest resistant) 
food production and distribution systems and income distribution (corn 
entitlements) sufficient to prevent famines in advance. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The effect of adjustment measures on household health status depends on an 
extremely complicated web of price and income changes. For instance, households in 
the worst case, may face a situation of declining incomes and rising prices. In the best 
case households may receive an increase in income as well as a decline in price. 
However, no actual household is likely to experience these extremes, more likely, 
households because of different sources of income and because of different 
consumption baskets will fall somewhere between. Structural adjustment programs 
change the overall income in a country as well as the distribution of income within a 
country (chapter four). As the distribution of income is hypothesised to change some 
groups may be made better-off while others may be made worse-off. The effect of 
changes in income is partially affected by the initial level of income of households. 
Those who have high levels of income can decrease their consumption of luxuries and 
concentrate on obtaining essential goods. Individuals that spend most of their budget 
on essential goods and services to begin with may have little scope to decrease 
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expenditures in the face of adjustment measures. The effects of changes in incomes is 
likely to occur as follows: 
(1) Those engaged in tradable activities will benefit from a devaluation as 
this will lead to an increase in real prices for these products (Woodward 
1992a, 28). If the price increases then incomes of producers will increase. 
Individuals (the rural landless) employed by producers of tradable may see 
an increase in income if the producer passes on increased profits in the 
form of wage increases. The increase can then be spent on health 
improving interventions. 
(2) Those producers (rural smallholders, medium and large landowners) 
engaged in non-tradable activities will see a relative decline in the price of 
goods produced with a commensurate fall in income. However, as 
smallholders frequently are net purchasers of food, and food is a major 
component of their consumption basket (Duncan and Howell 1992, 9) they 
benefit from a relative price decline. If producers of non-tradable receive 
the new price signal and they are able (due to favourable climatic and soil 
conditions) to switch production to tradable activities then they will enjoy 
the benefits of structural adjustment; albeit after a time-lag. However, if 
farmers are risk averse they may move back to subsistence production 
rather than face the uncertainty of market opportunities (World Bank 1990, 
57). In addition if the market is monopsonistic price increases may not be 
passed on producers (World Bank 1990, 5). 
Whether or not the producer is engaged in tradable or non tradable 
activities is not necessarily of primary concern. Duncan and Howell 
(1992, 7) warn that "it will not always flow that an increase or a decrease 
in producer prices will engender a concomitant change in price" because 
household food security may take precedence over profit maximization by 
risk adverse individuals. 
(3) In the urban formal sector cutbacks in public sector employment will 
lead to a decline in incomes for those participating in government 
employment. If the income of formal sector workers declines then this has 
implications for those engaged in informal activities. The implications are 
twofold. First, reduced incomes of formal sector workers means less 
money to be spend purchasing goods produced by the informal sector. 
223 
Second, given that there are likely to be only a limited number of jobs 
available in the formal sector, laid off formal sector employees will have 
to find jobs in the informal sector. Thus, the supply of labour to the 
informal sector will increase thus decreasing the real wage rate in the 
informal sector. In addition as incomes decline in the formal and informal 
sectors demand for goods produced by the agriculture, formal and informal 
sectors will decline leading to a decline in incomes of these producers. It 
is reasonable to expect that as household incomes fall, in sectors where 
formal and informal sector compete directly with each other there may be 
price-induced substitution of formal by informal sector goods. Basically, 
there will be a switch in consumption to low income goods produced in the 
informal sector. Also, there is a need to keep in mind that if urban-rural 
remittances are high then wage restraint in the urban sector can have 
adverse implications for groups in rural areas (Heller et al 1988,9). 
At the core of IMF and World Bank programmes is that poverty can best be 
alleviated by increasing the incomes of the poorest members of society. For instance, 
the World Bank's World Development Report (1980, 59) states that: 
There is now a wide measure of agreement on several broad 
propositions...malnutrition is largely a reflection of poverty: people do not 
have enough income for food...the most effective long-term policies are those 
that raise the incomes of the poor... 
However, this chapter has shown that this is a dubious conclusion to reach. first, it 
appears that calorie-income elasticities are lower than previously thought (lower than 
0.4 rather than greater) indicating that raising incomes may do little to improve 
nutritional status. On the other hand declines in one may not be associated with large 
changes in nutrition status. 
If it can be reasonably be believed that raising incomes does not have a major 
impact on nutrition levels due the elasticity estimates and the influence of consumer 
tastes, then World Bank and IMF programmes should be reoriented towards (Shah 
1983, 146) encouraging scientists to improve absorption and sensory quality 
(acceptability and palatability) of low cost foods. If sensory quality cannot be 
improved then the costs of preferred foods should be driven down by pushing the 
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"green revolution" towards preferred foods (Shah 1983, 146) and education should be 
provided about the relative nutritional merits of consuming different types of foods 
(Behrman and Deolalikar 1987, 505). 
Although it is possible to overstress that income is not a determining factor. 
In fact, income, along with other changes following macroeconomic reforms will 
affect health status. If this is the case the households must make recourse to survival 
strategies. As Pinstrup-Andersen (1987, 80) points out that the coping ability of 
households are the most important factors to consider when designing or evaluating 
macroeconomic policies that effect nutrition. Survival strategies in the face of 
adjustment are likely to benefit those who are initially better off than the poor. The 
poor only have limited access to survival strategies to begin with. If survival 
strategies fail to arrest the decline in health status then there is a need for outside 
intervention. Access to religious, social or economic solidarity networks may help the 
poor through difficult times. In the 1970s this intervention took the form of 
promoting food security. However, this strategy on the whole, has failed. 
The reason for this is based on the notion that the achievement of food security 
is not only about incomes, it is, in fact much more multifaceted. During the 1970s 
there was the belief that food security could be achieved at the household level once 
food self-sufficiency or surpluses was reached at the national level (Ali and Pitkin 
1991, 3). However, this has not transpired and the causes of food insecurity are seen 
as rooted in many different areas. Poor facilities for on-farm storage in rural areas, 
losses resulting from insects, rodents, rain and spoilage, poor rural infrastructure, high 
cost transport, poorly maintained vehicles, the lack of an efficient market caused by 
bureaucratic control, inequitable distribution of land resources, low labour 
productivity, low intensity of agriculture due to limited use of agricultural inputs 
(such as fertilisers), and lack of credit all work together to prevent food security from 
being achieved (Ali and Pitkin 1991, 3-6). 
Christensen and Stack's (1992) study of Zimbabwe has revealed that food 
insecurity is most likely to exist in rural areas amongst landless farmworkers, the 
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unemployed and in some parts of urban areas. Households that have diversified 
incomes, from, say, wages, outside remittances, livestock or self employment are 
more likely to be able to obtain food security at the household level. The short-term 
consequences of adjustment measures on household food security would be to worsen 
the initial condition. In the long-run, structural adjustment may improve household 
food security in so far as economic growth translates into higher incomes among the 
poor and production is increased. However, this will only occur so long as barriers to 
access are removed. 
Changes in the prices of health improving goods and other goods following 
adjustment are likely to play an important role in determining the health status of 
individuals. This chapter has highlighted these many effects: 
(1) General price increase may have little impact on the rural poor in so far 
as they exist only partially in the monetized sector to begin with. The 
urban poor fare worse to the extent that they must purchase food in urban 
markets. 
(2) Any increases in prices will not spell disaster for those effected due to 
the fact that substitution of cheaper food of an equal calorie/nutrient 
content is possible. 
(3) Increasing fees for health care is likely to be more important for the 
rural poor rather than urban residents. First, the rural poor in the 
agricultural sector are likely to face higher time and opportunity costs to 
begin with. Second rural areas are likely to contain poorer consumers who 
will decrease utilisation by more than the rich. In addition, the provision 
of health services to rural areas is still inadequate when compared to urban 
areas. 
(4) If the urban formal and to a lesser extent informal workers 
consumption basket has a large component of tradable goods then, 
following a devaluation the prices of the goods will increase with adverse 
implications for household welfare. If households are able to substitute 
imported goods for other cheaper goods then the crisis in consumption will 
be avoided. 
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This chapter has focused attention to the household level as the most important 
unit in the production of health care. Recent evidence suggests that household level 
activities are critically important in determining health status of individual members. 
Gender and maternal education appear to play a more important role in determining 
health status than increasing the incomes of poor people. This is related to the fact 
that households in Sub-Saharan Africa, when faced with adverse conditions are able 
to invoke survival mechanisms to help them retain their level of health. At this level, 
the household acts as an intermediate agent, protecting members from changes in their 
level of well-being following macroeconomic reforms. 
As has been seen from the section on maternal education the health benefits 
that accrue from additional years of female education are considerable. In addition 
education can lead to further opportunities in wage employment for women. Thus, a 
policy that aims at increasing female education, or reducing the gender gap, between 
male and female primary and secondary enrolment rates is of utmost importance. 
Increased female enrolment in primary and secondary schools is associated with 
longer life expectancy, lower infant and maternal mortality and lower fertility rates. 
Indeed the benefits of female education are not limited to the realm of health. The 
benefits of maternal education, and in fact all education, lead to increased family 
income, higher GNP per capita, increased productivity and improved social status 
(Hill and King 1993, 13-34). 
However, increasing female enrolment rates may not be that easy to achieve. 
As this chapter has shown increased female schooling entails opportunity costs; costs 
in household work left undone, childcare that is neglected, and the loss opportunity to 
undergo informal training activities; financial costs (tuition, uniforms, textbooks and 
travel); and psychic costs where culture and traditions prevent women from going to 
school and increasing their level of education (Hill and King 1993, 27). 
Svedberg (1190) says that since women account for more than 50 per cent of 
the agriculture labour input into food production in Sub-Saharan Africa they currently 
227 
occupy a favourable and autonomous position. However, if macroeconomic programs 
lead to the intensification (through the use of ploughs, machinery and the increased 
use of pesticides and fertilisers) of the agriculture sector the situation of women could 
change. Men could take on a more significant role in agricultural production and 
women would be forced to assume more marginal roles (Svedberg 1990, 482). If this 
were to occur then it is feared that "in the wake of such development, the nutrition and 
health status of women vis-a-vis men will deteriorate", perhaps to the level found in 
South Asia. In addition the autonomous role that some women enjoy may not lead to 
an improvement in health status. First, households in Sub Saharan Africa tend to be 
large requiring an enormous amount of economic activity in order to keep the family 
clothed, fed and in good health. Second, taxes raised in the agriculture sector often 
are not reinvested in rural services, but appropriated to urban areas (Steady 1987, 
226). 
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Chapter 7 
Evidence of the Impact of Adjustment on Health Care 
Development 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a critical review of the existing evidence on the impact of 
adjustment measures on health care delivery, health conditions and health status in 
Sub Saharan Africa. This first section is devoted to examining the studies that have 
sought to trace the linkages from macroeconomic reforms sponsored by the Fund and 
the Bank to the household level. The next section reviews the case studies that have 
been conducted in an effort to assess the negative impact of adjustment on health care 
development. The third section provides evidence from Bank and Fund studies to 
indicate that the adverse implications of adjustment measures may be rather limited. 
The second part of this thesis is devoted to an analysis of the impact of 
adjustment on the health sector in Sub Saharan Africa from 1980 to 1992. The 
analysis breaks with earlier approaches and examines each area relating to health 
individually. In addition, instead of concentrating on one type of analysis, as is 
common with most other studies, this chapter uses the "before-after" and "with with-
out" approaches. Moreover, instead of conducting a "with with-out" analysis that 
amalgamates all developing countries this study breaks down countries into matches 
— control and non-control countries. This chapter concludes with a summary of the 
major findings and the implications for health care development in Sub Saharan 
Africa. 
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7.2 Evidence of the Impact 
The World Bank [Zucherman (1989), World Bank (1990) and Seragdelin (1990)1, the 
IMF [Heller et al (1988), Demery and Addison (1987) and Enweze (1990)] and a 
number of researchers [Pinstrup-Anderson (1981, 1987, 1987a, 1988), Behrman 
(1988), Woodward (1992, 1992a) and Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987)] have 
provided the basic framework for analysing the impact of adjustment on social 
welfare and health care development. They are broadly similar to the approach taken 
by this thesis, but they differ in several important respects. For instance, Zucherman 
(1989) and Heller et al (1988) rely on a few case studies from an economically, 
socially and politically diverse set of developing countries to make generalisations 
about the adjustment impact in all developing countries. Or in the case of Serageldin 
(1990) and Enweze (1990) no evidence is provided to make generalisations. Second 
implications for household welfare are glossed over in Zucherman (1989) or treated 
superficially as in Heller et al (1988). In addition, all studies, while recognising that 
the role of women in health care development is important, do not thoroughly 
investigate or provide evidence as to why this may be. Moreover, many of the studies 
tend to underplay the health sector in favour of examining the entire social sector. 
Although Behrman (1988) and Pinstrup Anderson (1981, 1987, 1987a and 1988) 
correct for this, Pinstrup-Anderson's studies focus on nutritional consequences to the 
detriment of health status effects. 
Several attempts based on case studies have been made to link policy based 
lending to changes in health conditions, health care delivery and health status. Some 
of the approaches [Sanders and Davies (1988), Anyiman (1989), Glewwe and de Tray 
(1989), Kanji, Kanji and Manji (1991), Mwega and Kanbubo (1993), Eliott (1993), 
Kane (1993), Mwanawina (1993), Popoola (1993), Chipeta (1993), Ndongko (1993) 
and Lututal, Kintamba and Mvudi (1993)] which have sought to do this provide much 
useful information and a background to the problems, however they fail to construct 
the relevant linkages from macroeconomic reforms to household or regional changes 
in welfare. The strengths of these studies lie in the fact that they provide a snapshot 
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of the health system in a country during an adjustment period. However, they fail to 
compare their results with countries that did not undertake programme loans but faced 
similar economic conditions. In addition, many of the studies only concentrate on 
how the health care delivery system changed as a result of adjustment and ignore the 
importance of health status changes. 
For instance, Mwega and Kabubo's (1993) study of Kenya found that the 
health care delivery system expanded during that country's adjustment in 1982, 1986 
and 1988. The number of doctors increased steadily from 1980 to 1990, the number 
of pharmacists leapt from 113 to 443 from 1983 to 1990 and the number of enrolled 
nurses increased from 8,722 in 1980 to 17,734 in 1990. Moreover, the number of 
health institutions increased from 1,544 to 2,133 in 1989. However, the number of 
hospital beds and cots per 1,000 population declined from 174 in 1980 to 136 in 1989. 
Mwega and Kabubo's (1993, 39) conclusion based on this limited research, the fact 
that health care delivery was generally expanding, and without reference to health 
status changes, finds that "structural adjustment measures in the health sector have 
adversely affected the poor." 
Sowa's (1993) research into the Ghanaian health care delivery system also 
suffers from serious defects. Again, the links between adjustment and the health 
sector are not drawn up. In addition, changes in health status are not reported, instead 
Sowa (1993, 19) uses attendances at outpatient clinics as a proxy for health status 
changes. Implicit in his analysis is that since outpatient attendances declined from 
10.7 million in 1976 to 4.8 million in 1987, an adjustment period, then health status 
must have changed as well. However, as this chapter will show later, this is not the 
case. 
Eliott's (1993) case study of Sierra Leone and Kane's (1993) exposition on 
Senegal can be similarly criticised for their selective approach to examining the health 
crisis in Africa. For instance, Eliott (1993) notes that following the implementation of 
an IMF package in 1986 health expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures 
tripled, however by 1988-89 they had fallen back to their original level. Although, 
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this is of no doubt of great importance as far as health care delivery goes, no effort 
was expended in trying to explain why this occurred or, even, whose fault it was. 
Kane's (1993) analysis suffers from a similar problem. His research revealed that 
health status and immunisation coverage improved during a period of adjustment, but 
he finds it difficult to attribute this increase to anybody. Since, Senegal's adherence to 
IMF policy was weak it is hard to attribute the improvements to the Fund. 
However, not all author's believe the Bank and the Fund to be solely 
responsible for the decline in the living standards of Africans. For instance, 
Mwanawina (1993) places the blame for the deterioration of living standards at the 
Zambian President's door. He states (Mwanawina 1993, 73) that "the health sector 
[has been] adversely affected by the government's excesses and economic 
mismanagement." Due to government inaction drugs and vital medical equipment 
were in short supply and doctors and nurses left due to poor conditions of service. It 
is Mwanawina's (1993) view that since the government deprioritized the health sector, 
when funding declined by 55 per cent, health status has also declined. 
Popoola (1993) mirrors this view. His study of Nigeria found that the 
government failed to provide enough finance to the health sector. For instance, in 
1982 only $0.42 was spent per capita on health. Yet, a World Bank study conducted 
by Glewwe and de Tray (1989) on adjustment in the COte d'Ivoire found that under-
financing of the health sector may not be that important a factor in determining the 
health status as the majority of the poor do not consult formal health practitioners. 
However, in contrast to Mwanawina (1993) he feels that the government should bare 
only part of the blame for the precipitous decline in living standards. In contrast to 
the previous authors, Popoola (1993) has made an effort to trace the linkages from 
macroeconomic changes to welfare declines. For instance, following the 
implementation of structural adjustment in the early 1980s the price of rice jumped. 
A bag of rice sold for N500 to N800; more than a month's salary for the average 
worker or four to five times the minimum wage. However, having noted this fact he 
does not successfully relate it to health status changes, but he does provide the fact 
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that anecdotal evidence suggests that kwashiorkor has increased during adjustment 
(Popoola 1993: 96). His conclusion based on this rather thin evidence, and the fact 
that deaths from cholera increased from 1984 to 1988, states that (Popoola 1993: 96), 
"while the slogan 'Health for All by the Year 2000' has been widely publicised, 
popular ingenuity has produced the more accurate parody, 'Hell for All by the Year 
2000'." 
Where Popoola (1993) fails to provide evidence of health status changes, 
Lututala, Kintambu and Mvudi (1993, 35) note that adjustment may have led to health 
status changes in Zaire. They note that the percentage of people suffering from 
parasitic and infectious diseases rose from 24 per cent in 1981 to 50 per cent in 1984 
to 69 per cent in 1987 at the general hospital, Mama Yemo. Moreover, at the 
Kalembelembe Paediatric Hospital in Kinsasha mortality from malnutrition was 
increasing. During a period of structural adjustment rates for malnutrition increased 
from 9.6 per cent to 44 per cent in 1986. Although, the evidence only comes from 
two limited sources, this can, in part, be forgiven as data is difficult to obtain. 
Anyinam's (1989) case study of Ghana offers one of the most comprehensive 
treatments of the impact of adjustment on health care development. However, his 
study also has several weaknesses. The study is generally strong on relating 
macroeconomic reforms to health changes, however the research is weak in that it 
over relies somewhat on leaps of logic. He notes that as part of the economic 
recovery programme (ERP) implemented in 1983 price subsidies were phased out on 
most public services including health. Moreover, from 1983 onwards user fees were 
introduced for all public health facilities. From this information, he states " hospital 
attendances declined considerably in many areas when the new fees were introduced. 
Children with malnutrition who had been in regular treatment stopped attending 
clinics because the mothers complained that they could not afford the new fees." 
While this may be true, no evidence is was provided to back up this claim. His 
analysis which also concentrates on health care delivery changes also note that 
although some of the IMF money has been used to improve the health sector, poor 
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conditions of service have resulted in the continued loss of medical staff from the 
health sector. Overall, his study concludes that although the ERP has been successful 
in getting the Ghanaian economy to turn around, it has done so at the "expense of 
people's welfare, standard of living, and quality of health." 
Sanders and Davies (1988) review of the effect of stabilisation policies on the 
health sector in Zimbabwe is to be praised on one hand for its even handedness and 
attention to macroeconomic-microeconomic linkages but lamented for the (expected) 
lack of actual evidence. Their research pointed out that the IMF's 1982 stand-by 
agreement with Zimbabwe led to the removal of food subsidies, a wage freeze and a 
restriction in growth in government expenditures. For instance, for 1982-83 the price 
of maize meal increased by 100 per cent, the price of beef went up by between 69 and 
95 per cent and milk shot up by 50 per cent. The implications of this was that 
incomes in formal activities declined due to the wage freeze and the incomes of 
informal workers would decline because subsidies were removed. However, such 
negative income changes did not translate into health status changes. Although, the 
data was scarce, the author's noted that the infant mortality rate continued to decline 
(Sanders and Davies 1988, 729). However, they also noted that "it is arguable that the 
recession slowed the rate of reduction in child mortality (and some areas of morbidity) 
because of constraints in health sector interventions" (Sanders and Davies 1988: 730). 
The authors posit that declines in incomes and increases in prices did not lead to 
changes in health status for several reasons. First, during the adjustment period 
immunisation coverage continued to expand. Second, knowledge of ORT treatment 
was good. Third, the health sector continued its reorientation towards the PHC 
model with an increasing emphasis on preventative medicine. Finally, outside aid 
programmes and drought relief programmes helped to dampen any possible negative 
outcome. 
In contrast to the case study approach several author's have sought to provide a 
broad picture of the possible effects of economic adjustment of health status, health 
care delivery and health conditions in Africa. However, these studies are not without 
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problems. For instance, Taylor (1988) almost seems to think that the question is 
unanswerable. Taylor (1988, 35) believes that economic recession and the slowdown 
in growth in developing countries will have a severe effect on health and nutrition, but 
it is difficult to quantify. He states: 
What exactly do growth rate projections to the 1990s based on debatable 
hypotheses about global macroeconomic developments and widely imprecise 
statistical estimates of the relevant parameters have to do with health and 
nutrition of children and adults in the Third World? The answer, no doubt is a 
great deal, but it is difficult to add much to that. 
However, other authors are not as pessimistic when it comes to finding an answer to 
this question. However, these studies still suffer from a variety of short comings 
Comm.n Jolly and Stewart (1987), employed by UNICEF, were one of the first groups 
to provide an account of the effect that multilateral agencies have on social sectors in 
developing countries. Their research generally paints a bleak picture of the impact of 
adjustment measures on health status. Although their study tends to place economic 
recession and adjustment measures in one group, their review indicated that child 
welfare declined in eight countries in Latin America, 16 in Sub Saharan Africa, three 
in North Africa and the Middle East and four in South East Asia during adjusting 
periods. Furthermore, their study which focused on the effect of IMF adjustment 
programmes from 1980-85 noted that the adoption of economic reforms was the main 
element in the deterioration in living standards. Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987, 288) 
believe that this deterioration was caused by three main factors. First, the short time 
horizon of programmes and the deflationary character of Fund programmes led to 
lower levels of employment and declines in real incomes. Second, devaluation of 
national currencies and the liberalisation of prices had direct negative effects on 
nutrition through increases in food prices and decreases in subsidies. Third, cuts in 
social expenditures led to cutbacks in services that are of critical importance to the 
well being of individuals. 
However, the evidence from Africa used to support this claim does not hold up 
to close scrutiny. This UNICEF study contained three case studies from Africa. The 
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case study on Botswana for the period of 1980 to 1984 found that per capita food 
availability increased, immunisation rates rose and health facility use increased. In 
addition, the infant mortality rate decreased. However, child malnutrition increased 
25 per cent in 1982 and 31 per cent in 1984. The Ghana case study revealed a bleaker 
situation. For the period 1979 to 1985 calorie adequacy declined to 68 per cent in the 
1980s. In addition, attendances at health facilities fell by eleven per cent a year and 
infant mortality rates increased from 86.0 to 107.0 in the 1980s. The study of 
Zimbabwe, however, showed that there was basically no change in child malnutrition 
and the infant mortality rate and health services generally expanded with an emphasis 
on preventative care. 
Given this, Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987, 290) recommended that 
adjustment measure be reformed to take into account, explicitly, the impact on the 
poorest members of society. This approach, which they termed adjustment with a 
human face had six main elements. First, adjustment measures should concentrate on 
being expansionary rather than contractionary. Thus, they recommended that finance 
should be provided over the medium and long term and aimed at increasing output 
and employment. Second, policy instruments should be chosen carefully and those 
that restructure resource and incentives in favour of the poor should be given priority. 
Third, macroeconomic reforms should focus on the sectoral level. Amongst the 
different sectors, small farmers and urban informal workers should be given priority 
due to the fact that the potential for raising incomes for the largest number of the poor 
was greatest. Fourth, equity and efficiency in the social sectors should be encouraged 
so that services could be reoriented out of high cost interventions in over-served urban 
areas to lower cost interventions in rural areas. Fifth, adjustment programmes should 
integrate compensatory measures in their design. Such measures would concentrate 
on public works employment schemes and nutrition interventions targeted at the most 
vulnerable in society. Finally, adjustment programmes should include monitoring of 
changes in health and nutrition status during times of economic transformation. 
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However, this influential study does suffer from several flaws. First, as 
Cornia (1987, 21) admits the evidence is incomplete and should be treated with 
caution: "[the] available information often covers different periods and makes use of 
different concepts, or is derived from limited samples. From a rigorous statistical 
point of view this information remains fragmentary and scattered." Second, the study 
concentrates on IMF programmes and has little to say, directly, about the role of the 
World Bank in adjustment. Third, the lags involved in adjustment financing are not 
adequately considered. While it is certainly logical that adjustment will negatively 
affect some individuals' health status it seems somewhat implausible that such 
changes would show up so quickly. For instance, the Ghana case study shows that 
health and nutrition status were adversely affected in the early 1980s, however the 
first IMF stand-by to the country was not until August 1983. In addition, there seems 
to be some exclusivity evident in the picking of indicators. No mention, for instance, 
is made of improvements in some health status indicators. Although, the author's 
recognise that Ghana's economy did require outside intervention (Cornia, Jolly and 
Stewart 1987, 289) their overall conclusion could do more to emphasise the fact that 
poor economic policies are as much to blame, if not more, than IMF programmes. 
This fact is reinforced to the extent that the evidence from the Zimbabwe case study 
paints a mixed picture, and the evidence from Botswana, a country that has never 
received any adjustment financing, indicated an improving situation. 
Behrman (1988) is also quite critical of the UNICEF approach. Behrman 
(1988, 105) believes that the impact of adjustment measures, as shown previously in 
this thesis, depends on changes "in composition at various levels, including the nature 
of income and asset distributions, the breakdown of government expenditures and 
relative prices," and the decisions made by households. He directly criticises the 
UNICEF studies for failing to formally develop the links between adjustment and the 
health status of children. However, Behrman (1988, 131) hedges when he says: 
[UNICEF] provides a useful catalogue of trends, but relatively little 
information on changes due to economic recession and economic adjustment 
programmes. Given the project focus on finding possible negative and 
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recessionary and economic adjustment impact on children the authors appear 
to have pressed hard to find examples of deterioration in children's 
conditions. But they provide relatively little direct evidence of such 
deteriorations. 
He concludes (p. 132): 
I do not see these studies as having demonstrated that economic adjustment 
policies have had deleterious effects on health and nutrition in developing 
countries or that health and nutrition would have been substantially better 
without the economic adjustment policies or with different economic 
adjustment policies. 
Behnnan and Deolalikar (1990) press home this point. The author's re-examine 
Boyd's (1988) case study on Jamaica which was part of UNICEF's adjustment with a 
human face exercise. Boyd (1988, 137-141) found that the unemployment rate rose, 
informal labour participation increased, food expenditures fell, expenditures on the 
social sectors declined and nutrition status declined during Jamaica's adjustment from 
1984 to 1985. However, Behrman and Deolalikar (1990, 346) found that the 
unemployment rate actually peaked in 1982 the declined in 1984-85. Moreover, the 
unemployment rates for women, which is of primary concern when examining the 
health and nutrition of children, showed no deviation from the unemployment trends 
prior to the adjustment. Behrman and Deolalikar (1990, 346) also not that there was 
not a large movement into the informal sector. Their analysis suggests that the base 
year, 1983, that Boyd (1988) uses to judge changes in informal sector participation is 
wrong. Their study notes that Boyd's base year was an anomaly and that increases in 
informalization of employment from 1983 should be seen in the context of informal 
participation rates that were equally high prior to 1983 as after. 
Behrman and Deolalikar (1990, 347) also observe that there was not a major 
deterioration in food and nutrient intake amongst the poor as real food expenditures 
actually increased form 1984-85. The author's note that although government 
expenditures on social services declined in real terms during 1984.85, this does not 
necessarily mean that health status is adversely affected. For instance, it is plausible 
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that rationalisation of existing health services, efficiency gains and the use of private 
health facilities may have offset the reductions in government funding to the health 
sector.. 
Heller et al (1988) also note that the impact of adjustment programmes on the 
poor may be limited. Their rather brief study of Ghana noted that the ERP had 
positive implications for the rural poor, in so far as exchange rate policies increased 
the price of tradables, but may have hurt incomes of the urban poor. However, the 
urban poor would have benefited from a tripling of minimum wages during the 
adjustment period. However, this study is weak in that it assumes that an overvalued 
exchange rate hurt the poor. This assumption, however, is only true if the rural poor 
were prevented from engaging in other employment activities or were unable to evoke 
survival mechanisms. Heller et al (1988) also indicate that the situation in Kenya 
under adjustment was similar. Kenya's 18 month stand-by (1983-84) was 
hypothesised to hurt the urban poor more than the rural poor. Cutbacks in health 
services and real wage declines were focused on urban areas. The rural landless were 
largely protected from adjustment due to the fact that they could fall back on 
subsistence production. 
Woodward (1992) directly criticises the Bank-Fund model based on orthodox 
neo-classical economics. Woodward (1992, 11) says that "[in the model] there is a 
risk of circularity in using the theoretical model on which the current approach to 
adjustment is based to 'prove' that it works, or that its social impact is limited." 
Furthermore, Woodward (1992a, 19) states that the approach used by the World Bank 
and the Fund which focuses on static situations rather than the dynamics of adjusting 
to macroeconomic disequilibrium fails in providing information as to whether or not 
individuals can actually obtain a higher standard of living. Woodward (1992) goes 
further and states that the counterfactual approach is too limited in its scope. 
Adjusting countries should not only be compared with non-adjusting countries, but 
that adjustment should be seen in a wider context (p. 16): 
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because adjustment programmes are being pursued at the same time by a large 
number of countries, and have a profound effect on their economic performance, 
the overall adjustment process has a significant impact on the world economy as a 
whole; and this in turn has important repercussions for adjusting and non-
adjusting countries alike. 
The Director General of Save the Children Fund has similar reservations about the 
Bank-Fund approach. He states (Woodward 1992, x): 
a close reading of this carefully argued case does give us cause for real 
concern that current approaches to 'structural adjustment' are inadequate, and 
may be fundamentally flawed at both the conceptual and practical level. 
However, Woodward's (1992 and 1992a) approach is not without its flaws. Overall 
the evidence to support his view that the health status of individuals has been made 
worse off by adjustment and stabilisation measures is rather scant. For example, 
Woodward (1992a) believes that adjustment can lead to an increase in dependency on 
external aid agencies for funding assistance in the area of vertical health care delivery. 
The result he believes (p. 70) would result "in a duplication of efforts and resources 
(transport systems, communication, administration, etc.), unnecessarily increasing the 
cost of a given level services; and the introduction of new vertical services may 
seriously undermine existing integrated services." While this may be true, and the 
logic certainly is sound, no evidence is used to back up this claim.33  
In the worse cases the relationship between structural adjustment and health is 
dealt with superficially; declines in health status that occur during periods of 
macroeconomic restructurings arc simply attributed to the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. For instance, Kanji, Kanji and Manji (1991), adapting 
data from the Commonwealth Secretariat, provide information for several countries 
that have received Bank or Fund programs (Tables 7.1 and 7.2); 
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Table 7.1. Sub-Saharan African Countries with Fund/Bank Programs, Which Have 
Experienced Increasing Rates of Infant Mortality, 1980-85  
Infant mortality rate 
% change 1980- 
1965 1980 1985 85 
Ethiopia 165 146 168 +15.1 
Mali 200 154 174 +26.5 
Madagascar n/a 71 109 +53.5 
Uganda 121 97 108 +11.3 
Tanzania 138 103 110 +6.8 
Somalia 165 146 152 +4.1 
Kenya 112 87 91 +4.6 
Source: Kanji, Kanji And Manji (1991) 
Table 7.2. Increasing Childhood Mortality Rates in the Above Countries. 1980-85  
Childhood mortality rates 
% change 1980- 
1965 1980 1985 1985 
Ethiopia 37 32 38 +18.8 
Mali 47 34 43 +26.5 
Madagascar 18 11 21 +90.0 
Uganda 26 18 21 +16.7 
Tanzania 29 19 22 +15.8 
Somalia 37 32 33 +3.1 
Kenya  25 15 16 +6.7 
Source: Kanji, Kanji and Manji (1991) 
Based on the above tables, it would appear, on the surface at least, that the 
macroeconomic reforms promoted by the IMF and the World Bank are, in some form, 
affecting health status. But, a closer inspection reveals some interesting information. 
For instance, of the above countries during the period specified, Ethiopia received 
only one stand-by and had no World Bank credits and Uganda only received credits 
under the second reconstruction program. In addition, during the time period 
considered Ethiopia was suffering from widespread famine. However, and of more 
interesting, is the selection of countries. By choosing different countries, the opposite 
conclusion is reached. Table 7.3 outlines the increases in health and nutritional status 
that occurred during periods of macroeconomic reforms in Africa. 
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Table 7.3. Countries in Sub Saharan Africa that have experienced increases in health 
and nutrition status during periods of structural adjustment and stabilisation 
Infant mortality rate Life expectancy at birth Daily calorie supply 
Country (per 1,000 live births) (years) (per capita) 
1980 	 1990 1980 1990 1977 	 1989 
COte d'Ivoire 127 95 47 55 2,517 	 2,577 
Ghana 103 85 49 55 1,983 	 2,248 
Malawi 172 149 44 46 2,066 	 2,139 
Senegal 147 81 43 47 2,261 	 2,369 
Togo 109 88 47 57 2,069 	 2,214 
Mozambique 115 137 47 47 1,096 	 1,680 
Source: World Bank (1992), and World Bank (1982) 
In these countries the infant mortality rate is decreasing and life expectancy at birth 
and daily calorie supply is increasing, all during a period of macroeconomic reform. 
The World Bank [Kakwani, Makonnen and van der Gaag (1990), Diop, Hill 
and Serageldin (1991) and Maasland and van der Gaag (1992)] which uses the same 
approach as Kanji, Kanji and Manji (1991) but back up their claim with more 
evidence, reaches the conclusion that adjustment measures have not, on the whole, 
hurt the health sector. Diop, Hill and Serageldin (1991) aggregate study of ten 
countries that used data from the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) project found 
that the child mortality rate did not increase in adjusting countries. In the short run, 
countries that did not undergo adjustment did no better than adjusting countries in 
decreasing the child mortality rate. However, their study noted that adjustment 
policies were associated with increases in child mortality rates amongst the urban 
poor. 
Diop, Hill and Serageldin (1991, 46) study of the Cote d'Ivoire generally 
supports the conclusion reached in the aggregate study. For instance, the stabilisation 
policies were associated with declines in the incomes of urban residents, but incomes 
of rural residents were relatively well protected because the structural adjustment 
programme tended to protect agricultural incomes. They noted that the declines in 
urban incomes, and cutbacks in subsidies, were associated with decreases in child 
health in urban areas. However, their research revealed that this impact was 
concentrated not on the urban poor but amongst the urban middle class. The 
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deterioration in child health in the postneonatal period disproportionately affected 
families in the top 40 per cent of the urban income distribution (Diop, Hill and 
Serageldin 1991, 46). Unfortunately, neither the aggregate "with- without" study nor 
the individual country study examined whether health care delivery or health 
conditions changed during adjustment periods. Moreover, other health status 
indicators are ignored in the analysis in favour of using the child mortality rate from 
the DHS. Use of this indicator while useful, is somewhat limited, and the use of a 
child mortality rate, which is usually reported to be higher, published by the Bank, 
WHO or UNICEF, perhaps, would have proven to be of more interest. In addition, a 
"before-after" simulation would have aided in proving or disproving the author's case. 
Moreover, this study, only examines the short term and part of the medium term 
impact of adjustment measures on health care development. 
Kakwani, Makonnen and van der Gaag (1990) and Maasland and van der 
Gaag (1992) attempt to correct for the flaws of the earlier Bank study. Kakwani, 
Makonnen and van der Gaag's (1990) examination of the impact of adjustment on 
health care delivery, as measured by immunisation coverage, net enrolment ratios in 
primary education and government expenditures to the social sector, and health status, 
as measured by infant and child mortality, undernutrition and per capita protein 
intake, found that there was no discernible difference between adjusting and non-
adjusting countries, except in the area of social sector expenditures. Real per capita 
expenditures fell in most of the countries and the fall was greatest in those countries 
that undertook the most adjustment loans (Kakwani, Makonnen and van der Gaag 
1990: 47). Their study concluded (p.47) that "regardless of the adjustment status, 
developing countries achieved progress in social indicators during the eighties. 
However, progress was slowest in countries that already had the worst social 
indicators." 
Maasland and van der Gaag (1992) reach a similar conclusion. They note that 
living conditions in the short run are not related to adjustment lending in all 
developing countries. They found that there continued to be declines in infant and 
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child mortality rates, immunisation coverage increased, and nutrition indicators 
slowed improvements in most countries (but not in Sub Saharan Africa). However, 
the author's not that the study did not find any evidence that adjustment measures 
accelerated progress in social indicators. 
7.3 An Analysis of the Impact of Programme Lending on Health Care Development 
7.3.1 Introduction 
The second part of this chapter aims to correct several deficiencies evident in the 
previous studies. They are: 
(1) Most of the studies amalgamate many of the adjusters in developing 
countries and compare them to a group of non adjusters in developing 
countries. The problem with this approach is that it tends to obscure the 
progress or decline made on indicators in Africa. Such an analysis may 
skew the actual picture for Africa as relatively well performing adjusters in 
non-African countries will bring up the average performance of all 
developing countries. Maasland and van der Gaag (1992, 60) realise this 
problem in their conclusion. They believe that the results that they obtained 
were affected by the country groupings that they used. 
Thus, the analysis in the following section concentrates only on the 
performance of African countries. Moreover, the analysis does not break 
down all African countries into two groups of adjusters and non-adjusters. 
Instead it uses Harrigan and Mosley's (1991: 83-120) approach of breaking 
the countries down into control countries and non-control countries. Each 
adjusting African country, where possible, will be matched with a non-
adjusting African country. The criteria of matching will be based on 
similarity in levels of GNP per capita (1981), average annual GDP growth 
rates in the pre adjusting period (1970-81) and the distribution of Gross 
Domestic Product to Agriculture (1981). In addition, following Maasland 
and van der Gaag (1992), the following analysis will break the groups into 
early intensive adjustment lending (EIAL) countries and other adjustment 
lending countries in order to determine if intensive adjusters do better or 
worse than other adjusters. 
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It is important to note that because of the way that this analysis is done 
randomisation as an option is eliminated. It would be impossible to pool 
countries identical in every respect and from this randomly select countries 
and place them into two separate groups: a group that received the 
adjustment intervention and a group that did not. The problem here is 
twofold. First, the list of possible countries could be expanded but then the 
level of similarity between them decreases. Second, by focusing on Africa 
only, the list of possibilities becomes smaller (even if the similarity between 
countries increases), but the number of possible controls decreases as most 
African countries have undertaken adjustment programmes. 
Given that randomisation is improbable it is impossible to rule out bias in 
this study. It is also important to realise the possibility that observed 
changes in health status are the byproduct of one or several confounders. 
However, given the broad similarities between the country groupings and the 
pervasive influence of Bank and Fund lending in the economic environment 
of adjusting countries (as shown in chapter three) it is not unreasonable to 
assume that the main source of health status and health care delivery 
changes has been these two institutions. It is in part, because of confounding 
and bias that chapter eight provides a stand-alone case study. 
That caveat made, Table 7.4 below lists the control and non-control 
countries and the economic criteria that applies to them34: 
Table 7.4. Control and Non-control Countries 
Controls (number in Distribution of GDP 
parenthesis indicates to Agriculture 
year country ceases 	 (1981); percent of 
to be a control) 	 total GDP 
GNP per 
capita 1981 
dollars 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate 
GDP (percent) 
1970-81 
Pure Controls 
Angola 
Botswana 6 960 8.4 
Liberia 36 520 1.3 
Other Controls 
Benin (1989) 55 320 .. 
Burkina Faso (1991) 41 240 3.6 
Burundi (1986) 56 230 3.2 
Cameroon (1988) 27 880 6.3 
Chad (1987) 110 
Comoros (1991) 
Congo (1986) 9 1,100 5.1 
Ethiopia (1991)* 65 140 2.2 
Lesotho (1988) 540 8.4 
Mozambique (1986) .. 
Rwanda (1991) 46 250 5.3 
Nigeria (1987) 23 870 4.5 
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Non-control 
(adjusters) 
CAR (EIAL) 37 320 1.6 
Cote d'Ivoire (EIAL) 27 1,200 6.2 
Equatorial Guinea 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana (EIAL) 60 400 -0.2 
Guinea 37 300 3.0 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya (EIAL) 32 420 5.8 
Madagascar (EIAL) 35 330 0.3 
Malawi (EIAL) 43 200 5.6 
Mali 42 190 4.6 
Mauritania 28 460 1.7 
Mauritius 
Niger 30 330 3.1 
Senegal (EIAL) 22 430 2.0 
Sierra Leone 31 320 1.9 
Somalia (IMF adj.) 280 3.9 
Sudan (EIAL) 38 380 4.1 
Uganda (EIAL) 75 220 -1.6 
Togo (EIAL) 24 380 3.2 
Zaire 32 210 -0.2 
Zambia 18 600 0.4 
Zimbabwe 18 870 1.8 
Source: World Bank (1983) except for Botswana data which is from World 
Bank (1986) and refers to the year 1984 and the period 1965-85. 
* note that Ethiopia received a stand by from the IMF in 1981, however 
since is next loan was not until 1992 it is included as an "other control". 
EIAL: Two SALs or SBs, SAFs, ESAFs or any combination or any other 
adjustment operation prior to 1985. 
(2) This study includes both loans made by the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank in its analysis. None of the previous studies have done 
this. This is an important shortcoming for two reasons. First, by not including 
IMF lending in the analysis of adjustment impacts, countries that are listed as 
other adjustment lending countries may be falsely identified. That is other 
adjusters, as identified by Maasland and van der Gaag (1992), may in fact be 
adjusters or intensive adjusters in so far as the entered into SAF and ESAF 
arrangements with the Fund prior to World Bank lending. Second, the use of 
Fund lending in the analysis makes explicit the role of welfare changes that 
occur with a change in the exchange rate. 
(3) This study undertakes a "before after" approach as well as the traditional 
"with with-out" analysis. This is done by comparing the situation in control 
countries immediately prior to adjustment to a period after adjustment started. 
More importantly, the following analysis notes the trends apparent in the pre- 
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adjusting period in control countries and examines how far the control 
countries have deviated from their expected performance. 
(4) The conclusion to this thesis covers the "actual v. target" approach to 
determine if the Bank and the Fund have made sufficient progress, through 
adjustment programmes, in increasing social welfare in African countries. 
(5) This study does not limit itself to examining the short-run impact of 
adjustment lending as Maasland and van der Gaag (1992) do, but examines the 
possible medium and long term impact of adjustment lending on health care 
development. 
The following country groupings gave been deemed appropriate for the analysis in 
this chapter. As controls; Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Botswana, Cameroon, Lesotho, and 
Rwanda. As non-controls or adjusters: Niger, Guinea, Uganda, Zambia, Zaire, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mali and Sudan. Ghana, and her control pairing, Liberia and Benin, 
are examined in chapter eight. The remaining countries were excluded because of 
lack of data, as in the case of Angola, Cameroon and Mozambique for controls and 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau for adjusters. This left the 
Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia and Togo. These countries were excluded because they were difficult to 
match based on the established criteria. The controls and non-controls were matched 
as follows: 
(1) Overall match: Niger and Guinea (adjusters), Burkina Faso (control). 
Matched because of similarity in all three areas. The average annual growth 
rate in GDP (1970-81) for Burkina Faso was 3.6 per cent, for Guinea 3.0 per 
cent, for Niger 3.1 per cent. GNP per capita in 1981 in Burkina Faso stood at 
$240, in Guinea $300 and in Niger $330. The per cent of agriculture in GDP 
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in 1981 stood at 41 per cent in Burkina Faso, in Guinea 37 per cent and in 
Niger 30 per cent. 
(2) Agricultural match: Uganda (early intensive adjuster) and Ethiopia 
(control). Matched according to distribution of agriculture to GDP. In the 
case of Uganda this stood at 75 per cent of GDP in 1981. For Ethiopia the 
comparable figure was 65 per cent. 
(3) Non-agricultural match: Zambia and Zaire (adjusters) and Botswana (pure 
control). All three countries have relatively high levels of industry and 
services in GDP. The share of agriculture in GDP in 1981 was only six per 
cent in Botswana, 32 per cent in Zaire and 18 per cent in Zambia. 
(4) Growth rate match: Kenya and Malawi (early intensive adjusters ) and 
Cameroon and Lesotho (controls until 1988). The average annual growth rate 
of GDP from 1970-81 was 5.8 per cent in Kenya, 5.6 per cent in Malawi, 6.3 
per cent in Cameroon and 8.4 per cent in Lesotho. 
(5) 50-50 GNP match: Mali (adjuster), Sudan (early intensive adjuster) and 
Rwanda (control). Matched because distribution of agriculture to and 
industry/services approximately equally split. In the case of Mali 42 per cent 
of total GDP was agriculture; the balance was made up of industry and 
services. In Sudan approximately 40 per cent of total GDP was agriculture 
and in Rwanda 46 per cent of GDP was to agriculture. 
The indicators used in the following analysis are government support for the health 
sector, immunisation coverage, population per physician, access to safe water, access 
to sanitation, provision of nutrition, life expectancy at birth, infant mortality and 
under five mortality rate, and primary, secondary and female school enrolment rates. 
The rationale for using these indicators are that they relate to the priority areas 
examined as part of the basic needs approach in chapter five. 
More specifically, government support for the health sector is used to 
determine if the countries in question are reorientating their expenditure pattern away 
from non-priority areas (such as military expenditure) to the health sector. The use of 
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expenditure to the health sector as a percent of total government expenditure will not 
capture if a country is building more district hospitals and health posts as is consistent 
with a PHC or basic needs strategy. One way to correct for this would be to obtain 
the relevant data from various sources. However, this data is not routinely collected, 
and time series information that is comparable is not available. Mills (1990, 108) has 
also recognised the dearth of data available to determine the share of hospitals in 
health sector resource use. 
Immunisation coverage is used as an indicator because it is consistent with 
GOBI-I-1-1- approach, PHC and basic needs. Population per physician is used as an 
indicator because it will show if more resources are being directed into the health 
system at a time of increasing population pressure. Population per nursing person 
would have been a valuable indicator to use as it would have captured paramedical 
personnel such as birth attendants. However, unfortunately, data of this nature is not 
available (World Development Reports, various). 
Access to safe water and sanitation are used because they are important inputs. 
The provision of safe water has been identified by nearly all national governments and 
aid agencies as an area of high priority. In addition, the provision of hand dug or 
hand pump wells is consistent with basic needs. Primary, secondary and information 
on female enrolment rates, is used as most researchers agree that education has a 
powerful influence on health status changes. Information regarding female 
educational obtainment is viewed separately as it has been identified by the Bank 
(1994a), in Investing in Health, and others, as a high priority area. It too is consistent 
with the basic needs approach. 
The nutrition index, child and infant mortality rates and life expectancy at 
birth are used to determine how health and nutrition status has changed following 
macroeconomic reforms. 
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7.3.2 Government Support for the Health Sector . 
Both the adjuster, Uganda, and Ethiopia, the control, did worse in the per cent of total 
government expenditure to the health sector in the adjusting period than prior to it. 
The mean expenditure from 1972 to 1979 for Ethiopia was 4.98 per cent. From 1986 
to 1989 this fell to 3.44 per cent. In Uganda, the mean expenditure was 5.14 per cent 
from 1979-80, after which the mean expenditure fell to 3.73 per cent. The with 
without comparison reveals that the control did better during the adjusting period than 
the non-control. As of 1986 the percentage of total government support to the health 
sector was a meagre 2.39 per cent in Uganda, while Ethiopia's was slightly better at 
3.45 per cent. 
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Figure 7.1 Agricultural Match — Government Support for the Health Sector 
(expenditure to the health sector as a percentage of total government expenditure) 
An examination of the non-agricultural match shows fairly wide variations from year 
to year, yet it appears that the non-adjuster has done better; both in terms of before 
after and with without. Since, data is lacking for Zaire, the analysis concentrates on 
Botswana (control) and Zambia. Zambia's mean percentage was 6.48 from 1972 to 
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1980. This rose to a mean of 7.27 per cent from 1981-87. Botswana, however, 
showed a slight decline; from a mean of 5.57 from 1972-80 to a mean of 5.41 from 
1981-91. Another way of looking at the data shows that Zambia ended 1988 with 
7.43 per cent of the government's expenditure going to the health sector, whereas 
Botswana's support was at 5.45 per cent. However, given the fluctuations in the 
Zambian data, and lack of data past 1988, it is not clear whether Zambia has 
consistently been able to outperform Botswana during the adjustment period. 
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Figure 7.2 Non-Agricultural Match - Government Support for the Health Sector 
(expenditure to the health sector as a percentage of total government expenditure) 
The growth rate match reveals that there is a split in the performance of adjusters and 
the controls. In the case of the EIAL Kenya, during the adjustment period the 
percentage of government expenditure to the health sector declined steadily. It began 
1981 at 7.81 per cent, by 1991 this had fallen to over two percentage points to 5.41 
per cent. In contrast, Malawi, the other EIAL country, begins 1981 at 5.16 per cent 
and this increases to 7.26 per cent by 1988 (the latest year when data is available). 
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The before-after analysis for the control, Lesotho, shows a better picture than both 
adjusters. In 1982, in Lesotho, government support for the health sector stood at 6.15 
per cent of total government expenditure, by 1991 this had increased dramatically to 
11.46 per cent. However, in mean terms, Lesotho's performance prior to and during 
the adjustment period was less dramatic: from 1972 -1974 the mean was 7.02 per 
cent, this compares to a mean from 1982-1991 of 8.08 per cent. In Cameroon the 
other control, support for the health sector also declined from a mean of 4.76 per cent 
1976 to 1980 to a mean of 3.94 per cent from 1981-89. In addition in absolute terms 
Cameroon's performance is lower than that of both adjusters. 
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Figure 7.3 Growth-Rate Match — Government Support for the Health Sector 
(expenditure to the health sector as a percentage of total government expenditure) 
7.3.3 Health Care Delivery 
The World Health Assembly in 1977 adopted a goal of providing full immunisation 
coverage for all the world's infants by 1990 (UNICEF 1986, 1). Increased 
immunisation was also adopted by many developing nations as a means of achieving 
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the World Health Organization's goal of 'Health for All' by the year 2000, and as a 
critical component of any primary health care strategy. Increased immunisation 
coverage was estimated to cost approximately $5 for full immunisation against the six 
most common childhood diseases (UNICEF 1986, 101). Coverage would be 
expanded in two main ways. First, the use of existing services would be increased by 
informing households and community organisations about the benefits obtainable 
from a full course of prevention. Second, where distance was a deterrent to increasing 
demand services would be moved closer to households. 
Immunisation was targeted at the following six diseases: measles, pertussis 
(whooping cough), tetanus, poliomyelitis and tuberculosis. Measles was targeted 
because without immunisation it was estimated that 100 per cent of children between 
the ages of six and 3 years old would contract the disease in developing countries 
(UNICEF 1986, 102). Measles is viewed as an important disease to eradicate as 
serious complications may result in 30 per cent of the cases. These complications 
could lead to pneumonia, blindness, deafness, malnutrition and diarrhoea. Whooping 
cough, an infection of the respiratory tract, that is very contagious in early stages, was 
targeted because it can lead to serious cases of pneumonia. Tetanus vaccination was 
targeted for increase in coverage due to the particular danger it poses during the 
neonatal period. Unsanitary treatment immediately following birth could lead to an 
infant contracting the tetanus bacillus which could lead to potentially fatal respiratory 
problems. Polio, which can lead to paralysis, and sometimes death, was also targeted. 
As coverage was quite high in many areas the drive was towards eradication. 
Tuberculosis immunisation was also targeted at children as it has been estimated to 
cause 30,000 deaths annually in developing countries (UNICEF 1986, 103). 
Immunisation of infants was encouraged as the efficacy of the vaccine in adults 
remains an unresolved issue. Finally increased immunisation coverage against 
diphtheria, an infection of the throat (and sometimes the heart and the brain) was 
encouraged. Table 7.5 through 7.9 give an indication of the success that 
governments, multilateral and bilateral agencies have had in promoting increased 
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immunisation coverage in Africa during the 1980s. The tables breakdown 
information on immunisation in the control - adjuster matches. 
Table 7.5 Adjuster - Control DPT Immunisation 1980-92 
1980-82 	 1986-87 	 Difference 	 1981 1990-92 Difference 
Burkina 2.0 32.0 +30.0 2.0 39.0 +37.0 
Faso 
Niger 6.0 5.0 -1.0 6.0 21.0 +15.0 
Guinea 17.3 35.0 +17.7 52.0 ? 
Uganda 9.0 30.0 +21.0 9.0 72.0 +61.0 
Ethiopia 3.0 11.5 +8.5 6.0 13.0 +7.0 
Zaire 18.0 35.0 +17.0 18.0 32.0 +14.0 
Zambia 70.5* 66.0 -4.5 44.0 57.0 +13.0 
Botswana 70.0 64.5 -5.5 64.0 82.0 +18.0 
Kenya 70.0 72.0 +2.0 .. 85.0 ? 
Malawi 58.0 74.0 +16.0 66.0 86.0 +20.0 
Cameroon 5.0 34.0* +29.0 5.0 37.0 +32.0 
Lesotho 56.0 55.0* -1.0 56.0 58.0 +2 
Mali 4.5 ? 34.0 ? 
Sudan .. .. ? 1.0 67.0 +66.0 
Rwanda 17.0 78.0 +61.0 17.0 85.0 +68.0 
Source: WHO (1992) and UNICEF (1994, 1992) 
Note: * for the period 1983-85. 
Table 7.6 Adjuster - Control TB/BCG Immunisation 
1980-82 	 1986-87 	 Difference 	 1981 1990-92 Difference 
Burkina 16.0 52.0 +36.0 16.0 66.0 +50.0 
Faso 
Niger 28.0 .. ? 28.0 40.0 +12.0 
Guinea 5.0 ? 4.0 65.0 +61.0 
- Uganda 18.0 62.5 +44.5 18.0 98.0 4-8T.0 
Ethiopia 5.5 20.5 +15 10.0 21.0 +11.0 
Zaire 34.0 54.5 +20.5 34.0 65.0 +31.0 
Zambia .. ? 72.0 83.0 +11.0 
Botswana 76.0 64.5 -11.5 80.0 71.0 -9.0 
Kenya .. 80.0 ? .. 93.0 7 
Malawi 92.7 95.0 +2.3 86.0 99.0 +13.0 
Cameroon 8.0 ? 8.0 52.0 +44.0 
Lesotho 81.0 ? 81.0 59.0 -22.0 
Mali 19.0 18.0 -1.0 19.0 70.0 +51.0 
Sudan .. .. ? 3.0 75.0 +72.0 
Rwanda 51.0 87.5 +36.5 51.0 94.0 +43.0 
Source: WHO (1992) and UNICEF (1994, 1992) 
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Table 7.7 Adjuster - Control Polio Immunisation 
1980-82 1986-87 Difference 	 1981 1990-92 Difference 
Burkina 2.0 25.0 +23.0 	 2.0 39.0 +37.0 
Faso 
Niger 6.0 .. 7 	 6.0 21.0 +15.0 
Guinea 1.0 ? 	 .. 52.0 ? 
Uganda 8.0 30.5 +22.$ 	 8.0 72.0 +64.0 
Ethiopia 3.0 11.5 +8.5 	 7.0 13.0 +6.0 
Zaire 18.0 35.5 +17.5 	 18.0 31.0 +13.0 
Zambia .. ? 	 77.0 59.0 -18.0 
Botswana 71.0 59.0 -12.0 	 71.0 82.0 +11.0 
Kenya 72.0 ? 	 .. 85.0 ? 
Malawi 40.7 67.0 +26.3 	 68.0 84.0 +16.0 
Cameroon 5.0 ? 	 5.0 37.0 +32.0 
Lesotho 54.0 ? 	 54.0 58.0 +4.0 
Mali 4.5 1 	 .. 34.0 ? 
Sudan .. 1 	 1.0 67.0 +66.0 
Rwanda 15.0 79.0 +64.0 	 15.0 85.0 +70.0 
Source: WHO (1992) and UNICEF (1994, 1992) 
Table 7.8 Adjuster - Control Measles Immunisation 
1980-82 1986-87 Difference 	 1981 1990-92 Difference 
Burkina 23.0 52.0 +29.0 	 23.0 41.0 +18.0 
Faso 
Niger 19.0 ? 	 19.0 28.0 +9.0 
Guinea 9.0 ? 	 15.0 50.0 +35.0 
Uganda 22.0 40.0 +18.0 	 22.0 70.0 +48.0 
Ethiopia 5.0 11.5 +6.5 	 7.0 10.0 +3.0 
Zaire 24.0 40.0 +16.0 	 23.0 31.0 +8.0 
Zambia ? 	 21.0 56.0 +35.0 
Botswana 67.7 62.0 -5.7 	 68.0 65.0 -3.0 
Kenya 65.0 81.0 
Malawi 59.0 73.0 +14.0 	 645.0 82.0 +17.0 
Cameroon 16.0 16.0 37.0 +21.0 
Lesotho 49.0 9 	 49.0 80.0 +31.0 
Mali 6.5 41.0 
Sudan 1 	 • 66.0 +65.0 
Rwanda 42.0 68.5 +26.5 	 42 81.0 +39.0 
Source: WHO (1992) and UNICEF (1994, 1992) 
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Table 7.9 Adjuster - Control Pregnant Women Tetanus Immunisation 
1981 	 1990-92 	 Difference 
Burkina Faso 11.0 26.0 +15.0 
Niger 3.0 45.0 +42.0 
Guinea  5.0 70.0 +65.0 
Uganda 20.0 16.0 -4 
Ethiopia 7.0 ? 
Zaire 29.0 ? 
Zambia 20.0 ? 
Botswana 32.0 46.0 +44.0 
Kenya .. 37.0 ? 
Malawi 66.0 ? 
Cameroon 7.0 ? 
Lesotho 40.0 ? 
Mali 1.0 8.0 +7.0 
Sudan 1.0 14.0 +13.0 
Rwanda 5.0 88.0 +83.0 
Source: UNICEF (1994, 1992) 
A comparison of adjusters with controls reveals a mixed picture for increased 
immunisation coverage. An examination of all of the matches reveals that there is no 
reason to believe that non-adjusters do better at expanding immunisation coverage or 
in absolute terms. In only one pairing, Uganda (EIAL) and Ethiopia, does the adjuster 
clearly do better than the control at improving vaccination coverage. In this case, 
DPI' coverage is much higher in Uganda, in terms of absolute level and in increase in 
coverage, than in Ethiopia. The same is true of TB immunisation; the percentage of 
infants immunised rose 80 per cent from 1981-1992 to 98 per cent in Uganda, 
whereas in Ethiopia coverage expanded only by 11 per cent to a total of 21 per cent of 
infants immunised during the same time period. Immunisation of infants against 
polio and measles was also better in Uganda than in Ethiopia. Both started from 
relatively low bases, however by 1992 Uganda was able to cover approximately 70 
per cent of infants against polio and measles while Ethiopia could only immunise 
approximately 10 per cent of the infants against the same two diseases. The growth 
rate match, Kenya-Malawi - Cameroon-Lesotho also indicates that perhaps adjusters 
do better than non-adjusters. However, this is not as clear cut as in the Uganda-
Ethiopian pairing. In terms of absolute performance the adjusters do better than the 
non-adjusters. For instance, DPT immunisation in Kenya and Malawi for 1992 stood 
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at 85 per cent, while in the non adjusters the absolute level was lower; 37 per cent in 
Cameroon and 58 per cent in Lesotho. The same is true for TB and polio 
immunisation. By 1992 coverage was over 90 per cent for TB and over 80 per cent in 
polio for the adjusters, while coverage was under 60 per cent for the controls or the 
same diseases. For the other diseases, immunisation coverage in absolute terms is 
mixed, as is the improvement during the adjustment time frame. 
The rest of the matches indicate that, in general, progress has been made in all 
countries, but the performance on different types of vaccinations varies. For instance, 
in the overall match, the control (Burkina Faso) does better in expanding DPT and 
polio coverage, whereas, Guinea does better at expanding coverage in TB, measles 
and tetanus in pregnant women. Niger, also does better than the control in increased 
immunisation of pregnant women for tetanus. The non-agricultural match indicates 
that the control (Botswana) does better in absolute terms that the adjusters. However, 
this reflects the fact that Botswana started the adjustment period with a higher base; 
indicating that the infrastructure framework for immunisation was already in place by 
1980. In general terms, coverage expanded in all three countries (or declined slightly 
in the case of Botswana) for all diseases. On the whole the increase in immunisation 
tends to favour the adjusters, but the pattern is not without exceptions, and again this 
partly reflects the fact that Botswana started from a higher base. The 50-50 match, 
shows that the control does better in TB and measles in absolute terms but the 
adjusters do better in increasing immunisation coverage. Information on tetanus 
immunisation indicates that the non-adjuster does better than the adjuster in 
increasing coverage and in absolute terms. For polio and DPT the adjusters and the 
control do as well in expanding coverage, however in absolute terms the performance 
of the control is better. 
As another measure of health care delivery, population per physician or 
nursing person can be examined in order to determine if World Bank and Fund 
programme lending adversely affects inputs into the health production function. 
Population per physician numbers will give a reasonable indication of how the formal, 
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urban based medical system has changed throughout the 1980s in Africa. An 
examination of the number of nursing personnel will give an indication of how health 
care delivery has changed in terms of primary health care. Also, it should give an 
indication of how service to rural areas has changed. 
Due to limitations in the data, analysis on population per nursing personnel 
cannot be carried out, and an examination of population per physician can only be 
carried out on two matches. The control in the non-agricultural pairing does much 
better than the adjuster in improving health care delivery as measured by population 
per physician. Botswana records a 30 per cent improvement in the ratio from 1980-
90, whereas Zambia records a decline. However, the decline is rather small with 
Zambia ending the period close to the same level as it started. For the 50-50 match, 
the reverse is true; the adjuster does better than the control. Rwanda experienced a 
substantial worsening of its population per physician ratio from 31,340 to 72,990 from 
1980-90. Mali, the adjuster, experienced an overall improvement following a decline 
in the ratio from 1980-84. 
Table 7.10 Adjuster — Control Population per Physician 
1980 1984 1990 
1980-84 per 
cent change 
1980-90 per 
cent change 
Zambia 7,670 11,290 7,150 -67.0 -7.0 
Botswana 7,380 6,900 5,150 +7.0 +30.0 
Mali 22,130 25,390 19,450 -13.0 +12.0 
Rwanda 31,340 34,680 72,990 -10.0 -57.0 
Source: World Bank (World Development Reports, various) 
7.3.4 Health Conditions 
Chapter five demonstrated that the provision of clean drinking water and sanitation 
facilities is an important component in ensuring the well being of individuals. 
Chapter six showed that the health environment surrounding individuals was an 
important part of an individuals' or households health production function. Given that 
clean water is necessary for basic hygiene, food preparation and that water from 
unprotected sources can cause typhoid, cholera, dysentery and hepatitis, this section 
of this chapter will show how health conditions have altered during the economic 
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upheaval in the 1980s. Moreover, since the provision of sewerage facilities is also a 
key component in preventing illness, access to sanitation facilities will be examined. 
Tables 7.11 and 7.12 compare the performance of adjusters with non-adjusters in 
terms of rural and urban access to safe water and sanitation facilities. 
Table 7.11 Adjuster — Control Access to Safe Water  
Urban 	 Rural 
per cent change per cent change 
1980 1985 1988 1990 1980-90 1980 1985 1988 1990 1980-90 
Burkina 
Faso 27 43 44 44 +17 31 69 72 70 +39 
Niger 41 35 100 98 +57 32 49 52 45 +13 
Guinea 69 62 55 100 +31 2 15 24 37 +35 
Uganda 45 45 45 60 +15 8 12 12 30 +22 
Ethiopia 16* .. 70 70 +54 69* .. 11 11 -58  
Malawi 77 66 66 66 -11 15 49 49 49 +34 
Lesotho 37 .. 59 59 +22 11 40 45 45 +34 
Mali 37 48 100 41 +4 0 17 36 4 1-4 
Sudan 100* 90 90 90 -10 31 20 20 20 -11 
Rwanda 48 79 46 84 +36 55 48 64 67 +12 
Source: World Bank (1994 a), figure for 1985 from World Resource Institute (1990); 
figure for 1988 from World Resource Institute (1992) 
Note: from World Resource Institute (1990) 
Access to safe drinking water refers to water that is provided by standpost or 
connections to a dwelling. Table 7.11 indicates that, in general, non-adjusters have 
done better in providing access to safe water. Ethiopia, made better progress in 
expanding access to drinking water in urban areas than Uganda did throughout her 
adjustment period. Access increased by 54 per cent in Ethiopia as opposed to 15 per 
cent in Uganda. However, this has come at the expense of providing access in rural 
areas. Here, Uganda, even during her adjustment was able to make substantial 
progress while Ethiopia suffered from a major decrease in access to safe water in rural 
areas. In the 50-50 match countries, the non-adjuster, Rwanda, does better than the 
adjusting countries. Rwanda increased access to potable water in both rural and urban 
areas, from 1980-1990, exceeding that found in Mali and the Sudan. Moreover, by 
1990, Rwanda had, in absolute terms, the highest access figure for access to safe 
drinking water in rural areas, and only trailed Sudan by six per cent in access to urban 
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areas. Mali, which looked set to provide universal access to safe drinking water in 
urban areas in 1988 experienced a fall in access by over 50 per cent. 
A similar situation is evident in the growth rate match. The non-adjuster, 
Lesotho, does substantially better in improving access to safe water in urban areas 
than does the adjuster Malawi. Access in Lesotho improved by 22 per cent from 
1980-1990, whereas Malawi experienced an 11 per cent decline. Access was similar, 
and unchanging, for rural areas during the later part of the 1980s in both countries. 
The overall match reveals that access to safe water was good in all countries, but the 
balance shifts slightly in favour of the adjusters. In urban areas access improved 57 
and 31 per cent for Niger and Guinea from 1980-1990, while in Burkina Faso the 
improvement was only 17 per cent. However, the slight improvement in urban areas 
of Burkina Faso, implies that the government was concentrating on increasing access 
to rural areas. This is borne out in the figures; access improved 39 per cent in rural 
areas in Burkina Faso, while only improving by 13 per cent in Niger. 
Table 7.12 Adjuster — Control Access to Sanitation 
1980 
Urban 
1985 1988 1990 
per cent 
change 1980- 
90 or 1980-88 1980 
Rural 
1985 1988 1990 
per cent change 
1980-90 
Burkina 38 38 35 35 -3 5 5 5 5 0 
Faso 
Niger 36 .. 39 71 +35 3 3 4 +1 
Guinea 5 .. 65 .. +60 
Mali 79 10 94 81 +2 0.. 5 10 +10 
Sudan  63 40 40 40 -23 0 5 5 5 +5 
Rwanda 60 71' 45 88 50 55 62 17 -33 
Source: World Bank (1994 a), figure for 1985 from World Resource Institute (1990); 
figure for 1988 from World Resource Institute (1992) 
Access to sanitation facilities refers to sewer connections, communal toilets, pit 
privies or pour-flush latrines. For access to these facilities, adjusters, on the whole, do 
better. The improvement in access to sanitation facilities in Niger and Guinea exceed 
that of the non-adjuster Burkina Faso. To wit, Niger improved access by 35 per cent 
from 1980-90 and Guinea improved access by 60 per cent from 1980-88. At the same 
time, access in Burkina Faso declined by three per cent in urban areas. During the 
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time period 1980-1990 access in rural areas remained unchanged. The 50-50 match 
reveals that access to sanitation facilities in rural areas improved in the adjusters, 
while access declined in the control. Access improved in Mali by ten per cent from 
1980-90 and remained unchanged in Sudan, but declined by 33 per cent in Rwanda. 
However, this decline in Rwanda was partially offset by a gain in access of 28 per 
cent in urban areas. from 1980-90. This is in contrast to a 23 per cent decline in 
Sudan and a two per cent increase in Mali. 
7.3.5 Nutrition 
Longitudinal data on nutrition status changes is impossible to obtain. Data on 
nutrition status, as measured with reference to some standard of height-for-age, 
weight-for-height, weight-for-age, or percentage of underweight babies is not 
collected on a routine basis. This is due to the fact that surveys regarding health and 
nutrition status are not regularly conducted; over a decade can go by without 
information being collected. Occasionally, academic researchers, UNICEF, or FAO 
take nutrition surveys in certain regions of a particular country. Rarely ever are the 
findings of the original survey followed up with additional studies. 
Given that there is a lack of time series data on nutrition status, use is made of 
information provided by the Food and Agricultural Organization (Food Production 
Yearbooks, various). In the first instance information on average per capita calorie 
intake is collected. This refers to the total supply of calories available for human 
consumption divided by the population. Food supply includes food imports but 
excludes exports, animal feeds, seeds and food wasted in processing and storage and 
lost in transport. Thus, for any time period it is possible to obtain a reasonable 
estimate of the daily availability of calories per person in a country. This then can be 
related to the minimum daily requirement for a country. Such data is available from 
the World Resources Institute (1987). Once this information is collected it is possible 
to construct an index of nutrition which relates the actual average per capita calorie 
intake to the minimum requirement for any given country. This is calculated as: 
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N — C — M 	 x100 
where N= Nutrition, C= average per capita calorie intake, M=minimum daily 
requirement. 
There are several problems associated with using this technique to measure 
nutrition. First, if the population estimate is wrong the average per capita intake 
figure will be incorrect, thus giving an erroneous value for nutrition. Moreover, per 
capita supply of calories is an average; it does not indicate what is actually consumed 
by individuals nor does it allow for variation in consumption by individuals. Third, 
the minimum daily requirement does not give information on differences that may 
exist in the diet of different population groups in different ecological or geographic 
areas of the country. 
Nonetheless, such information should provide an indication of the general 
level of nutrition in a country. Moreover, it should be useful in showing how the 
nutrition situation in a country changes from period to period, and how countries 
compare in their nutrition situation. Maasland and van der Gaag (1992, 57) report 
that in OECD countries the nutrition index will take a value between 15 and 40. 
Within this range undernutrition is not considered to be a problem. However, if the 
nutrition index falls below -15 then acute undernutrition is said to exist (Maasland and 
van der Gaag 1992, 57). 
Table 7.13 shows that the nutrition situation in the Sub Saharan countries 
studied remained, at best, in a precarious state throughout the 1980s. An examination 
of the average for 1979-90 shows no clear difference in the performance of adjusters 
and non-adjusters. For instance, Burkina Faso, the non-adjuster in the overall match 
scored -14 for the period, while Guinea, an adjuster scored -12. In the 50-50 match, 
the performance of all three countries were similar for the period 1979-90; Rwanda 
scored -15, Mali scored -13 and Sudan had -10. Of the growth rate match and non-
agricultural match the controls appear to do slightly better. Zambia, had an average 
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score of -10 for the period 1979-90, while the non-adjuster Botswana scored -5. 
However as compared to the adjuster, Zaire, Botswana's performance is marginally 
worse. The same holds true for the growth rate match. Kenya does worse than the 
controls, Cameroon and Lesotho, but Malawi, the other adjuster does better than 
Cameroon, but worse than Lesotho. Overall the best performers in nutrition were: 
Niger (adjuster), Botswana (control) and Lesotho (control). 
Table 7.13 Adjuster — Control Nutrition Situation 
Average 
1979-90 
-14 
-2 
-12 
-7 
-4 
-10 
-5 
-10 
-4 
-7 
0 
-13 
-10 
-15 
Source: for average per capita intake FAO Production Yearbooks 1993, 1989, 1988, 
1986 (FAO 1992, 1990, 1989, 1986); for minimum daily requirement World Resource 
Institute (1987) 
7.3.6 Health Status Indicators 
An examination of life expectancy at birth, which indicates the number of years that a 
new-born infant is expected to live if the prevailing patterns of mortality were to 
remain the same throughout its life, shows that in virtually every case the control 
countries did better than the adjusters. Life expectancy at birth declined by seven 
years in Uganda from 1980-90. Zambia suffered a two year decline, while Zaire only 
improved by two years from 1980-90. In contrast Botswana, which started from a 
higher base improved by nine years. in the overall match Burkina Faso improved life 
expectancy at birth by ten years from 1980-90 while the adjusters, Malawi and Guinea 
saw a decline of five and one years respectively. In all three matches life expectancy 
at birth was higher for the non-adjusters than the adjusters as of 1990. In the growth 
1979-81 1981-83 1984-86 1986-88 1988-90 
Burkina Faso -23 -10 -14 -16 -6 
Niger -5 +1 0 -1 -4 
Guinea -2 -20 -22 -13 -3 
Uganda -9 0 -5 -13 -7 
Ethiopia 
Zaire -4 -3 -3 -6 -4 
Zambia -5 -13 -8 -12 -13 
Botswana -7 -7 -4 -3 -3 
Kenya -7 -13 -8 -13 -11 
Malawi -2 +4 +2 -11 -12 
Cameroon +1 -9 -12 -8 -5 
Lesotho  +3 +2 +1 0 -6 
Mali -19 -20 -14 -10 -4 
Sudan -6 -4 -12 -16 -13 
Rwanda -11 -5 -19 -22 -18 
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rate match, the increase in life expectancy was also higher in the non-adjusters than in 
the adjusters. Cameroon and Lesotho saw life expectancy increase by ten and five 
years from 1980-90 while the adjusters increased by less than 5 years. However, 
Kenya did have the highest life expectancy by 1990. Only in the 50-50 match is the 
situation less clear. From 1980-86 Life expectancy in years increased by 
approximately the same amount. However due to a decline in 1990 in Rwanda, life 
expectancy at birth from 1980-90 shows a decline in the control while showing an 
increase in the adjusters. 
Table 7.14 Adjuster — Control Life Expectancy at Birth 
 
Years 	 Years 
gained/lost gained/lost 
1980 1985 1986 1988 1990 1980-86 1980-90 
Burkina 
Faso 39 44 47 47 49 +8 +10 
Niger 43 45 44 45 45 +1 +2 
Guinea 45 37 42 43 44 -3 -1 
Uganda 54 49 47 -6 -7 
Ethiopia  40 43 47 +3 	  +8 
Zaire 47 51 52 48 49 +5 +2 
Zambia 49 51 53 53 47 +4 
Botswana .. 58* 59 67 67** +1 +9 
Kenya 55 57 57 59 59 +2 +4 
Malawi 44 44 45 47 47 +1 +3 
Cameroon 47 54 56 56 57 +9 +10 
Lesotho 51 53 55 56 56** +4 +5 
Mali 43 45 47 49 48 +4 +5 
Sudan 46 48 49 50 57 +3 +11 
Rwanda 45 47 48 49 44 +3 -1 
Source: World Bank (World Development Reports, various) 
Notes: * for 1984; ** for 1989 
A regression analysis using a dummy variable is used to determine if there is a 
structural change in life expectancy at birth during the adjustment period. This is a 
counterfactual analysis to detrmine if the adjusting countries experience a structural 
shift follwing the introduction of adjustment programmes. The relationship between 
time is conventionally thought of as non-linear in nature. Thus the following ordinary 
least squares regression is undertaken using the equation: 
logy = loga f3logt + z 
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Where y is life expectancy at birth, t is time and z the dummy variable. The 
regression analysis is shown in table 7.15. The R2 values indicate that the 
relationship between time and life expectancy at birth is non-linear except in the case 
of Uganda which has had very little change in life expectancy since the 1960s. T-stats 
are not reported in tis, or following, OLS analyses. Brennan and Croft (1994) warn 
that tests of significance in this type of analysis are inappropriate. As this is a non-
randomised investigation it is determined that the use of the t-stat would be 
misleading 
Table 7.15 Ordinary Least Squares Analysis of Life Expectancy at Birth for Adjusters 
Regression Coefficients 
Log Constant Log Time Dummy R2 
Niger 1 3.64 .058 .46 
Niger 2 3.61 .090 -.062 .54 
Guinea 1 3.64 .037 .14 
Guinea 2 3.55 .143 -.203 .74 
Uganda 1 3.90 -.004 .00 
Uganda 2 3.90 .000 -.012 .00 
Zaire 1 3.71 .084 .83 
Zaire 2 3.72 ,076 .015 .83 
Zambia 1 3.74 .081 .67 
Zambia 2 3.74 .084 -.005 .67 
Kenya 1 3.82 .091 .84 
Kenya 2 3.81 .113 -.044 .86 
Malawi 1 3.66 .067 .56 
Malawi 2 3.62 .137 -.138 .79 
Mali 1 3.57 .109 .96 
Mali 2 3.36 .120 -.020 .97 
Sudan 1 3.74 .063 .57 
Sudan 2 3.73 .095 -.064 .63 
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Improvements in the infant mortality rate tend to favour the controls over the 
adjusters. Progress on decreasing the number of infant deaths in Sub Saharan Africa 
has been notable in all the matches reviewed, except for the adjuster in the agricultural 
match and the adjuster in the 50-50 match. For Uganda the infant mortality rate has 
actually increased during the 1980s. In the adjuster, Uganda the rate went from 97 
infant deaths per 1000 population in 1980 to 117 in 1990. In Ethiopia the rate 
increased from 146 in 1980 to 155 in 1986 and then fell back to 132 in 1990. In Mali 
the rate increased by twelve between 1980 to 1990 from 154 to 166. This compares 
with the performance of the control, Rwanda, where the rate fell from 137 per 1000 to 
120 per 1000 in 1990. The other adjuster in the group saw a similar performance. In 
the growth rate match the performance of adjusters and non-adjusters is similar. In all 
four countries the infant mortality rate declined by about twenty. In the non-
agricultural match the performance of the control is better than that of the adjusters. 
Botswana's rate declined from 72 deaths per 1000 in 1984 to 38 deaths per 1000 in 
1990. This was a faster decline than that of the adjusters who were only able to shave 
off 18 deaths, in the case of Zaire, and 24 deaths in the case of Zambia from 1980 to 
1990. The performance of Botswana is also more noteworthy in that not only was 
the decline faster, but that the IMR started at a relatively low base to begin with. In 
the overall match the control also does better than the adjusters. The impressive 
performance of Burkina Faso which saw the rate decline from 211 in 1980 to 134 in 
1990 was much better than Niger whose rate declined by 18, and Guineas which 
declined by 27 during the same period. However, it should be noted that the infant 
mortality rate in 1980 was much higher in Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) in 1980, thus 
allowing for substantial improvements to occur. However, even if the base year was 
changed in the Burkina Faso case to 1981 the rate of decrease from 1981 to 1990 
would have been much faster than that of the adjusters. 
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Table 7.16 Adjuster — Control Infant Mortality Rate 
Change 
in rate 
Change in Change 
rate 1986- 	 in Rate 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1980-86 1990 1980-90 
Burkina 211 157 146 140 137 134 -71 -6 -77 
Faso 
Niger 146 132 142 135 133 128 -11 -7 -18 
Guinea 165 190 176 148 143 138 -17 -10 -27 
Uganda 97 120 110 105 101 117 +8 +12 +20 
Ethiopia 146 122 172 155 135 132 +9 -23 -14 
Zaire 112 106 103 100 96 94 -12 -6 -18 
Zambia 106 105 85 82 78 82 -24 0 -24 
Botswana 72 69 41 38 -31* -34** 
Kenya 87 77 92 74 70 67 -13 -7 
Malawi 172 137 158 153 149 149 -19 -4 -23 
Cameroon 109 92 92 96 92 88 -13 -8 -21 
Lesotho 115 94 107 102 98 93 -13 -9 
Mali 154 132 176 144 168 166 -10 +24 +12 
Sudan 124 119 113 108 106 102 -16 -6 -22 
Rwanda 137 126 128 116 120 120 -21 +4 -17 
Source: World Bank (World Development Reports, various) 
Note * change in rate 1984 to 1988; ** change in rate 1984 to 1990. 
In order to determine if there is any structural change in operation during the 
adjustment period in adjusting countries, the following regression model is used: 35  
Y=a+13t+z 
Where Y is the infant mortality rate, a the constant, fat the time period and z a 
dummy variable. The dummy variable takes a value of one beginning in the year that 
adjustment money was dispersed, otherwise the value is zero. A one year lagged 
dummy variable is also included. Data was analysed using PC Give. Caution is 
urged in the interpretation of the results as the degrees of freedom are low (from 15 to 
12) and the data used comes from the World Development Reports.36 
The regression coefficient time in model one, in all cases except Mali and 
Guinea, is negative indicating that infant mortality declines over time. The results of 
model 2 indicate that there is structural change occurring during the adjustment 
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period. Model three indicates where the dummy variable is lagged by one year, there 
is also a structural change. The R2 value differs from country to country. Time 
regressed on infant mortality rate explains over .50 of the variability in IMR in Niger 
and Zaire. In Guinea the R2 is .026, in Zambia .58, in Kenya .24, in Malawi .15. In 
Mali there appears to be no relationship between time and in the Sudan very little 
relationship. 
Table 7.17 Ordinary Least Squares Analysis of Infant Mortality Rate for Adjusters 
Regression Coefficients 
Country Constant Time Dummy Lagged Dummy R2 
Niger 1 167.74 -3.40 .56 
Niger 2 168.21 -3.87 4.72 .56 
Niger 3 156.28 -2.97 8.53 .76 
Guinea 1 160.15 1.43 .026 
Guinea 2 159.23 1.04 -27.78 .028 
Guinea 3 163.37 3.09 -20.24 .043 
Zambia 1 119.38 -3.43 .42 
Zambia 2 131.14 -1.76 -27.78 .58 
7ambia3 107.77 -1.10 -10.54 35 
Zaire 1 111.83 -1.50 .83 
Zaire 2 105.84 -1.84 8.98 .98 
Zaire 3 115.57 -1.78 -1.26 .98 
Kenya 1 95.21 -1.9'7 .24 
Kenya 2 93.79 -2.23 4.98 .25 
Kenya 3 81.58 -1.75 12.64 .18 
Mali 1 158.71 .37 .00 
Mali 2 158.58 .16 2.34 .00 
Mali 3 140.24 1.21 11.26 .40 
Malawi 1 160.46 -1.06 .15 
Malawi 2 143.85 -1.85 23.98 .47 
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Table 7.17 
(cont) 
Malawi 3 174.85 -1.42 11.16 .48 
Sudan 1 135.86 -1.66 .06 
Sudan 2 146.22 -.48 -22.44 .11 
Sudan 3 128.76 -.30 -6.72 .01 
Uganda 1 122.97 -1.39 .15 
Uganda 2 130.89 38 -27.72 .42 
Uganda 3 110.15 .16 4.12 .02 
UNICEF uses the under five mortality rate (U5MR) as the best indicator of human 
and economic progress. It also captures basic needs interventions and how they affect 
health status changes. It is a better than the IMR , as an output indicator, because it 
captures a wide variety of inputs, such as "the nutritional and health knowledge of 
mothers, the level of immunisation and ORT use, the availability of maternal and 
child health services (including prenatal care), food availability in the family, the 
availability of clean water and sanitation, and the overall safety of the child's 
environment (UNICEF 1993a, 83). A with without examination of this output 
measure shows that in three of the cases; the overall, the agricultural and the non-
agricultural matches, the adjusters do worse in improving the rate of the decline that 
their controls. In the 50-50 match the adjusters do better than the control and in the 
growth rate match the situation is mixed. 
The before-after analysis37 reveals that the average annual reduction in the 
U5MR improved in Niger, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali and the Sudan during their 
adjusting periods. In Zaire, progress was still evident in reducing child deaths, 
however, as compared to the earlier, non-adjusting period, the progress declined from 
an annual average decrease in the U5MR of 2.0 per cent from 1960 to 1980 to 1.1 per 
cent 1980 to 1991. In the case of Zambia, the progress made in the pre-adjusting 
period was reversed in the adjusting period. In 1980 the U5MR stood at 160 by 1991 
it had risen to 200 per 1000 live births. 
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Table 7.18 Adjuster - Control Under Five Mortality Rate  
Average Annual Reduction Average Annual Reduction 
1960-80 (per cent) 	 1980-91 (per cent) 
Burkina Faso 1.8 1.9 
Niger 1.1 1.6 
Guinea 1.0 1.5 
Uganda 0.8 0.0 
Ethiopia 0.6 1.9 
Zaire 2.0 1.1 
Zambia 1.6 -2.0 
Botswana 2.2 2.2 
Kenya 2.9 3.6 
Malawi 1.2 2.2 
Cameroon 2.3 2.7 
Lesotho 1.2 1.7 
Mali 1.3 2.9 
Sudan 1.6 2.0 
Rwanda 0.8 1.3 
7.3.7 Education 
Chapter six noted that education has an important influence on health status. Table 
7.19 demonstrates that in the performance of the matches is either similar or favours 
slightly the non-adjusting countries. The percentage change in primary school 
enrolment was broadly similar in the overall match and in the 50-50 match. in the 50-
50 match the control, as of 1990 did better in absolute terms as far as enrolment went; 
Rwanda had 71 per cent of school aged children enrolled in primary level education, 
whereas the Sudan had 50 per cent and Mali only 25 per cent. In the overall match, as 
of 1990, all the countries had enrolment percentages of less than 40 but greater than 
30 per cent. In the non-agricultural match the adjusters did worse that the control. 
Botswana maintained full enrolment throughout the 1980s, whereas Zaire and Zambia 
saw a 12 and three per cent decline respectively. The same holds true for the growth 
rate adjuster. Cameroon and Lesotho, the controls, maintained full enrolment during 
the 1980s, whereas Kenya suffered a five per cent decline (but still 95 per cent 
enrolment) and Malawi saw enrolment increase by only four per cent. Only one 
adjusting country did better than a control country. Uganda, in the agricultural match, 
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saw enrolment increase 21 per cent to 71 per cent from 1980-90, while Ethiopia saw 
enrolment decline 18 per cent to 25 per cent. 
Table 7.19 Adjuster — Control Primary School Enrolment 
1980 1985 1988 1991 
Change 
1980-88 
Change 
1980-1991 
Burkina 19 32 35 30 +16 +11 
Faso 
Niger 23 28 30 29 +7 +6 
Guinea 33 30 30 37 -3 +7 
Uganda 50 70f 77 71 +27 +21 
Ethiopia  43 36 36 25 -7 -18 
Zaire 90 98 76 78** -14 -12 
Zambia 95 103 97 92 +2 -3 
Botswana 96* 104 116 119 +4 +4 
Kenya 108 94 93 95 -7 -5 
Malawi 62 62 72 66 +10 +4 
0 (full 0 (full 
Cameroon 104 107 111 101 enrolment) enrolment) 
0 (full 	 0 (full 
Lesotho 104 115 112 107 enrolment) enrolment) 
Mali 27 23 23 25 -4 -2 
Sudan 51 49 49 50 -2 -1 
Rwanda 70 64 64 71 -6 +1 
Source: World Bank (World Development Reports, various) and UNESCO 
Note: *for 1983; ** for 1989; t for 1987. The primary school enrolment rate refers 
to the percentage of age group enrolled in the first level of education, in most cases, 
from six to 11 years. Percentages above 100 can occur if some pupils are older or 
younger than the country's defined standard primary school age. Numbers over 100 
are treated as 100. 
For secondary school enrolment, the overall match reveals that the control did better 
in improving enrolment from 1980-1991, but that when compared to percentage 
enrolled by 1990 all three countries did equally as well. The reverse is true for the 
agricultural match; Uganda improved faster in secondary school enrolment from 
1980-91 than Ethiopia did. However, as in the previous case, both countries ended up 
with similar levels of school enrolment by 1991. In the non-agricultural match, the 
per cent change in enrolment from 1980-91 was broadly similar, but the control, 
Botswana, reflecting its higher base in 1980, ended the period at a higher level. The 
growth rate match shows that the performance of the two controls and the adjuster 
Kenya were similar with respect to per cent change for 1980-91 and in levels achieved 
by 1991. However, comparing the controls to Malawi demonstrate that the adjuster 
did worse in both areas. The 50-50 match shows that the adjuster Sudan did the same 
as the control in improving enrolment from 1980-91, but in terms of the level of 
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the adjusters. In the case of Zaire this is noticeably slow. Compared to Zambia the 
performance is roughly equal, except in the area of females per 100 males in 
secondary education where Botswana has full female participation and Zambia only 
60 per cent. 
In the growth rate match females per 100 males is broadly similar for primary 
education where all countries have over 80 per cent of females enroled. In secondary 
education the performance is mixed, where the adjuster Kenya, and control Lesotho 
have the highest score. In the 50-50 match, Rwanda outperforms the adjusters in 
females per 100 males in primary education. This situation is reversed in secondary 
education where Sudan does better than the adjuster. 
Table 7.21 Adjuster — Control Percentage of Cohort Persisting to Grade Four 
(females) 
1970 1984 1985 1986 Change 1970-86 
Burkina Faso 71 84 87 86 +15 
Niger 75 76 93 +18 
Guinea 62 71 77 ? 
Uganda 
Ethiopia 57 45 45 56 -1 
Zaire 56 54 -2 
Zambia 93 97 -i-4 
Botswana 95 94 97 
Kenya 84 75 77 78 -6 
Malawi 55 64 67 67 +12 
Cameroon 59 58 85 85 +16 
Lesotho 87 86 85 87 0 
Mali 52 68 68 68 +16 
Sudan 81 
Rwanda 63 82 82 76 +13 
Source: World Bank; World Development Reports (various) 
Note: Information post 1986 is not available 
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Table 7.22 Adjuster — Control Females per 100 Males (Primary Education) 
1970 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 Change 1970-86 
Burkina Faso 57 58 59 59 61 62 +5 
Niger 53 56 56 56 57 57 +4 
Guinea 46 46 44 45 45 46 0 
Uganda 65 82 82 
Ethiopia 46 64 63 64 64 64 +18 
Zaire 75 75 78 
Zambia 80 89 90 90 91 91 +11 
Botswana 113 110 108 107 106 107 0 
Kenya 71 93 93 94 94 95 +24 
Malawi 59 77 78 80 81 81 +22 
Cameroon 74 84 84 85 85 85 +11 
Lesotho 150 125 125 125 122 121 0 
Mali 55 59 59 59 58 58 +3 
Sudan 61 68 68 75 +14 
Rwanda 79 96 97 97 99 99 +20 
Source: World Bank; World Development Reports (various) 
Table 7.23 Adjuster — Control Females per 100 Males (Secondary Education) 
1970 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 Change 1970-86 
Burkina Faso 33 47 47 46 48 50 +17 
Niger 35 39 39 42 42 42 +7 
Guinea 26 35 33 31 32 31 +5 
Uganda 31 54 54 
Ethiopia 32 64 64 67 67 67 +35 
Zaire 40 40 
Zambia 49 58 58 59 59 +10 
Botswana 88 115 111 103 109 114 +12 
Kenya 42 62 62 70 70 78 +26 
Malawi 36 48 51 60 54 54 +18 
Cameroon 36 59 62 64 68 68 +32 
Lesotho 111 150 150 153 147 149 0 
Mali 29 42 43 42 48 48 +19 
Sudan 40 74 76 80 +40 
Rwanda 44 26 29 35 52 56 +12 
Source: World Bank; World Development Reports (various) 
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7.4 Summary 
The above analysis reveals that, in almost every match, there is no difference and 
consistent pattern between the performance of adjustment and non-adjustment lending 
countries in terms of changes in health care delivery, health conditions or health status 
indicators. Virtually every country showed an improvement in immunisation 
coverage for infants, an expansion in safe water and sanitation and enrolment rates. 
The nutrition situation, however, remains worrisome, as most countries continue to 
suffer from widespread undernutrition. More specifically, the analysis, which 
examines the matches separately can find no reason to believe that adjusters have 
performed less well than the controls (see tables 7.21 and 7.22). For instance, the 
before after analysis, for the overall match, Niger, Guinea and Burkina Faso (control), 
shows that the improvement in immunisation coverage was better in the control than 
in the adjusters, but that all three countries saw an expansion in coverage throughout 
the 1990s. Furthermore, the control does much better in decreasing infant deaths 
from 1980-90 than the adjusters, however even the adjusters make substantial 
progress in reducing the IMR. In addition, the control also does better in terms of 
increasing primary and secondary school enrolment than the adjusters, yet here even 
the adjusters are showing a generally improving situation. On the other hand, 
improvement in health conditions favours the adjusters, although Burkina Faso also 
saw improvements everywhere except for urban sanitation. The nutrition situation 
remain equally precarious in all three countries. 
In the agricultural match, the situation is clearer. In almost every instance the 
adjuster does better than the control. Uganda, throughout the 1980s, saw an often 
spectacular improvement in immunisation coverage where Ethiopia saw only a slight 
improvement. In terms of access to safe water in rural and urban areas, both countries 
experienced broadly similarly rates of improvements, however it would appear that 
Ethiopia is financing the increase in safe water to urban areas at the expense of rural 
areas. Primary school enrolment increased in Uganda, but decreased in Ethiopia 
which indicates that the longer term prospects for improving health status in Ethiopia 
275 
may be put into jeopardy. In both countries secondary school enrolment increased at 
approximately the same rate. Perhaps, of greater concern is the fact that both 
countries experienced a decline in government support for the health sector 
throughout the 1980s: this may prove in the future, to limit the progress that both 
countries were able to make. The one areas where the adjuster does worse is in 
reducing the infant mortality rate. Uganda's rate actually increased in the late 1980s 
whereas Ethiopia's fell. 
In the non-agricultural match, the performance of Botswana and Zambia are 
broadly equal, whereas the performance of Botswana is slightly worse than the other 
adjuster Zaire. However, this is a broad statement to make, and there are enough 
exceptions to make one leery of committing to a definitive conclusion here. To wit, 
Botswana does worse in terms of improving TB and Measles immunisation than 
Zambia, but does better than Zambia on the population per physician ratio and in 
primary school enrolment. This tends to indicate that Zambia is able to improve 
health care development by devoting a large share of government expenditures to the 
health sector while simultaneously neglecting the education sector. In the case of 
Botswana and Zaire the adjuster shows, for all immunisations, an greater increase in 
coverage. However, it must be kept in mind that this reflects the fact that Botswana's 
base in 1980 was much higher than that of Zaire's. The nutrition situation for both 
countries was at an adequate level (in terms of African standards) throughout the 
1980s. However, as in the Zambian case primary school enrolment declined in Zaire. 
The infant mortality rate declined more in the control than in the adjusters. This is all 
the more notable as the decrease in the IMR occurred from a low base, 
The growth rate match, also demonstrates that there is no clear case where that 
non adjusters outperform the adjusters. One adjuster and one non-adjuster saw 
declines in government support for the health sector, whereas the other two countries 
saw increases. The improvement in immunisation coverage is broadly similar in the 
adjuster, Malawi and the control Cameroon, and slightly worse in the control Lesotho. 
In terms of access to safe water, the control Lesotho does slightly better than EIAL 
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Malawi. Yet given that resources are finite, Malawi has chosen to expand coverage, 
appropriately in rural areas at the expense of urban areas. In terms of education, the 
controls show no change in primary school enrolment, while Malawi shows an 
improvement and Kenya a decline. The nutrition situation was best in Lesotho and 
Malawi and worst in Kenya and Cameroon. The infant mortality rate declined by 
approximately the same amount in all four countries. 
The 50-50 match, reveals that the control Rwanda has done better than the 
adjuster Mali in virtually every area. Expansion in immunisation coverage, access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation, and the improvement in primary and secondary 
school enrolment, was higher in Rwanda (except for rural sanitation) than in Mali. 
The infant mortality rate decreased by 17 deaths per 1000 in Rwanda from 1980-90, 
while it increased by 12 deaths per 1000 in Mali during the same time period. 
However, in the Sudan the improvement in immunisation coverage was greater than 
or equal to that of Rwanda. However, Sudan does much worse than Rwanda in 
expanding access to safe drinking water and in improving primary school enrolment 
rates. 
As part of a basic needs strategy the importance of female education has been 
emphasised by researchers. Tables 7.21 to 7.23 have demonstrated that eventhough 
there has been a growing awareness of the returns that occur with improved 
schooling, most gains occurred prior to the 1980s. Only Botswana and Lesotho 
(controls) have obtained full female participation at the primary and secondary levels. 
In several countries, notably, Niger, Ethiopia, and Mali, female enrolment remains 
low compared to that of males. In the other countries, substantial investment in 
education is still needed so as to ensure that in this critical area improvements are 
made. 
Table 7.24. Comprehensive Before - After Analysis 
Gov't DPT TB Polio Measles Tetanus 
Pop. 
per 
Phys 
Urban 
Safe 
Water 
Rural 
Safe 
Water 
Urban 
Sanit. 
Rural 
Sanit Nutrition 
Prim. 
School 
Second. 
School LEB IMR 
Niger .. ++ + ++ I 	 I 	 I 	 I ++ -H-I- + -12 + + -5 -18 
+++ Guinea -H- .. -I-H- +++ -F-1-4- -H-+ .. -12 + - -1 -27 -H-H- 
Burkina III -H-+ -H- ++ -H-I- - ± -14 -H- + 10 -77 I 	 I 	 I 	 I I 	 I 	 I 	 I 
Faso  
Uganda +-H-+ I 	 I 	 I 	 I I 	 I 	 I 	 I +++ .. ++ +-I- -7 -7 +20 
++ Ethiopia   	 ++ 8 -14 
Zaire +4- +++ ++ + -4 - + 2 -18 
Zambia + +4- ++ +++ -10 + -2 -24 
Botswana ± 4-1- -HI- ++4- -1-1- -5 + + 9 -34 
Kenya -10 ++ 4 -20 
Malawi + 4-I- ++ -I-I- 4-F - +++ -4 + ± 3 -23 
Cameroon -H-i- -1-i-I- +1-1- -H- -7 ± + 10 -21 
Lesotho + - + +++ 4+ +++ 0 ± + 5 -22 
Mali .. -H-H- + -FF + + + + -13 - - 5 +12 
Sudan +-H-+ -H-H- 1141 -H- - - + -10 + 11 -22 1111 
III 	 I Rwanda +-I-H- -I-H- -F++ — -H-I- -H- -H- - -15 + + -1 -17 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 
Notes: data for nutrition is the actual score 1979-90; numbers for IMR are the change in the rate from 1980-90; data for life expectancy at birth (LEB) is the 
number of years lost or gained. +,-, or ± for per cent of government expenditure to the health sector indicates only if there was an improvement (+), decline (-) 
or no change (±). 
data is not available 
++++ excellent; greater than 50 per cent improvement 
+++ good performance; improvement greater than or equal to 30 per cent but less than 50 per cent. 
++ satisfactory performance; improvement greater than 10 per cent but less than 30 per cent. 
+ acceptable performance; improvement greater than zero but less than or equal to ten. 
- inadequate performance; decline of between less than ten and zero 
-- poor performance; decline of between greater than ten and less than 40. 
--- very poor performance; decline greater than 40 per cent. 
Table 7.25. Comprehensive With - Without Analysis 
Gov't DPT TB Polio Measles Tetanus 
Pop. 
per 
Phys 
Urban 
Safe 
Water 
Rural 
Safe 
Water 
Urban 
Sanit. 
Rural 
Sanit. Nutrition 
Prim. 
School 
Second. 
School LEB IMR 
Niger 2 3 2 3 2 .. 1 2 2 0 -12 0 0 +10 -18 
Guinea .. 1 1 1 2 0 1 -12 0 2 -5 -27 
Burkina 1 2 1 2 3 3 0 3 0 -14 0 0 -1 -77 
Faso  
Uganda 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 -7 1 1 -7 +20 
Ethiopia  0 2 2 2 2 ••  1 2 2 2 +8 -14 
Zaire 0 1 0 2 -4 3 0 +2 -18 
Zambia 0 0 2 2 1 2 -10 2 0 +2 -24 
Botswana  0 0 3 0 3 	  1 -5 1 0 -1-9 -34 
Kenya 4 .. .. .. -10 3 0 +4 -20 
Malawi 2 2 2 2 3 2 0 -4 2 2 +3 -23 
Cameroon 3 1 1 1 2 -7 1 0 +10 -21 
Lesotho 1 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 +5 -22 
Mali .. 2 2 .. 3 .. 2 2 2 1 -13 0 2 +5 +12 
Sudan 0 1 0 1 2 1 3 3 3 2 -10 0 0 -11 -22 
Rwanda .. 0 3 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 -15 0 0 -1 -17 
Notes: data for nutrition is the actual score 1979-90; numbers for IMR are the change in the rate 1980-90; data for life expectancy at birth (LEB) is the number 
of years lost or gained. 
Numbers represent rankings. The best performer receives a one, the next best a two and the worst a three. A rank of zero indicates that the performance was 
within five per cent of each other. If a country receives a zero, the next country match receives a two, except in the case of government expenditure to the 
health sector (gov't), where a zero indicates that it is not clear which country is doing better. 
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Thus, much of the analysis in this chapter, reveals that programme lending sponsored 
by the Bank and the Fund cannot be determined to adversely impact health care 
development in Sub Saharan African countries. However, this must be weighed 
against the fact that the OLS analysis indicates that there does appear to be a structural 
change occurring on the infant mortality rate when the adjustment money is dispersed. 
The implications of this are discussed in the conclusion. The next chapter of this 
thesis, in an effort to obtain clearer results, reviews the case of Ghana and her 
structural adjustment programme. 
Chapter 8 
Adjustment in Ghana: The Impact on the Health 
Sector 
8.1 Introduction 
Since 1983 Ghana has undertaken major structural economic reforms in the areas of 
fiscal and monetary policy, the financial system, international trade policies and 
industrial and agricultural programmes. These reforms have been directed and 
encouraged by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other 
multilateral and bilateral agencies. The improvement in economic policies has been 
noticeable, so much so that Ghana is held up as an example for other countries to 
follow. This chapter begins with a profile of the economic and political situation that 
occurred in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s in Ghana. The second part of this 
chapter provides a brief description of Ghana today. Geographic, demographic and 
economic characteristics are highlighted. The third section of this chapter traces the 
economic policies, successes and mistakes that were made from Nkrumah's 
presidency to that of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. The third section of this 
chapter discusses the elements that were evident in the first and succeeding 
adjustment programmes. Particular attention is paid to the controversial "transition 
period" (1983 to 1986/87) where indicators are hypothesised to alter significantly. In 
addition, this chapter provides a case study of the impact of structural adjustment and 
stabilisation on health care development in this west African country. The discussion 
then moves on to show how health care delivery indicators changed following a 
period of economic restructuring. Next, health conditions and health status indicators 
are reviewed. This chapter utilises the same indicators as the previous chapter in an 
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effort to show if basic needs are being satisfied. The analysis used in all three cases is 
based on the before-after, with-without, and actual versus target approaches. The 
conclusion to this chapter offers a considered explanation, as well as cautionary notes, 
on health care development in one African country. 
8.2 Background to Giuma 
Formerly known as the Gold Coast, the Republic of Ghana is located in western 
Africa. It shares borders with three CFA countries: Burkina Faso to the North, Togo 
to the East, the Cate d'Ivoire to the West and to the South lies the Gulf of Guinea. 
The land area is approximately 239,000 square kilometres and contains an estimated 
population of 15.3 million. Ghana, typical of many African nations is not heavily 
urbanised. Urban population is 33 per cent of total population. The main urban areas 
are Accra, the capital, with nearly one million residents, Kumasi with 300,000 
inhabitants, and Tamale, Tema and Takoradi. However, the average annual growth 
rate of population exceeded that found in the 1970s: population from 1980-91 
expanded by 4.1 per cent per year; although this annual growth rate remains below 
the average of for all Sub Saharan Africa of 5.8 per cent. The population age 
structure is consistent with that found in many other African countries: nearly 50 per 
cent (46.8 per cent) of the population is under 15 years of age. There are over one 
hundred ethnically diverse groups in the country, however most Ghanaians come from 
one of four major ethnic groups. In descending order of importance they are: the 
Akan, Moshi-Dagoma, Ewe and Ga. Economic and social divisions based on historic 
ethnic divisions continue to be important in Ghanaian life. Forty five per cent of the 
population is Christian most of whom live in the South, whereas 12 per cent of the 
population that is Muslim live in the North. A small number of Syrian and Lebanese 
traders live in the Southern cities and have been the target of hostile actions 
throughout the years. Historically,  and to a degree this evident to this day, Southern 
part of Ghana have benefited from the presence of export crop growing regions and 
physical and social infrastructure, whereas the North had faired less well. 
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Ghana is located 400 miles North of the equator. The southern areas of the 
country benefit from the relatively cool, moist air off of the Atlantic. In the South two 
wet seasons are evident, April-July and September-November, and the rainfall is 
highest here with rain occurring in the range of 1,270-2,100 mm. In the North, there 
is only one wet season from April-September and rainfall averages 1,270 mm. 
Following the rainy season the North suffers a long dry season that is characterised by 
the Hartmatan winds blowing off the Sahara desert. Climate and soil conditions 
determine the type of vegetation prevalent. In the South west part of the country 
heavy annual rainfall allows for rain forests, evergreen and semi-deciduous trees to 
grow. The drier Northern two thirds of the country are covered with savannah and 
scrub. 
Ghana is primarily an agricultural and land-based economy. The contribution 
of agriculture to GDP currently stands at 42.4 per cent (GSS 1993).38 Services which 
is slightly larger contributes 45.5 per cent to GDP and industry only 14.5 per cent. 
The percentage of economically active population is approximately 50 per cent. This 
represents a percentage decline from the early 1980s, but the number of economically 
active in agriculture has actually increased slightly. The principal food crops are 
cassava, yams, taro (coca yams) and plantains. The natural resources most commonly 
found and exploited in the country consist of gold, timber, diamonds and bauxite. 
The composition of export earnings from these sectors vary from year to year in the 
early 1980s. Cocoa production generated the greatest share of export earnings, 
however by 1992 the earnings from the mineral sector eclipsed that of cocoa. The per 
cent contribution of minerals to export earnings was 39 per cent, whereas cocoa's 
share fell from 67.2 per cent in 1986 to 30.7 per cent in 1992 (ISSER 1993, 59). Of 
mineral exports the volume of gold exports has increased steadily throughout the 
1980s even as prices have declined. The export of diamonds continues to be an 
important element in the Ghanaian economy; exports have increased from 305,787 
carats in 1985 to 690,409 carats in 1992 (ISSER 1993, 62). Exports of timber have 
increased, unevenly, from a mid 1980 low of 44.1 million dollars in earnings to 113 
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million dollars in 1992 (ISSER 1993, 62). Bauxite and manganese are two other 
important foreign exchange earners. 
The most important sector in the economy is cocoa. Cocoa has historically 
dominated the modern economy. When real prices for the crop increased from 1983 
to 1987 output expanded to over 220,000 metric tons, when the real producer price 
declined, and allowing for a time lag, output declined in 1989. The most recent 
estimate puts the per cent contribution of cocoa to export earnings at 30 per cent down 
from 67 per cent in 1986 (ISSER 1993, 59). The state continues to remain active in 
cocoa, as of 1983, the Cocoa Marketing Board or Cocobod provided marketing and 
support services to farmers. As of that date it employed nearly 100,000 persons. 
The industrial sector, consisting of manufacturing, mining and quarrying, 
electricity and water, and construction has recently began to grow after several years 
of negative growth rates. Whereas the early 1980s showed a contraction in the 
industrial sector, after 1984 industry, except for 1986, has expanded. Foe instance, 
the growth rate for 1987 was 11.49 per cent, in 1988 7.25 per cent and in 1989 2.63 
per cent. Tourism, an increasingly important sector in the economy has expanded 
throughout the 1980s. Tourist receipts which were below 20 million dollars in the 
early 80s expanded considerably to 168 million dollars in 1992. 
8.3 The Economic Crisis 1960 — 1983 
Ghana the first black African country to become independent in 1957, and a leader of 
African nationalism, held much promise both as an example for other African 
countries and for improving the welfare of its citizens. Nkrumah, the charismatic 
leader of the new republic, while instrumental in mobilising initial popular support for 
his regime, failed to provide the essential framework necessary to ensure continued 
economic expansion. Green (1988, 8) notes that the Nkrumah period was 
characterised by state led economic reform aimed at increasing production, 
infrastructure and improving human capital. Although growth rates were strong in the 
1950s and adequate, in that they kept pace with population growth in the early 1960s, 
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by the mid 1960s it was obvious that serious problems were emerging in the Ghanaian 
economy. Shortages were evident in both imports and in some home produced goods. 
It became increasingly difficult to obtain agricultural equipment, pharmaceuticals and 
some food products (Rimmer 1988, 119). By 1966 Nkrumah was overthrown in a 
military coup. 
The economic malaise that hit Ghana can be traced to two main areas. As is 
common with other developing countries, the external economic environment and 
internal mismanagement of the economy are jointly to blame. In the case of Ghana, 
however, the scale tips, in large measure, away from exogenous shocks and favours 
internal causes as the appropriate explanatory factor (Rimmer 1988, 120). As Ghana 
is, and was, primarily an agricultural economy, negative changes in the commodity 
terms of trade, especially for cocoa, would have a large, negative, external effect on 
the economy. However, Rimmer (1988, 120) notes that overall the commodity terms 
of trade were favourable from 1950 onwards. When the commodity terms of trade 
fell for cocoa, as it did from 1959 to 1966, Ghana was able to increase export 
volumes so that her capacity to import foreign goods was not placed in jeopardy. 
After 1966, the commodity terms of trade were more favourable. Except for 1971-72, 
commodity terms of trade for cocoa increased from 111 in 1960 to 144 in 1979 (using 
a base year of 1975) (Rimmer 1988, 120). However, it should be noted that after 
1979 the commodity terms of trade shrunk further to 97 using the same base year. 
Since changes in the commodity terms of trade only offers a weak and 
inconsistent explanation of Ghana's economic decline other factors must work against 
her favour. These factors are rooted in the internal political system of the 1960s and 
1970s. Nkrumah's desire to modernise the economy and jettison its colonial 
orientation, was not completed successfully. In line with much of the development 
thinking of the day, Nkrumah implemented high tariffs which discouraged imports. 
Imports were further limited by various administrative bodies which sough to control 
their absolute number and composition (Rimmer 1988, 120). In addition, price 
controls were put into effect on a variety of goods. Moreover, the state took control 
285 
over much of the manufacturing sector and many industries were required to become 
state corporations. Furthermore, mechanised agriculture was organised as a public 
enterprise. Foreign enterprises were discouraged from investing in Ghana due to 
disputes arising over ownership and control and the repatriation of profits. In essence, 
as Rimmer (1988, 121) puts it, instead of developing countries de-linking themselves 
from the core controlled by the North, international capitalists de-linked themselves 
from the periphery. In order to meet payment obligations Ghanaian officials resorted 
to printing money and heavy borrowing (Rimmer 1988, 120). 
Kwame Nkrumah's leadership of the Convention People's Party whose 
ideology was based on Pan Africanism, anti-imperialism and a loose alliance with the 
Eastern Bloc, set, with the benefit of hindsight the foundation for future economic 
failures (Frimpong-Ansah 1991, 91-92). Roe and Schneider (1992, 18-29) identify 
two main elements that compromised Ghanaian economic growth. First, substantial 
nationalisation of industry and state involvement in economic activity, which is still 
evident today in over 230 enterprises, favoured trade with the Eastern bloc, and the 
preference for Ghanaians in personnel positions in the public sector, led to widespread 
economic mismanagement. Second, state farming sucked up an enormous amount of 
expenditures. The result was the swelling of the national bureaucracy. This in turn 
led to administrative capacity to be spread too thinly. Given that bureaucracy was 
bloated and of uneven talent corruption became evident in every day activities. Poor 
supervision led to a large number of projects that were unviable in that they could not 
yields a sufficient rate of return to ensure that their loans could be serviced (Roe and 
Schneider 1992, 30). By 1960, national trucking was hampered due to a lack of spare 
parts and 70 per cent of manufacturing capacity was under utilised (Roe and 
Schneider 1992, 30). Frimpong-Ansah (1991, 112), former Governor of the Bank of 
Ghana, adds that dependence on primary export sectors as a source of foreign 
exchange finance, and the subsequent downgrading of small scale food production, 
sewed the seeds of future economic problems. 
1 
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Overall the 20 year period from the 1960s to the early 1980s consisted of a 
series of poor economic policies coupled with political instability. Amongst the main 
policy failings were (Killick 1978 and Rimmer 1988): 
(1) Administrative capacity was not sufficient to ensure that state enterprises 
were run efficiently or that price controls and licensing requirements were 
effectively managed. Poor administration in favour of inappropriate policies 
became the norm as income gains favoured those that enjoyed access to the 
political system. Public employment mushroomed 14 per cent per annum 
from 1975 to 1982. 
(2) The drive towards modernisation led to the use of agricultural and 
industrial techniques that were inappropriate in the Ghanaian context both in 
terms of ability to implement and in financing their continuation. 
(3) Domestic savings was downplayed in favour of increasing export earnings 
even in the volatile primary commodity market. 
(4) Following a necessary devaluation of the cedi in 1971, the exchange rate 
remained fixed and overvalued until a further (insufficient) devaluation in 
1978. Foreign exchange use continued to be licensed. The Busia government 
was finally overthrown in January 1972 following a ban on Trade Union 
Congress activities. The National Redemption Council then reversed the 
Busia devaluation by two thirds and reinstated import controls. 
(5) Interest rates, import and retail prices remained controlled throughout the 
1970s. The use of price controls led to the emergence of a large parallel 
market where windfall profits were made by individuals who could purchase 
goods at official prices and later sell them at market clearing prices. The end 
result was that illegal trade was favoured by individuals instead of production. 
(6) From 1974 onwards, in part in order to finance the growing public sector, 
deficit financing ballooned. The government continued to spend more than it 
received in tax revenues, aid and foreign borrowing. The situation was made 
worse to the extent that the tax base began to crumble. The overvaluation of 
the cedi discouraged export volumes. Revenues from import duties also 
declined. Price controls encouraged illegal transactions that could not be 
taxed. Moreover, such controls led to a decline in sales tax revenue. Later 
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increases in prices led individuals to turn away from the monetized sector of 
the economy where taxation is impossible. 
(7) From 1975 there were several more changes in government all of which 
led to discontinuity in economic policy. From 1975-1978 Acheampong led 
the Supreme Military Council, from July 1978 to June 1979 General Akuffo 
led the Supreme Military Council II. Jerry Rawlings overthrew Akuffo on 
July 4, 1979 and had him and Acheampong executed. Following three months 
of rule he turned power over to the government of Dr. HiIla Linmann of the 
People's National Party. However, economic distress continued and Rawlings 
on December 31, 1981 overthrew Linmann, suspended the constitution, 
dissolved the parliament and outlawed political activity. He then formed the 
Provisional National Defence Council. 
These economic policies, coupled with unstable governments, led to a catastrophic 
situation in Ghana. As Rimmer (1988: 122) reports the government deficit grew from 
0.4 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 14.6 per cent in 1982. This meant that 65 per cent of 
total government spending went to finance the deficit. Investment rates declined from 
14 to 2 per cent, and the domestic savings rate from 12 to 3 per cent of GDP in the 
same time period. Import volumes were down by 66 per cent and export receipts 
were off by 50 per cent from 1970 to 1982. Agriculture declined by 0.3 per cent per 
year from 1970 to 1980. Deindustrialization occurred as manufacturing's share of 
GDP declined from 20 per cent in 1970 to less than 10 per cent in 1983. Moreover, 
income per capita had declined by nearly one third, and real wages had collapsed by 
80 per cent. All this had the effect of leading to a massive haemorrhage of skilled 
manpower from the country. Rimmer (1988: 119) estimates that between 50 and 66 
per cent of the top professional manpower had departed the country. Those that were 
not fortunate enough to be able to leave the country were faced with increasing 
poverty. Dead bodies, unheard of in previous decades, began to show up on the 
streets. Elsewhere, "Rawlings' necklaces" became evident, as the population suffering 
from inadequate nutrition, began to exhibit signs of protruding collar bones. 
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8.4 The IMF and World Bank Adjustment Programme 
It was against this backdrop of near total economic collapse that the Rawlings 
government agreed to undertake a major economic recovery programme. The 
stabilisation programme that was sponsored by the IMF, with assistance from the 
Bank, initially sought to reform prices, the public sector and various institutions. The 
main elements of the Ghanaian adjustment programme were (Ewusi 1987, 17-18): 
(1) Price Reform 
(a) Exchange rate devaluation and price and trade liberalisation. 
(b) De-emphasise the role of the state and re-emphasise the market 
mechanism. 
(c) Reduce subsidies on food, energy and agricultural inputs. 
(d) Maintain a positive real interest rate. 
(2) Public sector reform 
(a) Reduce the government deficit by rationalising employment in the public 
sector, improve the efficiency of public enterprises and increase revenues by 
reforming the tax system. 
(b) Improve public investment by concentrating recurrent expenditure on 
existing industries that could increase capacity utilisation. Investment in 
agricultural products to be privatised. Improve the management of the public 
sector and introduce user charges for some services (water and veterinary). 
(3) Institutional Restructuring 
(a) Parastatals to be rationalised with manpower reductions in marketing 
boards. Some functions of parastatals to be privatised. Government 
institutions to be decentralised. 
The Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research at the University of Ghana 
(ISSER 1993) provides information on the main economic policy actions and reforms 
undertaken by the government of Ghana since 1983 to 1991. They are in 
chronological order: 
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1983 
(1) Tariff schedules simplified at rates of 0, 25 and 30 per cent, Property 
taxes, and taxes on non-commercial vehicles introduced, taxes on rental 
income increased. Improved tax collection carried out. 
(2) Minimum wage raised from 12 to 25 cedis per day. 
(3) Interest rates raised by 3 to 5 per cent. 
(4) Exchange rate devalued by 30 cedis per dollar. 
(5) Controlled prices, including government services, increased substantially 
to pass on the cost of the devaluation. Price controls eliminated on all but 23 
goods. 
(6) Retail prices of beer and cigarettes increased by 75 and 33 per cent 
respectively. 
(7) Cocoa producer prices raised from 12,000 to 20,000 cedis per ton. 
1984 
(1) Personal income tax raised. Tax on cigarettes and beer increase again. 
(2) Public sector wages increased by 40 per cent. 
(3) Interest rate raised by two per cent. 
(4) Exchange rate devalued by 35 cedis per dollar, then to 38.5 cedis per 
dollar, then in November to 50 cedis per dollar. 
(5) Exporters allowed to retain some foreign exchange for use in purchasing 
inputs. 
(6) Cocoa producer prices raised to 30,000 cedis per ton. 
1985 
(1) Taxes increased on beer, cigarettes, airport services, casinos and gasoline. 
(2) Civil service salaries doubled. 
(3)Interest rates raised two per cent. Deposit interest rates up by one per cent. 
(4) Price of petroleum increased by 20 per cent in real terms. 
(5) Only eight gods to benefit from price controls: soap, matches, textiles, 
cement, baby food, sugar and imported rice. 
(6) Cocoa prices increased to 56,000 cedis per ton. Cocoa Marketing Board 
starts to layoff employees. This leads to cuts of 16,000 by December 1985 
with a further 10,000 laid off by February 1987. 
(7) Foreign investors guaranteed ability to repatriate capital and profits. 
290 
1986 
(1) Minimum wage increased to 90 cedis per day. Wages for civil servants 
adjusted for inflation. 
(2) Exchange rate devalued to 90 cedis per dollar. Controlled prices adjusted 
to reflect this. 
(3) Price of coffee crop raised by 50 per cent. 
(4) Foreign exchange auction introduced. 
1987 
(1) Corporate tax reduced from 55 to 45 per cent. 
(2) Income tax rates reduced. Tax on cigarettes, beer, liquor and other 
beverages raised. Sales tax on consumption of electricity abolished. 
(3) Public sector productivity to be raised through the provision of cedi 3,000 
million in a Special Efficiency Fund. 
1988 
(1) Importers no longer required to obtain import licences to obtain foreign 
exchange. 
(2) Civil servants granted allowances to close the gap between their wage and 
wages of other public corporations and private sector employees. 
(3) Projects subject to environmental impact studies before commencing. 
1989 
(1) Tax rates lowered to raise the take home pay of workers. 
(2) Basic tax reduced from 25 to 22.5 per cent. This tax subject on beer, 
cigarettes, liquor and other beverages. 
(3)Banking reform begins 
(4) Export Development and Investment Fund established to help fund 
industries in difficulty that, however, have the promise for growth. The 
Export Finance Company Limited Created to expand the export of non-
traditional commodities. 
(5) Law passed guaranteeing a minimum wage. Minimum wage of 170 cedis 
per day raised to 218 cedis per day in 1990. 
(6) Producer price off cocoa increased to 224,400 cedis per ton. 
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(7) PAMSCAD funding secured and implementation begins. 
1990 
(1) Sales tax on luxury goods implemented. Range of tax 50 to 500 per cent. 
(2) Bank of Ghana lending rate at 33 per cent. Bank of Ghana given a new 
supervisory and audit roles, and authority to fine and punish violators. 
(3) Ghana stock exchange established in order to mobilise capital for growth. 
(4) Petroleum prices increased. 
(5) Producer price of coffee increased to 8,100 cedis per 60 kg. bag. Producer 
price of cotton and tobacco also increased. 
(6) Local industry supported through an assistance programme that aids in 
access to bank credit. 
8.5 Price and Income Changes 
Chapters four and six demonstrated that macroeconomic reforms would lead to 
changes in prices and incomes. For prices, the main mechanism for changes would be 
a change in the exchange rate, which would alter relative prices, and possibly, lead to 
an increase in inflation, and reduction in government support for subsidy schemes or 
an increase in cost recovery in the social sector. For incomes, increases and decreases 
in wages would occur if the government sought to expand or cutback public 
employment and through changes in the real exchange rate which would send signals 
to producers to switch production to more profitable goods. Furthermore, the 
argument was advanced that these changes might adversely affect health and nutrition 
states. For instance if prices for food increased then nutrition status might suffer, if 
incomes decreased then medical care might become too expensive to afford. In 
Ghana all of these measures have been undertaken by Ghanaian authorities as part of 
the World Bank and IMF sponsored adjustment programme. 
In the aggregate the impact of the adjustment programme has been to raise real 
incomes. At the start of the adjustment period (1983) Real GDP declined 4.6 per cent 
from 1982. However, from 1984 to 1990, the annual percentage change in real GDP 
was positive: 1984 saw real GDP rocket by 8.6 per cent; 1985, 1986,1987,1988 and 
1989 saw approximately 5 per cent increases in real GDP per year. However, in 1990 
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the annual percentage change in real GDP was only 3.3. per cent. In per capita terms, 
the annual percentage change in real GDP was lower. This, obviously, reflects the 
fact that population continued to expand at a robust rate. Figure 8.1 below indicates 
that the improvement in real GDP per capita from the beginning of the adjustment 
period to 1990. 
-8 	  
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Source: ISSER (1993: 7 and Kapur et al 1991, 6) 
Figure 8.1 Annual Percentage Change in Real GDP per capita (1983-1990) 
However, unfortunately, this only gives an extremely rough picture of how incomes 
have changed during adjustment. For instance, as previously noted, the use of an 
aggregate measure disguises the distributional impact. This is not an easy problem to 
correct for. The poverty typology developed in chapter four noted, roughly, that 
individuals ought to be classed in terms of urban formal, informal and public 
employees and rural landowners, smallholders and peasants. As far as informal sector 
information goes, there is no available data regarding the size, on a national basis, or 
the amount of income labourers earn in Ghana, or for that matter any country in Sub 
Saharan Africa. In terms of formal sector employment there is also a dearth of data: 
Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar (1994, 7) note that governments in Sub Saharan 
Africa do not conduct regular labour force surveys and data on employment by sector 
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is sadly lacking. The Government of Ghana (Quarterly Digest of Statistics 1991) 
shows that real wages have gradually risen in all sector activities throughout the 
transition period. This increase in wages has helped to offset the erosion in incomes 
that occurred with uncontrollable inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 1983 is a 
turning point for real wages (except for construction). At that point, real wages had 
reached a low; post-1984 reflects the fact that real wages increased until 1986 (the 
latest year that data is available). As of 1986 real wages had risen above the pre-
adjustment level. The real wage index for the public sector indicates that 1983 was 
also a low point for earnings. After that date real wages in the public sector began to 
rise. The increase in real wages throughout the transition period is more notable in so 
far as the increase in wages occurred at the same time that employment in 
manufacturing was expanding. As of 1981 26,000 people were employed in 
manufacturing, by 1986 this had risen to 79,000 people (ISSER 1993, 111). 
However, note should be made that after this date manufacturing employment 
declined substantially. 
Table 8.1 Real Wage Index for the Formal Sector 1980-86 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Services 100 57 49 36 55 70 131 
Manufacturing 100 71 64 46 85 92 153 
Construction 	 100 65 54 61 67 188 175 
Public 100 61 52 41 58 86 147 
Source: Quarterly Digest of Statistics (1991) 
Leechor (1994, 164-65) reports that post 1986 wages in the public sector continued to 
rise in real terms. Such an increase in real wages in the public sector, however, must 
be seen in against the retrenchment programme that occurred as part of Ghana's 
adjustment. From 1987 to 1990 the government sought to redeploy 47,439 civil 
servants39 (Alderman, Canagarajah and Younger 1993, 2). However, as Alderman, 
Canagarajah and Younger (1993) point out there is ample reason to believe that this 
retrenchment of public sector workers did not have negative, long-term, 
consequences. Their survey of redeployees in Greater Accra, Ashanti and the Central 
regions who had worked for the education department or a District Assembly found 
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that most retrenched workers were able to find other forms of employment 
immediately after severance. Their survey noted, however, that such employment 
tended to generate less income than prior employment in the government with "a 
significant proportion probably poor by any standard definition" (Alderman, 
Canagarajah and Younger (1993, 31). However, this statement is contradicted, at 
least in part, by the fact that the retrenched workers were able to save 13 per cent of 
their severance package (Alderman, Canagarajah and Younger 1993, 31). 
Given that incomes in the formal sector have held up relatively well 
throughout the transition period, the performance of prices must be examined. 
However, before proceeding directly to an examination of price changes it is useful to 
determine how much food is actually purchased in the market by Ghanaians. The 
Ghana Living Standards Survey (GSS 1989), Boateng et al (1990), Alderman (1990) 
and Roe and Schneider (1992) provide estimates as to the share of food produced for 
own consumption and food purchased in the market. As a rough guide the rich use 
approximately 44 per cent of their total expenditure to purchase food and 22 per cent 
of their 'expenditure' is used on home produced food. For the poor, 36 per cent of 
total expenditure is used to secure food, while reliance on home produced food is 
greater at 33 per cent (Boateng et al 1990):l0 However GSS data and Alderman 
(1990) indicates that there is variation by region in the amount of food consumed 
from home production. The poor in the coastal region are less reliant on home 
production than the poor in the forest or savannah regions. Those households rely on 
over 50 per cent of food to come from home production. Moreover, in urban areas, of 
the coastal region poor households rely little (six per cent) on home production to 
meet food consumption needs. 
Thus, it is clear that any increases in food prices will likely impact urban, 
relatively well off individuals more than the rural poor because they rely on the 
market more to meet their food needs. Those households in rural areas that produce 
most of their own food will be protected from imported inflation following an 
increase in prices. The evidence (figure 8.2) suggests that urban areas have not had to 
	q 	 Per cent change year to year CPI 
^Co 	 Per cent change year to year 
Food Price Index 
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fear from rising food prices. Except for the drought year, food price inflation has 
trailed consumer price inflation. 
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Figure 8.2 Percentage Change Year to Year in Consumer Price Index and the Food 
Price Index 
8.6 The Impact of Adjustment on Health Care Delivery, Health Conditions 
and Health Status41  
8.6.1 Government Support for Health 
Expenditures on the health sector have generally improved during the transition 
period and into the post transition period. The percentage share of GDP to health and 
percentage share of budget to health declined from 1980-83, from 0.95 and 0.35 per 
cent and from 6.43 to 4.38 per cent respectively. As of 1984 the per cent share of 
GDP devoted to health increased from 0.84 to 1.20 in 1987 then fell slightly to 1.40 in 
1988. The percentage share of the budget to health increased dramatically to 8.50 per 
cent, where it remained steady throughout the 1980s except for a slight dip in 1987. 
In terms of health expenditures per capita the central government's expenditure rose 
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from $3 per person in the adjusting period to $5 per son during the adjustment (WHO 
1992, 7). 
Percentage share of budget 
Percentage share of GDP 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Source: World Bank (1989b) 
Figure 8.3. Ghana Transition Period — Government Spending to the Health Sector 
Source: IMF (1992a) 
Figure 8.4. Government Expenditure on Health (per cent of total) 
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The above diagrams give a good indication of how the health sector, strictly speaking, 
has performed. However, as noted in chapters five and six the obtainment of a high 
health status is not dependent only on health care interventions. Health conditions can 
be altered by government interventions in housing and other social services. 
Furthermore, expenditure on education can lead to increased education of individuals 
which will also positively influence health status changes. Table 8.2 shows how 
government expenditure to community and social services, which includes; education, 
health, social welfare services, housing and community amenities and recreational, 
cultural and religious services, has changed relative to other categories of expenditure 
from 1983-1991. 
Table 8.2 Composition of Government Expenditure by Function 1983-1991 
(per cent) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
General Services 27.1 27.1 29.4 24.4 10.0 21.8 20.6 21.2 21.1 
Community and 
social Services 
31.6 36.3 37.7 39.7 43.2 44.7 44.5 46.4 41.7 
Economic 20.9 18.4 16.6 15.1 18.5 17.2 16.2 14.5 15.6 
Services 
Other Purposes 17.6 15.3 11.8 17.2 14,9 12.4 14.9 14.4 18.4 
Net Lending 2.8 2.9 4.4 3.6 4.5 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ISSER (1993, 28) 
The trend in the broad measure of welfare is one of increasing government 
involvement in the health sector. The broad measure demonstrates that government 
expenditure to the social sector increased by ten per cent from 1983 to 1991. 
8.6.2 Health Care Delivery Indicators 
8.6.2.1 Immunisation Coverage of Infants 
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 demonstrate that there is no clear pattern regarding immunisation 
coverage in Ghana during the transition period. For the period 1983-85 immunisation 
of infants either decreased or rose marginally; DPT coverage expanded by less than 
two per cent. Measles, polio and BCG immunisation dell by 19 per cent, two per cent 
and ten per cent respectively. Towards the end of transition period, the data on 
immunisation coverage indicates an expansion in the number of infants immunised. 
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The percentage of infants immunised for DPT increased by 18 per cent too 35 per cent 
from the 1980-82 base. Measles immunisation rocketed by 43 per cent in 1986-87. 
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Figure 8.5. Ghana Transition Period — Percentage of Infants Immunised 
Evidence on the later adjustment period indicates that in general, progress has been 
made in both absolute terms and relative to the pre-adjusting period. Figure 8.6 
indicates that from 1981 to 1988-89 immunisation coverage expanded for TB, 
polio, measles and tetanus in pregnant women. TB coverage increased by 32 per cent, 
DPT by 29 per cent, polio by 26 per cent, measles by 42 per cent and tetanus by eight 
per cent. However by 1990 coverage began to slip for TB and tetanus. By 1992 
coverage had slipped in all immunisation categories from 1988-89; TB was at 57 per 
cent and tetanus in pregnant women was at nine per cent, both below pre-adjustment 
period levels. DPT was at 34 per cent, polio at 36 per cent and measles at 40 per cent. 
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Figure 8.6. Percentage of Ghanaian One-Year-Old Children Fully Immunised 1981- 
1992 
The with without comparison for the transition period reveals that Ghana does better 
than the controls. Benin and Liberia both demonstrate a downward trend in DM' and 
measles immunisation in infants. For, instance, from 1980-87, Liberia falls from 39 
per cent to 19 per cent in DPT coverage and from 99 per cent to 40 per cent in 
Measles coverage. Meanwhile, Ghana expands its coverage. During the same time 
period, Ghana's measles coverage fell from 20 per cent in 1980-82, to one per cent in 
1983-85, and rose to 63 per cent in 1986-87. Coverage for DPT rose slightly (by four 
per cent) from 1983-85 to 1986-87. For Benin, immunisation of infants, for the 
period 1983-85 to 1986-87, fell from 47.5 to 23.5 per cent for DPI', from 43 to 27 per 
cent for measles and from 54.5 per cent to 26 per cent for polio. Figure 8.7, sets out 
this trends in the form of stacked columns. 
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Figure 8.7. Ghana Transition Period— With Without Immunisation 
For the later adjustment period Ghana also does better than the Liberia control and 
roughly matches the performance of the Bcnin control. From 1981 to 1990-92 the 
percentage of one-year-old infants covered for DPT and polio in Ghana expanded 
from 22 to 34 per cent and from 25 to 36 per cent respectively. However, Ghana 
does poorly on TB immunisation where the percentage of infants immunised fell by 
ten per cent form 1981 to 1990-92. Moreover, expansion in coverage for Ghana was 
mixed for polio; coverage was highest in 1990 at 56 per cent, before falling to 36 per 
cent, whereas in Benin coverage expanded consistently. Benin, during the same time 
period expanded immunisation by ten per cent for TB, by 31 per cent for DPT and 
polio. Liberia, in contrast, experiences a decline in immunisation coverage by nine 
per cent for TB and 11 per cent for DPT, while coverage of polio expanded slightly. 
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Figure 8.8. With Without Immunisation TB, DPI' and Polio 1980-90; Per cent of 
One-Year-Old Children Fully Immunised 
The with without analysis of measles and tetanus in pregnant women is also 
somewhat mixed. Ghana does better than Liberia in that immunisation expands in 
Measles in Tetanus in Ghana, whereas in Liberia it is down substantially in both from 
1981 to 1990-92. It does worse than Benin in so far as Benin sees an expansion in 
both tetanus and measles immunisation. From 1988-89 to 1990-92 measles 
immunisation in Benian infants increases from 41 to 70 per cent while in Ghana it 
declines by 25 per cent from 65 to 40 per cent. For tetanus immunisation coverage 
expands from 60 to 83 per cent from 1988-89 to 1990-92 in Benin, while in Ghana the 
per cent of infants fully immunised declines ten per cent form 19 to 9 per cent. Figure 
8.9 shows these trends. 
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Figure 8.9. With Without Immunisation of Measles and Tetanus in Pregnant Women 
1980-90; Per cent of One-Year-Old Children Fully Immunised 
8.6.2.2 Supply of Health Care 
Access to health facilities and health manpower in Ghana has held up during the 
transition period. Ghana currently has a three-tiered PHC system. On the first tier are 
community health workers trained by the Ministry of Health in simple techniques of 
preventative and promotive health care. On the second level are community 
health/nurse midwives who supervise tier one workers and provide immunization 
coverage. On the third tier or district level a district hospital team acts as a referral 
centre for lower tiers. Ewusi (1989: 32) reports that although there was only a small 
improvement in the number of hospitals from 1970 to 1987, where the number of 
government and mission hospitals expanded from 106 to 112, the number of hospital 
beds expanded considerably in all areas except Accra. In 1970 there were 5,215 
hospital beds throughout the country. By 1987 this figure had risen to 18,614. 
Although there is still a bias towards the capital city, the Volta, Central and Western 
regions had population hospital bed ratios similar to that of Accra by 1987. The 
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population hospital bed ratio in Accra, as of 1987 was 1:402, in the Volta region the 
ratio improved from 1:933 in 1970 to 1:496 in 1987 and in the Western region the 
ratio improved from 1:799 to 1: 485. Table 8.3 shows the increasing supply of 
hospital beds and the subsequent reduction in the importance of Accra as a centre of 
hospital care. In essence, Ghana throughout the adjustment transition has been able to 
move away from an urban, curative-based system to one that is consistent with PHC 
and basic needs. 
Table 8.3 Regional Distribution of Hospital Beds (Number and Ratio) in Ghana 
1970-87 
1970 1987 
Region Total Ratio Total Ratio 
Accra 1761 1:307 3536 1:402 
Volta 369 1:933 2423 1:496 
Eastern 604 1:1186 2200 1:763 
Central 426 1:1451 2303 1:497 
Western 548 1:799 1379 1:485 
Ashanti 436 1:933 2927 1:714 
Brong-Ahafo 76 1:1698 1389 1:849 
Northern 346 1:1698 1043 1:1115 
Upper East 349 1:262 696 1:1109 
Upper West 349 1:262 718 1:612 
Total 5215 1:641 18,614 1:656 
Source: UNICEF— Ghana (1991) and Ewusi (1987) 
However, it should be remembered that an increase in the supply of hospital beds 
does not necessarily mean that health care is improving. Table 8.3 fails to capture 
other factors that may influence hospital care. It is possible that drug supplies may 
have been limited or that equipment was not available or was broken. 
Vogel (1988: 130-132) provides Ministry of Health information on drug 
supplies in Ghana. He notes that the allocation of drug supplies in Ghana has never 
matched the stated requirements. Prior to the adjustment period the difference 
between stated requirements and allocations was great. As of 1982, the Government 
asked the Ministry of Health to provide "realistic" estimates as to the requirements. 
This the Ministry of Health did and allocations rose to the eve of adjustment. 
However, by 1984 requirements were estimated at $76.7 million with only $23.1 
q Requirements 
	 * 	
 Allocations 
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million approved. In 1985, the Ministry of Health requested $22 million and received 
68 per cent of the money or $15 million. However, by 1987 estimated requirements 
stood again at $73 million and the Ministry of Health only received $13 million. 
Vogel (1988: 130) notes, however, that the difference should be seen in the context of 
adjustment measures which have encouraged the private importation of 
pharmaceuticals. The Special Unnumbered Licences (SULs) have been used by 
private companies to ensure "reasonable quantities of a wide range of drugs on the 
Ghanaian market." (Vogel 1988: 130). 
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Figure 8.10. Ghana Transition Period — Drug Supplies 
Prior to Rawling's first coup d'etat the health system in Ghana was in disarray. 
Hospitals, then, have been described (Anyiman 1989, 543) as "graveyards" because 
they did not have a sufficient supply of drugs and equipment. Following Rawling's 
ascencion to power the situation began to improve. As part of the ERP $114 million 
was initially allocated for the improvement of basic health infrastructure. Most of the 
money was to go to the lower tiers of the primary health care system. However, most 
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of this money was not spent on PHC activities: $69 million went to the procurement 
of pharmaceuiticals, $19.9 million went to equipment costs and only $15.5 million 
went to the rehabilitation of district hospitals and $7.2 million to the completion of 
hospitals (Edwusi 1989, 20). However, this must be weighed against the fact that 
during the 1980s, as part of basic needs/PHC 4,113 TBAs and 2,913 community 
health workers were trained (see table 8.4), 
8.6.2.3 Health Manpower Indicators 
The situation of health manpower during the transition period is mixed. On the 
negative side the number of doctors declined substantially from the immediate pre-
adjustment period. On the positive side the number of paramedical personnel rose 
greatly and the regional distribution of doctors improved for most parts of the country. 
As of 1980 there were 1,648 registered doctors in the country. However, by 1985, 
due to the economic crisis in the country, this figure had declined by 51 per cent to 
810 doctors. Ewusi (1989: 37) reports, that based on medical school admission data 
the figure for 1985 should have been 2,177 doctors. However, after 1985 the number 
of doctors in the country began to improve. In any case the loss in skilled health 
manpower was at least partially offset by an increase in the number of nurses and 
midwives. As of 1980 there were 13,232 of this type of personnel, by 1985 the 
number of nurses and midwives ballooned to 20,200 and by 1988 the figure was 
21,300, Improvements in the supply of paramedical staff was matched by 
improvements in the distribution of doctors. The number of all doctors improved in 
all regions as of 1986 as measured against 1980 and 1985. Moreover, the doctor 
population ratio improved in all regions except the Northern and Western as measured 
against the 1970 ratio. In absolute terms, Accra is still the best doctor-served region. 
An urban bias is evident as the doctor population ration is only one for 4,244 
inhabitants in Greater Accra, where in the Northern region the ratio is 1:56,502 and in 
the Upper East and West the ratio is 1:57,903. Table 8.4 indicates the improvement in 
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doctor supply across regions and the continued urban bias in skilled health manpower 
delivery. 
Table 8.4. Numbers of Doctors and Doctor/Population Ratios by Region (1970-86) 
Region 
1970 1985 1986 
Number of Doc/Pop 
Doctors 	 Ratio 
Number of Doc/Pop 
Doctors 	 Ratio 
Number of Doc/Pop 
Doctors 	 Ratio 
Greater 147 1:6000 222 1:6400 357 1:4244 
Accra 
Volta 17 1:56000 35 1:34000 45 1:28890 
Western 60 1:13000 41 1:27000 65 1:18088 
Eastern 28 1:45000 26 1:65000 50 1:35221 
Central 23 1:39000 29 1:4000 45 1:26849 
Ashanti 78 1:19000 115 1:18000 182 1:12063 
Brong- 12 1:64000 15 1:79000 40 1:31341 
Ahafo 
Northern 17 1:43000 18 1:65000 22 1:56502 
Upper East 8 1:107000 7 1:63000 14 1:57903 
Upper West 8 1:107000 7 1:63000 9 1:57903 
Total 390 1:22000 508 1:25000 827 1:15536 
Source: UNICEF — Ghana (1991) and Ewusi (1987) 
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Due to data limitations, a with without analysis if population and nursing person ratios 
is only possible to the middle of Ghana's transition period. From 1970 to 1980 there 
was steady progress in reducing the population per physician ratio in Benin and 
Ghana. However, Benin was able to make faster progress, albeit starting from a 
higher base. As of 1970 the ratio in Benin stood at 1:28,570 by 1980 this had fallen to 
1:16980, whereas in Ghana the ratio fell from 1:12,910 to 1:7,160. In Liberia the 
ratio fell at a slower rate from 1:9,260 in 1977 to 1:8,550 in 1980. However, during 
the transition period, Ghana, as noted, saw a worsening ratio, whereas Benin's ratio 
continued to decline and Liberia's only increased slightly For the nursing person ratio 
a similar pattern is evident. Ghana by 1970 had already achieved an enviable ratio of 
1:690 which held steady until 1985. Benin and Liberia, which had much worse ratios 
in 1970, around 1:2600, and following an increase in the ration to 1973, saw the ratio 
decline precipitously until 1985 1:1370 in the case of Liberia and to 1:1750 for Benin. 
However, in absolute terms Ghana's performance continued to be much better than 
her controls. 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Reports (various) 
Figure 8.13. With Without Population per Nursing Personnel 
8.6.2.4 Outpatient Attendances 
Data on outpatient attendances during the transition period comes from the World 
Bank's country Office in Accra (World Bank 1989b). The data reveals that outpatient 
attendances began a steady decline from a high of 10.7 million in 1976 to 4.7 million 
in 1983. During the transition period outpatient attendances remained fairly constant; 
4.5 million in 1984, 4.1 million in 1985, 4.2 million in 1986 and 4.8 million in 1987. 
This would tend to suggest that the structural adjustment programme is having little 
impact on discouraging outpatient attendances. Moreover, that since user charges 
were introduced in 1985 after the main decline in attendances, increased price to pay 
for medical care is not deterring utilisation. Furthermore, it was the Government of 
Ghana which took the initial step in increasing hospital fees. On 5 July 1985, the fee 
for a hospital bed for an adult increased from 7.5 to 40 cedis for adults and 5 to 20 
cedis for infants and children. It was not until December of 1985 that as part of the 
Bank's Health and Education Rehabilitation project that the government was required 
to meet 15 per cent of its recurrent budget from cost recovery efforts. In addition, it 
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has been reported elsewhere (Toye 1991, 178) that this condition was attached to the 
credit at the request of the PNDC and that slippage on the condition was high.42 
However, there are two points that need to be considered before reaching a 
firm conclusion. First, while it may be true that adjustment may not have deterred 
hospital attendance, it certainly has not improved it. Moreover, although outpatient 
attendance has remained fairly consistent over the transition period in absolute terms, 
due to population expansion, outpatient attendances per capita have declined. On the 
eve of adjustment attendances per capita stood at 0.54 by the end of the transition 
period this had fallen to 0.35. Second, Ewusi (1989, 67) warns that poor maintenance 
of facilities as well cost recovery in hospitals has deterred utilisation. Evidence from 
one district hospital, University Hospital at Legon, shows hospital attendances 
declined 15 per cent from 27,536 in 1986 to 24,368 in 1987 (Ewusi 1989, 67). 
However, it should be noted that in 1988 there appears to be an improvement in the 
situation. As of 1988 attendances had risen to 27,812— above the 1986 and 1985 
levels. 
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Figure 8.14. Ghana Transition Period — Outpatient Attendances (1976-87) 
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Waddington and Enyimayew (1989 and 1990) also note that utilisation has 
dropped in Ghana following the introduction of user fees. The issue here is not that 
utilisation has decreased, but that the decline in utilisation is not the direct fault of the 
Bank or the Fund. Although Waddington and Enyimayew (1989 and 1990) use an 
"eclectic" approach to determining if utilisation decreases when a price is introduced 
for health care (the mix data on outpatient attendances, interviews with health staff 
and focused group discussions) they have reasonably d6monstrated that user charges 
likely led to a decline in utilisation. They have demonstrated (Waddington and 
Enimayew 1990) that the decline in rural areas was substantial, and utilisation was not 
able, by 1988, to recover to the 1984 level. Although urban areas saw a similar 
decline utilisation there was able to recover to the pre-fee level. 
5.6.3 Health Condition Indicators 
An analysis of the transition period with regards to health condition indicators reveals 
that overall access to sanitation and safe water are up. However, the total figure 
obscures the differences between urban and rural areas. Access to safe water and 
sanitation remained unchanged in rural areas during the transition period. Only 39 per 
cent of rural Ghanaians had access to safe water throughout the period. Sanitation 
coverage also failed to expand and remained static during the transition period. 
Instead resources went into improving facilities for the urban population. Access to 
safe water expanded to near universal levels in urban areas; to 95 per cent during the 
transition. Access to sanitation also improved; at the start of the adjustment access 
was limited to 47 per cent of the urban population, by 1986-87 access had increased to 
63 per cent. 
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Figure 8.15. Ghana Transition Period — Access to Safe Water and Sanitation 
The transition period with without analysis reveals a similar picture for the controls; 
rural access to safe water remained constant while coverage in urban areas improved. 
Only rural areas in Liberia saw a slight improvement in access to safe water, from 20-
25 per cent during Ghana's transition. Rural areas of Benin retained the same level of 
access throughout the transition. Access to safe water in urban Liberia also improved 
greatly to 93 per cent at the end of the transition. however, in Benin coverage fell by 
one per cent from 80 to 79 per cent during the transition. 
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Figure 8.16. Ghana Transition Period — With Without Access to Safe Water 
Figure 8.17, also reflects a rural urban differential in the provision of sanitation 
services to the control groups. The with without analysis reveals that the controls did 
better at improving sanitation services to rural areas than did Ghana during the 
adjustment. Access increased 11 per cent in rural Benin and six per cent in rural 
Liberia, while rural Ghana saw a one per cent decline. Access to sanitation services 
for urban Liberia is not available, however a comparison of access to sanitation 
facilities for urban Ghana and Benin reveal a similar pattern. At the start of Ghana's 
adjustment in 1983 urban access increased by 3 per cent and in urban Benin the 
increase was on the order of two per cent. 
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Figure 8.17. Ghana Transition period — With Without Access to Sanitation Services 
The with without analysis of the post transition period reveals that the Benin control 
does better than Ghana — data on Liberia is not available. Urban areas in Benin 
increased access to safe water to 73 per cent by 1990. In Ghana access to safe water 
falls from pre-adjustment and transition period levels. In 1980 urban access was 72 
per cent, by 1985 this had risen to 96 per cent, and by 1990 this had fallen to 63 per 
cent. Benin also appears to fair better in rural access to safe water. At the cusp of the 
transition period Benin's rural access was still increasing, to 39 per cent, whereas 
Ghana's had fallen by 16 per cent from 55 to 39 per cent. 
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Sourece: World Bank (1994a); figure for 1985 from World Resources Institute (1990); 
figure for 1988 from World Resources Institute (1992) 
Figure 8.18. With Without Access to Safe Drinking Water 1980-90 
Information from the World Bank (1994a) and the World Resources Institute (1990 
and 1992) indicates that access to sanitation services is improving in both control and 
non-control. Again, data on Liberia is not available. In urban areas, both countries 
began Ghana's adjustment period at the same level and ended in 1990 at nearly equal 
levels. However, from 1988 to 1990 the rate of increase was virtually non-existent in 
Ghana, whereas in Benin the increase was from 42 to 60 per cent. In rural areas, the 
rate of increase in access to sanitation services leapt in Ghana from 1988 to 1990 
while making steady progress in Benin. In Ghana access increased 45 per cent from 
15 to 60 per cent, while in Benin the increase was lower at four per cent. 
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Source: World Bank (1994a); figure for 1985 from World Resources Institute (1990); 
figure for 1988 from World Resources Institute (1992) 
Figure 8.19. With Without Access to Sanitation Services 1980-90 
8.6.4 Nutrition Status Indicators 
There is a dearth of time series data regarding nutrition status in Ghana. Information 
is occasionally gathered by the World Bank (GSS 1989), FAO and UNICEF —
Ghana (1984 and 1991) on the nutritional status of children in various parts of the 
country. While important, these sources only provide a static picture of the nutrition 
status of individuals. Such data while highlighting the severity of the situation in the 
various regions in Ghana it is useless in ascertaining the impact of adjustment on 
nutrition status. In order to get a rough idea of the impact of World Bank and IMF 
programme lending on nutrition status in the country two alternative data sources are 
used: aggregate food supply figures supplied by FAO (Food Production Yearbooks, 
various) and estimates of malnutrition provided by the Catholic Relief Services in 
Ghana. Figure 8.20 shows the percentage of children between ages of 7 and 42 
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months that are below the third percentile of Harvard weight for age standard during 
Ghana's transition period. The data generally indicates an improving situation during 
the transition period. Overall, 1980 was the worst year for malnutrition in Ghana. 
The next worst year was 1984. Although this is during the transition period it is 
unlikely that the poor performance on weight-for-age can be attributed to the 
adjustment programme. 1983 was a critical period in Ghana: during that year 
prolonged drought and severe bush fires plagued the country (UNICEF — Ghana 
1984). In addition in January of that year Nigeria expelled an estimated one million 
Ghanaians from the country (UNICEF — Accra 1988: 97). This had the effect of 
greatly reducing the country's food supply while simultaneously increasing its food 
requirements. By 1984, this showed up as increases in malnutrition in children. 
Following 1984 the situation generally improved in 1985 and 1986, so that 
approximately one third of the children in the Catholic Relief Service data were 
malnourished. However, before reaching a firm conclusion that adjustment measures 
have been responsible for the 1984 deterioration two points need to be made. First, 
the Catholic Relief Service data suffers from a selection bias. The data includes only 
those children that attended health clinics for supplementary feeding. Thus, those 
children who were unable to get to a clinic or were unaware of the programme are 
excluded from the analysis. The data, however, does seem to provide a reasonable 
estimate of malnutrition in so far as the latest year of the Catholic Relief data is 
consistent with findings from the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GSS 1989). 
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Figure 8.20. Percentage of Children Aged 7-42 Months Below the Third Percentile of 
Harvard Weight/Age Standard Attending Clinics 1980-86 
FAO figures also back up the data from the Catholic Relief Services. Figures 8.21 
and 8.22 show that 1983 was the worst year for food supply in Ghana. Protein and 
calories per capita per day were below the level necessary to ensure that an average 
family would have an adequate diet. Figure 8.22 shows that calories per capita per 
day plunged from 1,973 calories per person per day prior to the adjustment period to 
1,621 calories per person per day at the start of the adjustment period. During the 
transition period food supply improved markedly to 2,167 calories per person per day. 
However, compared to the control countries Ghana still remained behind in ensuring 
an adequate food supply for its citizens. Moreover, as figure 8.23 illustrates Ghana's 
situation, eventhough it made progress during the transition period, failed to ensure 
adequate nutrition both during the transition and adjustment periods. Figure 8.23 
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demonstrates that the nutrition situation remained in critical condition until 1990. 
Using Maasland and van der Gaag's (1992: 57) criteria of -15 as the point were acute 
undernutrition becomes widespread, figure 8.23 shows that it was not until the end of 
the transition period that Ghana was able to obtain a level were undernutrition became 
the norm as opposed to sever undernutrition. Compared to the control countries, 
Ghana also does relatively worse. Benin, from 1980 to 1988, has a nutrition rating of 
approximately -6, indicating that mild undernutrition was, in the aggregate prevalent. 
After 1988 the Benin score shows that undernutrition ceased to be a major problem. 
More surprisingly the Liberia control shows that, in the aggregate, during Ghana's 
adjustment, undernutrition did not become a problem until 1990. 
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Figure 8.21. With Without Protein per Capita (1960-1990) 
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Figure 8.22. With Without Calories per Capita per Day (total number; 1979-1990) 
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Figure 8.23. With Without Comparison of Nutrition Situation 
8.6.5 Health Status Indicators 
Information obtained from the World Development Reports published by the World 
Bank indicates that there has been a steady decline, save for one period, in the infant 
mortality rate. Information contained in the World Development Reports indicates 
that the infant mortality rate was steadily decreasing to 1982 when the rate fell to 86 
infant deaths per 1000. Following that date the IMR increased to 97 per 1000 in 1984 
before declining in 1984, 1985 and 1986. By 1987 the rate had increased slightly 
over the previous year. The indirect estimate of infant mortality provided by the 
United Nations (1992) based on DHS data is generally consistent with this pattern. 
As of 1974 the IMR stood a 102 per 1000, the rate declined until 1980 at which point 
it began to rise. In 1982 the rate was 97 per 1000, in 1984 100 per 1000 and in 1985 
109 per 1000. These estimates a broadly comparable to that of the World Bank in that 
they show the rate declining to the early 1980s, and then an uptick in the IMR around 
1984. Both sets show improvement in the IMR at the end of the transition period, 
although in the case of the indirect DHS estimate the rate of decline is much greater. 
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The direct estimate from the Ghana DHS indicates that there has been no increase in 
the IMR from 1973 to 1987, and marked progress has been made in reducing infant 
deaths. Given that the indirect DHS estimate and the World Bank data are similar in 
pattern, if not in scale, these two sets are considered more reliable. Moreover, the 
estimates are what would be expected given that 1983 was a drought year in Ghana. 
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 
Source: World Bank (World Development Reports, various); 
UN (1992) and Ghana Statistical Service and Institute for Resource 
Development (1989) 
Figure 8.24. Alternative Estimates of the Infant Mortality Rate 
As there are no DHS estimates for Benin and Liberia for the 1980s the with-without 
analysis is based on the World Bank data. That data indicates that in all three 
countries the infant mortality rate declined until 1982, before increasing in 1983. It is 
notable that after 1982 Ghana consistently has a lower infant mortality rate than the 
other two countries. However, throughout the 1980s Benin was able to stabilise its 
rate at around 115 infant deaths per 1000 population. In the case of Liberia the rate 
continued to fluctuate considerably. The IMR stood at 111 in 1983 before increasing 
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to approximately 128 in 1984 and 1985, during 1986 and 1987 the rate fell to 87. 
However, for 1988-1990, the rate increased substantially to 130, 137 and 136 infant 
deaths per 1000 population.43  
Source: World Bank; World Development Reports (various) 
Figure 8.25. With Without Infant Mortality Rate (1960-1992) 
Similar to the analysis conducted in chapter seven, a regression is run in order to 
determine the influence of the adjustment programme on the infant mortality rate. 
The OLS reveals, as expected, that there is a negative relationship between time and 
IMR. The R2 of .38 reflects the low number of observations and a low IMR score in 
the 1970s. 
Table 8.5. Ordinary Least Squares Analysis of IMR 
Regression Coefficients 
Lagged 
Constant Time Dummy Dummy R2 
Model 1 114.54 -2.17 .38 
Model 2 116.8 -3.24 12.55 .41 
Model 3 107.62 (-2.06) 7.14 .28 
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The performance of the U5MR in Ghana improved during the adjustment period as 
compared to the previous period. The reduction in the U5MR continued to make 
steady progress from 1980 to 1991. From 1960 to 1980 the average annual reduction 
in the under five mortality rate was 1.5 per cent, from 1980 to 1991 this had increased 
slightly to a 1.7 per cent average annual reduction. As compared to the controls this 
performance is acceptable. Liberia actually saw an the U5MR decrease faster during 
the 1980s than from 1960 to 1980. Benin's rate, on the other hand, continued to 
decline, but slowed considerably during the 1980s. Table 8.6 outlines these changes. 
Table 8.6 With Without/Before After Under Five Mortality Rate  
Average Annual Reduction Average Annual Reduction 
1960-80 (per cent) 1980-91 (per cent) 
Ghana 1.5 1.7 
Liberia 1.2 1.8 
Benin 2.8 1.5 
Source: UNICEF (1993a) 
8.6 Indicators on Education 
A before after analysis of Ghana's performance on providing education to its citizens 
indicates that progress has been made at the primary level. Prior to the adjustment 
period, in 1982, primary school enrolment stood at 69 per cent. By 1983 the 
enrolment of school aged children reached a peak of 79 per cent. By 1984 in the 
transition period enrolment fell by 13 per cent to 66 per cent. However, after that date 
enrolment increased steadily to 1991 where the enrolment percentage off 77 was close 
to the pre-adjustment level. The with without analysis indicates that prior to Ghana's 
adjustment, in 1980, primary school enrolment was similar for all the countries; 
Ghana at 69 per cent, Liberia at 66 per cent and Benin at 62 per cent. Benin and 
Liberia, like Ghana, reached peak levels of 67 and 76 per cent respectively in 1983. 
After that date Liberia's enrolment declined by a massive amount to 35 per cent while 
Benin's fell by only two per cent before recovering to 66 per cent in 1991. Overall 
Ghana's performance was slightly better than Benin's and substantially better than 
Liberia's. 
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A before after analysis of Ghana's record on secondary level education 
demonstrates that improvements in enrolment rates have been difficult to maintain. In 
contrast to primary school enrolment, secondary school enrolment improved over the 
transition period. From 1980 the percentage of school aged children enrolled in 
secondary education increased from 36 per cent to a peak of 40 per cent in 1987. In 
the later adjustment period the enrolment percentage fell marginally to 39 per cent in 
1989 and to 38 per cent in 1991. This performance when compared to the Benin 
control shows that Ghana is doing better on education than non-adjusters. Benin 
which had a much lower enrolment level than Ghana, reached a peak of 25 per cent in 
1985, then fell back to the pre 1980 levels by 1989. Data on Liberia is not available 
post 1983. 
However, worrying signs have shown up in the quality of teaching in Ghana. 
The primary pupil/teacher ration declined until 1988 when it reached 23 pupils per 
teacher. However, in the post transition period the ratio increased to 29 pupils per 
teacher in 1991. The same pattern is evident in Benin. The ratio reached a low in 
1988 of 33 students per teacher, then increased slightly to 36 students per teacher in 
1991. 
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In chapter five and six the critical role that female education plays in health status 
changes was discussed Chapter five indicated that improvements in female education, 
specifically, made up a portion of the basic needs approach. Given this it is useful to 
examine the case of adjusting Ghana and compare it to non-adjusting Benin. Tables 
8.7 and 8.8 show that the overall and relative performance of Ghana was better that of 
her control pairing. In terms of females per 100 males in secondary education Benin's 
performance dropped as compared to the pre-adjusting period while Ghana's 
expanded. A comparison of primary education shows relatively equal performance, 
although Ghana does better overall. 
Table 8.7 Ghana Adjuster — Control Females per 100 Males (Primary Education)  
1970 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 	 Change 1970 - 1990 
Benin 45 50 50 51 51 
Ghana 75 78 77 80 81 82 	 +7 
Source: World Bank, World Development Reports (various) 
Table 8.8 Ghana Adjuster — Control Females per 100 Males (Secondary Education)  
1970 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 	 Change 1970 - 1990 
Benin 44 39 41 39 
	
37 	 -7 
Ghana 35 62 62 66 65 63 	 +28 
Source: World Bank, World Development Reports (various) 
8.7 Commentary 
During the transition period concerns were raised that not enough attention was being 
placed on the vulnerable groups in Ghana. In 1987 a draft of a report outlining 
guidelines to help alleviate any adverse effects arising from the economic recovery 
programme was produced by the Ghanaian authorities, UNICEF and World Bank 
field staff in Accra. The Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was aimed at the rural poor and small farmers, the urban 
poor, retrenched workers, malnourished children and women. Funds amounting to 
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$84 million were suggested by donors to protect vulnerable groups from any problems 
that occurred as a result of the adjustment programme. 
The programme had two broad areas of action: employment creation and basic 
needs. The employment portion of PAMSCAD concentrated on providing food-for-
work schemes in the Northern region, public work programmes in urban areas, such 
as the (re)building of housing, roads and schools, the provision of compensation 
packages to redeployees and training programmes for laid-off workers. The basic 
needs part of the programme provided funds for well-digging and sanitation projects, 
the provision of essential drugs and a supplementary feeding programme for infants. 
Several criticisms can be directed at the implementation of PAMSCAD. The 
main criticism relates to the ad hoc nature of the programme. It was not until the eve 
of ERP II that discussions about the possible consequences of adjustment were held. 
By this time any frictional costs associated with the transition period would have 
already been borne by the vulnerable groups. Thus, the employment portion of 
PAMSCAD would have been little use to displaced workers as they would have 
already found other sources of work or immigrated out of the target region. Second, 
interventions in the health sector appear to have been of an add-on nature. The low 
point for health and nutrition status indicators was 1983 to 1984, thus any programme 
aimed at addressing a deterioration of living standards should have started at the 
beginning of ERP I. Third, funding of the programme was delayed until 1989 when 
only a fraction, $15 million, of the estimated requirements was dispersed. This sum 
was wholly inadequate for providing funds to both rural and urban areas and to 
generate a high level of employment creation and basic needs provision to what 
amounted to almost all poor groups in the country. 
Due to problems in targeting, implementation, lack of financial commitment 
and coordination amongst various groups the programme has gradually faded away. 
UNICEF (Gotnick 1994) has reported that from their perspective the programme for 
all purposes is dead. Cooperation between UNICEF and the Bank over objectives and 
implementation was never completely ironed-out. Consequently, UNICEF has 
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focused on devising a system of basic health interventions applicable to the poor in 
Ghana. 
However, it is apparent from the preceding analysis that the adjustment 
programme in Ghana has not led to a worsening of either health care delivery, health 
conditions or health status in Ghana. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell how the 
effects of adjustment were distributed. However, the available evidence does suggest 
that rural and urban areas have weathered the adjustment relatively well. It is 
impossible to tell what the impact on the informal sector of the economy has been. 
The government's expansion of funding to the health sector, following the beginning 
of the ERP, has allowed for improvements in health status to occur. The rise in the 
broader welfare measure also indicates that the provision of services that affect an 
individual's health environment has also risen. Nutrition status has not suffered as a 
result of adjustment. The available evidence suggests that food supply has continued 
to increase despite fears that the real exchange rate devaluation would lead to food 
crops being replaced with cash crops produced for the export market. 
The adjustment programme has also been relatively successful in restraining 
inflation. The rate of inflation has decreased substantially from the triple digits found 
in the per-adjustment time period. Moreover, and contrary to the pattern found in 
most developing countries, increases in food price inflation, in several instances has 
trailed consumer price inflation. This has protected urban consumers who purchase 
most of their food in the market place from the full effects of the adjustment 
programme. However, this must be compared against the contraction in public sector 
employment and incomes in urban areas. However as Alderman (1993) has 
demonstrated there is reason to believe that the decline in income has not been severe 
and that many of the effected Ghanaians have been able to offset declines in income 
by finding employment in other areas. 
Health care delivery indicators have continued to expand in Ghana during the 
adjustment period. The picture for immunisation coverage is mixed, but it is 
generally clear that for most diseases immunisation increased throughout the 
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transition period and to the early 1990s. The performance of Ghana relative to her 
controls is also mixed but the picture tends to favour the adjuster. The adjustment 
period also saw an increase in formal health care delivery. Hospital beds and the 
number of physicians increased steadily. Moreover, the transition period was 
characterised by an increase in equity in the provision of services. Informal health 
care delivery, as measured by population per nursing person, also expanded. The 
number of nursing Ghana nearly doubled from the 1980 level. Although, outpatient 
attendances showed a worrying decline from 1982 to 1987, this appears not to have 
been the result of accepting the conditions of the adjustment programme: outpatient 
attendances were on a downward trend from the mid 1970s and the implementation of 
user charges preceding the World Bank programme tat recommended cost recovery. 
The Government of Ghana (Republic of Ghana 1992a) remains committed to 
the tenants of primary health care and basic needs. The government has planned 
expenditure of 134,000,000 cedis to primary health care strengthening, 750,000,000 
cedis to a Health Stations Rehabilitation and Completion project, 1,120,000,000 cedis 
to the construction of new health stations, 520,000,000 to teaching hospital 
rehabilitation, 4,649,000,000 to health support rehabilitation and 580,000,000 to a 
new regional hospital in the Cape Coast. The Health Stations Rehabilitation project 
has built 100 new health stations so as to improve the access to health care facilities. 
This should expand access to 60 per cent in rural areas; up from 45 per cent in 1987. 
A MCH/Family Planning project which should improve basic needs coverage, has 
since 1985, improved the supply of contraceptives and medical equipment to health 
stations. Moreover, the project has provided funding aimed at immunisation and 
control of diarrhoeal diseases, the promotion of breastfeeding, and the construction of 
MCH/FP centres and the rehabilitation of old ones. 
The provision of safe water and sanitation facilities grew throughout the 
transition period. However, the bias here is in favour of urban areas. However, 
although progress was flat in expanding the provision of these facilities in rural areas, 
coverage did not decline as it did in other African countries. However, the latter 
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adjustment period indicates that access to safe drinking water was expanding in the 
control, Benin, while falling in Ghana. Access to sanitation services to rural areas, in 
the post transition period shows that the rate of increase was higher in Ghana than in 
Benin. 
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Republic of Ghana 1992) 
Report of 1992 indicates that the Governemnt of Ghana remains committed to 
expanding basic needs coverage in this area. As of 1992, two main projects, Rural 
Water Suppply Schemes I and II were underway in order to provide safe drinking 
water to all Ghanaians, to help in the eradication of Guinea-worm and other water 
borne diseases and to improve agricultuaral productivity. Under the Rural Water 
Supply Scheme I, 6,079 new hand pump wells are planned. As of 1991, 472 new 
wells were dug by the government, 636 old wells were rehabilitated and 1,249 wells 
were dug by NGOs. Under scheme II, 602 hand wells (tapped by rope and bucket) 
were dug by 1992. 
In an effort to improve basic housing stock the Ghanaian government has been 
improving and increasing rural housing. The Approtech housing scheme aims to 
construct 102 core housing units and the Rural Housing Rehabilitation and 
Maintenance Programme will provide roofing sheets, cement and nails to rural 
farmers. However, eventhough Ghana shows a commitment to increasing and 
improving housing stock the interest of several "non-priority" groups is evident. As 
part of housing improvement, money has been allocated to the construction and 
fencing of new stables for a new race course and the rehabilitation of a police station 
(Republic of Ghana 1992, 99) 
The performance of health and nutrition status indicators is a bit more difficult 
to measure. As time series data on nutrition status is impossible to obtain use was 
made of a crude proxy. This indicates that nutrition status has tended to suffer most 
when food supply has declined due to poor weather conditions. As the measure is far 
from ideal it is difficult to ascertain the impact of the adjustment measures. However, 
given that food production has increased during adjustment, it is likely that Ghana, at 
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the least, did not end the 1980s at a state worse than the pre-adjusting period. 
Indicators on health status are also problematic. The DHS data sets suggest that the 
infant mortality rate ended the transition period at a better level than the World Bank 
data would suggest. However, both sets indicate a substantial decline throughout the 
1980s. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the complex issues surrounding World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund programme lending to Sub Saharan Africa and the 
impact that adjustment policies have had on health care development. It has been 
shown that both institutions exact a powerful influence over African countries. The 
ability to wield a substantial amount of pressure has arisen for two reasons. First at 
the founding of the Bank and the IMF at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire the western 
developed governments sought to bring stability to the post war situation. Initially the 
support from the IMF was directed towards the developed market economies that 
needed funds to aid in temporary shortfalls of foreign exchange. Throughout the 
1960s and 1970s the Fund continued to provide support mainly to developed countries 
in the form of stand-by agreements for temporary balance of payments support. The 
Bank, much like the Fund, initially started out be providing concessional finance to 
European countries to aid in the post war reconstruction. However, gradually 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with the provision of project loans, the Bank began 
to expand its activities to the poorest developing countries. It is this expansion of 
both Fund and Bank involvement that provided the first tentative encouragement for 
African governments to allow technical experts access to government policy makers. 
The second factor relates to the introduction of new policy instruments by both 
institutions that would prove to give them an unheard of degree of decision making 
with regards to the way that African economies were managed. Although, in the case 
of the IMF, the use of stand-by finance had always allowed the Fund some influence 
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noted that health and nutrition status and educational obtainment could suffer as a 
direct result of the conditions applied in the macroeconomic arena. More importantly 
they believed that adjustment programmes would lead to differing degrees of 
suffering or improvement depending on the occupational, residential, gender and age 
categories of individuals. In the area of health care development it has been 
hypothesised that adjustment programmes would affect health and nutrition status 
through a variety of mechanisms. First, expenditure reducing policies would lead to 
declines in incomes for public sector employees who were laid of. This decline in 
income would feed through to declines in health and nutrition status in so far as 
individuals and households would not be able to afford health care or food. The 
problem would have a knock on effect in the informal sector when the redundant 
public sector workers sought to redeploy their labour in informal activities. This 
would lead the wage in the informal sector to decline as the supply of labour 
increased. Second, expenditure reducing policies could lead to a reduction in health 
and nutrition status if funding to the social sector was cutback. This tended to be 
viewed as a universally bad reform to undertake. However, it has been noted that 
such cutbacks need not necessarily be associated with declines in health and nutrition 
status. Such cutbacks could eliminate unnecessary services and serve to encourage 
the promotion of cheaper, paramedical personnel and non-technical interventions 
consistent with the primary heath care strategy. Third, reduction in government 
support for a variety of subsidy schemes could adversely impact the poor. Obvio,.sly, 
the elimination of food subsidies was hypothesised to affect nutrition status. The 
reduction in other subsidies were also believed to affect health status. For instance, 
reduction in transport subsidies would discourage travel to health facilities. It is here 
that the linkage between macroeconomic reforms and changes in health status become 
murky, extremely complicated, and, basically, impossible to measure. To wit, a 
reduction in kerosene subsidy would require that a greater amount of income be 
foregone in order to purchase vital fuel. This income, in one possible scenario, would 
have to come from the household health budget. Or, alternatively, households could 
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cease to purchase kerosene, in which case health status might suffer as time formerly 
spent in household production and care of children was substituted for fuel wood 
gathering activities. 
The second area of concern was that welfare would be reduced through 
expenditure switching policies. The programme based conditions usually required a 
real devaluation of the exchange rate. This, then, would lead to a shift in the 
production in tradables and the incomes of those that produced such goods would 
increase. It was generally believed tat urban groups would suffer, but that rural 
groups, who make up the bulk of the African population, would benefit. However, 
the evidence in this area is rather mixed with some studies indicating that the 
participation in cash cropping schemes had a beneficial impact on heath status and 
some researchers showing that impact would be neutral or negative. 
Thus it has become clear that even the basic linkages between adjustment 
programmes and health status are not clear cut. The web of welfare changes is 
extremely complicated and few generalizable rules about the impact on different 
groups can be established. The reason for this lies in the fact that although adjustment 
programmes are standardised to a certain degree, the reforms may be promoted at 
different strengths. For instance, although cutbacks in the public sector and exchange 
rate devaluations figure prominently in most African adjustments, one country may 
only be required to cutback government employment by ten per cent while the other 
has to do away with 30 per cent. The uniqueness of each country's situation is further 
established by the fact that slippage on conditions may be quite high. Furthermore, 
the internal characteristics of each country may determine the ultimate impact of 
adjustment on householder health status. To wit, in some countries, or even in parts 
of countries, the autonomy of women may be well established so that children' 
welfare is protected even in the face of adverse events, while in other countries men 
may be the main budget holders and decision makers — subsequently, although not 
necessarily, household health and nutrition status might decline. 
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A considerable problem with the design of adjustment programmes is that the 
process by which economic reforms impact the social sector is not known with 
precision. The reason for this relies on an overuse of economic analysis to ascertain 
the possible linkages. Although the theoretical construction has merit, economic 
analysis fails to adequately capture the behaviour of poverty groups. This notion was 
brought forward in chapter six when the assumption of a maximising household unit 
was dropped. Clearly, there arc cases where household members may unequally bear 
the costs and benefits of adjustment. The failure to take into account the behaviour of 
the majority of the poor is evident in Ghana's PAMSCAD. The safety net created by 
the Bank and UNICEF was mainly too broad in scope and where the programme did 
focus on it a bias towards relatively well-off, politically connected urban employees 
was shown. Recent developments in the Ghanaian "national insurance" programme 
suffers from the same problem. The programme offers the possibility of insuring not 
poor groups but individuals who have relatively high incomes. The programme 
concentrates on providing insurance only to civil servant, members of the formal 
labour force and Cocobod. 
Although this does offer some relief to urban consumers some rural cash crop 
producers in the purchase of health care, attention is consequently diverted away from 
the majority of the rural poor. Thus, the Bank, in conjunction with national policy 
makers and other interested parties should focus their attention to rural groups when 
designing compensatory programmes that mitigate against any costs associated with 
adjustment programmes. This would differ from the ad hoc character of PAMSCAD. 
Instead, more use should be made of existing systems to identify vulnerable groups. 
The World Bank's database on living standards in some African countries should be 
expanded to all adjusting countries, and would serve as a foundation for research in 
this area. Second, there is a desperate need to expand the collection of regular data on 
health status, health care delivery and health condition changes. While it is 
recognised that from a humanitarian point of view if the choice is between spending 
money on data collection or on health status increasing activities the latter should be 
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preferred to the former in the short-run. However in the long-run the availability of 
an improved database will offer the ability to make informed, economic decisions, 
regarding the best use of scarce resources. The Bank in 1993 promised to become a 
more open and transparent institution. At that time it was believed that blanket 
clearance to review Bank reports of projects, economic reviews of the overall 
economy and specific sectors would become available to interested parties. However, 
the original proposal has been scaled back to a case by case policy of disclosure. The 
Bank, correctly, argues that full disclosure would hurt the process of honest policy 
dialogue with member countries and would undermine the long-term sustainability of 
projects. Thus, the future of better data is a matter of conjecture. On one hand, the 
new policy represents an improvement on past methods of disclosure, but it would 
appear not to go far enough in offering adequate information. It is not hard to 
envision a scenario where African governments approve the disclosure of information 
that show improvements, while withholding information that presents a country 
unfavourably. 
Third, the above improvements would be complemented with a people 
focused analysis of what or groups demand and the problems that they face under 
conditions of adjustment. The Bank, has already taken tentative steps in this 
direction. Although the effort is belated, coming over a decade after the first 
adjustment loan was implemented in Africa, the use of participatory poverty 
assessments (PPAs) offers some hope of filling the gaps in our knowledge. In this 
case, cluster samples of poverty groups are interviewed and observed in order to 
obtain information on what overtly groups believe to be the root causes of their 
poverty, the factors that are responsible for their continued immiseration, 
opportunities or obstacles to fuller labour force participation and the quality and 
provision of social services. The PPAs were created in 1993 and some problems still 
remain. First, for many of the PPAs rapid survey methods have been used. The 
strength of this approach is that it allows for a large amount of information to be 
gathered in a short period of time at a relatively low cost. However, the drawback of 
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such an approach is that it fails to consider the dynamic nature of adjustment. It is 
possible, although due to the recent nature of the PPAs this is not proven, that answers 
given in one time period may not be applicable later on. For instance, a PPA could 
reveal that access to credit markets is a problem in rural areas. Based upon that 
evidence it may be determined that some form of formal credit facility be provided to 
the poor. This might seem like a reasonable solution, however, a second, follow-up, 
PPA might reveal that informal, community-run credit arrangements to be more 
advantageous. Thus the PPAs should be designed as a continuing process. This, so 
far, is not the case. Only eleven PPAs are currently underway or completed in Sub 
Saharan Africa. None of these PPAs provide provision for further studies. 
Nonetheless, assuming that PPAs can be strengthened in terms of methodology and in 
numbers they will provide not only a way of assessing poverty from those affected but 
will also provide information that can be used in the design of safety nets and 
improving the welfare of the poor. 
Once the general linkages between adjustment and health status changes was 
established this thesis then examined the actual experience of African countries in the 
1980s. Although the analysis represents an improvement in earlier work it has been 
determined that the problem of bias and confounding could not be eliminated entirely. 
Clinical control trials require that in order to remove bias in results, the selection of 
subjects should be random. When talking about human subjects it is relatively easy to 
select people who are similar in all respects, and then randomly select from that pool. 
However, when the subjects become countries it becomes impossible to do this, as no 
two countries are exactly similar; all that can be hoped for is that countries are broadly 
similar. The interpretation of the results of this thesis are affected by this. Another 
factor that influences the results of this thesis is confounding. As the analysis was not 
random, the subjects were not identical, and the intervention was not always the same, 
the possibility that there is an alternative explanation cannot be entirely ruled out. 
Yet, as Brennan and Croft (1994, 729) note, this need not mean " that decision making 
in public health [be] paralyzed as a result. 
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The design of adjustment programmes should have taken this into account. 
Although randomisation will never be a realistic possibility, the Bank and the Fund 
should have been less quick at introducing adjustment programmes on a widespread 
scale in Africa. If this had been done, it would have allowed for the affects of a 
particular adjustment programme to be compared to many non-adjusting controls. 
Although this would not have eliminated bias, it would have provided a clearer 
understanding of how adjustment works when compared to several alternate 
scenarios. As poverty reduction and health improvements are major tenants of the 
World Bank, and with hindsight, the Bank and the Fund should have implemented 
studies as controlled before-after, interrupted time series or switchback designs in 
order to determine any health care or poverty affects of adjustment lending. 
The future design of adjustment programmes may allow for the problems of 
bias and confounding to be reduced. The movement away from SAL lending to 
health sector specific lending opens up the potential of increasing the number of 
African controls in an area and possibly randomising them. For instance, it will be a 
far easier task to compare countries that are utilising user fees, insurance schemes or 
some other World Bank/IMF sponsored intervention to countries that are not 
reforming. Indeed there is no doubt a great benefit in further breaking down SECAL 
lending so that interventions are done in parts of a country and evaluated against 
regions were the reform did not occur before they are extended to the entire country. 
The recent introduction of disability adjusted life years (DALYs) by the World Bank 
(World Bank 1994a) may offer the possibilty in the future of capturing changes in 
morbidity under adjustment programmes. 
Given the above caveats regarding the impact of adjustment measure, chapter 
seven and eight sought to correct for some of the flaws in earlier studies. Chapter 
seven provided a broad approach to the problem while still eliminating the 
deficiencies evident in the earlier approaches. As opposed to comparing adjusters and 
non-adjusters on a global scale, the analysis focused particularly on Africa. 
Moreover, African countries were matched based on economic criteria prior to the 
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adjustment period. Although no criteria or set of criteria could hope to capture the 
similarities evident in the countries, the approach was still an advancement. 
Furthermore, the analysis updated earlier studies whose periods of analysis extended 
only to the mid to late 1980s. In addition, the study was more comprehensive. The 
results of chapter seven's analysis indicated that, on an aggregate level, there was no 
systematic reason to assume that adjusting countries did better or worse than non-
adjusters. 
Chapter eight sought to focus the approach even further. Ghana was used as a 
case study to determine if health care delivery, health conditions and health status was 
adversely influenced by the country's economic recovery programme. The evidence 
indicated Ghana, not only did not suffer, but tended to make considerable progress 
during the transition period and the latter adjustment period. This is attributable to 
two main factors. First, the government remained committed to programme 
throughout the period of adjustment. Moreover, it did so while expanding its 
commitment to the social sector. Second prior to the adjustment was a low point for 
Ghana. It is almost possible to say that the economy could not have been any worse. 
Prior to 1983, the country was characterised by a series of coup d'etats, triple digit 
inflation, disinvestment by foreign private enterprises, thousands of ghost workers on 
the public payroll, the presence of a large parallel market and smuggling and a 
deteriorating infrastructure. The stability that the PNDC and the discipline of the 
World Bank and the IMF conditions offered to the economy set the foundation for 
future economic expansion. Although it is impossible to say what the distributional 
consequences were and how the informal sector was impacted, the available evidence 
suggests that both urban and rural groups increased their welfare. 
However, even though the adjustment programme did not lead to declines in 
health care development in Ghana, or show up a systematic pattern in the 
comprehensive study, this is not to say that the Bank and the Fund have been 
successful. In common with other approaches to examining the impact of lending on 
a country's economic performance, it is useful to employ the actual versus target 
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approach to health care development. As previously noted conditionality is not 
normally applied to the social sector. Thus, since the Bank and the Fund do not make 
formal specification of health sector improvements, information about targets is 
obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO 1993) and UNICEF (1990a). 
The goals of the Third Development Decade consisted of (UNICEF 1990a): 
(1) The elimination of hunger and malnutrition. 
(2) Immunisation coverage for all by 1990. 
(3) Safe water and sanitation for all by 1990. 
(4) Life expectancy of 60 years or better. 
(5) Infant mortality rate for the poorest countries less than 120 by 1990, and 
less than 50 by 2000. 
(6) Universal primary school enrolment by 2000. 
The goals were later revised to state: 
(7) Between 1990 and 2000 the reduction in IMR in all countries by one third 
or to between 50 and 70 per 1000 live births, whichever is less. 
(8) Between 1990 and 2000 a reduction in childhood malnutrition by 50 per 
cent. 
(9) Universal access to safe water and sanitation by the year 2000. 
(10) Maintenance of high levels of vaccination coverage (at least 90 per cent 
of children under one years of age) against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, 
tuberculosis, measles, polio and tetanus for women of childbearing age. 
The above list indicated that the goals to 1990 and the objectives set for 2000 were 
(are) extremely ambitious. Such targets must be treated with a degree of scepticism. 
For instance, these goals are formulated at the headquarters of UNICEF in New York 
and the World Health Organisation in Geneva and probably do not represent the 
thinking of field staff in African countries. Moreover, given that there are many 
difficult to predict variables, that may effect health status, health care delivery and 
health conditions, such as weather patterns, civil wars, external conflicts, mass 
expulsion of immigrants and large refugee movements, any such list of targets must 
be treated with caution. However, it must also be remembered that the goals are 
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formulated by experts in the field of health that, although ensconced in large 
bureaucracies, are not completely divorced from the everyday realities of health care 
development in Sub Saharan Africa. 
Chapters seven and eight indicated that in terms of the actual versus target 
approach hunger and undernutrition remained a major problem in all countries, except 
Lesotho, throughout the 1980s. In Mali the situation remained critical throughout the 
period. In the realm of immunisation coverage, progress to the specified target has 
been made. In virtually every instance adjusting countries have expanded 
immunisation coverage for infants. In some cases the expansion of coverage has been 
much greater than 50 per cent. However, there is reason to believe that a continuous 
90 per cent coverage will not be obtained by the year 2000. First, the data for the 
1980s has indicated that coverage varies widely from year to year, so that in one year 
it is possible to have 70 per cent of infants covered and the next year only 50 per cent. 
Such fluctuations can have serious implications for health status as the benefits of 
herd immunity will decline with such year to year negative changes in immunisation 
coverage. Second, it is highly likely that continued coverage will hit a financial 
barrier. As the cost of immunising additional infants increases as more infants are 
immunised, it is unlikely that the continued expansion in coverage can be financed 
from the coffers of national governments. Given the pressure on national aid budgets, 
particularly in the United States, it is not likely that increased funds will be released to 
expand immunisation coverage of infants. 
Chapters seven and eight have also indicated that the provision of safe water 
and sanitation facilities remain well below target levels. Yet, in the aggregate, 
adjusters have made steady progress. However the total access figures are effected by 
the large increase in urban areas. Expansion in rural areas has tended to be hindered 
by the promotion of urban access. The concentration on urban areas is inconsistent 
with the broader goals of primary health care and ignores the plight of the majority of 
Africans. 
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Progress in reducing the infant mortality rate has tended to favour the controls, 
but this is not to say that there were no advances in adjusters. The rate continued to 
decline in adjusters. However, by 1990 in only five adjusters was the rate below the 
1990 target level. Only Uganda (whose IMR actually increased during adjustment), 
Zaire, Zambia, Kenya, and Sudan saw their rates fall below 120 per 1000 live births. 
In the adjusters, Guinea, Malawi, Mali the rate was substantially above the target. to 
reach the 2000 year target Guinea would have to reduce the rate by 88 deaths per 
1000 live births, Malawi by 99 and Mali by 116. The under five mortality rate 
continues to remain unacceptably high in the region. UNICEF considers a reduction 
in the under five mortality rate in Africa to 70 per 1000 live births or two thirds the 
1990 rate (whichever is less) to be a desirable goal for the year 2000. However, for 
most adjusters this is clearly an impossible goal. Mali would have to reduce the under 
five mortality rate by an average of 19 per cent per year to reach the target level. This 
compares to a past performance of zero average annual reduction in from 1960 to 
1992. Guinea and Malawi would have to reduce the rate by an average of 14 to 15 
per cent per year to reach the year 2000 level. Sudan, Ghana, Uganda, Zaire and 
Zambia would have to reduce the rate by between an average of 10 and 13 per cent 
per annum to reach an acceptable under five mortality rate. Of the adjusters, Kenya, 
is the only country that may reach the target. There a 4.4 per cent reduction in the rate 
is required. However, given that the performance from 1980-1992 was an average 
annual reduction in the rate of 3.5 per cent, and improvements in the rate become 
more difficult as the rate falls, even Kenya may have problems. 
Advances in coming decades in improving health status will likely be hindered 
by due to a lack of sufficient funding to the social sector. None of the adjusters 
(except Kenya) will be able to reach the 2000 year target. Although, three of the 
controls have universal enrolment, enrolment levels remain low in Guinea, Niger, 
Mali and Sudan. The problem in this area is compounded to in so far as primary pupil 
teacher ratios have increased. Given the positive and powerful impact that education 
has on health and nutrition status, the lack of attention to education will hinder the 
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rate of the improvement that has been evident during the 1980s. Ghana offers an 
illustrative example. The popular press (Wall Street Journal 1994 and Financial 
Times 1993) and the World Bank (1994) compare Ghana to Malaysia and Thailand. 
Both Malaysia and Ghana obtained independence in the same year, were rich in 
natural resources, infrastructure and foreign reserves. Both countries had per capita 
incomes of about $750 in 1957. However, currently per capita income in Malaysia is 
around $2,500 a year while in Ghana it is closer to $400. The reason for the 
divergence in per capita incomes are many, however it is clear that one factor plays an 
important role. Progress in education is considered critical in ensuring continued 
growth. In this area Ghana has failed to mirror the performance of East Asia. 
Literacy is estimated at about 60 per cent in Ghana, with some estimates of functional 
Literacy as low as 40 per cent of the population. In Malaysia the literacy rate is 
closer to 80 per cent. As chapter eight demonstrated the quality of education is 
foundering in Ghana. Thus, the possibility of achieving Fast Asian growth rates and 
improvements in health status seems only a dream for the present lime. 
Thus, although the Bank and the Fund programmes appear not to have a major 
impact, either positive or negative, on health care development in Sub Saharan Africa, 
it also appears that both institutions have failed to fulfil their stated goal to improve 
living standards, basic needs and welfare in Africa. Perhaps this is excusable in the 
case of the IMF which has never had a particularly close association with 
development issues. However, in the case of the Bank, which promotes itself as a 
successful leader in the field of development, this is not so. The Bank which has a 
clear mandate to improve health care development has failed to make a noticeable 
impact on health status, health conditions and health care delivery in adjusting 
countries in Africa, and has not placed the foundations necessary to ensure continued 
progress on internationally recognised performance criteria. 
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Appendix 
Declaration of Alma-Ata 
I 
The conference strongly reaffirms that health, which is a state of complete physical 
and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, is a 
fundamental human right and that the attainment of the highest possible level of 
health is a most important world-wide social goal whose realisation requires the 
action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health sector. 
II 
The existing gross inequality in the health status of the people particularly between 
developed and developing countries as well as within countries is politically, socially 
and economically unacceptable and is, therefore, of common concern to all countries. 
III 
Economic and social development, based on the New International Economic Order, 
is of basic importance to the fullest attainment of health for all and to the reduction of 
the gap between the health status of the developing and developed countries. The 
promotion and protection of the health of the people is essential to sustained 
economic and social development and contributes to a better quality of life and to 
world peace. 
IV 
The people have right and duty to participate individually and collectively in the 
planning and implementation of their health care. 
V 
Governments have a responsibility for the health of their people which can be fulfilled 
only by the provision of adequate health and social measures. A main social target of 
governments, international organizations and the whole world community in the 
coming decades should be the attainment by all peoples of the world by the year 2000 
of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically 
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productive life. Primary health care is the key to attaining this target as part of 
development in the spirit of social justice. 
VI 
Primary health care s essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and 
socially acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible to 
individuals and families in the community through there full participation and at a 
cost that the community and the country can afford to maintain at every stage of their 
development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination. It forms an integral 
part both of the country's health system, of which it is the central function and main 
focus, and of the main overall social and economic development of the community. It 
is the first level of contact of individuals, the family and community with the national 
health system bringing health care as close as possible to where the people live and 
work, and constitutes the first element of a continuing health care process. 
VII 
Primary health care: 
1. reflects and evolves from the economic conditions and sociocultural and political 
characteristics of the country and its communities and is based on the application of 
the relevant results of social, biomedical and health services research and public 
health experience; 
2. addresses the main health problems in the community, providing promotive, 
preventative, curative and rehabilitative services accordingly; 
3. includes at least: education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods 
of preventing and controlling them; promotion of food supply and proper nutrition; 
an adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation; maternal and child health 
care, including family planning; immunisation against the major infectious diseases; 
prevention and control of locally endemic diseases; appropriate treatment of 
common diseases and injuries; and provision of essential drugs; 
4. involves, in addition to the health sector, all related sectors and aspects of national 
and community development, in particular agriculture, animal husbandry, food, 
industry, education, housing, public works, communications and other sectors; and 
demands the coordinated efforts of all those sectors; 
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5. requires and promotes maximum community and individual self-reliance and 
participation in the planning, organization, operation and control of primary health 
care, making fullest use of local, national and other available resources; and to this 
end develops through appropriate education the ability of communities to 
participate; 
6. should be sustained by integrated, functional and mutually-supportive referral 
systems, leading to the progressive improvement of comprehensive health care for 
all, and giving priority to those most in need; 
7. relies, at local and referral levels, on health workers, including physicians, nurses, 
midwives, auxiliaries and community workers as applicable, as well as traditional 
practitioners as needed, suitably trained socially and technically to work as a health 
team and to respond to the expressed health needs of the community. 
VIII 
All governments should formulate national policies, strategies and plans of action to 
launch and sustain primary health care as part of a comprehensive national health 
system and in coordination with other sectors. To this end, it will be necessary to 
exercise political will, to mobilize the country's resources and to use available 
external resources rationally. 
IX 
All countries should cooperate in the spirit of partnership and service to ensure 
primary health care for all the people since the attainment of health by the people in 
any one country directly concerns and benefits every other country. In this context 
the joint WHO/UNICEF report on primary health care constitutes a solid basis for the 
further development and operation f primary health care throughout the world. 
X 
An acceptable level of health for all the people of the world by the year 2000 can be 
attained through a fuller and better use of the world's resources, a considerable part of 
which is now spent on armaments and military conflicts. A genuine policy of 
independence, peace, de-tente and disarmament could and should release additional 
resources that could well be devoted to peaceful aims and in particular to the 
acceleration of social and economic development of which primary health care, as an 
essential part, should be allotted its proper share. 
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Source: Mahler, Halfan. 1981. The Meaning of "Health for All by the Year 2000". 
World Health Forum. 2 (1): 5-22. 
Notes: the declaration above is reproduced in full from the proceedings of the 
International Conference on Primary Health Care held at Alma-Ata in September 
1978. 
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Table A.1 International Monetary Fund Arrangements in Sub Saharan Africa 1980- 
Present 
Country Arrangement Date of Approval 
(Inception) 
Date of Expiration Ainount45,46 
Angola 
Benin ESAF 1.25.93 1.24.96 46,95047  
SAF 6.16.89 6.15.92 	 121,910 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso ESAF 3.31.93 330.96 48,620 
SAF 3.13.91 3.12.94 22,120 
Burundi ESAF 11.13.91 11.12.94 42,700 
SAF 8.8.86 8.7.89 29,890 
(SB) (8.8.86) (3.31.88) (21,000)48  
Cameroon SB 4.11.94 331.95 69,740 
SB 12.20.91 9.19.92 28,000 
SB 9.19.88 6.30.90 61,800 
Cape Verde 
Central African SB 3.28.94 3.27.94 16,480 
Republic SB 6.1.87 9.30.88 8,000 
SAF 6.1.87 5.31.90 21,280 
SB 9.23.85 3.22.87 15,000 
SB 7.6.84 7.5.85 15,000 
SB 4.22.83 4.21.84 18,000 
SB 4.10.81 1231.81 10,400 
SB 2.15.80 2.14.81 10,400 
Chad SB 3.23.94 3.22.95 16,520 
SAF 1030.87 10.29.90 21,420 
Comoros SAF 6.21.91 6.20.94 3,150 
Congo SB 8.27.90 5.26.92 27,975 
SB 8.29.86 4.28.88 22,400 
Cote d'Ivoire ESAF 3.11.94 3.10.97 333,480 
SB 9.20.91 9.19.92 82,750 
SB 11.20.89 4.19.91 175,80049 
SB 2.29.88 4.30.89 94,000 
SB 
SB 
6.23.86 
6.3.85 
6.22.88 
6.2.86 
100,0005° 
66,200 
SB 8.3.84 5.2.85 82,750 
EFF 2.27.81 2.22.84 484,500 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea ESAF 2.3.93 2.2.96 12,880 
SAF 12.7.88 12.6.91 12,88051 
SB 6.28.85 6.27.86 9,200 
SB 7.1.80 6.30.81 5500 
Ethiopia SAF 10.28.92 10.27.95 49,420 
SB 5.8.81 6.30.82 67,500 
Gabon SB 3.30.94 2.26.95 38,600 
SB 930.91 3.29.93 28,000 
SB 9.15.89 3.14.91 43,000 
SB 12.22.86 12.31.88 98,685 
EFF 6.27.80 1231.82 34,000 
The Gambia ESAF 11.23.88 11.22.91 20,520 
SAF 9.17.86 11.23.88 11,970 
SB 9.17.86 10.16.87 5,130 
SB 4.23.84 7.22.85 12,83052 
SB 2.22.82 2.21.83 16,900 
SB 11.2.79 11.1.80 1,600 
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Ghana ESAF 
SAF 
SB 
SB 
EFF (EA) 
SB 
11.9.88 
11.6.87 
11.6.87 
10.15.86 
8.27.84 
83.83 
11.8.91 
11.9.88 
11.5.90 
10.14.87 
8.2.84 
12.31.85 
368,100 
143,150 
245,40053  
81,800 
238,500 
180,000 
Guinea ESAF 11.6.91 11.5.94 57,900 
SAF 7.29.87 7.28.90 40,530 
SB 7.29.87 8.28.88 11,600 
SB 2.3.86 3.2.87 33,000 
SB 12.1.82 11.30.83 25,000 
Guinea-Bissau SAF 10.14.87 10.13.90 5,250 
Kenya ESAF 5.15.89 5.14.92 241,400 
SB 2.1.88 7.31.89 85,000 
SAF 2.1.88 1.31.91 99,400 
SB 2.8.85 2.7.86 85,200 
SB 3.21.83 9.20.84 175,950 
SB 1.8.82 1.7.83 151,500 
SB 10.15.80 10.14.82 241,50054 
SB 8.20.79 8.19.81 122,48055 
Lesotho ES AF 5.22.91 5.21.94 18,120 
SAF 6.29.88 6.28.91 10,570 
Liberia SB 12.7.84 6.6.86 42,78056 
SB 9.14.83 9.13.84 55,000 
SB 9.29.82 9.28.83 55,03057 
SB 8.26.81 9.15.82 55,000 
SB 9.15.80 9.14.92 65,00058 
Madagascar 
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5.15.89 5.14.92 76,900 
9.2.88 7.1.89 13,300 
831.87 8.30.90 46,480 
9.17.86 2.16.88 30,000 
4.23.85 4.22.86 29,500 
4.10.84 3.31.85 33,000 
7.9.82 7.8.83 51,000 
4.13.81 6.26.82 76,700 
6.27.80 6.26.82 65,00059 
Mali ESAF 8.28.92 8.27.95 60,96060 
SAF 8.5.88 8.4.91 35,560 
SB 8.5.88 10.4.89 12,700 
SB 11.8.85 3.31.87 22,860 
SB 12.9.83 531.85 40,500 
SB 5.21.82 5.20.83 30,380 
Malawi ESAF 7.15.88 7.14.91 55,800 
SB 3.2.88 5.30.89 13,020 
SAF 8.31.87 8.30.90 46,480 
EFF 9.19.83 9.18.86 81,00061  
SB 8.6.82 8.5.83 22,000 
SB 5.9.80 3.31.82 49,880 
SB 1031.79 12.31.81 26,34062 
Mauritania ESAF 12.9.92 12.8.94 3,410 
ESAF 5.24.89 5.23.92 50,850 
SB 5.4.87 5.3.88 10,000 
SAF 9.22.86 9.21.89 23,730 
SB 4.26.86 4.25.87 12,000 
SB 4.12.85 4.25.86 12,000 
SB 6.1.81 3.31.82 25,800 
SB 7.23.80 331.82 29,70063 
351 
Mauritius SB 
SB 
SB 
SB 
SB 
4.1.85 
5.18.83 
12.21.81 
9.5.80 
10.31.79 
8.31.86 
8.17.84 
12.20.82 
9.4.81 
10.30.81 
49,000 
49,500 
30,000 
35,000 
73,03064 
Mozambique ESAF 6.1.90 5.31.93 85,400 
SAF 6.8.87 6.7.90 42,700 
Namibia 
Niger SB 3.4.94 3.3.95 18,596 
ESAF 12.12.88 12.11.91 50,550 
SAF 11.17.86 12.12.88 23,590 
SB 12.5.86 12.4.87 10,110 
SB 12.5.85 12.4.86 13,480 
SB 12.5.84 12.4.85 16,000 
SB 10.5.83 12.4.84 18,000 
Nigeria SB 1.9.91 4.8.92 319,000 
SB 2.3.89 4.30.90 475,000 
SB 1.30.87 1.31.88 650,000 
Rwanda SAF 4.30.91 4.29.94 30,660 
SB 10.31.79 10.30.80 5,000 
Sao Tome and SAF 6.2.89 6.1.92 2,800 
Principe 
Senegal SB 3.2.94 3.1.95 47,560 
ESAF 11.21.88 11.20.90 144,670 
SB 10.26.87 10.25.88 21,275 
SAF 11.10.86 11.21.88 59,570 
SB 11.10.86 11.9.87 34,00065  
SB 1.16.85 6.15.86 76.60 
SB 9.19.83 9.18.84 63,000 
SB 11.24.82 11.23.83 47 25066 
 SB 9.11.81 9.10.82 63000 
EFF 8.8.80 8.7.83 184,80067 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone ESAF 3.28.94 3.27.97 88,780 
SAF 3.28.94 3.27.95 27,020 
SAF 11.14.86 11.13.89 40,530 
SB 11.14.86 11.13.87 23,160 
SB 2.3.84 2.2.85 50,200 
SB 11.2.79 11.1.80 17,000 
EFF 3.30.81 2.22.84 186,00068  
Somalia SAF 6.29.87 6.28.90 30,940 
SB 6.29.87 2.28.89 33,150 
SB 2.22.85 9.30.86 22,100 
SB 7.15.82 1.14.84 60,000 
SB 7.15.81 7.14.82 43,130 
SB 2.27.80 2.26.81 11,500 
Sudan SB 6.25.84 6.24.85 90,000 
SB 2.23.83 3.9.84 170,000 
SB 2.22.82 2.21.83 198,000 
ESAF 5.4.79 5.3.82 427,00069  
Swaziland 
Tanzania ESAF 7.29.91 7.28.94 181,900 
SAF 10.30.87 10.29.90 74,900 
SB 8.28.86 2.27.88 64,200 
SB 9.15.80 9.30.82 179,600 
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Togo ESAF 
SAF 
SB 
SB 
SB 
SB 
SB 
SB 
SB 
5.31.89 
3.16.88 
3.16.88 
6.9.86 
5.17.85 
5.7.84 
3.4.83 
2.13.81 
6.11.79 
5.30.92 
3.15.91 
4.15.89 
4.8.88 
5.16.86 
5.6.85 
4.3.84 
2.12.83 
12.31.80 
46,080 
26,880 
13,000 
23,04070 
15,360 
19,000 
21,370 
47,500 
15,000 
Uganda ESAF 4.17.89 4.16.92 179,280 
SAF 6.15,87 4.17.89 69,720 
SB 9.16.83 9.15.84 95,000 
SB 8.11.82 8.10.83 112,500 
SB 6.5.81 630.82 112,500 
SB 1.4.80 12.31.80 12,500 
Zaire SB 6.9.89 6.8.90 116,400 
SAF 5.15.87 5.14.90 203,700 
SB 5.15.87 5.14.88 100,000 
SB 5.28.86 3.27.88 214,20071  
SB 4.24.85 4.23.86 162,000 
SB 12.27.83 3.26.85 228,000 
EFF 6.22.81 6.21.84 912,0072 
SB 8.27.79 2.26.81 118,000 
Zambia (SB) (2.21.86) (2.28.88) 229,80073  
SB 4.24.85 4.23.86 162,000 
SB 7.26.84 4.30.86 225,00074 
SB 4.18.83 4.17.84 211,500 
EFF 5.8.81 53.84 800,00075 
7imbabwe ESAF 9.11.92 9.10.95 200,600 
EFF 1.24.92 9.11.9276 343,800 
EFF 9.11.92 9.10.95 114,600 
SB 3.23.83 9.22.84 300,000 
SB 4.8.81 4.7.82 37,500 
Note: SB stands for Stand-by Arrangement; EFF stands for Extended Fund Facility; SAF stands for 
Structural Adjustment Facility and ESAF stands for Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. 
Source: International Monetary Fund Annual Reports 1981-1992. 
353 
Table A.2. World Bank Structural Adjustment, Sectoral Adjustment Loans, and 
Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-present 
Country Fiscal Adjustment Operation77  Total Amount 
Year approved78  
Angola 
Benin 1991 IDA SAL: SALE 55.0 
1989 IDA SAL: SAL I 45.0 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 1994 IDA: Economic Recovery Credit 25.0 
1992 IDA SECAL: Agricultural Adjustment 28.0 
1991 IDA SAL: SAL I 80.0 
Burundi 1992 IDA SAL: SAL III: 30.0 
1988 IDA SAL: SAL II: 90.0 
1986 IDA SAL: Structural adjustment credit 15.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit I (includes 19.3 SJF) 36.0 
Cameroon 1994 IDA: Economic Recovery Credit 75.0 
IDA: Economic Recovery Credit 51.0 
IDA: Structural Adjustment Programme 50.0 
1989 IBRD SAL: SAL I 150.0 
Cape Verde 
Central African 1991 IDA SAL: SAL III 45.0 
Republic IDA SAL: SAL II 40.0 
1988 IDA SECAL: Cotton sector adjustment 15.0 
1987 SAL I 14.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit 16.0 
Chad 1994 IDA: Economic Recovery Credit 20.0 
Comoros 1991 IDA SECAL: Macroeconomic reform and capacity building 8.0 
Congo 1994 IDA: Economic Recovery Credit 100.0 
1988 70.0 
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Cote d'Ivoire 1994 IDA: Human Resources Adjustment Programme 85.0 
IDA: Human Resources Adjustment Programme 100.0 
IDA: Financial Sector Adjustment Programme 100.0 
1992 IBRD SECAL: Financial sector adjustment 150.0 
IBRD SECAL: Human rsrcs adjustment 125.0 
IBRD SECAL: Regulatory reform 75.0 
1990 IBRD SECAL: Water supply and sewerage sector adjustment 80.0 
IBRD SECAL: Agriculture sector adjustment 150.0 
IBRD SECAL: Energy sector loan 100.0 
1986 IBRD SAL: SAL III 250.0 
1984 IBRD SAL: SAL II 250.7 
1982 IBRD SAL: SAL 150.0 
Djibouti 
Equatorial 1986 SFC: Reconstruction Import Credit 4.0 
Guinea 
Ethiopia 1994 IDA: Structural Adjustment Credit 0.5 
1993 IDA SAL: Structural Adjustment 250.0 
Gabon 1994 IBRD: Economic recovery Loan 30.0 
1988 IBRD SAL: SAT., I 50.0 
Gambia 1989 IDA SAL: SALE 23.0 
1987 SAL I 5.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit 11.5 
355 
Ghana 1994 IDA: Agricultural Adjustment Credit 5.7 
1993 IDA SAL: Private investment promotion (supplement) 6.5 
1992 IDA SAL: Private investment 6.1 
IDA SECAL: Financial sector adjustment 100.0  
IDA SECAL: Agriculture sector adjustment 80.0 
1991 IDA SAL: SAL II supplement 83 
IDA SAL: Private investment promotion 120.0 
1990 IDA SAL: SAL II supplement 5.7 
IDA SECAL: Education sector adjustment II 50.0 
1989 IDA SAL: SAL II 120.0 
1988 IDA SECAL: Financial sector adjustment 100.0 
1987 SAL I 34.0 
Education sector 34.5 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit 81.0 
1986 SFC: Road rehabilitation and maintenance credit 14.0 
SFC: Reconstruction import credit II 41.0 
SFC: Industrial sector-adjustment credit 25.0 
1985 IDA: Economic recovery program 60.0 
1984 IDA: Export rehabilitation project 76.079 
1983 Reconstruction Import Credit 40.0 
Guinea 1993 IDA SAL: Structural Adjustment II (supplement) 0.1 
1990 IDA SECAL: Education sector adjustment 20.0 
1988 IDA SAL: SAL II 65.0 
1986 IDA SAL: Structural adjustment program 25.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit (includes 42.2 SJF) 59.0 
Guinea-Bissau 1989 IDA SAL: SAL II 23.4 
1987 SAL I 10.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit 5.0 
1986 SFC: Reconstruction-import credit 5.0 
1985 IDA: Economic recovery program 10.0 
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Kenya 1993 IDA SECAL: Education Sector Adjustment (supplement) 52.1 
1992 IDA SECAL: Education Sector Adjustment 100.0 
IDA SECAL: Export Development (supplement) 49.2 
1991 IDA SECAL Agriculture sector adjustment II 100.0 
IDA SECAL: Export development 673 
IDA SECAL: Financial sector adjustment supplement 44.0 
1988 IDA SECAL: Industrial sector adjustment 102.0 
1986 SFC: Agriculture sector credit 
1983 IBKD SAL: Second structural adjustment program 60.9 
IDA SAL: Second structural adjustment program 70.0 
(1980) (SAL) (55.0) 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 1993 Public-sector adjustment (supplement) 1.4 
1992 IDA SECAL: Public sector adjustment (supplement) 13 
1991 IDA SECAL: Public sector adjustment supplement 1.7 
1990 IDA SECAL: Public sector adjustment supplement 1.2 
1988 IDA SECAL: Public sector adjustment 125.0 
1987 Industry and trade 16.0 
SFC: Industry assistance credit II 66.5 
1986 SFC: Industrial assistance credit 
SFC: Agriculture-adjustment credit 
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Malawi 1994 IDA: Entrepeneurship Development and Drought Recovery 4.3 
Programme Credit 
1993 IDA SAL: Entrepeneurship development and drought recovery 
(supplement) 5.9 
1992 IDA SAL: Entrepeneurship development and drought recovery 120.0 
IDA SECAL: Agriculture Sector Adjustment (supplement) 5.2 
1991 IDA SECAL: Industry and trade adjustment supplement 7.2 
1990 IDA SECAL: Industry and trade adjustment supplement 4.7 
IDA SECAL: Agriculture sector adjustment 70.0 
1988 IDA: Industry/trade adjustment 70.0 
1987 SFC: Structural adjustment credit supplement 10.0 
1986 IDA SAL: SAL III 30.0 
SFC: SAL III (includes 39.1 in SJF) 79.0 
1984 IDA: Second structural adjustment credit 55.0 
(1980) (IBRD SAL: SAL) (45.0) 
Mali 1994 IDA: Economic Recovery Credit 25.0 
1991 IDA SAL: SAL I 70.0 
1988 IDA: Public enterprise adjustment 40.0 
Mauritania 1994 IDA: Public Enterprise Sector Adjustment Credit 1.3 
1993 IDA SECAL: Public-enterprise sector adjustment (supplement) 2.2 
1992 IDA SECAL: Public enterprise sector adjustment supplement 2.5 
1991 IDA SECAL: Public enterprise sector adjustment supplement 4.0 
1990 IDA SECAL: Agriculture sector adjustment/irrigation improvement 25.0 
IDA SECAL: Public enterprise sector adjustment 40.0 
1987 Industry Adjustment 25.0 
SAL I 15.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit 27.5 
1985 IDA: Public enterprise technical assistance rehabilitation project 16.4 
Mauritius 1985 IBRD SAL: Second SAL 40.0 
(1981) (SAL) (15.0) 
Mozambique 1994 IDA: Second Economic Recovery Programme 200.0 
1992 IDA SAL: Economic recovery 180.0 
1989 IDA SAL: Rehabilitation III 90.0 
1988 IDA: Multisector rehabilitation II 70.0 
1985 IDA: Rehabilitation project 45.0 
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Namibia 
Niger 1994 IDA: Economic Recovery Credit 25.0 
1987 Public enterprise sector 60.0 
SFC: Public enterprise adjustment 20.0 
1986 IDA SAL: Structural adjustment program 20.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit 40.0 
SFC: Transportation credit 38.0 
Nigeria 1990 IDA SECAL: University education development 120.0 
1987 Trade policy 452.0 
Rwanda 1994 IDA: Private Sector Development 12.0 
1991 IDA SAL: SAL I 90.0 
(1986) (SFC: Highway IV project) 15.0 
Sao Tome and 1990 IDA SAL Structural adjustment technical assistance 9.8 
Principe 
1987 IDA SAL: SAL I 4.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit 3.0 
1985 IDA: Economic rehabilitation and modernization project 5.0 
Senegal 1994 IDA: Economic Recovery Credit 25.0 
IDA: Transport Sector Adjustment Credit 3.7 
1992 IDA SAL: SAL IV supplement 4.7 
1991 IDA SAL: SAL IV supplement 7.1 
1990 IDA SAL: SAL IV 80.0 
IDA SAL: SAL IV supplement 4.4 
IDA SECAL: Banking/financial sector adjustment 45.0 
1989 IDA SAL: SAL III supplement 5.5 
1987 IDA SAL: SAL III 45.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit III 40.0 
1986 IDA SAL: SAL II 20.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit (includes 7.0 in SJF) 51.0 
(1980) (IBRD/IDA: SAL) (60.0) 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 1994 IDA: Structural Adjustment Credit 0.2 
IDA: Structural Adjustment Credit 50.0 
1993 IDA SAL: Reconstruction impost (supplement) 0.3 
1992 IDA SAL: Import substitute 43.1 
IDA SAL: Reconstruction Imports (supplement) 0.3 
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Somalia 1986 SFC: Agricultural inputs program I 22.0 
SFC: Agricultural sector adjustment credit 40.0 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Thnzania 1993 IDA SECAL: Financial -sector adjustment (supplement) 113 
1992 IDA SECAL: Financial sector adjustment 200.0 
IDA SECAL: Agriculture sector adjustment supplement 113 
1991 IDA SECAL: Agriculture adjustment supplement 16.1 
1990 IDA SECAL: Industry and trade adjustment supplement 103 
IDA SECAL: Agriculture sector adjustment 200.0 
1988 IDA: Multisector rehabilitation supplement 30.0 
1987 Rehabilitation Imports credit 50.0 
SFC: IVIultiseetor rehabilitation credit 46.2 
Togo 1991 IDA SAL: SAL IV 55.0 
IDA SECAL: Population/health adjustment 142 
1990 IDA SAL: SAL III supplement 0.2 
1989 IDA SAL: SAL III supplement 0.1 
1988 IDA SAL: SAL III 45.0 
1986 SFC: Structural adjustment credit II 40.0 
1985 IDA: Second structural adjustment project 27.8 
1983 IDA SAL: Structural adjustment program 40.080 
Uganda 1994 IDA: Second Structural Adjustment Credit 80.0 
IDA: Financial Sector Adjustment Credit 1.1 
1993 IDA SAL: Structural Adjustment (supplement) 1.4 
IDA SECAL: Financial sector adjustment 100.0 
1992 IDA SAL: Economic recovery II (supplement) 1.6 
IDA SAL: SAL I 125.0 
1991 IDA SAL: Economic recovery program II supplement 2.0 
IDA SECAL: Agriculture sector adjustment 100.0 
1990 IDA SAL: Economic recovery program II 125.0 
IDA SAL: Economic recovery program II supplement 1.5 
1989 IDA SAL: Economic recovery program supplement 1.7 
IDA SAL: Economic recovery program supplement 25.0 
1988 IDA: Economic recovery program 65.0 
1982 IDA: Second reconstruction program 70.0 
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Zaire 1987 IDA SAL: SAL I 55.0 
SFC: Structural adjustment credit 94.3 
1986 SFC: Highway IV project 34.0 
SFC: Industrial sector-adjustment credit 60.0 
Zambia 1994 IDA: Economic and Social Adjustment Credit 150.0 
IDA: Privitization and Industrial Reform Credit 16.8 
IDA: Second Privitization and Industrial Reform Credit 10.0 
1993 IDA SECAL: Ptivitization and industrial reform (supplement) 20.9 
IDA SECAL: Privitization and industrial reform II 100.0 
1992 IDA SAL: Economic recovery supplement 10.0 
IDA SECAL: Privitization/industrial reform 200.0 
1991 IDA SAL: Economic recovery program 210.0 
IDA SAL: Economic recovery program supplement 27.2 
1986 IDA SAL: Recovery program 50.0 
SFC: Agriculture rehabilitation credit 14.0 
SFC: Industrial reorientation credit 64.0 
Zimbabwe 1993 IDA SAL: Structural Adjustment II 125.0 
1992 IBRD/IDA SAL: SAL I 175.0 
Source: World Bank Annual Reports 1993-1982. 
Note: SAL stands for Structural Adjustment Loan, SECAL stands for Sector Adjustment Loan and 
SFC stands for Special Facility Credit. 
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Notes 
1  The countries of Sub Saharan Africa, broken down by income group, are: Low 
income (1991 GNP per capita $635 or less); Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sdo Tome and Principe, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Lower-middle income ($636-2,555) Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, GOte 
d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Namibia, Senegal, Swaziland. Upper-middle income ($2,556-
$7,910) Botswana, Gabon, Mayotte, Reunion, Mauritius and Seychelles. South 
Africa is technically part of Sub Saharan Africa, but in keeping with convention, is 
excluded from analysis. 
2 For Africa as a whole (including North Africa) Griffiths (1994: 215-16) reports that 
there have been 80 successful coups d'etat from 1950-1993 and only 50 constitutional 
changes of government. Out of 57 African states, as of 1993, 27 were led by military 
rulers. 
3  The major wars in the region are: Angola (1975 - ), Chad (1978 - ), Ethiopia (1961 
-1993), Mozambique (1977 - ), Somalia (1960 - ), Sudan (1956-72 and 1982 -), 
Uganda (1979 - ) (Griffiths 1994: 134) and Rwanda (1994 - ) 
4 Helleiner (1991: 1834): notes that the "1980 Amendment to the U.S. Bretton Woods 
Agreement Act which required US representatives to the IMF to 'take into account the 
effect...on jobs, investment, real per capita income, the gap in wealth between rich and 
poor, and social programmes such as health, housing and education, in order to seek 
to minimize the adverse impact of those adjustment programmes on basic human 
needs.' (section 33)" 
5 Factors that characterize the countries which approach the fund for assistance are 
[when compared with non-program countries (Joyce 1991)]: higher rates of domestic 
credit expansion, larger government sectors, more severe current account deficits, 
smaller reserve adequacy, and lower income levels. 
6 The United Nation publication also make a third distinction — that of economic 
reform. Economic reform includes broader institutional changes as well as changes to 
capacity and the flexibility of the economy. Here, deregulation, privatising state 
enterprises, land and tax system reforms are viewed as economic reforms. 
7 The Systemic Transformation Facility is not mentioned here. Although African 
countries that had former relations with the CMEA could avail themselves to this 
facility, it is unlikely that they would since ESAF financing is cheaper (IMFa 1993 
135). 
8Exception: Due to political pressure from the US a loan of 1.25 billion to Argentina 
in October 1988 without an IMF stabilisation package in place. Belatedly, the Bank is 
trying to cancel huge chunks of the loan. Also, exception made in the case of a loan 
to Honduras. 
9 Turkey is the only example of a country that reached this 'country ceiling'. 
10 Borrowed, here, takes on a loose meaning. For the use of IMF facilities the term 
actually refers to purchases of fund resources. For the World Bank, in most cases, it 
refers to credits granted by the International Development Association. 
11 The distinction between what constitutes a tradable and nontradable good is not 
always clear. Services are viewed as nontradable, but there are examples of grey 
areas — electricity is often traded between countries and education certainly is 
(Killick (1993: 11). However, nontradable goods can often be distinguished by some 
or all of the following characteristics: they are perishable, difficult to transport, the 
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quality of a good is higher in other countries, trade may be prohibited, and the good 
may be consumed elsewhere do to national culture and tastes (Woodward 1992 a: 83). 
Helmers (1988: 17) points out this problem. He divides industry into four 
main types; import competing, export, domestic market and home good. Import 
competing industries produce goods to satisfy the domestic demand for imports. 
Export industries produce for the export market and to satisfy home demand. 
Industries that produce for the home market produce goods for the domestic market 
but may switch to exporting if the exchange rate changes. Industries that produce 
pure home goods are those that produce goods that are not traded at all — such as 
construction. 
12 To be fair this report a.k.a the Berg Report says that dependence on a select rage of 
primary products will be disadvantageous (p.23). 
13 Potential for tax avoidance by richer members of the community (by moving 
assets abroad, etc. 
14 The Declaration of Alma-Ata is reproduced in the appendix. 
15 As of 1977 23.5 per cent of Kenyan households lived more than 8 km from a 
health facility (UNICEF 1989, 85) 
16 Note that this is a study based on a survey of users of New York City's free 
outpatient clinics and municipal departments. The findings are broadly consistent 
with other findings for developing countries, see for instance Mwabu (1989) — who 
also considers the problem of seasonality. 
17 At the time of the study government hospitals were free in Kenya, however the 
cost of transportation to them is high (Mwabu 1989: 389) so increases in income were 
likely spent on transportation. 
18 Goods C and G are assumed to be perfect substitutes. 
19 	 (1) The slope of AB represents the marginal product of labour. 
(2) VJ goods are produced, not OJ goods because it is assumed here that OV 
market goods can be purchased with non-labour income. If the household did not 
have any non-labour income then the household production function would be 
represented by a line running from point A to point T. 
20 The slope of the line DE is w/p or the real wage rate. The line is drawn from E 
because market production is only undertaken when household work drives the 
marginal product of labour down to the real wage rate. At point E the slopes of AB 
and DE are equal; that is gn = wip 
21  Assumption here is that satisfaction is only obtained through goods purchased or 
produced by labour. Satisfaction is not obtained by the act of working. 
22 The normal assumptions are made here. They are: 
(1) The family attempts to maximize satisfaction. 
(2) It faces market prices for all goods and has limited income to purchase 
them. 
(3) All income is spent on two composite goods; good x (say maize) and all 
other goods y. In order to represent all the combinations of maize and other 
goods purchasable by the family (when income is exhausted) use is made of 
the budget constraint: 
pxX + pyY = M 	 (6.1) 
Where py is the price at which all other goods may be purchased, px is the 
price at which a unit of maize may be purchased. X represents the quantity of 
food purchased and y represents the quantity of all other goods purchased. M 
is the family's income. 
Solving for Y, in order to get a geometric representation: 
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Subtract pxX from both sides to get; 
pyY = M - pxX 
	 (6.2) 
Divide by py to get; 
Y= (M/Py) - (Px/Py)X 
	 (6.3) 
Moreover, 
(4) Households have preferences (likes and dislikes) and they are: 
(a) able to rank all possible combination of one good and all other 
goods, and 
(b) they prefer more to less, and 
(c) households are consistent in their preferences. 
(5) These preferences are expressed geometrically in terms of indifference 
curves, which is the locus of points representing all the combination of goods 
and services that the household prefers equally well. Based on the principle of 
"diversity of consumption" indifference curves are shown as convex to the 
origin. Only interior solutions will be considered, although it is realised that 
corner solutions are possible with convex indifference curves (and certainly 
with concave curves). 
23 From (6.3) we have; 
Y= (M/py) - (px/Py)X, if income changes we get Y= (M2/py) - (px/Py)X; that is the 
intercept has changed, not the slope. 
24 Sahn and Sarris (1191) report that of food expenditure most expenditure goes to 
nontraded food rather than to traded foods. For example, in Tanzania 71 per cent of 
household expenditure goes on food; of which 23 per cent goes to traded foods (rice, 
maize and groundnut) and 48 per cent to nontraded foods (cassava and millet). 
25 Recourse made only in extreme circumstances. 
26 Here, look especially for an increase in informal sector activities. Note also 
possibility of household members engaging in quasi-legal or completely illicit 
activities (smuggling, prostitution, and drug trafficking, for instance. 
27 Income transfers from extended family members (to meet basic needs 
requirements), or increased use of the government aid network. For instance food 
stamps, unemployment compensation or programs to expand subsistence food 
production (home gardens). 
28 Either labour seeking migration, relief seeking migration, or migration of the entire 
family. Note here, the lumpiness of remittances may be a factor in health status 
[recipients may spend money on things other than daily requirements of children 
(Kennedy and Peters: 1992)]. The reasons behind migration are not completely clear. 
One view has it that "workers vote with their feet" and migratory decisions are 
reached by an individual alone. Another view, centred on the family, has it that 
migration occurs to smooth consumption and to achieve stable income levels in order 
to reduce risk to the family [see (Stark 1991) for a concise explanation of the different 
theories]. 
29 Known as survival strategies or buffer mechanisms. 
30 In general in the agricultural sector of Sub Saharan Africa men specialise in cash 
crops and women in food crops (World Bank 1990: 43) 
31  This analysis did not distinguish between biological, illegitimate, or foster children 
when treated. It should also be noted that the time of the study was when money was 
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plentiful. In lean times the results could be different with mothers bearing a greater 
proportion of treatment costs (p.204). 
32 Interestingly, the authors broke-down female household head into two categories: 
de jure and de facto. De facto female head-headed households are those in which the 
male is absent for more than 50 per cent of the time. 
33 Overall the book is speculative about the social consequences of adjustment and 
stabilisation measures. For instance, he posits (p. 76-78) that adjustment and 
stabilisation may lead to a breakdown in extended family structures, the nuclear 
family and crime may increase. These all have implications for changes in health 
status, the problem is there is no hard evidence to back up this claim. 
34 Namibia, Cape Verde and Seychelles are excluded from the control list due to lack 
of data. 
35 On the assumption that the relationship between time and IMR is non-linear the 
following OLS regression was run: 
logy = toga + plogt 
The R2 values were as: 
Country 
Niger 	 .84 
Guinea 	 .33 
Zaire 	 .67 
Kenya 	 .18 
Mali 	 .05 
Malawi 
	 .00 
Sudan 	 .97 
36 Data on infant mortality rate for any given country is weak. Data presented is 
based on a variety of sources. First, data is obtained from demographic surveys or 
vital-registration based estimates. The following countries had their last survey or 
data collected in (year in parenthesis): Ghana (1988), Guinea (1954-55), Kenya 
(1989), Malawi (1982), Mali (1987), Niger (1992), Sudan (1989-90), Uganda (1988-
89) and Zimbabwe (1992). Beyond these years estimates of IMR are based on 
projections or extrapolation techniques. In the case of survey or census data the IMR 
for intermediate years is interpolated or estimated from base reference statistics. 
Thus, the data should be thought of as giving an indication of the IMR in a country at 
a particular time. 
37 The analysis of other measures of infant/child mortality is hindered by a lack of 
data. There is no sufficient time series data to undertake an analysis. UNICEF (State 
of the World's Children, various) offers data on under five mortality from the early 
1980s to 1992, however there is not enough data prior to 1980 to get an accurate 
picture of the 'before' period. The World Bank (World Development Reports, 
various) report the child death rates, from ages 1-4, for 1960, 1965 and 1975 through 
1985, then the data is discontinued until the 1990 World Development Report when it 
is replaced by the under five mortality rate. The World Resources Institute (1990, 
1992) reports that the under five mortality rate for the periods 1965-70, 1970-75 and 
1985-90. 
38 Note that the World Bank, World Bank (1993), reports a higher figure of 53 per 
cent. 
39 Leechor (1994, 164) reports that by 1992 the net retrenchment of total public 
sector workers stood at 55,546. 
40 Roe and Scneider (1992) report slightly different numbers. For the very poor 34 
per cent of expenditure goes to market food and 34 per cent to home produced food. 
While for the rich expenditure in the market on food is 50 per cent and expenditure on 
home produced food is only ten per cent. 
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41  In order to give as complete a description of the changing nature of health care 
development in Ghana several different sources of data are used. As with most 
research the best way to find an answer or a solution is to put together the pieces of 
the puzzle. Research into African countries is slightly different, in that pieces from 
different boxes must be used to put together a complete picture. Given this the data in 
this section comes from six main sources (boxes): The World Development Reports 
published by the World Bank, the annual reports published by UNICEF, world health 
statistics published by the World Health Organization, the UNICEF country office in 
Accra and the FAO country office in Accra. The information obtained from the 
UNICEF office in Ghana is mainly based on Ministry of Health data. 
42 For instance, Vogel (1988, 135) provides data for 1986 and 1987 that shows that 
the 15 per cent requirement was not met. 
43 It is unclear from the World Development Report if these estimates correctly apply 
to the years in question. The Report indicates that the estimate of the IMR is not for 
the year indicated (either 1988, 1989, 1990). In this case the estimate should be equal 
to the estimate of the most recent prior year. However, this is clearly not the case. 
44US $1 = 392 cedis 
45 In thousands of SDRs. Total amount approved. Actual amount disbursed may 
differ from these figures. Undisbursed SAF amounts may, subsequently, be 
committed under an ESAF arrangement. 
46Total amount approved. Does not have to equal amount purchased. 
47 Amount increased from SDR 46.95 million 
48 Amount approved was not purchased at expiration or cancellation. 
49 Amount decreased from SDR 175.8 million. 
50 Cancelled as of February 28, 1988. 
51  Three-year commitment has expired, but annual arrangements are in effect until 
12.3.92. 
52 Arrangement cancelled on April 22, 1985. 
53 Mix of resources modified, and arrangement cancelled as of November 9, 1988. 
54 Arrangement cancelled on January 7, 1982. 
55 Arrangement cancelled on October 14, 1980. 
56 Arrangement cancelled December 6, 1985. 
57 Arrangement cancelled on September 13, 1983. 
58 Arrangement cancelled on August 25, 1981. 
59 Arrangement cancelled on April 12, 1981. 
60 Amount increased from SDR 60.96 million. 
61  Decreased from SDR 100 million. Cancelled as of August 5, 1986. 
62 Arrangement cancelled as of May 8, 1980. 
63 Arrangement cancelled as of May 31, 1981. 
64 Arrangement cancelled as of September 4, 1980. 
65 Cancelled as of September 28, 1987. 
66 Arrangement cancelled on September 18, 1983. 
67 Cancelled as of September 10, 1981 and replaced by a Stand-by Arrangement. 
68 Augmented by SDR 22.30 million in June 1981 to a total of SDR 186 million. 
Cancelled as of April 6, 1982. 
69 Augmented by SDR 227 million in November 1980 to a total of SDR 417 million. 
Cancelled as of February 17, 1982, and replaced with a Stand-by Arrangement. 
70 Cancelled as of March 14, 1988. 
71  Cancelled as of April 21, 1987. 
72 Cancelled as of June 21, 1982. 
73 Approved in 1985/86. Cancelled as of May 15, 1987. 
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74Arrangement cancelled as of February 7, 1986. 
75 Cancelled as of July 3, 1982. 
76 Cancelled prior to original expiration date of January 23, 1995. 
77 The 1994 Annual Report does not make explicit the distinction between 
adjustment operations and project loans. It is assumed that items not listed as projects 
are in fact adjustment credits or loans. 
78 In millions of US dollars (includes Special Facility for sub-Saharan Africa). 
79 Of this amount, SDR 33.9 m (US $ 35.4 million) is being provided by the Special 
Fund administered by the International Development Association. 
8° Of this amount, SDR 12.0 million (US $13.0 million) is being provided by the 
Special Fund administered by the International Development Association. 
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